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The American Political Science Review

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HOW CAN WE JUSTIFY DEMOCRACY?

H. B. Mayo
University of Western Ontario

One should say at the outset what one means by democracy. I shall keep close to historical usage by excluding the economic, social, cultural and other extended meanings, and stipulate that democracy is a type of political system. A political system in turn is composed of methods of making public policies, those policies embodied in laws, orders, agreements, understandings and "conventions," at varying levels of generality, related to government and binding upon all within the system.[1] The approach taken here is thus to classify political systems according to how public policies are made, the assumption being that different systems use different methods or, as we may say, operate on characteristic principles.

The theory of any political system consists, in the first instance, of the operating principles on which the system works. These make up what may be called the *explanatory* theory, which is of course based upon empirical data. Thus we have a political theory of communism, of democracy, and of many other systems. Each theory forms as it were a stripped model of the particular system and inevitably appears somewhat abstract, analogous perhaps to the simplified model of an economic system.

In the case of democracy the operating or institutionalized principles that are the heart of the explanatory theory, appear to me as set out in what follows. They cannot, I think, be reduced in number, even by the most rigorous demands for theoretical parsimony, though they may certainly be increased by drawing out their practical implications. And they could no doubt be arranged in a different order, depending on which feature of democracy we wished to emphasize.

I

(1) Public policies are made by representatives, on a majority rule. It is a waste of time today to consider direct democracies such as that of ancient Athens, or the New England town meeting or small face-to-face groups, if we want to understand representative democracy. Even worse, great confusion can be generated by mixing the classic premises of direct democracy with the quite different premises and conditions of representative democracy.

As to the majority rule, what is meant is simply the common practice in representative legislatures that when a vote is taken the decision of the majority prevails. We are all aware of the complications introduced by special majorities, bicameralism, federalism, the relation of the legislative to the popular majority, and the like; but we cannot expect an abstract model to describe the endless variations of particular real-life specimens. The point is that these *are* variations from what is generally regarded as a democratic principle.

(2) The representatives are elected periodically. A policy-maker or leader may of course "represent" without being elected—history is full of examples—but it can scarcely be denied today that popular election is what gives title to make policies in a democracy; it is the generally accepted type of authorization, by which policies in a democracy are accepted as rightfully made, and hence to be obeyed—if only for the time being. Even pseudo-democracies go

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[1] This definition has the defect of evading an important question, namely that of the boundaries of the system. What, for instance, is to be the unit of democracy? Should we take the municipality? the state? the nation? the world? This is one of the most difficult and least explored questions in democratic theory, and because it is seldom even asked, many political controversies—*e.g.*, over local government or national sovereignty—are unnecessarily confused. (The international political system is clearly *sui generis.*)

through the ritual of elections, thereby testifying to the almost universal acceptance of this mode of legitimation.[2] The general principles of political theory will not tell us how often elections should be held nor, what is the same thing, the tenure of representatives. A period of tenure is arrived at by exercising judgment on a number of often conflicting practical considerations. In a similar way, not the elements of theory, but practical wisdom, determines such matters as the secrecy of the ballot, method of voting, etc.

(3) Political equality of voting prevails, with the universal franchise and the familiar rule of one person one vote. We recognize this principle whenever we criticize plural and weighted voting, gerrymandering, and any electoral system or practice that distorts the political equality. As with election periods, so questions of voting age and the like connected with the franchise, are settled by practical considerations arising from experience.

(4) Elections, policy-making, and politicking in general, take place in a framework of political liberties. These political liberties—notably of speech, press, assembly and organization—are necessary to ensure a free choice of representatives, and to ensure that policies have popular support. They constitute only a sector of the wider field of traditional civil liberties and rights which may include, for example, trial by jury or religious freedom, and some of the latter may or may not happen to prevail in any given democracy at any given time. That is to say, democracies may be wise or unwise, good or bad in many of the policies which they enact and approve. No one can foretell the full consequences of his acts, and public policies even though undertaken for the best of reasons will sometimes turn out to have been wrong or mistaken. Moreover, the public in a democracy may sometimes endorse harsh treatment of minorities. To make democracy, by definition, an ideal system with ideal policies, is to destroy all possibility of understanding politics, and gives no help at all with our problem of justifying (or even defining) democracy.

A political system which operates on these characteristic principles, we may then call democracy. If fewer than all of them are present, we should not call the system democratic. (It is the absence of number (4) above that is usually noted when we dismiss the claims of the Soviet Union to be a democracy in any ordinary sense; the existence of political liberties forms a litmus test for democracy.)

The system is one which institutionalizes popular control of policy-makers; and this popular control may be called the broadest, most general, the highest-level principle of democracy, underlying and unifying the separate principles. It is not only that policy-makers are *responsive* to the public—any clever autocrat makes concessions to public sentiment; or that political authority is *ultimately* derived from the public—even the Roman Empire paid lip service to popular sovereignty; but the point is that a democracy provides the institutional machinery of popular control. As with the classical democracy of Athens, the system is thought of as a form of government, and at the same time is identified by and rigorously connected with certain specific institutions.[3] We do not imply that every democracy must push each of the principles to full application before we call the system democratic; in practice, it is a question of degree, of a system being more or less democratic in its complex of characteristics —for instance in the extent of the franchise or of the political liberties.

The operating principles can be cast in *normative* as well as neutral explanatory form. We can, that is, take each of the separate principles as moral imperatives—*e.g.*, that popular control, political liberties and political equality *should* prevail—and in their normative form the principles provide a proximate justification for the system. There is more to justification than that, or this paper could stop here and now, but enough has been said to make the point that the theory of democracy is normative as well as explanatory. In this respect a comprehensive political theory is unlike a scientific theory; the former justifies as well as explains, whereas the scientific theory does not pass moral or esthetic judgment on the motion of atoms or the behaviour of bacteria.[4] A political theory may of course explain and *condemn*—as Marxists pass judgment on capitalist democracy, or as most of us would condemn the Soviet system—but condemnation is like justifying, in that it invariably has reference to moral discourse. The distinction between explanation and justification has frequently not been made in the history of thought; to explain has been thought to justify—as in teleological explanations, or in *laissez-faire* with its appeal to the assumed fact of natural harmony, or in those theories which purport to base themselves upon a scientific or rationalistic account of human nature.[5]

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[2] Bertrand de Jouvenel apparently believes that democratic legitimacy is so widely agreed that "Argument about attribution has now, however, passed into history; the transitional period is over, and all that matters now is the realistic study of the 'what.' " *Sovereignty* (Chicago, 1957), p. 6.

[3] *Cf.* Richard Wollheim, "Democracy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 19 (1958), p. 226.

[4] By a "comprehensive" political theory I mean one which deals with a type of political system, in contrast to a "partial" theory, which may cover only a specific policy, or confine itself to empirical explanation alone, or to normative theory alone, or deal with the purposes that all political systems should pursue.

To call democracy a political system is also to say that it is a method of choosing leaders or rulers, and its full theory is thus both an explanation (by reference to institutionalized principles) of how the leaders are chosen, and a validation of that method of choice. This point of view has the advantage of giving us a ready method of classifying political systems, so that we can contrast democracy with other systems and their corresponding theories of leadership—for instance with hereditary aristocracy, or military rule, or that of Plato's *Republic*. It is not a system of registering and implementing the general or popular "will," which we might rather call Jacobinism and which could be done by a benevolent autocrat with the aid of a computing machine. There is plenty of room in the system outlined for the fact and art of leadership, the struggle for power, and the emergence of policy from the complex interplay of citizen and politician.

Everyone would subscribe to the view that the best should rule, but this gets us nowhere. The problem is how to find and agree on the credentials of the politically best, to identify such persons, to install them as rulers, to hold them accountable, to prevent their corruption by power. These are practical questions, thrust upon men by bitter experience, and are not primarily questions of philosophy or logic. Hence an important part of the justification of any political system consists of the answers it gives to the questions of leadership, questions somewhat neglected in traditional democratic theory.

II

Since history and experience are among the tests applied to judge a system, democracy too must stand on its record as well as upon its rational and moral justification in theory. In this paper, however, the empirical justification by reference to the record of democracies will not be explored. Neither will the question of empirical conditions for the success of democracy be discussed, though it too is relevant since theoretical superiority is not enough if we are to work the system and preach it to the world. (The only *caveat* one may enter is that democracy is certainly not immediately feasible all over the world. Neither for that matter is any alternative system. One should not be misunderstood on this—it has nothing to do with climatic, racial, or other determinism, but simply with conditions such as the requisite leadership, economic level, education, consensus, tradition, etc.) Neither do I propose to discuss the tendencies—whether logical or practical—for the principles and spirit of democracy to carry over from the political to other spheres, and so to become "social democracy"; nor the association of democracy with a capitalist or a socialist economy; nor questions of the psychological feasibility of democracy. These and other great questions must be put aside to concentrate upon the narrower, though surely central, questions of the logic of justification of democracy—*i.e.*, what does it mean to justify a political system and what *types* of justification can we use?

The formal, rather than the informal policy-making system will be dealt with, *i.e.*, the framework or model, not its detailed application to reality as the sociologist or group theorist, for instance, might reveal the actualities of day-to-day decision-making—the lines of power and influence; or as Marxists and others might speak of those behind the scenes making decisions or calling the tune. In judging the extent of democracy in a system we are, of course, perfectly entitled to ask how far the image corresponds to reality. Reform and opposition to reform of the system both presuppose such an inquiry. But that is not the same as constructing the model and justifying it.

Some people say that to desire explicit justification at all is a symptom of our declining belief in the "given" and of our "unhappy consciousness," and the famous flight of Minerva's owl at dusk is bound to be mentioned. Perhaps all this may be so. Certainly we do not feel impelled to justify our everyday habits and beliefs until doubts arise, and when put on the defensive we generally do seek to give reasons for our beliefs.[6] We do the same, however, when we take the offensive. A rising and confident democracy also justifies itself when challenging the *status quo*. One thinks of the democratic movement in the 19th century. I am not convinced that to want justification is a sign of decadence, or that beliefs wither when we can rationally justify them; whereas I do feel sure that to seek justification is a sign of intelligence, a perfectly proper and inevitable undertaking for man as he moves from myth to philosophy, from unexamined impulse to rational belief. Only if we take thought can we hope to take charge of our destiny.

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[5] Explanatory theory could of course take other forms—*e.g.*, it could be historical, or by reference to causality.

[6] *Cf.* F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (New York, 1957), p. 80: "All theology is the result of doubt and criticism, not of simple and childlike faith, which has at no time felt the need for it."

One method of justifying political systems seems to me quite erroneous: that of justification by origin or source. This method has sometimes been used by political philosophers to account for the institution of political society in general, where it may be valid enough, as in Aristotle's remark that "the State *comes into being* for the sake of mere life." But social contract theorists have often been tempted to justify a particular form of government by the historical or hypothetical origins of government-in-general. To use this sort of justification is to fall into something close to the genetic fallacy, which Aristotle avoided by saying that "the State *exists* for the promotion of the good life" (*i.e.*, regardless of what its lowly origins may have been). Origins neither validate nor invalidate any current beliefs or systems, any more than etymology dictates current word meanings. The genetic argument must be put aside; we are concerned with the present merits and validity of a system, and attention to its sources or origins will add nothing to its justification (though it may have lessons to teach on the conditions for the successful working of democracy).[7]

A second error is to justify a system by reference to its "intrinsic" purposes or "essence," a method which has also been common in the history of political thought. The defect here is that it is so misleading to speak of intrinsic purposes. All governments, by definition, govern, *i.e.*, carry out the minimum function of maintaining order and security, but it is purpose beyond this of which we speak. It does not seem to make sense to say that a society, state, or political system as a whole, has an intrinsic or "natural" or "essential" purpose, other than those mundane and collective purposes which are given to it by the citizens and their rulers. In some social institutions the specific purposes are to the forefront—a joint stock company for instance, or a sports club or a traffic board—but there are others such as friendship, marriage, politics and government where purpose is too limited and too rational an explanation, and where purposes (and functions) as well as procedures change from time to time.[8]

A related fallacy must also be avoided, namely, that the type of political system follows logically from a statement of the purposes it should pursue. Pick any of the great names in the history of political philosophy—Hobbes for instance—and you will find a logical gap between the purpose of government as he outlines it and the form of government which he purports to deduce. It is perhaps the commonest logical fallacy in the history of political thought. (Similar fallacies are perpetrated when we start with an intrinsic or postulated human nature and purport to deduce the political system.)

Nevertheless, when all this is said, the language of purpose (as well as of social function) must be used. We might, for instance, specify the goals that a good political system should pursue and then we could justify democracy on the instrumental ground that it can best attain these goals. This is a more modest claim than that of deducing the system from intrinsic or posited goals. And it is at first sight a very promising approach to the question of justification. For instance, justice, happiness (including liberty), and improvement, are said by one philosopher to be the three accepted goals of a good political system. Democracy is then justified by showing (not deducing) that it can more nearly reach these goals than other systems can.[9] There is no doubt that this type of argument is very common; it appeals to our deep and proper concern with the substance as well as the form; and it makes a powerful case for democracy if certain difficulties are noted and can be avoided.

The difficulties with it are: (a) All such goals —*e.g.*, happiness, peace, the good life, the common good, human dignity, the development of the personality, etc.—if they command universal agreement, are usually vague and at such high levels of generality that we can hardly say what they are until they are spelled out in intermediate and specific terms. They are so general that all can adopt them as desirable goals. It is extremely rare to find politicians or political philosophers disagreeing over their general aims. But when we get to the intermediate and more practical levels the agreement vanishes, and we find ourselves in the familiar disputes over policy that are typical of democracies, disputes that are over competing conceptions of the good as well as over means and over self- and sectional-interest. (b) Different democracies can and often do pursue different purposes, or the same democracy may pursue different purposes at different times, if by purposes we mean something as specific as the objectives of particular policies. The only common elements in all democracies are those of the system itself, and the effects upon purposes and policies which the democratic principles and procedures will have.[10] Indeed, non-democracies may also pursue many if not all of the same purposes as any given democracy. That is why it seems useless to try to distinguish forms of government by the criterion of purpose, as in the line: "Kings seek their subjects' good, tyrants their own."

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[7] *E. g.*, how we come to hold our beliefs has wide implications for education in a democracy.

[8] Some human behavior is hardly purposive at all—*e.g.*, a quarrel or even a war, which may be "*because* of something, not *for* something." We may even speak of unconscious purposes.

[9] E. F. Garritt, *Ethical and Political Thinking* (Oxford, 1947).

The meaning of democracy as stipulated above has no reference to purpose except indirectly: purposes pursued could not, except with inconsistency, conflict with the operating principles or values of the system; and of course procedures often affect the content of policies. The purposes, whether individual or common, are left to be worked out in the system itself, and that is what disputes over public policy are about: they are not simply over means to agreed ends, Maritain and others to the contrary. It is quite impossible to believe that all men are agreed, in any politically meaningful sense, on the ends or purposes they should pursue (except as noted above, in the most general and least useful sense). The democratic system gives scope for (almost) any purposes.

The assumption behind this is presumably that purposes (and results) will take care of themselves in a democracy, and this is a very large assumption indeed. Naturally there can never be a guarantee that they will do so, and a democracy may be unwise and fall, or be wicked and deserve to fall. Infallibility is not for human beings and their institutions. That the people or their representatives can do no wrong is a grotesque assumption that has no place in democratic theory, though it is often made the basis of sneering criticisms of democracy.

Several reasons account for the persistent tendency to define democracy in ideal terms: the ancient hankering that what we favour (democracy) will always be wise and right; the fact that democracy has in the course of history accumulated around it many of our best hopes for mankind, and been closely associated with many great popular reforms. Further, when we see an unpleasant reality we often define it out of sight as not "true" or "real," thereby insulating our faith and definition against shock and disillusion. But democracy does not answer all the questions of political philosophy, and certainly not the greatest of all—those concerned with "final" or "ultimate" ends.

In a very real sense the theory of democracy is not an ideology, like liberalism or socialism, say; not, that is, a body of doctrine in the grand manner dealing with the ends of government. Contemporary efforts to make democracy a kind of secular faith, an ideological substitute for religion, are I think mistaken and likely to fail. In a democracy many ideologies, many economic, social, religious and other outlooks may flourish (as indeed they do), and may do so without inconsistency so long as their principles and values are not antipathetic to the principles and values of democracy.[11] One may go deeper and say that in a sense all politics has of itself no content; it is an organizing principle, the principle of order and priorities and harmonizing; what it is *about*, what gives it content, is morality, economics, religion, education and so on.[12]

III

We can now move closer to the heart of our subject. The operating principles which make up the explanatory theory of democracy, discussed above, will not be further dealt with. Their validity is, one supposes, established by empirical investigation: Do democratic systems operate as the principles assert? Or are Marxists and others right who say that the democratic principles are a facade for class or élite rule?

What I shall discuss instead are the normative principles of democracy and the broad theory of justification in general. We may justify a democratic system in several ways.

(1) First, we may take the normative principles—political equality, etc.—as ultimate moral imperatives, as good in themselves, in-

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[10] A lesser objection to this end-means justification is that it tends to make a political system merely of instrumental or expedient value, whereas a good system is surely good for itself—though not of course unconditionally good. (Loyalty to a political system should not—probably cannot—be absolute, *i.e.*, *always* regardless of the content of policies.)

[11] Possibly Daniel Boorstin had this in mind when he wrote in *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1953), of the "un-American demand for a philosophy of democracy."

[12] *Cf.* E. Jordan, *Theory of Legislation* (Chicago, 1952), p. 73 and Ch. 7.

trinsically good. Or we could take as our ultimate (our most general, basic and unifying principle) that there ought to be popular control of policy-makers; and if we grant this we could then accept the separate principles which are listed, as instrumental to that end. These might not follow in strict deductive logic, but we should be practically committed to their incorporation in some such machinery.

Some may call this method of justification an appeal to self-evidence or intuition; it is fashionable nowadays to despise both, and with considerable reason. There is clearly such a thing as a climate of opinion, a way of thinking of an age, and hence the kind of belief that one age finds self-evident or obvious seems doubtful to another. Even when we give reasons in support of a principle, the reasons that one age or culture finds convincing leave another cold. Nothing is quite so dead as obvious or self-evident truths which have ceased to command belief.

Since self-evident principles and moral beliefs —except again when they are very general or "high order"—appear to vary so much from age to age and place to place, some people dismiss them altogether and say that one is as good as another. While self-evidence is not a guarantee of truth—but of usage—the conclusion that one belief is as good as another is not one that necessarily follows from the varieties of moral experience.

Very often no doubt, our final choices of belief or of action at the end of the longest possible deliberative process, are of values which we make intuitively or call self-evident. Somewhere choice, like philosophy, must have a stop. But this is not to say that our choices are quite arbitrary and capricious, still less that they are all trivial preferences which we can shrug off as a matter of taste. We all come sometime to the *hier stehe ich*, some things are just right or wrong, however powerful the case against us, however weak our own case.

One is aware that this may be a dangerous ground of argument, justifying even the whirling dervish in his fanatical error; but it is also rich and fertile ground, often giving rise to and justifying the best in our heritage, for instance, belief in the rights of man. It was this kind of argument which condemned racial inequality long before the biologists could show scientifically that there were no inherent human differences between men of different shapes and colours.

Still, there are those who will incline to distrust this method of argument (as I do myself because it tends to make democracy an absolute value), and who may simply reject the principles of democracy as ultimates. If they are regarded as imperatives or "stop signs," reasons are wanted why they are so regarded.

One immediate lesson follows, however, regardless of our opinion on self-evidence, namely, that to make a convincing case for a political system we have to put it in terms of the unexpressed assumptions of the age, the climate of opinion and belief to which we speak. No political case would go far today that did not take account of the scientific, urban, and industrial environment. Even cognition, though taking place inside the individual head, is social and affected by others. How much more so are our thinking and beliefs about politics. And this is highly relevant to any effective justification of democracy. In fact it makes our task easy, perhaps too easy. Being soaked in the attitudes and beliefs of democracy, the man on the street often believes in democracy for the most feeble of reasons. It is our job, as political philosophers, to see whether a case can be built which will stand critical analysis.

(2) The second method then is to make out a case for the separate and the underlying principles, giving arguments and reasons. The method here is to take the principles of popular control, political equality, majority policy-making, etc., and examine them in detail, weighing the pros and cons of each argument.[13] Such a proceeding has some resemblance to the cases which are heard daily in the law courts, where the evidence is not conclusive, but a decision has to be made that will satisfy the "reasonable man." It resembles even more the usual debates over public policy, which involve judgments on not only facts and expectations, but also on moral principles. (Something more is said on this below.)

Behind the democratic system there clearly lies an assumption, perhaps many assumptions, about the nature of politics. Just as our criteria of reality help to determine what reality is, so our definition of politics inevitably forms part of our justification, and should therefore be made explicit. In ancient Athens, for instance, the assumption of the democrats was that politics was not an expert skill, like navigation, but something in which all were equally competent. (Plato's view was the opposite, and so he argued that only a few were fit to rule.)[14]

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[13] As in my *Introduction to Democratic Theory* (New York, 1960), Chs. 5 to 8.

[14] Just as we cannot call upon all the arguments for a direct democracy to support a representative system, so the latter is immune from some of the criticism aimed at the former—*e.g.*, that of mob rule. Our problem is less that of the psychology of crowd behaviour than of mass manipulation.

Whatever the validity of this assumption for a direct democracy, we cannot use it in a representative democracy; and fortunately do not require it since deciding policies directly, and choosing the rulers, are two different—though some would call them related—skills.

There are many tricky problems here. One could still ask the question whether the common man can in fact judge his rulers wisely. When we put it that way we have at the back of our minds the old idea of the intelligent, informed, impartial voter deciding policy. We are then naturally driven back to consider some kind of test for "fitness" to vote, and we land in a bog of controversy about how we test the political wisdom of the voter. Voting is certainly not a scientific method of ascertaining political wisdom in the rulers, still less of finding wise policies; but there is *no* such scientific method open to man.

We must, I think, forget about tests of "fitness" to vote (or to rule), and fall back upon the nature of democratic politics; the parties, leadership and liberties which screen the candidates and find the political wisdom a system needs. Democracy then stands on the ground that periodic election and popular control of leaders (policy-makers) is likely to result in better rulers and policies than alternative methods. If we reject this, we are committed, like Plato, to some other method of identifying minority rulers and validating their rule.

In a direct democracy again, the argument of the democrat is that each citizen is the best judge of the public interest in making policy. Once again, in a representative system we do not require this assumption to the same extent, since the voters do not make policies. It will, however, be required to *some* extent, since presumably some policies (issues) will be judged by a proportion of voters on election day, and there will be some connection however indirect and complex between public opinion and policies. Being marked by popular control, and compelled to defer to the voters, democracy will have a tendency to bias government towards the popular interests. (Other tendencies work in other directions.) The notion of political feasibility reminds us that the democratic politician must carry the public with him. There is plenty of room in a democracy for political wisdom, and knowledge of the *summum bonum*, but it must be wedded to political persuasion.

Instead of assuming that the ordinary citizen is a competent judge of the public interest, the defender of a direct democracy could argue, for example, that the public good emerges almost automatically from the struggle over private interests, and that each is the best judge of his own interests. I do not recall ever having seen this argument put forward on behalf of ancient Athens. Something very like it is, however, put forward by interest-group theories of politics today, which thus give us a kind of corporate political version of *laissez-faire*. All equilibrium theories of politics make use of the same argument, which may not be quite as foolish as it sounds; but in any case we do not need it. We must fall back again upon the nature of democratic leadership, upon the debate and discussion, the complicated interplay of politician and public. The result is never an automatic equilibrium, but one that is constantly worked out afresh by the conscious efforts of many participants.

A completely sceptical argument for democracy may also be constructed: since no one really knows where the "true" interests of the individual or community lie, everyone ought to have a chance to help choose the rulers, and policy can do no better than go by the majority, just because it is a majority and as likely to be right as a minority.[15] Again, one need not stake anything on this argument—though it might have its appeal, at certain times and places.

(3) The third method is to justify by reference to the social and individual values realized by the democratic system. To take this approach is to trace the logical or practical consequences of the system—the values actually realized in any working democracy, even though they may not have been the purposes for which democracy was set up or which it keeps always before it. Good results are, in some moral theories—*e.g.*, utilitarianism—the *only* moral justification, and while not going so far, nearly all would agree they are *some* justification. It would be an odd social or political theory that entirely ignored results. This type of justification (similar in its ends-means structure to that mentioned earlier) is very common, and certainly powerful; so much so that many people would regard it as quite sufficient.

Among the social values realized by democracy are: the peaceful adjustment of the disputes and conflicts that exist in any society (by treating conflict and the struggle for power as legitimate—even creative—and providing for its settlement); the closely related adaptability and peaceful social change (particularly necessary in a world of rapid technological and social change); and the peaceful and orderly succession of rulers. Many political philosophies have concerned themselves with prescribing ways to these high ends, and consequently in achieving them democracy, whatever its defects, may easily be regarded as superior to alternative systems. Judge Learned Hand put it thus: "For, abuse it as you will, it gives a bloodless measure of social forces—bloodless, have you thought of that?—a means of continuity, a principle of stability, a relief from the paralyzing terror of revolution."[16]

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[15] *Cf.* Wollheim, op. cit. This argument also was not used by the Athenians.

To these commonly accepted values we may add: it is the system—other than anarchy, which is hardly a live option—with the minimum of coercion (not so much because the majority is presumed to favour every policy, as that policy emerges from discussion and pressure in which all may share); the promotion of diversity (which like knowledge or self-control is not unconditionally good, but good so far as it goes); the self-correctibility in the attainment of justice (a political system cannot guarantee that injustice will not be committed—an impossible political ideal—but democracy provides the means of redress); the political freedoms and rights which tend to "grow" into non-political fields. Other values, such as the promotion of science, may also perhaps be added. One does not maintain that every democracy is always successful in real life in turning up these results, but that they are, so to speak, built into the logical structure of democracy, which also provides the institutional means to their realization.

One may also think of individual values, such as the promotion of rational methods of thought, or regard free participation in politics and governing as a kind of moral self-education for the citizen—an argument as old as Aristotle. (Because of the free participation there is incidentally a wider range of leaders to draw from.) The effect upon citizens will always be one test of a political system. In general our mode of justification here is to look at the image of human nature, the qualities or characteristics regarded as admirable—*e.g.*, independence, rationality, sympathy, tolerance, etc.—and to show that these are the qualities promoted and presupposed by democracy. A similar kind of justification is used by those—T. H. Green and others—who argue in terms of "maximum self-realization" and the like.

As with the separate principle, these systemic and resulting values may be taken as ultimates, and since some of them command nearly universal approval—*e.g.*, peaceful succession—this method of justification carries much weight. But it would not of course carry any weight with one who rejected the values concerned.

(4) Again, as with the separate principles, we might go further and deeper and build a rational-empirical-moral case for the resulting values, and only then show that democracy best realizes them. Unlike the economist, the political philosopher cannot rest content with taking social and individual values as given, and confine himself to talking of "maximum net goal achievement." His view of rationality must be broader than the economists' means-ends definition; he must examine ends as well as means because they are always mixed together in politics.

Alternatively, the resulting values of democracy (peaceful change, diversity, means of redress, etc.) could be regarded as procedural or intermediate values, instrumental to more general values agreed upon alike by the democrat and his critic. If there is no such agreement, justification along this line is of course impossible.

(5) We may try to give the principles and values of the system support in philosophy. The mere mention of this raises at once the whole vexed question of the relationship of philosophy to political theory.

There are, to begin with, two conflicting and extreme views on the relationship. The *first* of those is that a close logical relationship invariably exists, so that we could by working out the implied ultimates in, say, metaphysics and epistemology, take our political theory back to a point of philosophic truth or falsehood; and conversely, from a philosophic position by a process of deduction we could arrive at the principles of a political theory. It follows, if this view is correct, that the theory of democracy might find support in a sound philosophy, and that unsound political theories could be exposed by showing their unsound philosophic basis.

The *second*, and conflicting view, is that philosophy has no necessary or close logical connections with a political theory, although admittedly the two may be associated in the same mind (that is, there may be psychological connections), or may go together in the same historical period (that is, the relation may be historical and more or less accidental). If the relationship is of this adventitious kind, it follows that democracy can find no support in philosophy.

Adherents of the first view argue that philosophic "absolutism" leads to autocracy; but strangely enough others argue that philosophic (or moral) "absolutism" is the necessary foundation of democracy. We are also given arguments that each of a rational philosophy, an empiricist epistemology, relativism, scepticism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, positivism, dialectical materialism and perhaps other philosophies supports (or undermines) democracy. The mind reels in the conflict of charge and counter-charge, and linguistic analysis comes along with the *coup de grâce* that no philosophy can provide a foundation for any political system, because that is not the sort of job that philosophy is equipped to do.

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[16] *The Spirit of Liberty*, ed. Irving Dillard (New York, 1959), p. 76.

Plainly we have here a good deal of confusion and arguing at cross purposes. The debate is so heated that at times one wonders whether anybody listens to his critics. The relationship is probably extremely complex, if it can generate so much disagreement by good and able men, most of them only too anxious to defend what they understand by democracy.

IV

How are we to disentangle the threads and and weave a valid answer? It is impossible to examine each case of alleged relationship in a short space, so I can only state my position with desperate brevity.

For one thing, the attempts to prove the logical relationship, by classifying philosophers and schools as, say, absolutist and relativist and noting the correlation of philosophic beliefs with authoritarian or democratic political beliefs, are a long way from being convincing. The lines are blurred because democracy has not been a live issue, or a real alternative, throughout most of history, and the best that can be done is to say that the emphasis in the thought of this or that philosopher lay in the general direction of what today would be called democratic ideas. Further, the citing of persons is not conclusive because people may be inconsistent: men are often better than their philosophy—perhaps fortunately so.

For another, if the arguments for a close logical relationship from philosophy to political theory (and *vice versa*) are examined closely, they turn out in fact not to be arguments for the deductive relationship at all. The first impression given, it is true, is of such a relationship; but in the actual arguments one invariably finds a "toning down" of the tight connection. Russell, to take a typical case, argues that it is the "temper of mind" of empiricism that favours democracy—a quite different statement, which may or may not be true. "Temper of mind" is not deduction or logical implication. Kelsen, too, backs away from a rigorous connection and uses the looser language of "tendency."

The close deductive relationship between philosophy and political theory (and *vice versa*) is extremely uncommon, if not non-existent. (One is aware that if a political ingredient is inserted into the premises, a political conclusion may be drawn, but this is already to re-define "philosophy," and make it political). Political and everyday reasoning is rarely deduction from philosophical or general premises; chains of syllogistic reasoning, while they exist here and there, are short and disconnected.[17]

There is undoubtedly a tendency for bodies of thought to cluster or "hang together" so that philosophic, educational, economic, religious and other beliefs all as it were buttress each other. That is why, for instance, we study political activity in the context of other beliefs. It would make little sense to study the political thought and activity of the Puritans without noting their religious beliefs; though this admittedly is an extreme case. Moreover, we (*i.e.*, some people, sometimes) do consciously try to bring order and consistency to our varied beliefs, and are not content to weld them together by our tastes and personalities. (In a sense every philosophy tries to explain everything, by a kind of Parkinson's Law of Ideologies.) But although we sometimes try to integrate our life with our metaphysics, and our different belief systems, the amount of logic or intellectual satisfaction demanded varies greatly among both philosophers and the unlearned.

If, like the Athenians, we treat government as a practical matter and defend democracy by listing its advantages, we do not come very close to philosophy. More precisely, perhaps, democracy may be combined with a variety of technical philosophical (*i.e.*, metaphysical and epistemological) views. Political theory and philosophy occupy different territory. Even though we read into nature or reality (or history or experience) a moral component, at the most we can draw a conclusion which is relevant to our political theory. But though relevant, moral principles alone do not determine policy and still less a political system.

We can draw satisfaction from the looser connection of philosophy with politics: the great advantage is that we can all be democrats before we come to the end of the restless search for agreement on cosmic ultimates. As suggested earlier, even though we approach politics with a conception of the purpose or end that should be served, we still cannot deduce the political system, and can therefore accommodate our ultimates to a democracy that can be valued for instrumental reasons; as Acton agreed with Mill on liberty, though for quite different reasons. We may believe with Plato that Justice rules through every part of the cosmos and still stop short of his other belief that the political order can and should imitate it.

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[17] *Cf.* Stephen E. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge, 1958). It seems to me that some "natural" law reasoning falls into the error of suggesting that reaching a moral decision is a matter of drawing a correct conclusion by a chain of deductive reasoning from a general moral principle; whereas we weigh evidence and arguments and then make a choice what to do. To make a decision or judgment is much more than deductive reasoning.

Why is it that the ethical relativist and the ethical absolutist may both be at home in a democracy? And if different moral philosophies can lie down together in one political system, then *a fortiori* general philosophies can do so. The reason is that politics is a practical art—its function is to arrange priorities and harmonize interests. Policies are usually if not always compromises, mixing many elements; seldom if ever ideal or a choice of good and evil; where they are moral then they are not *only* moral, and sometimes their connection with moral principles is slender or accidental. Political controversy is legitimate and normal even when we agree on moral principles. Policies are a matter of judging the components, not of applying a single standard like a yardstick. Short of abolishing politics, only relative justice is attainable, and hence political relativism does not imply moral relativism. Nor are public policies simply like private actions. Hence a knowledge of moral principles is not a guarantee of political wisdom—which explains why good men are often poor politicians, and personally bad men good politicians. Though politics "may indeed sometimes centre in a moral emphasis, political and moral argument are essentially different things."[18]

The integration or inter-relatedness or "hanging together" of general and moral philosophy with political theory which we often find, is a loose kind of relationship, the only strictly logical part being that of compatibility, the usefulness of which is very limited. We must, that is, not define logic or even intelligence too strictly when we look for connections between human beliefs. There are, then, relationships that are loosely logical and rational, and people go too far who assert that they are only psychological or historical. But because relationships are loose, we never settle our political problems by a resort to philosophy.

If all this is granted we can more easily avoid the "hedgehog error"—the belief that we can discover one great principle, one unifying thought or vision that will unlock the mysteries of the universe and from which we can deduce everything else. We can not, in the present state of our ignorance, make a purely logical synthesis of human knowledge that will stand the cutting edge of analysis.

> Our elders were (and some of them still are) full of hopes and ambitions of achieving a 'synthesis' of knowledge; science, religion, art, the practice of personal and political life were to become an orderly pattern, dominated by an agreed philosophical outlook. But it looks as if we were becoming increasingly conscious of diversities and discontinuities in our worlds of thought and experience. . . . The real problem is that our diverse worlds of thought do not make sense as a coherent unity, and probably cannot and will not do so for some time to come.[19]

This being a frustrating state of affairs, men turn in many directions to find a forcible synthesis or unity, and others give up philosophy altogether for the analysis of language or for existentialism. As for me, my position is that the debate is still open—as it is on other great questions, such as the metaphysics of science and its relevance, if any, for human life. The very vexations of the unsettled debate over philosophy and political theory emphasize the importance of keeping the channels open for all contributions, and this forms in itself no small justification for democracy and its concomitant liberties and public discussion. (This would not be a justification however, for those who believe they already have Truth, but instead the political question would be—as it was for Plato—to trace out the obligations of their premises.)

V

Finally, part of the defence of democracy will always rest upon the deficiencies of alternative systems. This will always be a cogent defence, since intelligent action presupposes that we understand, compare, and appraise alternatives.[20] As a defence it gains strength too from the consideration that our choice is never between ideal systems: if we do have a choice it is between democracy and accepting the credentials of some type of self-appointed minority rulers.[21]

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[18] Aurel Kolnai, "The Moral Theme in Political Division," *Philosophy*, Vol. 35 (July, 1960), p. 237. It is also true that a knowledge of moral principles is often not a sufficient guide to personal duty in concrete situations—indeed the whole subject of casuistry (in its original sense) takes its *raison d'etre* from this very difficulty; hence too a partial reason why moral philosophers are often no better than anyone else: knowing the rules and knowing how to apply them (to say nothing of being motivated to apply them) are different things.

[19] Dorothy M. Emmet, *Function, Purpose and Powers* (London, 1958), p. 219.

To paraphrase F. W. Maitland slightly, one could say that the most powerful argument for democracy is based on the necessary ignorance of our masters. This—like the arguments drawn from the historical record of democracy and of other systems—will always be persuasive, because most of the problems of politics are practical, not philosophic. Politics arise from life, not logic. Bryce once wrote, in *Modern Democracies:* "The facts and forces that have created Popular Government are partly of the Practical and partly of the Theoretic order." And the same is true of the total justification of democracy, or indeed of any other political system or public policy.

It is at this practical point that philosophers from Plato onwards have been weak, with their belief that the (politically) best could be found, their rule validated and accepted, and their character remain incorruptible by office; and after all it is this belief, sublime often, naive always, that alternative systems, without political liberties and periodic elections, ask us to approve. It is too tall a story for us, the disillusioned generations.

It is at this point too, that democracy is so strong: it implies and institutionalizes a distrust of those with power, by offering them competition and criticism, and by providing for their removal. That is why Niebuhr's defence will always be a good one: "man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." The same mixture of hope and pessimism, of idealism and realism, is found in James Madison and his view of human nature. It is an appropriate outlook for democrats, avoiding cynicism on one side and Utopianism on the other.

The total justification for democracy is thus a mixed case, combining the rational, the factual, the moral.[22] Being mixed, it compels all of us, if we want to defend democracy, to be both political scientists and political philosophers. To make such a case, to come down on the side of the weight of the evidence and the argument, involves much more than avoiding logical fallacies, or special pleading, or the rationalisation of personal preferences. There is both valid and invalid reasoning about political systems as in every type of discourse, and each has its appropriate criteria, and canons of evidence.[23]

Problems still remain, even when we have made the most comprehensive justification, and ranged over territory not explored in this paper.[24] For one thing, justification is not proof, not a conclusive demonstration, after which we can write Q.E.D. as after a theorem in Euclid, nor yet one that gives a measurable probability of truth as in much of science. It is not proof or statistical probability because it always depends upon values. The case does not compel belief but favors it. It is a matter of judgment—of weighing imponderables, of decision and choice—and there are no rules for this except in the routine case.

We may never know for certain that our political theory and system are the best, but we are better able to establish that others are worse. In this perhaps we are not very different from the natural scientists in many fields. Justification, like explanation or even description, is selective and always incomplete. In any event, however provisional our case for democracy, it must serve well enough to act upon.

For these reasons not everyone will be convinced; the democrat may not convince his adversaries but he may make disciples. Not everyone will accept the values which the democrat holds, and some of those who do accept them might argue they are better realized in some other system. We may apply to democracy, perhaps, what Pascal said of the argument from design: Nature proves God only to those who already believe in Him on other grounds.

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[20] *Cf.* F. H. Knight, *Intelligence and Democratic Action* (Harvard, 1960), p. 145.

[21] Possibly we could add as a further argument the impracticability of other systems: "... under modern conditions it is the only working possibility. No member of an emancipated industrial society will put up with political tutelage," Wollheim, *op. cit.*, p. 242. (The last remark is however excessively optimistic, even false.)

[22] *Cf.* Douglas N. Morgan, "On Justifying Political Action," *Ethics*, Vol. 71 (October, 1960), pp. 1–13.

[23] *Cf.* Stephen Toulmin, *Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 67–101. *Cf.* also Florian Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (New York, 1940), p. 189, "... the choice between any given theories is (not) subjectively arbitrary. For there are objective standards by which inductive theories can be compared and their relative validity estimated. Of two theories, A and B, bearing on the same empirical field, if B solves all the problems A has solved and also other problems which A could not solve, B is superior to A in theoretic validity, both from the rational and from the empirical point of view."

[24] It will be observed that I have not attempted defences of democracy in terms of theology, religion, natural law, natural rights, psychology, economic progress, etc.

So we can say that acts of faith may be demanded. But again the same is true with respect to any political system, and as for me, democracy strains my credulity less than do the alternatives. So, but not perhaps in a religious sense, we come in the end to a "justification by faith" or, as it is sometimes put, to those ultimate beliefs and ideals which we cannot wholly validate by rational means (though they are not thereby irrational). Machiavelli wrote wisely when he said in his *Discourses:* "There are in fact many useful truths of which a wise man will have knowledge without their having in themselves such clear reasons for their being so as to be able to convince others."

VALUES AND INTERESTS*

VERNON VAN DYKE
University of Iowa

Most political scientists concern themselves in one way or another with *values* and *interests*. References to *values* are ubiquitous in the literature, and one need only cite such terms as interest groups, the public interest, the common interest, and the national interest to recall the frequent reference to *interests*.

The two words have already been discussed a great deal.[1] Even so, there is considerable confusion about their meaning and about the interrelationships of their meaning. Rather than serve as effective tools for incisive analyses, they frequently lead into intellectual traps; and rather than serve as clear symbols for communication, they frequently lead to misunderstanding. These difficulties have been especially great in the field of foreign affairs, where so much has been made of the concept the *national interest*.

My aim here is to search for greater conceptual clarity, and to identify the roles that scholars and others can properly play in relation to various sorts of values and interests; at the same time I hope to show that some of the conceptions that have been employed in discussing the national interest and interest groups have shortcomings both in terms of their clarity and in terms of the role that they permit scholars to play. I propose first to establish a perspective from which values and interests can be viewed—a perspective that makes the two words virtually synonymous and enables them to be discussed in terms of means and ends, or of causal or functional relationships. Next I propose to examine the epistemological bases for knowledge about values and interests, indicating how they can be identified or calculated or clarified, whether for practical or for analytical purposes. And finally I will point out what seem to be weaknesses and difficulties in conceptions of *interest* advanced by Hans Morgenthau and the Bentleyans. A clearer and more useful meaning of the term, and a clearer and more useful role for scholars, will, I hope, emerge.

I. SEQUENTIAL AND HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIPS

It is a common feature of the words *values* and *interests* that they apply to items in a series, like rungs on a ladder or links in a chain; more broadly, they apply to a sequence of stages or states. A value may be endorsed either for its own sake or because it contributes to a second value; the second may be endorsed either for its own sake or because it contributes to a third; and so on. One interest may be pursued because it is held to be inherently or intrinsically worth pursuing; or it may be pursued because it is thought to promote the achievement of another interest.

In many cases this is not an "either-or" proposition. A value or interest may be endorsed *both* because it is thought to be self-justifying *and* because its promotion may contribute to a second value or interest; the second may be endorsed for a similar mixture of reasons; and so on.

Thus health in a given city may contribute to health in the country, which may contribute to greater productivity, which may contribute to greater power, which may contribute to greater security, which may contribute to the survival and development of the social order, which may contribute to human dignity and liberty. Each item in the sequence might be judged good in itself or good because it contributes to the next item, or good for both reasons.

Various terms are used to describe this situation. Especially if the reference is to purposes or ends or objectives or interests, they are likely to be classified as "immediate," "intermediate," and "ultimate," or perhaps as "proximate" and "remote" or "ulterior." Dahl and Lindblom classify goals as "prime" and "instrumental";[2] if values and interests are thought of as goals, they too can be classified as prime and instrumental. Harold Lasswell and others speak of "goal values," which suggests the term "instrumental values." Ralph Barton Perry classifies values and interests into categories labelled "independent" and "dependent."[3] His focus is on the "independent" value or interest, *i.e.*, on the far end of the series—on the goal value that is regarded as desirable for its own sake; presumably this value is freely chosen and therefore "independent." Given the "independent" value or interest, "dependent" values or interests remain to be selected, and they are selected at least in part on the basis of their utility or desirability as instruments. This use of the terms independent and dependent is implied in every day usage. For example, if the question is whether it is in the American interest to build up its armed power, the answer might be that *it depends* on the prospect that more armed power will promote greater security. If it will, then the enhancement of armed power may be a dependent interest.

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[1] *Cf.* Ethel M. Albert, Clyde Kluckhohn, *et al.*, *A Selected Bibliography on Values, Ethics, and Esthetics in the Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, 1920–1958* (Glencoe, 1959); and Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest, A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept* (Glencoe, 1960). See also Philip E. Jacob and Jame J. Flink, "Values and Their Function in Decision-Making," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 5, Supplement (May, 1962), pp. 5–38; this thoughtful and stimulating study became available after I had completed the present article.

[2] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1953), p. 26.

Obviously, if a value is instrumental it can also be called a means or method. Similarly, an immediate end or objective may be pursued as a means of promoting the achievement of another end farther along in the series. A dependent interest is championed as a means of promoting an independent interest. In any series of these sorts everything leading up to the end can be thought of as means.

In place of means and ends, some prefer to speak of *conditions* and *consequences*. Under this usage conditions are analogous to means, and consequences are analogous to ends—or at least the consequences are farther along in the series and may be thought of as ends. In other words, instrumental values and goals, immediate ends, and dependent interests may all be thought of as analogous to *conditions* through which or on the basis of which *consequences* come about.

The idea of a series in all of the above usages suggests the idea of cause and effect. In so far as anything is instrumental, it is—or is analogous to—a cause. If the goal-value is American security, armaments of certain sorts have instrumental value and can be thought of as a condition or cause of security. If the prime goal of a person is to live, food becomes an instrumental goal and can be thought of as a condition or cause of survival. Achievement of a dependent interest in being elected Governor may operate as a means or a condition or a cause in bringing about the achievement of the independent interest—election as President. In any process comprising a sequence of states, features of each state may be thought of as causing the development of the next succeeding state.

Instead of using any of the above sets of terms, some describe the factors that are relevant to any development as variables, and they are likely to classify variables as dependent or independent, just as Perry classifies interests. But in the two contexts the meanings of the words get reversed, an independent variable being analogous to a cause and a dependent variable being analogous to an effect. In truth, however, those who speak of variables commonly speak of functional rather than causal relationships, dependent variables being functions of independent variables.

Quite apart from their sequential relationships, values and interests also fall into hierarchical relationships. This implies the obvious point that values and interests do not all fit on the same means-ends chain. Rather, different sorts of values and interests belong on different chains, some of which are likely to intersect. Sometimes pursuit of values in one series may interfere with pursuit of values in another series; *e.g.*, a government that seeks both higher scales of living and greater military power may have to make a choice, at least of emphasis. It can perhaps keep the conflict at a minimum by finding measures that promote both values simultaneously or by identifying different areas of activity in each of which one of the values can be pursued without adverse effect on the other. But where conflict exists, a choice is likely to have to be made, effective for a shorter or a longer period.

There is a reference above to the possibility of considering values and interests as goals. Let this possibility now be stressed. When we use the language of means and ends, we say that means can themselves be ends and that ends can be means. Both means and ends can be goals. The goal of a student may be to get credit in a course as a means of achieving another goal or end—graduation from college. When we speak of conditions and consequences, we can also say that the creation of certain conditions is a goal, sought as a means of achieving another goal, *i.e.*, the consequence. When we speak of causal or functional relationships, similar statements are possible. A goal can be defined as an event that an actor plans or seeks to bring about or prevent, or a state of affairs that he plans or seeks to establish, maintain, or change.

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[3] Ralph Barton Perry, *Realms of Value, A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 79.

II. CRITERIA OF CLASSIFICATION

The fact that the words values and interests apply to items in a series or to links in a chain (or network of chains) suggests difficulty when it comes to classification. By definition, the final item in a series or the final link in the chain represents a "goal value" or "independent interest." But, as a normative matter, is there any objective or scientific way of determining which items or links—which goals—should be ultimate? As a descriptive matter, are there ways of determining which goals are in fact ultimate for given actors, or are treated as if they were? If so, on what basis and within what limits? Is there a reasonable basis on which the scholar can classify values or interests simply for analytical purposes, even if his classification cannot be validated or cannot be shown to reflect reality in any way?

Similar questions can be asked concerning the hierarchical relationships of values and interests. If a conflict exists between what are admittedly goal values or independent interests, is there an objective way of determining which is the more important?

The question whether there is an objective way of validating goal values has been debated especially. The issue is the old one concerning the relationship between fact and value, between the is and the ought. No one has yet succeeded, and it seems unlikely that any one will succeed, in developing a reliable method of determining what ought to be for its own sake—what is self-justifying. As Perry says,

> There do not appear to be any interests that are inherently independent rather than dependent. The basic biological interests may play either role: one may live to eat and drink or eat and drink to live. Games may be played for themselves or for money. Even self-preservation may be a dependent interest; otherwise there would be no meaning in the question, What is it that makes life worth living?[4]

Similarly, a candidate for office may champion certain principles in order to win an election, or may seek to win in order to champion the principles. And self-preservation is no more a categorical imperative for a corporate entity (*e.g.*, a nation-state) than it is for an individual human being. The simplest statement, and apparently a correct one, is that, consciously or not, actors assume or postulate the goal values or independent interests that guide their behavior—sometimes seeking to justify themselves by references to alleged natural law or to religious injunction. If they try to prove the validity or rightness of goal value "A" (other than by an appeal to faith), they apparently can do it only on the assumption that it is a means of promoting goal value "B," and this automatically forces the consideration of "A" as an instrumental value.

The second question—whether as a descriptive matter there are ways of determining which goals are in fact ultimate for given actors—offers somewhat greater possibilities, but nevertheless here too there are difficulties. The fact is that people rarely proceed on the basis of a well considered and consciously entertained comprehensive conception of their values or interests. The point is implicit in a study of human motivation by A. H. Maslow.[5] He speaks of motivation in terms of needs, suggesting a number of categories: physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, the need for self-actualization, the need for the preconditions of need satisfaction (*e.g.*, for freedom and justice), and the desire to know and understand. People have motives (goals, values, interests) in a number of such categories, but are rarely conscious of them all. When their physiological interests are threatened, concern for them is likely to be a controlling guide to behavior; temporarily, at least, they may become ultimate interests. When a reasonable degree of satisfaction for the physiological needs is assured, they are more or less taken for granted, and attention is directed to, *e.g.*, safety needs. When satisfaction for these can also be taken for granted, they are more or less forgotten and attention shifts to another category. Maslow suggests that, in principle, there is an endless set of categories of motives or needs (goals, values, interests), new types emerging or developing as others come to be substantially satisfied. He pictures men shifting their attention back and forth among the various categories, depending on circumstances—now being guided by an "ultimate" interest (my term, not Maslow's) in knowledge or understanding, perhaps, only to shift suddenly to an "ultimate" interest, say, in physiological or safety needs if a threat to life develops. Preoccupation with one sort of interest may lead to a neglect of another sort; pursuit of peripheral interests may jeopardize those that are fundamental. The point has its parallel in politics. Time and again in the conduct of American foreign relations, for example, interests have been pursued in normal times that did not appear to be the ones that really mattered when a crisis occurred. Presidents and Secretaries of State tend to speak of those values or interests that are threatened or that seem to be in need of attention, and they tend to forget about values and interests that seem to be assured. Sometimes there has seemed to be complete unawareness of certain values and interests and complete insensitivity to developing dangers.

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 51

[5] A. H. Maslow, "A Dynamic Theory of Human Motivation," in Chalmers L. Stacey and Manford F. DeMartino (eds.), *Understanding Human Motivation* (Cleveland: Howard Allen, 1958), pp. 28ff.

To a limited extent there are ways of checking statements by actors concerning their interests or values or goals. In every culture certain rules of behavior or patterns of activity come to be associated with the pursuit of specific goals; and when the statements and the activities of an actor all point in the same direction, goals (at least those pursued at the time) can be inferred with some degree of probability. Along the same line, certain criteria for identifying goals are suggestive. Under a common view goals are "recognized as the points at which prolonged patterns of activity cease with comparative suddenness."[6] Another statement, and a more useful one, is:

> We call something a goal not because it is a natural terminating point of movements but because movements persist towards it and vary in accordance with the changes in it and with conditions that lead to it.[7]

The implication is that if we see where prolonged patterns of activity cease, or if we see that movements persist and vary as indicated, we will have identified a goal. But such criteria could be used to identify instrumental goals as well as prime goals. According to them, crossing the goal line in a football game is a goal, and so is winning the game itself. Further, the use of such criteria may or may not provide a very sure basis for identifying broad and general goals, such as the promotion of peace, security, justice and freedom. In complex situations the same movements or activities (*e.g.*, building up the military power of the country) might indicate the pursuit of either war or peace—or, for that matter, prosperity or victory in the next election.

The upshot is that though it may sometimes be possible to identify, from his behavior, the goals that an actor pursues and to determine which of them is (are?) ultimate, this cannot always be done. In many cases it is plain that actors themselves have not clearly and consciously identified their ultimate goals.

Considerations of this sort commend the view that a goal is "an incentive that is chosen by the investigator as a reference point for describing observed behavior."[8] In other words, if we think of a series of desired events or states of affairs, the identification of the one to be picked out as the goal may be rather arbitrary, designed to suit the purposes of the investigator rather than to be a reflection of a factual situation. The investigator simply breaks into the means-ends chain at a point where he finds it useful to do so; and then for analytical purposes he treats the final link as ultimate, and all links leading toward it as instrumental.

III. THE IDENTIFICATION OR CALCULATION OF INTERESTS

Implied in what has already been said is the fact that it is frequently difficult both to identify the interests that actors do pursue and to determine those that they should pursue. The problem is obviously of concern to scholars, especially to those who are policy-oriented and who seek to enhance capacities for rational action. I will discuss it first in relation to independent interests and then in relation to dependent interests.

If the issue concerns strictly the desirability of a goal value or independent interest, then (as indicated above) no reliable method—*i.e.*, no method that produces the same result for all qualified persons who use it—is available. That something should be desired for its own intrinsic goodness or because it is self-justifying is an argument that no one has been able to establish by evidence and logic sufficient to command the assent of all who look and listen. There is (and probably can be) no theory of ends or theory of interests if by this is meant verifiable thought about what ought to be for its own sake.

This means that methods other than scholarship are to be employed in selecting the goal values or independent interests that are to be pursued, *e.g.*, by governments. Perhaps they will be the methods prescribed in some constitutional or legal arrangement—or the methods of civil or international war. One of the assumptions on which democracy rests is that the preferences of the majority should prevail. Whatever the method of determining goal values, the likelihood is that attitudes reflecting them will be laden with affect. They will be matters of principle, intrinsically desirable, sustained by emotion. At the extreme they will not be open to discussion.

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[6] Raymond B. Cattell, *Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement* (Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Co., 1957), p. 440.

[7] R. S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation* (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), p. 122; *cf.* pp. 5–6.

[8] Dalbir Bindra, *Motivation: A Systematic Reinterpretation* (New York, 1959), p. 54.

Nevertheless various tasks are open to the scholar in connection with goal values or independent interests. One of them is conceptual analysis. The scholar can bring reason and logic to bear in analyzing statements of goal values or independent interests with a view to identifying and reducing vaguenesses and ambiguities. If it is said, for example, that the major goal values in conducting American foreign relations should be to provide for the survival of the nation and the integrity of its territory, institutions, and culture, the scholar can analyze the crucial terms to see whether they convey clear meaning and, if so, what it is. There are bound to be intellectual difficulties in connection with any such broad formulations, and there are opportunities for real service in identifying them and seeking to reduce them.

Further, the scholar can also ask about the practical implications of the endorsement of various goal values: what are the actual or potential risks and costs of pursuing each of them? Perhaps the pursuit of one will turn out to be incompatible with the pursuit of another, or extremely costly in terms of values in other realms. Again there is an opportunity for significant service in identifying implications, for when people are made to see what their value position entails, they may choose to shift to a different position.

To express approximately the same point in a different way, the scholar may seek to influence the choice of independent interests. He can do this not by asserting that he knows best what they ought to be but rather by stimulating and contributing to clarity of thought on the part of those who make the choice. The suggestion was made above that ordinarily individual and corporate actors (including governments and governmental agencies) do not act on the basis of an articulated, comprehensive and coherent conception of their independent and dependent interests. They do not fully know their own minds, if indeed the relevant questions have entered their minds at all. They tend to fasten on certain goals and endow them with affect without fully exploring the implications and the possible alternatives. The scholar thus has an opportunity to stimulate more or less detached thought, and he may lead an actor to re-examine his assumptions concerning his independent interests. As a result some interests may be removed from the category and others placed in it.

It is probably desirable for scholars to try to get the realm of goal values or independent interests restricted to the narrowest possible confines. If it were foreordained that certain values were necessarily goal values—if a given list of interests were inherently and intrinsically independent—there would be no choice about the matter. But we have seen that this is not the case. It is difficult to imagine any value or interest that cannot be considered instrumental or dependent. Recall, for example, the alleged values or interests that should guide American foreign policies: the survival of the nation and the integrity of its territory, institutions, and culture. Whatever the phenomena or the qualities identified by these words, they are not necessarily goal values or independent interests. All of them can readily be considered as instrumental values or dependent interests. Territorial integrity is in fact very often regarded as instrumental to survival. The survival of the nation could quite plausibly be regarded as instrumental to the survival of other cherished institutions, or as instrumental to the survival of the culture. The culture might be thought worth preserving because it provides the fullest known opportunity for the development of the potentialities of individual human beings. As each interest or value is shifted into the instrumental category, two reciprocal advantages may be gained: the role of emotion in considering the interest is likely to be reduced, and the role of objective inquiry is likely to be increased.

If the present analysis is correct, those who seek to reduce the role of conflict in human affairs should be especially alert to the conception of independent interests that guides actors who are in contention. It seems highly probable that all kinds of actors have engaged in all kinds of struggle, including war, on the basis of a conception of independent interests that they would have rejected if they had thought more incisively and clearly. Certainly the states that have been primarily responsible for launching the major wars of this century have lost more than they gained, and in nuclear wars all belligerents might suffer net losses of truly catastrophic proportions. One way of reducing the likelihood of irrational war or other costly struggle is to keep asking one or both contending parties why they do what they do—to keep trying to force them farther out toward the ultimates on their means-ends chains. What was beyond discussion as a self-justifying end may then become discussable. Perhaps one party or the other may then decide that the probable consequences of its course of action are unacceptable. Conceivably the contending parties may find that their means-ends chains intersect, *i.e.*, that they have a common interest; and in the light of the common interest (taken as independent) the courses of action leading to conflict can be reexamined in a search for common dependent interests.[9] This type of thing seems to be going on, for example, in Western Europe, where the question is, why seek jealously to maintain sovereign independence; and many of those who manage to transfer the principle of sovereign independence from the category of independent interest to the category of dependent interests are apparently concluding that the alleged dependent interest is not, after all, a very compelling one. A similar development seems to be occurring in interest groups that are in contention in the United States over the school segregation issue. If a man says that he wants segregation or integration simply because he wants it (that is, if he treats it as an independent interest), the opportunities for helpful objective inquiry are rather limited; but if he identifies a goal that will allegedly be served by segregation or integration, then it may be possible to determine whether his notion of the means-ends relationship is correct.

The statement is made above that a reduction of conflict can sometimes be sought by forcing the contending parties farther out on their means-ends chains. The reverse of this procedure also sometimes applies. When ultimate goals are in irrevocable conflict, the appropriate strategy for reducing conflict is presumably to draw attention away from them and to look for more immediate interests that, hopefully, may be shared.[10]

The foregoing is addressed to independent interests and to the role of the scholar in relationship to them. If, conversely, the problem is to identify or calculate interests of a strictly dependent sort, there are additional possibilities. The scholar, the actor himself, or any observer—all may feel qualified to take a stand. So far as the scholar is concerned, he has the same opportunities that he has in connection with independent values or interests; that is, he can seek to clarify the meanings and the logical and practical implications of propositions advanced. And he may also be able to do much more. As is pointed out above, if a precise goal value or independent interest is given (either in fact or hypothetically), the problem of identifying the dependent interest(s) is the problem of identifying the means that will bring about the desired end, the conditions that will produce the desired consequence, the cause that will produce the desired effect, or the variables associated with the desired functional outcome. Obviously, this is an area in which objective inquiry is possible, perhaps leading to conclusive proof. Studies can be made on various sorts of relevant questions, *e.g.*, the costs of employing various alternative possible means, the degree of probability that the means will produce the desired result, the speed with which the result will be achieved, etc. On the basis of such studies it may be possible to say flatly whether a given dependent interest is a "true" interest, *e.g.*, whether it will in fact promote the independent interest more surely or more quickly or more economically or with fewer risks than the available alternatives.

What the scholar can properly do for analytical purposes, as described above, has naturally had some influence on thoughts about what he can do for practical purposes. Thus the suggestion has been made that more of the practical problems of politics and government should be turned over to experts of one sort or another. For example, the well known distinction has been made between "politics" and "administration," the suggestion being that politics is the realm of choice among values and that administration is (or should be made to be) the realm where technical expertise is relied upon to promote the values that have been politically selected. Suggestions have been made, too, that in other areas greater reliance should be placed on the professionals (*e.g.*, the career Foreign Service Officers) and less on the amateurs. At the extreme, the suggestion would be that virtually all governmental decisions should be the work of the expert: that he should simply be told what the goal value(s) or independent interest(s) is (are) and then be allowed to identify the appropriate instrumental values or dependent interests.

This line of thought has much to commend it; nevertheless, it cannot be pressed too far. The solution of public problems is not always a matter of specialized expertise. Clear cut situations of the sorts assumed above for analytical purposes do not always obtain in practice. In practical affairs more than one goal value is usually involved, with nothing to indicate clearly their relative importance or urgency. Means are usually not separated neatly from ends. Precisely the same thing may be both goal value and an instrumental value; an actor may want something because he considers it intrinsically desirable, and he may also want it because it will contribute to the achievement of something else that is also desirable. Further, where a number of persons are involved it is likely that what is an instrumental value for one will be a goal value for another. Moreover, though reliable methods may exist for selecting means in connection with rather narrow problems, the task is more difficult in relation to problems of a broad and general sort.[11] If the object is to maximize the firepower of the foot soldier, there will presumably be a fairly reliable means of choosing between two rifles; at least, the question is unlikely to be submitted to a vote, above all not to voters who have little or no relevant knowledge or experience. Even if the object is the broader one of reducing unemployment, the question whether to attempt it through a program of government spending or through cutting taxes so as to encourage private spending may be susceptible to answer on a fairly reliable scientific basis; but one need only mention the problem to make it obvious that this is a situation where goal values and instrumental values are likely to be inextricably intermixed in practice. If the problem is to maintain or create a world environment in which the American people will have a maximum opportunity to develop their way of life as they please, the scientific basis for a choice of means is still less reliable. The number of relevant variables is so large and the interrelationships among them are so obscure that reliable prediction could not be counted on even if goal and instrumental values could be kept neatly separated; and, of course, this neat separation could not be achieved. When judgment is to be exercised (*i.e.*, when a decision is to be made on the basis of inadequate knowledge of relevant relationships) there is a fair prospect that the greater knowledge of the specialist will enable him to judge more soundly. But if he seems to claim a prescience that he does not have he may discredit himself. Given the necessity of some guessing, he may wish to have affairs so arranged that those who will enjoy or suffer the consequences share in the process and the responsibility.

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[9] *Cf.* Gordon W. Allport, "Normative Compatibility in the Light of Social Science," in Abraham Maslow (ed.), *New Knowledge in Human Values* (New York, 1959), pp. 140–41.

[10] Charles Frankel, *The Case for Modern Man* (New York, 1955), pp. 78–84.

Much depends on the mix in connection with any given decision. Except perhaps for the purest of independent interests, the position is scarcely tenable that " 'the public interest, so far as the United States is concerned, is and can only be what the public, what mass opinion, says it is.' "[12] After all, a great many interests are of the dependent sort, subject to determination by more or less reliable methods. But conversely, except for the purest of dependent interests, the position is scarcely tenable that the interest of an actor is what the expert says it is. For analytical purposes the scholar can consider all interests dependent. But for the purpose of practical decision-making the value element must ordinarily be recognized. And the appropriate roles of the expert and the others are likely to vary depending on the relative emphasis on the two elements involved.

IV. *Interests* IN CURRENT USAGE

Those who dwell on values are usually alert to the problems discussed above, though there is a tendency to assume that all values are necessarily normative (*i.e.*, goal) and not instrumental. Problems more commonly arise where the emphasis is on the concept *interests*.

Let it be recalled that the actor himself (*e.g.*, a person, a group, a government), the scholar, or any observer may advance propositions concerning the actor's interests, and that the interests may be either independent or dependent. Independent interests are assumed or postulated or accepted on faith; and whatever will serve them is a dependent interest.

Let it be noted, also, that the word *interests* is commonly modified by various terms, *e.g.*, *national*, *public*, *common*, which create difficulties; and much of the discussion of interests has concerned the meaning of the adjectives rather than the meaning of the noun. We are not here concerned with the adjectives.

Interest as a Guide to Foreign Policy. Where *interest* is the subject of discussion in connection with foreign affairs—and particularly in the writing of Hans Morgenthau concerning the national interest—much of the trouble is definitional rather than epistemological; and the examination of such trouble is not central to the present purpose. Nevertheless, brief attention to the matter is called for, if only to identify the problem.

In developing what he calls a theory of international politics Morgenthau says that this is "inherently a world of opposing interests." "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."[13] Morgenthau repeatedly uses the formula, "interest defined in terms of power." But, so far as I have been able to discover, he does not himself advance a definition explicitly, whether or not in terms of power. In truth, he seems almost deliberately to accentuate the vagueness of the key terms. Thus he says,

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[11] See Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,' " *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19 (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88.

[12] Harwood L. Childs, as quoted by Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[13] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace* (3d ed., New York, 1960), pp. 4–5.

> The kind of interest [and here he does not say "defined in terms of power"] determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy [note that interests are apparently goals] can run the gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.[14]

It is not clear whether Morgenthau approves such an elastic interpretation of the term *interest*. It is clearer, however, that he approves a similarly elastic interpretation of the term *power*.

> Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.[15]

Morgenthau does not say what kind of power he has in mind when he says that interest is to be defined in terms of power, nor does he identify the degree or level of power (of whatever kind) that the pursuit of interest requires. He identifies survival as the minimum interest of a political unit; and, in broader terms, he suggests that the concept *national interest* "encompasses the integrity of the nation's territory, of its political institutions, and of its culture."[16] But at the same time he makes it clear that persons or entities other than the nation have interests that will sometime supersede the national interest.

> While the realist indeed believes that interest [but whose interest? and on the basis of whose calculation?] is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the national state is a product of history and is therefore bound to disappear.[17]

Sometimes Morgenthau speaks of the "true" interest, which seems to imply that some interests are something other than "true," but he does not clearly describe the tests by which "true" interests are distinguished from others. Pretty obviously, such a treatment of interests leaves many questions unanswered. And Morgenthau adds to the uncertainties when, after seeming to identify interests with goals or objectives, he warns that "a realist theory of international politics [must] guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences."[18] But surely many interests in the sense of goals or objectives are closely associated both with motives and with ideological preferences. In short, Morgenthau's use of the term *interest* leads mainly to puzzlement. It is perhaps noteworthy that his most recent book, which is very perceptive and stimulating, focuses not on the concept *interest* but rather on the concept purpose—*The Purpose of American Politics.*

Robert E. Osgood likewise makes extensive use of the concept *interest* in discussing foreign policy problems, but he departs considerably from Morgenthau's extremely vague meaning.

> National self-interest is understood to mean a state of affairs *valued* solely for its benefit to the nation. The *motive* of national egoism, which leads men to seek this *end*, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself solely with the welfare of one's own nation; it is self-love transferred to the national group.[19] [Italics supplied.]

Implicitly, Osgood grants that an interest might be altruistic, for he adopts a modifier for the word, speaking of self-interest. He does not define self-interest in terms of power, nor does he reject concern for motives; rather, to him an interest *is* an end or a motive. It is a *valued* state of affairs, and not a state of affairs that exists objectively—independently of human evaluations or appraisals. Though Osgood equates interests with ends, he might also identify them with means; for, as indicated above, a state of affairs might be valued either for its own sake or because of its contribution to the achievement of some other valued state of affairs, or both. In short, Osgood's definition leads to the question of the bases on which evaluations occur and to the question of the relationships between interests on the one hand and ends and means on the other.

The contention here is that the discussion of *interests* as a guide to foreign policy decisions is likely to be sounder and more cogent if a distinction is made between the independent and the dependent. Especially if an author is prescribing, it is important that he stipulate clearly the independent interests that he is postulating; given the independent interests, he then in principle has the opportunity to identify appropriate dependent interests—and he may be able to do this more soundly than any one else. Even if the author is describing, it is likely to be desirable to maintain the distinction between independent and dependent interests, or at least to place them accurately in their serial and hierarchical relationships.

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December 1952), p. 973.

[17] *Politics Among Nations*, p. 10.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[19] Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 4.

Interests and Interest Groups in Domestic Politics. The tendency of those who dwell on the role of interests or interest groups in domestic policy is to think only in terms of interests as defined by the actor himself, leaving no room for the scholar or any detached observer to say that the actor goes against his own interests or that he *should* pursue an interest other than the one that he in fact pursues.

Arthur F. Bentley set the precedent for this:

> There is no group without its interest. An interest . . . is the equivalent of a group. . . . The group and the interest are not separate. There exists only one thing, that is, so many men bound together in or along the path of a certain activity. . . . The group is activity and the activity is only known to us through its . . . value in terms of other activities. . . . The interest is just this valuation of the activity, . . . the valued activity itself.[20]

In approximately the same manner, Jack Peltason says, "An interest consists of all kinds of activity of all kinds of people, some of whom may be public officials, in conflict with an opposed array of activities."[21] And Charles Hagan says, "The activity is the interest. The interest is a shorthand way of saying that there is a mass of activity operating in a given direction. . . . The present assignment of meaning to interest is to find the activity and call that an interest which the activity connotes."[22]

Definitions of this sort suggest two kinds of problems.

The first is whether the pursuit of interests or the activity of interest groups is to be considered in the general context of purposefulness and rationality. Probably so, though the quotations cited are not very clear on the point. Both Bentley and Hagan describe the activity as going along a path or operating in a given direction. This implies that the activity is not random, and it probably implies that it is directed or controlled so as to promote the achievement of a goal. If so, a discriminating intelligence is involved, and choices are made among possible alternatives. But in stressing activity rather than the criteria of choice that guide the activity, Peltason and Hagan do little to suggest concern for the purposes, the goals, and the rationality of the behavior. They might remedy the matter by including expressions of purpose and reason in the category that they label activity; but then they would make the category so broad that they would simply join the ranks of others who are concerned with identifying and appraising means and ends in politics. The role that Bentley himself assigned to discriminating intelligence—to reason and purpose in the activity of groups—is not very clear either, though he did refer to interest as the "valuation" of the activity.

The other problem to which the Bentleyan type of definition leads is that it apparently rejects the view that anyone other than the actor has a basis for identifying the actor's interests. Hagan makes this explicit in repudiating the practice under which "interest is often utilized to designate a kind of activity which follows as an inference from a premise."[23] He is adversely critical of those who say in certain circumstances that an interest group acted against its interests. As noted above, he is on sound ground if the reference is to independent interests, strictly defined; but given the independent interest to be served, it is quite possible that a scholar or other detached observer may identify the dependent interests of a group more accurately than do its members or leaders. Under the conception being advocated here, for example, an observer might find that it is against the interests of a candidate for office to insult the voters; or he might find that it is against the interests of children to skip school persistently. But if the activity is the interest, then insulting the voters and skipping school automatically become interests by the fact of their occurrence.

David Truman relates the word *interest* to attitudes rather than to activity.

> As used here, "interest group" refers to any group

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[20] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), pp. 211, 213.

[21] Jack W. Peltason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process* (Garden City, 1955), p. 2.

[22] Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in a Political Science," in Roland Young (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 45.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

> that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes. . . . The shared attitudes constitute the interests.[24]

If interests are attitudes, an evaluation is implied; a person who has an attitude is for or against something. An attitude indicates a sense of direction if not a desired destination. This suggests again that the pursuit of an interest is the pursuit of a goal, and it again points to the question whether the goal is being pursued rationally. Obviously, a detached observer might conclude that an interest group is not acting rationally, and sooner or later some or all members of the interest group might agree. This means that the observer and the members would take the view that the activity of the interest group had not served its best interests. And it suggests that there are difficulties in a conception that identifies interests with the current attitudes of those pursuing them. Further, there is at least a certain incompleteness in the conception of "potential groups" that Truman advances. In his view a potential group consists of people with shared attitudes who have not yet become organized; but it might also be potential in the sense that the prospective members may develop certain attitudes when they become aware of their common dependent interests.[25] The interest group might be there potentially, regardless of both existing attitudes and existing organizational forms.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, values and interests fall into sequences (some leading to others in the same sequence) and into hierarchies (some superseding others). In common usage the words *values* and *interests* have approximately the same meaning, and each designates two sorts of thing—approximately the same two sorts. What are called interests divide into categories that can conveniently be labelled "independent" and "dependent." What are called values divide into categories that can conveniently be labelled "goal" and "instrumental." Independent interests are equivalent to goal values, and dependent interests are approximately equivalent to instrumental values, the difference being that the term dependent interest is not so likely to connote the notion of intrinsic desirability whereas the term instrumental value may do so. No value or interest belongs inherently in one category and not in the other; any value or interest might be in either category, depending on human preference. The scholar has no scientific way of determining what goal values or independent interests should be pursued, and since in practice most actors are not clear in identifying them, the scholar may not be able to determine which ones are in fact pursued. In any event, what is an independent interest for one actor may be a dependent interest for another, and *vice versa.* For items in each category, however, the scholar can seek to promote conceptual clarity and knowledge of logical and practical relationships. Moreover, he can simply assume one or more independent interests for analytical purposes and then identify and appraise relevant dependent interests. If he focuses on the concept *interest,* he is likely to do better if he avoids defining it in terms of power or activity or attitudes—though, to be sure, different meanings may be useful for different purposes. He is likely to find it advantageous to define an interest as a goal that an actor does or should pursue. His appraisal of dependent interests may lead him to make recommendations, which is intellectually justifiable if he keeps himself within the limits of logic and evidence and if he recognizes that the independent interests that he postulates may or may not be the ones that others accept.

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[24] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), pp. 33–34.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35, 510–15.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

HERBERT J. SPIRO
Amherst College

This is a tentative outline of a systematic and comprehensive approach to the study of politics. Part I gives the method. Part II indicates some advantages of the approach. Part III anticipates likely objections to it. And Part IV suggests some applications. My purpose in presenting the paper in its present form is to encourage my colleagues to consider this approach and, if they find it potentially useful, to contribute to its refinement through criticism.[1] As David Easton said in his "Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"[2] I know "I run the definite risk that the meaning and implications of this point of view may be only superficially communicated; but it is a risk I shall have to undertake since I do not know how to avoid it sensibly."

I

Politics is the process by which a community deals with its problems. A *community* exists among people who are aware of pursuing common goals.[3] *Problems* are obstacles perceived on the road toward goals. Problems must therefore be recognized in order to become politically relevant or alive. But recognition of a problem by itself does not lead to the generation of politics about it. When there is complete consensus in the community on the solution of a problem, after it has been recognized, no politics concerning the problem takes place. In this sense, a community whose members always agree on solutions to their problems is not a political system. Since there are few (if any) such communities, most communities are political systems. In almost all communities, disagreements occur. Disagreements present *issues.* A *political system,* therefore, is a community that is processing its issues. While the basic prerequisite for community is *consensus,* though minimally only on common goals (which may be negative, like prevention of the extermination of the community of mankind), the basic prerequisite for a political system is *dissensus.* Politics arises out of disagreements within a network, wide or narrow, loose or tight, of agreement. (17–27)[4]

A problem enters politics once members of the community recognize it *and* disagree about it. A problem leaves politics when it has been "solved" *and* this solution has been recognized. Between the beginning and end of this process, the issue(s) generated by a problem passes through four *phases* of the "flow of policy": (1) formulation of the issue, (2) deliberation, (3) resolution, and (4) solution of the problem. Since problems are obstacles on the road to goals, disagreements may be about the *substance* of the goals or the *procedures* used to approach them. (363–372) In either case, the issue may be perceived as involving a long-term, *fundamental* matter or a short-term, *circumstantial* matter. (211–213)[5] A political system may be described, and two or more systems may be compared, by "plotting" the incidence of issues with reference to two intersecting axes. The vertical axis runs from the procedural to the substantive extreme, the horizontal from the fundamental to the circumstantial. (Figure 1)

In every political system, some issues arise under each of the four combinations. (I) Fundamental procedural issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *stability, i.e.,* by *constitutional* problems. (II) Procedural circumstantial issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *flexibility, i.e.,* typically by *economic* problems in modern or modernizing communities. (III) Circumstantial substantive issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *efficiency, i.e.,* by *power* problems. (IV) And substantive fundamental issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *effectiveness, i.e.,* by *cultural* problems.

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[1] I am already indebted for very helpful critiques to V. O. Key, Jr., Harvey C. Mansfield, Franklin L. Ford, Harry Eckstein, and especially Duncan MacRae, Jr.

[2] *World Politics,* Vol. 9 (April 1957).

[3] This does not imply a "progressive" as distinguished from a "conservative" bias, since the goals may include maintenance of the *status quo.*

[4] Numbers in parentheses refer to pages in my *Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy* (New York, 1959), where the concepts used in this paper were put to work in a less systematic fashion, and which contains many concrete illustrations that could not be included here.

[5] This distinction is not meant to suggest that issues about fundamentals are more important than those about circumstantials.



FIGURE 1. Diagram of system issues.

The relative *success* of political systems (or of one system at different times) can be gauged by the degree to which they manage to sustain a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals. (41–42) If problems are thought of as the input and solutions the output of the political system, *efficiency* measures the output-input ratio. If the system solves none of its problems, it will fail. But the problems it recognizes for processing, the process itself, and the solutions also have to be considered *effective*, or acceptable, by at least those members whose opposition could put an end to the system. At least some procedures used for the handling of problems have to remain *stable* over time, otherwise the system will lose its identity *vis-à-vis* itself and its basic goals.[6] But both procedures and even more the policies (or solutions) worked out within these procedures have to be sufficiently *flexible* to adjust to changes in the content of the community's problems; otherwise stagnation will set in. Stability and effectiveness are concerned with the long run; flexibility and efficiency with the short run. Each of these basic goals needs to be balanced by its temporal opposite. Stability and flexibility are concerned with the methods used for handling issues; effectiveness and efficiency with the content of problems and their solutions. Each procedural goal should be balanced by its substantive opposite.

None of the four basic goals by itself is sufficient for the success of a political system. Exclusive concern with stability is shown by legalistic attempts to foreorder the entire future by means of comprehensive, detailed, and consistent regulation. (211–236) This is designed to preclude the need for any future choices, to prevent changes in values or goals, and to keep efficiency at its current level, since no novel substantive problems will be allowed to come up. The final goal pursued here is a kind of regimented bureaucratism. Members of a more or less well balanced political system who are overly committed to bringing about stability only will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (I). Their *political style* is *legalistic.* The style of the subsystem of these members could be described graphically as in Figure 2.

Exclusive concern with flexibility is the temporal antithesis of legalism. (182, 189)

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[6] This should not be confused with substantive "boundary maintenance"; a political system may be stable even though its scope and membership fluctuate, that is, expand, contract, and overlap or merge with those of other systems preoccupied with the solution of similar or different problems. See also p. 595 below.



FIGURE 2. Subsystem distortion, I.



FIGURE 4. Subsystem distortion, III.

Here the desire is to keep opportunities for change permanently open. Constancy in goals would consequently become impossible, and policies would fail because of inability to sustain them long enough to solve the problems to which they were addressed. Even the procedures of politics would be altered in response to changes in the problems currently considered most pressing. Anarchy would be the logical end result. Members overly interested in flexibility will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (II). Their style is *pragmatic*. (Figure 3)

Exclusive concern with efficiency results from the desire to achieve nothing but the immediate solution of current problems. (179–180, 186–187) It manifests itself in technocratic focussing on the substance of problems, as these happen to be perceived at the moment, in order to bring available power and other resources to bear on them at once. What participants desire is quick solutions—regardless of the means used, of alternative policies that may have been suggested, or of the effectiveness of these solutions in terms of goals other than pure short-run efficiency. The end result of imposition of its rule by an efficiency-minded group would be a kind of technocratic totalitarianism. Such persons will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (III). Since they are concerned only with the application of power to the solution of problems, their political style in its extreme form is *violent*. (Figure 4)

Exclusive concern with effectiveness is the temporal opposite of violence. (194–210) It would seek to imprison the whole community in the rubrics of one ruling ideology. Ideological motivation would shape the recognition of problems and the formulation of issues, regardless of "objective" needs. All policy is put in the service of the long-run substantive goals to which the ideology is committed, so that nothing that deviates from it can remain stable, nor can adjustments be made to changes within, or in the environment of, the system, unless the ideology itself dictates these changes. Theocracy or "hierocracy," in which a fanatical intelligentsia, secular or spiritual, ruled would be the result of victory by a group committed to the exclusive pursuit of effectiveness. Members of a more or less balanced political system who have this kind of commitment will raise an inordinate number of issues under (IV). Their style is *ideological*. (Figure 5)

The style of a successful political system, in which tensions due to pursuit of the four basic goals bring about a dynamic equilibrium, could be described by Figure 6. It also relates the political process, *i.e.*, the four phases of the flow of policy, to basic goals and to types of issues and problems. A system is most successful when issues cluster around the intersection of the procedural-substantive and fundamental-circumstantial axes. This central clustering will happen, not because of the content of the problems dealt with, but because of the equilibrium described above. This in turn is related to the particular sequence in which each of the four phases of the political process proceeds from one to another of the basic goals.

A problem is recognized for issue *formulation* when fundamental substantive goals, *i.e.*, the effectiveness of the system and its policies, call for its solution. Cultural values, in the broad sense, lead to recognition of discrepancies between goals and current conditions. But the



FIGURE 3. Subsystem distortion, II.



FIGURE 5. Subsystem distortion, IV.



FIGURE 6. Diagram of system in dynamic equilibrium.

particular formulation that the issue receives is shaped by the fundamental procedures in use. If there is disagreement on recognition of the problem and/or its proper solution, this is due to differences in the fundamental substantive goals of members. But the form in which the resultant issue is stated—two or three alternative solutions, clear or vague differentiation, etc.—is shaped by the "constitution," and the fact that it is so shaped gives, and is usually designed to give, stability to the system, regardless of the content of all the various issues that have to be dealt with. (164–177)

Deliberation consists of the consideration of alternative solutions to a problem. The alternatives, having already been formulated, are now examined in the light of the need to adjust to changes inside the system and in its environment. (239–257) Without realistic consideration of these changes, deliberation would be meaningless, and the solution would be unsatisfactory.

Deliberation normally leads to *resolution*, that is, the narrowing down of alternatives and the final selection of one policy. Resolution might be called "the big decision," since the word *decide* means to cut off—in this case, to cut off deliberation. (258–269) But one should not identify resolution alone with decsiion, because the whole political process consists of a sequence of decisions: what problems to recognize, how to formulate the issues, how to deliberate and resolve, what resources to use in solution, and many more decisions. While the formulation of the issue involves fundamentals, its resolution involves short-term considerations. Resolution is always addressed to the problem as it appears at the moment deliberation is cut off. It need therefore not be final, because changes can always be made during the phase of solution. In fact, resolution rarely is final, and only rigid adherents of the mechanical doctrine of the separation of powers believe that the legislature deliberates and resolves, and then the executive puts this resolution into effect. (12–13) Actually, "the executive," and whoever else participates in the final phase of the political process, often introduces new, or re-introduces old, alternative solutions to the problem. In any case, the resolution of the deliberated issue directs flexibility toward efficiency. While constitutional and economic considerations normally play important roles in the course of deliberation, economic and power considerations do so during resolution. And while an excess of constitutional regulation may prevent an optimal weighing of alternatives, a lack of available power or other resources may lead to inability to arrive at resolution of the issue.

The phase of *solution* deals with the substance of a problem, bringing to bear short-run power for the achievement of the community's long-run goals. Solution of a problem normally removes the goal on the road toward which the problem was an obstacle. Once an economy with millions of unemployed has achieved stable full employment, this achievement ceases to be a goal, though the maintenance of full employment may continue as a goal of lesser importance. In a successful system, solution links efficiency to effectiveness and thereby clears the channels of politics for the recognition and processing of new problems that are obstacles on the road to new goals.

Formulation, deliberation, resolution, and solution are called *phases* rather than stages or departments of the political process or, preferably, of the flow of policy, in order to emphasize that they usually overlap. In an emergency, for example, all four may be compressed into a matter of moments. (269–273) Moreover, political systems differ with respect to the relative importance of the four phases and the basic goals that are given strongest consideration in each phase. For example, a system with a very legalistic style might devote most of its politics to the concoction of "artificial" constitutional issues and their very abstract deliberation, without ever arriving at their resolution or the solution of its "real" problems. Or a system of very violent style might concentrate its politics on the quick resolution of conflicts between various armed organizations and the efficient solution of these problems, to the complete neglect of considering alternative solutions and formulating other issues about different problems. In the Fourth Republic, French politics was preoccupied with formulation and deliberation, to the neglect of resolution and solution. In the Fifth Republic, this emphasis has been reversed.

The style of a political system at any one time is rarely as one-sided as in the preceding examples of legalism and violence. Combinations with a double or triple emphasis are more common; for example, legalistic pragmatism, as often displayed in American constitutional litigation (Figure 7); pragmatic violence, as among the criminal underworld (Figure 8); ideological legalism, as in Calvin's Geneva; or alternating pragmatic and ideological violence, as in the Soviet Union (Figure 9). A triple emphasis of this kind cannot describe the style of a system at one moment, because ideologism and pragmatism are true opposites, as are legalism and violence. Triple emphasis is therefore more likely to describe style over time, when radical oscillations occur, *e.g.*, from ideologically motivated to pragmatically motivated violence. However, simultaneous concern with stability and efficiency, or with flexibility and effectiveness, is possible when the issues of politics are clustered around the intersection of the two axes: for example, when the problem is jay-walking and the issue is means of enforcement, arguments about legality (not legalistic arguments) and the availability of traffic cops can be adduced simultaneously without calling for a description of style as violently legalistic. Or when the issue arises out of the problem of dowries in a modernizing community, arguments about cultural values and the distribution of income may be raised in the course of pushing this problem closer toward solution, without making the style ideologically pragmatic.

The greater the incidence of issues away from the central intersection, the weaker is consensus on those of the basic goals near which the issues cluster, and the more pathological is the



FIGURE 7. Combination styles, A.



FIGURE 8. Combination styles, B.



FIGURE 9. Combination styles, C.



FIGURE 10. Judicial and business firm systems.

style in that particular direction. For example, when the most important issues revolve around the constitutional document itself—constant proposals for its amendment, discussions of its internal consistency, of its effectiveness, of its adequacy to solve the problems different members consider most pressing—if indeed this preoccupation with the constitution leads to the formulation of artificial issues, then consensus is obviously weakest on the content of the goal of stability, and style is legalistic.

For most subsystems, this kind of preoccupation with only one or two of the four basic goals is normal. The judiciary, for example, and parts of the bureaucracy are subsystems more concerned with stability than with anything else. (276–297) Both the internal style of these subsystems and their contributions to the style of the system of which they are parts will tend more toward legalism than toward the other three styles. However, a detail of their square, Figure 6 (I), shows that their concern with stability also has aspects of flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness; and that, while the two phases of the central policy flow to which they mainly contribute—formulation and deliberation—deal typically with the constitutional aspects of problems, these constitutional aspects have to be looked at from the "purely" constitutional, the constitutional-economic, the constitutional-power, and the constitutional-cultural points of view. (Figure 10)

Similar details for the other squares would show major preoccupation with flexibility on the part of, say, a business firm during a period of great economic growth, Figure 10 (II), with efficiency on the part of, say, the military in some Latin American country, Figure 6 (III), and with effectiveness on the part of, say, "ideologues," propagandists, or public relations agents of a certain type, Figure 6 (IV).

Useful comparisons can be made by examining the internal political style of similar subsystems or groups of political personnel in different systems; *e.g.*, the governments of Paris and Stockholm, Coca Cola distributors in various countries, the general staff corps of France and Germany, or of Weimar and Federal Germany, different firms in the American electrical industry, or the top newspapers of several states. This kind of comparison would show, among other things, that the sources of authority of the personnel of these subsystems vary from one system to the next, and do so even more within any single political system. If *authority* is considered a kind of "additive" to central decisions, which leads those who are exposed to the consequences of these decisions to accept them, then the sources of authority can be classified in the same way as issues and consensus. (372–379) For instance, military heroes have authority among the military as a result of substantive circumstantial achievements, like a general's victories. Some saints have authority among communicants of their religion as a result of more fundamental substantive claims, such as visions of the deity, performance of miracles, or stigmata. The

Supreme Court of the United States enjoys authority among the legal profession and other Americans because it is identified with the fundamental procedures of the legal profession and of the Constitution. (282–286) Medical researchers like Dr. Jonas Salk enjoy authority among the public because they have addressed their innovating methods to the successful solution of current medical problems. I am willing to take the prescriptions my general practitioner issues to me and I regard him as an authority on my ills, because he has solved my medical problems before and because I know him to have been certified by meeting a combination of procedural and substantive requirements.

These are examples of authority in various types of subsystems. Of greater interest are the sources of authority of contributors to the central flow of policy. In a successful system, these sources vary with the phase(s) of the political process in which particular contributors are chiefly involved. To illustrate this, we can take the American problem of the costs of medical care. In Figure 11, each of the four phases of the policy flow is further broken down into two sub-phases, one on either side of the axis passing through it. The recognized problem is brought to public attention and (1) formulated as a substantive issue by leaders of affected interest groups, that is, subcommunities whose members are aware (or are being made aware) of having special goals and problems in common. Among these are leaders of underprivileged minority groups, of labor unions, of the medical profession. The issue is then (2) formulated in such a form that it can be deliberated upon, given the constitution of the system, in this case the fundamental procedures of politics in the United States. In this phase, legal advisers to the groups involved make their contributions, and other lawyers and the courts may also participate, *e.g.*, if constitutional test cases are initiated. Some of the issues arising out of the general problem are formulated by the political parties, *e.g.*, through inclusion of planks in their platforms, and by other national politicians through introduction of legislation, *e.g.*, to change social security laws. These issues are (3) deliberated upon in the Congress and, occasionally, by Congressional politicians, the President, and others outside the Congress, *e.g.*, in public debates and on television interviews. Next, (4) deliberation begins to be carried on by increasingly less "constitutional;" more interest-oriented figures, like negotiating agents for the various groups involved, perhaps with the advice of economists and business consultants. The issue will come closer to (5) resolution, perhaps after further litigation, as a result of successful negotiation between the antagonists, or through Congressional action. In Switzerland, a referendum might bring resolution at this point. (6) Substantive resolution can also be accomplished through threats or the use of force, as in strikes or violent clashes between doctors' and patients' organizations and the police. Here men whose authority comes largely from substantive and circumstantial sources would be in charge. After resolution of the issue, (7) solution begins with participation of government and private administrators, like the Surgeon General, hospital administrators, Blue Cross officials, Social Security civil servants. Finally, (8) the original problem is solved and thereby removed close to the "low" or "grassroots" levels at which it was first recognized through the actions of doctors and patients and subordinate bureaucrats who operate the system that has been set up more or less in keeping with the resolution of the issue. The authority of these people is derived from their identification (which may be a new product of the earlier phases of the process) with the substantive fundamentals of the community.



FIGURE 11. Sub phases in the policy flow.

In an unbalanced system, on the other hand, sources of authority will be out of keeping with the particular phase of the policy flow to which participants contribute. For example, in subphase 3 of deliberation, which calls for authority coming from identification with fundamental procedures, practicing physicians and "experienced patients" may be the main actors. Or in subphase 7 of solution, which calls for authority based on experience with administrative and medical organization, the bargaining agents of medical associations or labor unions may play the most important role. In either case, the success of the system in its handling of this problem would suffer. The mishap in subphase 3 might be an indication of ideological style. The malfunction in subphase 7 would



FIGURE 12. Post-independence system.

suggest pragmatic style. If mob leaders or the police had to get involved in subphase 2 of formulation, this would be a manifestation of violent style. If constitutional lawyers opened new issues in the course of subphase 7 of solution, the system would be suffering from undue legalism.

Perfect equilibrium among the four basic goals is hard if not impossible to achieve and it would not be desirable to insure success except under very rare conditions. Members of any non-stagnant political system change their estimates of the most important problems it faces. If they start, for example, by considering solution of the problem of independence from outside rule most important, as colonial independence movements have, the initial style of the system may be more or less violently ideological. Once independence is achieved, leaders identified with solution of the problem of colonialism will be regarded as most authoritative in all phases of the political process. If the independence movement develops successfully into a new political system, its style will add elements of pragmatism and legalism, as concern shifts to flexibility and stability, the original problem having been solved efficiently and effectively, *i.e.*, in an acceptable fashion. In this kind of development, the phase of deliberation would be last to receive the backing of a firm consensus. (Figure 12) Consensus would initially be strongest on solution to the poorly formulated, undeliberated, and therefore technically "non-resolved" independence problem. But this would be true only within the movement, since between it and the colonial power this would be precisely the area of greatest disagreement, leading to ideologism and violence in the larger system and, eventually, to its breaking apart.

On the other hand, a subsystem that starts off with an exclusive pursuit of stability, perhaps out of opposition to an efficiency-oriented totalitarianism, (1) will have an initially legalistic style; (2) slowly pay greater attention to the twin needs of flexibility and effectiveness; and (3) finally perhaps reach a point where it is ready to use violence against the totalitarian regime to solve its own crucial problem. The German resistance to Hitler seems to have followed this pattern. (Figure 13) Its members began by discussing the legality of resistance to the tyrant (and drafted a new constitution for the *Reich*), then constructed an ideology of resistance on this foundation of constitutionality, considered how to adjust their tactical plans to Hitler's operating procedures, and finally—after several unsuccessful



FIGURE 13. Anti-Nazi resistance movement.



FIGURE 14. Nazi suppression of resistance.

attempts on his life—set off the bomb in his headquarters on July 20, 1944.

After failure of this plot, the Nazi regime's reactions followed the reverse order, though this development occurred much more quickly. The first reaction (1) was brutally violent. It then became somewhat more pragmatic in the sense that temporary concessions were made where this seemed expedient, *e.g.*, concerning executions. At the same time, (2) the existing anti-resistance ideology was quickly elaborated. Finally, (3) the surviving major conspirators were tried by a special people's court, so that their execution could be presented as "legal" to the public. A diagrammatic presentation would look like Figure 13, except that the movement starts in (III), not (I), and that final arrows from (III) to (I) would be much farther away from the central intersection. (Figure 14)

This comparison of the resistance to Hitler and its repression by the Nazis might suggest that the development patterns of these two or any political (sub)systems are considered of equal value or, indeed, that this method of comparison pretended to be *wertfrei*. It does not, for two related reasons. In the first place, the purpose of comparison is to evaluate the relative success of political systems, success having been defined as a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals. Success was not defined with reference to the achievement of the always necessarily transient substantive goals of political systems. However, this criterion of success may be considered unsatisfactory because, for example, we might at least conceive of an ideologically violent totalitarianism that manages to indoctrinate its population so thoroughly in its ideology that it retains sufficient stability and flexibility to remain effective. No totalitarianism has in fact so far "succeeded" in this sense. On the contrary, the more successful ones are precisely those that moved away from an exclusively substantive to an increasingly procedural emphasis in both consensus and sources of authority. This objection is, nevertheless, well taken, and the normative assumptions underlying this approach can be made explicit. (30–42)

In the first instance, or in the last instance, or in both, it is individual human beings who recognize the problems that make up the raw material of politics, because these human beings are working toward goals: in the first instance, when individuals deliberately come together, as in modern interest organizations; in the last, when collectivism is at least alleged to serve the end goal of greater individualism, as according to Marx ("the free development of each . . . "). Human beings are distinguished from the rest of creation (or "existence") by their presumed capacity to work deliberately toward perceived goals. What distinguishes them even more is their capacity to invent new goals, *e.g.*, when old ones have been reached. In this respect, human beings, or our understanding of ourselves, resemble political systems (more than our understanding of political systems resembles our understanding of human beings, since the differentiated functioning of political systems is much more open to analysis than that of individual persons). (28–29)

The individual, as a personality system, also pursues the basic goals of stability, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness, in terms of his own built-in or acquired substantive values. He or she also has to maintain a dynamic balance in the pursuit of these basic goals. The development of the behavior style of infants or older persons could be described in the terms used here for political systems. (366–367) Because there is general agreement that human beings are capable of forging new goals for themselves and of working toward their goals, broad consensus might also be reached on the desirability of providing individuals with optimum opportunities for "realizing themselves" in this sense. The norm of individual responsibility could serve as the highest common normative denominator for the two antagonistic camps of the Cold War, and others, at least philosophically.[7] This norm demands that individuals should be given opportunities to contribute to those central decisions whose consequences will affect themselves; and that their capacity to contribute to such decisions should be proportionate to the extent of their exposure to the consequences. The balance between opportunity to contribute and exposure to consequences describes the individual's *situation of responsibility*. To be in a sound situation of responsibility, one should be provided by the political system with four ingredients: (1) *foreknowledge* of the probable consequences of one's decisions; (2) *choice* among alternative courses of action; (3) *resources* with which to realize the choice; and (4) *purpose* or commitment on the part of the system to the norm of responsibility itself.[8]

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[7] See my "Responsibility and the Goal of Survival," *Responsibility: Nomos III* (New York, 1960), pp. 290–303.

[8] For an earlier application of the norm of responsibility, see my "Co-Determination in Germany," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (December 1954), pp. 1114–1127. "Purpose" has been added as a fourth ingredient since then, for reasons that may be apparent.



FIGURE 15. Prerequisites of individual responsibility.

Without foreknowledge, one's situation in the political system would lack stability; without choice, it would lack flexibility. Without resources, the problems arising out of one's membership could not be dealt with efficiently; and without the system's commitment to the goal of responsibility, its pursuit by the individual would be thwarted even if the other three ingredients are provided. Knowledge and choice are matters of procedure; resources and purpose are matters of substance. Foreknowledge and purpose relate to fundamental goals, choice and resources to circumstantial problems. (Figure 15) The pathological systems described by Figures 2 to 5 and 7 to 9 would, each in a different way, unbalance their members' capacity to pursue self-realization, that is, to achieve a sound situation of responsibility, by putting one or more of its four ingredients beyond their reach. For this reason, disequilibrium and pathological style can also be criticized systematically from a normative standpoint.

II

Table I shows relations between various dimensions of this approach. The approach makes possible systematic comparison by allowing the same aspects of any two or more political systems, empirical or normative, to be "plotted" in systematic comparison to one another. Issues are taken as the basic data of politics. Their incidence can be plotted comparatively with reference to the two coordinates, Substantive-Procedural and Fundamental-Circumstantial. These in turn are related to the basic goals of any system, balance between which serves as a criterion of success and, at the level of the individual, of normative judgment. Political style and sources of authority can each be described systematically and in relation to one another. Style and authority can also be related systematically to the political process and the personnel of politics. (276–297) The approach also offers a tool for the comparative study of political development of systems and subsystems, in relation to their problems, issues, consensus, sources of authority, types of personnel, and the political process. It also provides a descriptive pathology of politics. So far, systematic description is the main use of this approach. Without systematic description, comparison is difficult. Without sound comparisons, explanations are impossible.

While systematic comparison is its main advantage, the method may also have some other merits. Among these is avoidance of any artificial compartmentalization of one and the same system into "polity," "society," "economy," "culture," etc. To be sure, any system studied by political scientists has all these

TABLE I RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SYSTEM DIMENSIONS

Policy Flow Sub-Phase	Policy Flow Phase	Coordinates		Basic Goal	Problem	Style	Situation of Responsibility
8		Subst-Fdtl	8	Effectiveness	Cultural	Ideological	Purpose
1	Formulation	Fdtl-Subst	1				
2		Fdtl-Proc	2	Stability	Constitutional	Legalistic	Foreknowledge
3	Deliberation	Proc-Fdtl	3				
4		Proc-Circ	4	Flexibility	Economic	Pragmatic	Choice
5	Resolution	Circ-Proc	5				
6		Circ-Subst	6	Efficiency	Power	Violent	Resources
7	Solution	Subst-Circ	7				
8		Subst-Fdtl	8	Effectiveness	Cultural	Ideological	Purpose
1		Fdtl-Subst	1				

aspects, and sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and other "social" scientists have developed their own methods for studying these aspects. The approach outlined here would rely heavily upon application of these methods. For example, when we want to compare the efficiency of two systems, we would turn to economics, which is better qualified than any other "policy science" to relate output to input. Sociologists would be best qualified to study, among other things, consensus, especially cultural. The several component disciplines of political science similarly have their specialized contributions to make. For example, historians of political philosophy are better qualified than anyone else to study the evolution of consensus on fundamentals for periods for which few primary sociological data are available. (And, incidentally, our diagram, divided into sixteen squares, provides a convenient scheme for classifying political philosophies.) Jurisprudence and, in the United States, constitutional law are the disciplines best suited for the study of procedural fundamentals. Different "schools" of administration, both public and business, are well qualified to compare systems with regard to their stability *and* efficiency. Psychologists, in addition to providing insights into the decision process,[9] may be most helpful in comparing the flexibility of systems. Students of communications are well qualified to study the flow of policy as it affects consensus, And so forth. But compartmentalization among these several disciplines should be avoided and, consequently, the tendency to think of the objects of their study as separate entities having an existence apart from one another. Any system studied by political science has all these aspects, but what makes it a political system is the processing, by means of certain procedures, of issues arising out of common problems that are obstacles on the road to goals. The procedures are applied to the whole range of problems faced—economic, power, cultural, constitutional, and others. Each of these problem areas provides the data for the several specialized disciplines. As soon as these problems are converted into issues and introduced into the flow of policy, they are, as it were, raised from the rock-bottom level of givenness, and the community that so raises them is a political system. If no problems are raised in this sense by an otherwise apparently somehow coherent aggregate of human beings, these people do not constitute a political system, except perhaps in the case of a very primitive and therefore pre-political community, unaware of its problems, its capacity to do something about them, and the feasibility of inventing new goals.

Just as this method avoids system compartmentalization, so it also avoids mechanical compartmentalization of functions, like legislation, execution, and adjudication, or policy-making and implementation. Another advantage is the more systematic and symmetrical relation in this approach between functions and the other dimensions of comparison—more than, *e.g.*, the *four* input and *three* output functions (of the American separation of powers) of Almond's method, or the seven categories of functional analysis advanced by Lasswell.[10] The latter, incidentally, could easily be "synchronized" with the eight subphases of the political process suggested here.

This approach, further, broadens the conventional identification of politics with power, mainly by returning to Thomas Hobbes' conception of power, which was wider than most contemporary usage of the term. Two advantages result. First, this method can be applied to any political system, regardless of size or scope, instead of being confined, as most current methods still are, to the state as defined by Max Weber. Some applications to different types of political systems, at different levels, will be sketched out below. Secondly, this approach facilitates the systematic inclusion in comparison of more factors, and more relevant factors, than are usually considered.

Partly because it broadens the conventional identification of politics with power, this method can offer improvements upon classifications like the following: constitutional democracy and totalitarianism (or autocracy), democratic and authoritarian, modern and traditional. The first of these pairs is usually defined with respect to power: its concentration and control, its exercise and scope. Friedrich's syndrome of totalitarianism, for example, cannot now be put on some kind of a scale that would permit the systematic comparison of political systems for the purpose of determining which are more or less totalitarian, or constitutional, autocratic or democratic.[11] In fact, his syndrome might lead to condemning as potentially totalitarian some new African states as soon as they reach a certain level of industrialization. The method suggested here, by contrast, while taking into account such factors as "totality" of control, terror, propaganda, and "one-party system," would relate all of these systematically to one another *and* to phasing of development, as well as success and the norm of responsibility.[12] A similar improvement could be made upon Eckstein's classification of authority patterns into democracy, authoritarianism, and constitutionalism, in which the main variables are "mass" and "elite," participation, choice, transmission of instructions, autonomy, and a framework of rules.[13] This scheme leads Eckstein to consider certain basic social relations and governmental functions as inherently undemocratic and authoritarian. For instance, if one condition of governmental democracy is "that elections must decide, in some basic way, the outcome of the competition for power and policies,"[14] then evidently there cannot be a high degree of congruence between this governmental authority pattern and the social authority pattern of relations between children and their parents. But the suggestion that, if the latter is not democratic, it therefore tends toward authoritarianism, with a greater or lesser admixture of social equivalents of constitutionalism, hardly helps our systematic understanding of the relation between governmental and non-governmental authority patterns. The method outlined here is designed to facilitate the systematic description and comparison of authority patterns of families and other social and political units.

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[9] "Decision-making" was deliberately avoided, because the phrase is redundant: a decision is not a decision unless it has been made. By speaking of decision-making we suggest repeated cut-offs between successive but "separated" powers or functions and thereby deny the fluid continuity of the political process.

[10] Gabriel A. Almond, "The Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), p. 17; Harold D. Lasswell, *The Decision Process* (University of Maryland, 1956), p. 2.

The various classifications that have been used to describe and explain French politics are another case in point: the traditionalist, bourgeois, and industrial orders; the traditions of authority, liberty, and equality; two "geological faults," one caused by the Great Revolution, the other by the Industrial Revolution; the forces of order and the forces of movement (311–314); or the representative and administrative traditions.[15] Each of these classifications, and the interpretation based upon it, contains valid insights which, moreover, need not contradict each other. For purposes of relating the phenomena covered by them to a systematic concept of politics, however, and for comparing them with similar or different but parallel phenomena in other political systems, they could easily be "translated" into the scheme proposed here.

Classifications based on the distinction between traditional and modern can also be refined by means of such a translation, which would widen their scope by asking questions like these: Is the stability of a traditional system more substantive or more procedural? Is a modernizing system deliberately recognizing new problems, or are these being forced on, or into, it? Is its flexibility greater with respect to constitutional procedures or technology, the production and distribution of goods, or defense against neighbors? And so forth.

Perhaps the greatest advantage that can be claimed for this approach is a very practical one, namely the easy translatability, noted in passing, of a wealth of extant material, both substantive and methodological, fruits of the labor of all the social sciences. To provide this easy convertibility was an intended purpose of this method. Conversely, the approach could be worked out in its present tentative form only by building it selectively upon the foundation of this wealth of available material. In order to put this method to use, no "staggering amount of empirical work . . . seems required."[16] The questions that it asks have already been asked of and answered about many political systems of all imaginable types, from a variety of small groups to the community of mankind. The empirical material is ready and waiting to be used in a comparative way.

One other advantage should be mentioned before moving on to possible objections. As already suggested in references to new and developing political systems, *e.g.*, in Africa, this scheme is applicable to them. (431–441) In other words, it avoids the ethnocentricity of some other approaches designed to serve similar ends. It especially avoids what might be called the "Anglophile fallacy," into which many western political scientists fall—for perfectly understandable reasons. (336–344)[17] It does *not* make universally valid criteria out of "the two-party system," regular alternation in office, a neutral civil service on the current British model, or "stable democracy." This method avoids the Anglophile fallacy by withdrawing our focus from the relatively transitory content of the problems faced by particular communities in periods of greatest interest to ourselves, and resetting our sights upon the basic goals that all political systems ever have been and will be pursuing. For the same reason it also avoids what might be called the "Cold War fallacy," into which many students of comparative government fall—for even more understandable reasons. They look upon all governments as either totalitarian or constitutionalist or somewhere between these two poles and tending in one or the other direction. They also sometimes convey the impression that the "history of all hitherto existing society" has been nothing but a determined preparation for the Cold War. One can almost detect the affinity of opposites between their approach and that of their Soviet counterparts. The latter assert that Soviet socialism is the penultimate manifestation of man's political genius. Our western colleagues seem to assume that western constitutional democracy is the final expression of human political genius. However, to the leaders of some of the new political systems in Africa, neither of these rather self-satisfied and ethnocentric approaches will appear very convincing. Nor does it to anyone else who retains faith in man's political inventiveness.

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[11] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 9–10.

[12] For a brief effort in this direction, see my *Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara* (Englewood Cliffs, 1962).

[13] Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton, 1961), p. 7. He calls for formulation of "more discriminating," "less ambiguous" categories; p. 45.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[15] Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System," in Beer and Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe* (New York, 1958), pp. 216–220.

[16] Eckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[17] This bias was brought to my attention by

III

Some objections to the approach outlined here can perhaps be anticipated. The first of these is likely to be directed at the definition of *community* that has been used, because it fails to make "the absence or presence of violence as a means to settle disputes" the main criterion.[18] For Haas,

> The ideal type of political community . . . assumes, therefore, that the condition toward which the process of integration is to lead is one in which a sufficient body of general consensus imposes limitations upon the violence of group conflict.[19]

Our notion of community, on the other hand, requires as a minimum only awareness of the pursuit of common goals, and of members' inability to solve alone the problems arising out of these goals. In this sense, there is a community between the parties to a civil or international war, as indeed between the contestants in the current Cold War, *e.g.*, with regard to the goal of the survival of mankind. Non-violence and loyalty to institutions, other components of Haas' definition, were deliberately left out of ours, as part of the effort to shift attention away from the sovereign state and related units. The old focus of attention easily leads to a preoccupation with questions of "obedience" that seems increasingly anachronistic. Community in our sense of the word is worth studying because there exists within it at least some consensus.

A second objection is likely to be raised against failure to make non-violence in the settlement of disputes a criterion of the *political system*. All we require of a community to consider it a political system is that it process its issues—regardless of its style, including the incidence of violence, regardless even of failures to solve its problems. The motive was the same as before; *e.g.*, there is a global political system and various international political systems within it. Most of these may not have been very successful, but they do process issues and sometimes solve some of their problems. They have politics and they are certainly worthy of study. Violence is one of several means of conducting politics and should not be excluded from our purview merely because its use fortunately has been reduced and regularized within many, and between some, modern states—but more in some than in others, which again shows the need for including the incidence of violence in comparisons.

A third objection may be made to apparent neglect of *institutions*, like presidents, cabinets, parliaments, and the like. This omission was intentional, in order to avoid fallacious comparisons, *e.g.*, between the United States Congress and the Swiss Parliament. What matters is not the formal function, like legislation, assigned to an institution by its name or the constitution, but the phases of the flow of policy to which the institution and its personnel contribute. For example, comparison might show that the Swiss Parliament contributes less to the resolution of major issues than the Congress, because in Switzerland resolution is often provided by the referendum. In the global system, formulation has been quite decentralized, except with regard to issues dealt with by some of the older special-

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Reginald Bartholomew of the University of Chicago. For an illustration, see Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 533, and *passim.*

[18] Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, 1957), cited by Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, 1958), p. xv.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

ized international agencies. So is resolution, while at least public deliberation is becoming increasingly centralized upon the United Nations. If we looked first for institutions and then asked what functions they performed, we would get a less comprehensive and less comparable picture than we do by first identifying the political process and then asking which subsystems and subcommunities contribute to its various phases.

A fourth objection might be raised against our apparent neglect of the role of *groups* in politics. This would, however, be based on a misreading of Part I. Communities whose members are aware of sharing special problems in common were discussed and are usually described as interest groups. The same is true of some of the subsystems discussed above. Again, use of the conventional words, including "political parties," was avoided on purpose, because it easily leads to erroneous universalization of the familiar, *e.g.*, by projecting the American relation between interest organizations and parties onto, say, French or Ghanaian politics, or by assuming that interest groups everywhere are most active in bringing problems to the attention of politicians (sub-phase 1) and then later in helping lower level administrators with the solution of their own special problems (sub-phase 8), when they may actually contribute more to deliberation or to resolution.

A fifth objection might be made to the relation between "society" and the political system that we are assuming: which is "prior"? Society and its institutions are chronologically prior in the sense that all deliberately created contemporary political systems were superimposed upon pre-existing societies. But these political systems often were superimposed precisely in order to bring about changes in the society or, frequently, the several societies comprising them, and in their institutions and values. After this kind of change, and to the extent that it brought intended or unintended results, habits and characteristics conventionally called "social" or "national" become effects rather than causes of political style. (192–193)

A sixth but certainly not final objection might raise the question of *agreement among investigators*. Even if two students accepted this approach, could they not come up with quite different descriptions of the same phenomena, *e.g.*, in the exercise of comparison immediately following? That is, could not an issue be described as violent by one scholar, and as pragmatic by another? This kind of disagreement should not be possible after further refinement of the method, especially with respect to comparisons. But even if it were unavoidable, the method would still have the merit of asking sets of questions that are both comprehensive and systematically interrelated.

IV

The purpose of systematic comparison is to facilitate explanation of differences. Without such explanations and the understanding to which they contribute, the conduct of responsible politics is impossible. In this sense, political science can contribute a great deal to the foreknowledge required for improvement of situations of responsibility. The following illustrations do no more than to sketch some suggestions of how this approach can be put to work to provide explanations.

A Backward Society and the Village in the Vaucluse. The southern Italian village of Montegrano analyzed by Banfield seems comparable to Wylie's Peyrane.[20] Banfield quotes Hume's saying that an explanation is a place where the mind comes to rest.[21] He considers the moral basis of the society "the strategic, or limiting factor."[22] This moral basis is the ethos of "amoral familism,"

> which has been produced by three factors acting in combination: a high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institutions of the extended family.[23]

Banfield suggests that

> The village of southern France described by Wylie . . . exemplifies, perhaps, the adaptation the ethos of amoral familism would make to improved economic circumstances. The average income in Peyrane seems to be at least twice that in Montegrano.[24]

Wylie, like Banfield, found that the people he studied "do not unite to work together for any cause. . . ."[25] But life is much better in Peyrane than in Montegrano. Wylie's explanation of his community's relative success is also strongly centered on the family.

These two political systems can easily be compared in terms of the incidence of issues in them. (Figure 16) In internal Montegrano politics, (a) stands for a mild anti-clericalism,

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[20] Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, 1958); Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse* (Cambridge, 1957).

[21] Banfield, *op. cit.*, p. 10, note 2.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[25] Wylie, *op. cit.*, p. 59.



Figure 16. Systematic comparisons of issues, A.

(b) for municipal elections, in which voting patterns are unstable and voting motivation mainly personal resentment against candidates, (c) for criminal violence, (d) for litigation, of which there is a great deal and (e) for petty corruption. In internal Peyrane politics, (a) anti-clericalism is a more lively issue, (b) local elections revolve around less extreme issues than in Montegrano, like the need for a new sewage system and public baths, (c) criminal or other violence is lacking, as are (d) litigation—the men say *"homme de loi, homme de merde"*[26] —and corruption. The mayor got parents of school children to threaten a unanimous school boycott (f), in order to put pressure on the French Government to provide a new school building and, at the same time, to regain local electoral support from the Communists, recently popular as a result of a successful ochre miners' strike (g). (A village near Montegrano had strikes, but not Montegrano itself.) The organization of annual dances presented a recurrent issue (h). Opposition between Communists and Roman Catholics, while not precluding occasional alliances in municipal campaigns, is a sometimes more ideological, sometimes more pragmatic issue (i). Organization of the hunt club and its affiliation with neighboring clubs is another hotly debated item (j).

The main differences between the two systems are apparent. In Montegrano, the issues are farther from the intersection of the two coordinates than in Peyrane, and there are fewer issues. The issue formulating phase is being performed very poorly in Montegrano. In Peyrane, it is being performed very well, at least relative to the problems that citizens consider important. The conduct of a kind of politics over questions of dance organization or hunt club policies keeps the flow of policy in constant circulation and enables it to pick up the "truly" political issues when necessary. This tends to strengthen procedural consensus and suggests one intermediate explanation for the different success of the two systems: the people of Peyrane are more experienced in the use of procedures on which they are generally agreed. The people of Montegrano are utterly inexperienced in the use of any political procedures, but if they were experienced, chances are they would be in profound disagreement on the propriety of whatever procedures they were familiar with. This in turn suggests that doubling the level of income in Montegrano by itself would not make it any more successful than it is, because its people are procedurally incapable of absorbing this economic improvement or even recognizing the new problems this would raise, and even less capable of solving them. We could almost describe Montegrano as a pre-political system, because its people are largely unaware of the feasibility of doing something about their common problems. If we compared Montegrano with an economically much more backward African tribe which, however, uses old and widely popular procedures for settling quarrels or allocating land, the Africans would be found more successful in operating their political system than the Montegranesi, and would probably prove more flexible in absorbing economic help from the outside.[27]

The pattern of external issues differs from the internal one, because it is part of the pattern of the national Italian or French systems, of which these villages are only small subsystems. (Figure 17) The external issues in Montegrano are (a) an uncomprehending opposition to the outside world which is believed to be utterly capricious in its operations as these affect the village; (b) party conflicts in national politics, on which voting behavior is as erratic as in local elections; (c) a slumbering potential of anti-state violence of the kind that has historically erupted in southern Italian peasant uprisings; and (d) relations with the State

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[27] See my *Politics in Africa*, p. 155 and *passim.*



FIGURE 17. Systematic comparisons of issues, B.

administration, which is concerned almost exclusively with the police aspects of its mission in Montegrano; and (e) the fear of corruption.

The external issues in Peyrane are (a) a more clearly defined feeling of suspicion for *les autres* of the outside world which is, however, believed to operate according to fairly rational procedures, of which the Peyranais avail themselves in order to get out of the French State what they want from it, *e.g.*, in national elections (b); (c) the use of organized violence in defense of firmly cherished values, as by the *maquis* against the Germans during World War II; and (d) relations with various branches of the bureaucracy, in which "contacts" are used pragmatically, but stopping short of bribery and corruption, in order to round out the square compartments of regulated existence into which the administration would like to fit the village and its citizens. In the case of the school issue (f), internal consensus generated by the mayor was applied to the national political process at those points where it was most likely to bring, and did bring, the desired results. Relations with other hunt clubs (j) and many other issues of "external relations"—transportation and communication, conscription, social security, etc.—also play a role, most of them arising near the central intersection.

The difference between the two patterns again revolves around the higher and more centripetal incidence of issues in Peyrane. Montegrano's internal and external patterns differ, in that the former shows no serious ideologism, whereas the latter shows no serious legalism. As members of their subsystem, the Montegranesi are not aware of any constitutional problems arising out of their relations with the Italian State. Consensus on procedures is strong, not because of general familiarity with them, but because the possibility of adapting them to changed needs does not occur to anyone. This strength of consensus, in turn, has the result of letting potential leaders of substantive reforms—like Montegrano's equivalent of Peyrane's school improvement movement—perceive their roles in a very stagnant, legalistic way: only men in official positions have the right to approach the prefect with such proposals, but they are unlikely to do so, because their official role calls for compliance with administrative instructions. Once more, Montegrano's underdevelopment is mainly procedural. New problems are not recognized *in* it, only *for* it by the outside administration, which then formulates and deliberates and, if things ever get that far, resolves issues for Montegrano. In Peyrane, by contrast, this process is operated by the local people themselves, or as part of the national policy flow with their participation. It is true that problems that have gone through the whole political process in Peyrane are not necessarily solved in the end: by the time *The Village in the Vaucluse* was published, the promised school had not yet been built. However, in terms of our criteria, non-solution of an otherwise fully processed problem has to be considered more successful than solution of a problem handled entirely by administrators who are not members of the community. The supreme value is balanced participation in politics itself: man is a political being.[28]

How can these differences be explained? We have already rejected an economic explanation in favor of a procedural one, by making the comparison with the African community. Banfield mentions an historical factor, the late and incomplete abolition of feudalism in southern Italy, by contrast with northern Italy and France. Since the Revolution, the peasants of the Vaucluse have owned their land and have been individually responsible for their own and their families' welfare. They have not been dependent upon resident or non-resident land-lords. Their community has been much more egalitarian. Peyrane lacks the equivalent of Montegrano's "upper-class circle," between whose members and the rest of the village there is very little community feeling. Individual economic responsibility has combined with egalitarianism to reduce fatalism in Peyrane. Small children, both before and in school, are brought up according to very regular rules, while they are raised capriciously in Montegrano. This could be explained by reference to "family values," but the overwhelming bias of the social sciences in favor of such sociological explanations warrants at least exploration of the reverse. According to this comparison, the much more pragmatic, erratic, capricious, and incomprehensible operation of Italian politics may have contributed to equally deficient child-raising habits, rather than the reverse. The Third Republic and the Italian Monarchy were contemporaries, but France did not have an equivalent of *trasformismo* in its worst form. French deputies had to "produce" for their constituents to get re-elected and—at least as important—the parliamentary system enabled them to produce. For purposes of the present illustration, we cannot pursue this question any further, but it seems something other than a chicken-or-egg question.

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[28] How much this approach owes to Aristotle should by now be evident.

Sources of political, but not only of political, authority in Peyrane are procedural, in Montegrano substantive. School children in Peyrane value honesty and non-violence most highly, whereas (though Banfield did not inquire into this) they probably value such qualities as physical strength, good looks, and substantive learning most highly in Montegrano. Banfield agrees with this estimate when he suggests that "Perhaps the best starting place [for reform] would be the organization of village soccer teams."[29] In Peyrane, *boules* is the favorite sport, with very complicated rules, about which people argue a great deal. Of course, *boules* is not cricket, but it is better than nothing and has been played for many generations in the Vaucluse. In any case, the problem of reform initiated from the outside does not arise for Peyrane. Its citizens are in comparatively sound situations of responsibility, in their own view. And if we or other outsiders were to advance proposals for the reform of the political system, the proposals would be torn up—as was the telegram sent to the local communist head of the *maquis* by the departmental "purge chief" upon the Liberation of the Vaucluse, with the words, "*Nous réglons nos affaires en famille!*"[30] *Regler* means "to rule" in the procedural sense.

France and Great Britain. The relative failure of French politics is often explained with reference to France's lack of consensus, and the success of British politics in terms of "agreement on fundamentals." We can compare present consensus in the two countries by showing the close clustering of major British issues around the central intersection, and the centrifugal scattering of French issues which shows up strongly in the direction of violence and ideologism. If our mind will come to rest in the England of Henry VIII, we can begin an explanation with his success in making the single problem of relations with Rome the dominant issue of his reign, and in solving this problem in an effective manner. Formulation and solution were of greatest concern in this period. Next, in the seventeenth century, this previous success in solving the religious problem facilitated the processing of another single problem, the overwhelming importance of which was generally recognized, namely, the problem of the constitution. It was solved with the help of ideological commitment (even though new issues about the already "solved" religious problem were raised) and the use of organized force in the Civil Wars. After the Glorious Revolution, sufficient constitutional consensus had been built up to enable the British to be first in recognizing the possibilities of the Industrial Revolution, another problem of single undiluted impact upon the system, and to solve the contemporary manifestations of this problem.

In the French case, the religious, constitutional, and industrial revolutions, each accorded priority by different subsystems, made a simultaneous impact, and violence was used not only to attempt resolution of each issue, but also to resolve the issue of priority among them. As a result, the use of violence itself became an issue. Much less constitutional consensus than in Britain was built up, none of the problems was solved effectively, and the issues down to this day continue to arise at the extremes. French politicians more often enjoy authority from identification with the substantive goals of the groups they lead, than from identification with parliamentary procedures, at least by comparison with British politicians. The same difference is echoed in former colonies of these two powers.[31]

The Soviet Union. This approach can be used to compare different periods of one political

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[29] Banfield, *op, cit.*, p. 173.

[30] Wylie, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[31] See *Politics in Africa*, p. 143.



FIGURE 18. Styles in successive periods of the Soviet system.

system and thereby to help explain its development. Since the Bolshevik Party "became the State," we have to start this sketch with Lenin before the Revolution (1), when he had nothing but ideological commitment. (Figure 18) Next "comes the Revolution," in which violence was used ruthlessly and ideological principle sometimes sacrificed for pragmatic considerations (2). During the N.E.P. period, Soviet style turned more pragmatic, still less ideological, and somewhat less violent (3). Under Stalin, it was pragmatically violent (4). Since his death, Soviet internal politics has become less violent, somewhat more ideological but also more purposive, and slightly "legal" without becoming excessively legalistic (5). Issues in Soviet domestic policies—both publicized and, more important, behind the scenes—seem to be clustering closer around the central intersection than ever before, though still not as closely as in constitutional systems.

There is no element of determinism in this account. Lenin was initially ideological because of his exclusion and self-exclusion from "legitimate" Russian politics. In the Revolution, power and other resources were harnessed to the ideologically defined goals in order to solve the ideologically defined problems. Because of changes in the environment of the revolutionaries, they also began to show a degree of flexibility, especially with regard to economic aspects of their problems. In the next phase of development, they *could* have turned toward legalism, as colonial independence movements sometimes do at a parallel stage of development, especially if they base their claim to independence on treaty obligations of the colonial power or on their "rights" under constitutional documents like the United Nations Charter. The Soviets did not turn toward legalism partly as a consequence of the Marxist rejection of the state. Similarly, Marxist preoccupation with substantive economic problems led to the increased pragmatism of the N.E.P. period. Development in the last two phases (until the present) suggests—as would comparison with other totalitarian systems—that there are no "inherent laws" of totalitarian development. More important, phases (2) to (5) illustrate the variety of totalitarianism that is logically and practically possible. An understanding of this variety may be of use in preventing the rise of and combatting totalitarianism.

Sources of authority have also been subject to change in Soviet history. At first, theoretical brilliance or orthodoxy were the most important sources. Revolutionary achievement followed. Both are substantive sources, the former being goal-oriented, the latter problem-oriented. During the N.E.P. period, managerial skills, partly procedural, began to be recognized for the first time, and they have increased in importance in the post-Stalin decade. Meanwhile, however, substantive sources continue to predominate for men in the top positions: identification with the Revolution or with its major figures, demonstrated ability in manipulating the machinery of power or propaganda, "production victories," and the like. But one can anticipate that, when the revolutionary generation has died, one of the hitherto most important sources of authority will dry up, and more procedural trends may develop.

World Politics. Since the most important phases of international politics are being conducted increasingly by the leaders of states instead of professional diplomats and military officers as formerly, these leaders' sources of authority and the style of their political systems are of some interest. (442–465) Despite poorer communications, international relations until World War I had a more unified style than they have today. Diplomats and military who, respectively, performed most of the deliberation and resolution, operated within a fairly strong consensus on the rules of diplomacy and warfare. Today, though improved communications are centralizing deliberation, and even the formulation of issues, in the global political process, such consensus is lacking. The sources of authority, for example, of the current candidates for participation in a summit meeting vary widely. A summit meeting, once it reaches agreement on its agenda (formulation of issues), would presumably conduct deliberation in hopes of reaching resolution or, at least,



FIGURE 19. Imbalance in the international system, old and new.

agreement on the postponement of resolution for issues that, for the time being, can be settled only violently. But of the four participants, only Macmillan and Kennedy have procedural sources of authority and much experience with deliberation conducted according to clearly understood rules. General De Gaulle's military career and his achievements as leader of the Free French and founder of the Fifth Republic endow him with quite a different type of authority, somewhat closer to that held by President Eisenhower at the time of his first summit conference. Khrushchev's sources of authority have just been adumbrated. Deliberation of world political issues has the disadvantages of an unbalanced system, already mentioned earlier. It also changes the types of issues that are generated for world politics. Under traditional diplomacy, typical issues related to legal and power problems. Flexibility was the most persistent goal. Today, cultural and economic problems, or the cultural and economic aspects of legal and power problems, are more often introduced into the international flow of policy. Stability is the most persistent goal. (Figure 19) This has a feedback effect by increasing the proportion of ideologically and pragmatically inclined participants in world politics, *e.g.*, in the case of the United States the U.S.I.A. and the C.I.A. Ideologism and pragmatism have been described as true opposites, as have legalism and violence. This means that they cannot "co-exist" in a system at any one time. This fits the international system, in which one political style is usually succeeded by its opposite. While von Clausewitz's dictum was still valid, war was the continuation of diplomacy by other means. Today, subversion and guerrilla warfare are the continuation of propaganda by other means. Perhaps this is the crucial difference between old fashioned international relations and the Cold War.

The importance of propaganda and the possibilities presented by world-wide communications suggest another use to which this approach might be put. An understanding of the style of a political system and its subsystems in terms of the categories suggested here can be of help in deciding how to "pitch" one's appeal or what sort of "image" to present. Specialists in public relations have, of course, been doing that for decades, in terms of their own categories, and the great propaganda agencies are doing it today. Skillful politicians of all ages have accomplished the same thing more or less intuitively. Most opinion polls or attitude surveys concentrate upon the substance of their subjects' feelings, and this substance has been known to change even more rapidly and more radically than the issues themselves. By getting an accurate picture of the style of politics along lines suggested here, on the other hand, one should be able to get at the more enduring patterns of attitudes and behavior, because this approach focuses on the manner in which people are likely to process whatever problems come their way, rather than on specific reactions to the substance of particular problems. This should be of some use in world politics, too, because of the quick succession of vast changes in the problems that make up its raw material.

This instability and the fluctuating, overlapping, intermeshing, clashing, simultaneously centralizing and fragmenting, expanding and contracting character of world politics points to one final advantage of the method that has been tentatively put forward in this paper. In the beginning (note 6), a warning was issued—in what may have seemed a rather cavalier fashion—against confusing "stability" with "boundary maintenance." Whether this latter function was transferred to politics from biology or physics, in conventional sovereign nation states boundary maintenance is taken care of by the military together with customs and immigration police. But students of politics are no longer concerned primarily with this unit of politics. Political science is concerned with politics at all levels, in all kinds of communities. Today, and in the immediate future, its attention will be drawn especially to politics in the global community of mankind, in and for which a political system is slowly being built up. And the boundaries for that political system do not have to be maintained, they only have to be grown into.

SUBCOMMITTEES: THE MINIATURE LEGISLATURES OF CONGRESS[1]

GEORGE GOODWIN, JR.
University of Rhode Island

Woodrow Wilson spoke of the "little legislatures of Congress," in referring to House and Senate standing committees. Perhaps it is not out of place, then, to call subcommittees the "miniature legislatures." Little systematic academic attention has been given them since Burton French's discussion in this REVIEW in 1915.[2] They are worth understanding, however, for subcommittees often leave an indelible mark on legislation. As one Congressional staff member stated, "Given an active subcommittee chairman working in a specialized field with a staff of his own, the parent committee can do no more than change the grammar of a subcommittee report." This article deals with the reasons for the existence and growth of subcommittees, with the variety of ways in which they are organized, and with the issues and methods involved in their control. Conference committees are outside the scope of this study.

I. THE GROWTH OF SUBCOMMITTEES

Observers have often deplored the proliferation of subcommittees, on the same general grounds that Wilson urged in his criticism of the committee system, both for their dispersion and for their irresponsible concentration of power. Their persistence and extension nevertheless testifies to a functional utility—their convenience and congeniality to the working habits and purposes of members. When the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the number and consolidated and rationalized the jurisdictions of the standing committees, the average number of subcommittees per committee—as might be expected—increased; and the trend has continued upward. In 1945 the count was 180; of these, 106 were in the House, 68 in the Senate, and 6 from joint committees.[3] By 1961 the number had grown rather more than one-third to a total of 253 of which 131 were in the House, 109 in the Senate and 13 from joint committees.[4] Senator Dirksen has described the problem this increase has caused for some Congressmen:

> I would not dare to say to the people of Illinois that I knew all about all the things that go on, when I serve on five subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, on seven subcommittees of the Committee on the Judiciary, and on three subcommittees of the Committee on Government Operations. To do so I would really need roller skates to get from one subcommittee to another, without even then knowing entirely everything about every subject matter which is considered by the various committees.[5]

A blanket condemnation of the growth of subcommittees, however, is likely to ignore their uses. The most obvious of these is to cope with the growing and shifting specialization of legislative activities as the range and complication of governmental concerns extend to new frontiers. Some changes in the subcommittee structure plainly reflect congressional adjustments to such developments. Senate Banking and Currency, for example, dropped a subcommittee concerned with rents and created a new one on international finance. House Foreign Affairs recently divided its subcommittee on the Near East and Africa into two, and Senate Foreign Relations added one on disarmament. House Judiciary has added a subcommittee on civil rights and Senate Labor one on juvenile delinquency.

Again, some division of committee functions helps solve the ever-present problem of securing a quorum. A wisely worked out subcommittee system can also cut down the total amount of time each member is required to spend with the affairs of a given committee, and at the same time allow for a greater degree of specialization. Senator Robert LaFollette commented on this in 1948:

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[1] The author is indebted to the Faculty Research Council of the University of Massachusetts for funds to support the study that made this article possible. Much of the information was gathered from interviews with members and staff connected with each House and Senate committee in 1960 and 1961.

[2] "Subcommittees of Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 9 (Feb., 1915), pp. 68–92. Congressman French (R., Idaho) later served on the naval appropriations subcommittee, and after retirement from the House taught political science at Miami University (Ohio).

[3] Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, *The Organization of Congress*, Hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1945), p. 1039.

[4] *Congressional Record* (daily ed.), July 18, 1961, p. 11908.

[5] *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 1417.

The essential and important difference between a hodgepodge committee system and an integrated scheme is not in the relative number of subcommittees, but rather in the formalization of fixed and definite jurisdictions so that each new piece of legislation in a given field can have the benefit of the staff work and specialized experience of members of Congress.[6]

Further, subcommittees have often "been an outgrowth of internal friction and resentment generated by one-man rule."[7] They can, within limits, allow less senior legislators to gain prestige and to follow their interests and exploit their abilities as they could not in a seniority-governed committee system which tolerated no subcommittees. It is significant, for example, that Albert Rains has been able to establish a subcommittee on housing of the House Banking and Currency Committee, when all its other subcommittees are designated by numbers and given no clear jurisdiction. Other examples are John Moss's subcommittee on governmental information (Government Operations, House) and Henry Jackson's policy machinery subcommittee (Government Operations, Senate).

Whether committees are adapting to increasingly difficult times, providing for greater specialization or giving less senior men a position of greater importance, there comes a point of diminishing returns, and it would seem that Senator Dirksen had passed this point when he confessed his inability to keep up with events. This is largely a problem of the Senate and not of the House, for there are roughly one-quarter as many members to share in a task equal to that of the House of Representatives. An analysis of the number of subcommittee assignments per member in both houses shows that a Representative is likely to have two subcommittee assignments at the most, while a Senator is likely to have at least six.[8]

TABLE I. COMMITTEES THAT HAVE RESISTED SUBCOMMITTEE AUTONOMY, 87TH CONGRESS*

Type	Senate	House
No standing subcommittees	Finance	Rules Un-American Activities Ways and Means
Numbered subcommittees		Armed Services Banking and Currency District of Columbia
Full committee handles major share of work	Foreign Relations Government Operations	Foreign Affairs Post Office and Civil Service

* The two space committees are too recently created and work in too changing a field to be included in this table. The Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences had no subcommittees in the 87th Congress, though some *ad hoc* subcommittees had been used previously. The House Committee on Science and Astronautics started its life without subcommittees, moved to number subcommittees without fixed jurisdiction and in 1961 established named subcommittees with fairly clear jurisdiction.

II. SUBCOMMITTEE ORGANIZATION

There is a startling variety in the pattern of subcommittee organization. Some committees have no subcommittees at all; others a few, perhaps designated by number only and without clear jurisdiction; and some perform most of their important work in full committee, even though they have a well-defined subcommittee system. These committees are listed in Table I. Other committees establish a large number of subcommittees with clear jurisdiction and grant them wide autonomy. What determines whether a committee will subdivide its work or not?

When committee work involves a great deal of detail or when it includes a number of distinct subject matter areas, there is a tendency to form subcommittees, the more so if the work is technical and non-controversial, so that it matters less who handles which assignment; no one wants to be left out of a fight that matters to him. The business of the appropriations and judiciary committees involves so much burdensome detail that subcommittees are inevitable, even though some of the work is controversial. The relatively non-controversial committees concerned with administration, interior and public works (each a consolidation of a number of different committees brought together under the Legislative Reorganization Act) have such varied tasks to perform that they also inevitably work through subcommittees. On the other hand, committees are less likely to subdivide their work if it involves broad policy rather than great detail, or if it does not fall easily into categories that can be assigned to regular subcommittees. The more controversial this work, the less likely it is to be consigned to subcommittee autonomy. The activities of the House Committee on Rules (which determines the conditions under which most major legislation reaches the floor) and on Un-American Activities (which is primarily an investigating committee) do not lend themselves to subcommittee organization, except, in the latter case, for the limited purpose of holding hearings. A somewhat better case could be made for the use of subcommittees on the two revenue-raising committees, yet they generally handle broad matters which senior members are reluctant to turn over to subcommittees.[9] While the foreign relations committees have carefully organized subcommittee systems for study purposes, because of the broad nature of their work, the major share of it is done by the full committee.

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[6] Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, *Evaluation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946*, Hearings, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1948), p. 63.

[7] Stewart L. Udall, "A Defense of the Seniority System," *New York Times Magazine*, January 13, 1957. p. 64

[8] In the 86th Congress, only a third of the House members had two standing committee assignments; the rest had one. Approximately half of the House committee members were assigned to only one subcommittee. In the Senate, however, one-third of the Senators had three committee assignments and the rest had two. Over half of the members of standing committees were assigned to three or more subcommittees.

Beyond these limits deriving from the character of a committee's assigned tasks, organization reflects to a great extent the nature of the chairman—his personality, his political ideology and his concept of his role. No recent change of chairmen has illustrated this better than the succession of Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem to the top position on the House Committee on Education and Labor in the 87th Congress. His predecessor, Graham Barden of North Carolina, had succeeded in bottling up many liberal proposals in the eight years of his chairmanship. He formed only those subcommittees made necessary by the varied jurisdiction of his committee, and he saw that they were headed by trusted conservatives, passing over second-ranking Powell in the process. In 1961, Powell brought a burst of activity to the committee which was not expected by some observers, since he had not previously taken his committee work seriously. He followed a novel approach of creating three subcommittees on education and three on labor. Two of these six subcommittees were called "general," two "special" and two "select," but these titles meant nothing. By increasing the number of subcommittees he was able, without depriving existing subcommittee chairmen of their position, to find chairmanships for younger liberals such as Edith Green, James Roosevelt and Frank Thompson, Jr., and he channelled much of President Kennedy's controversial social program to their subcommittees.

A conservative chairman will not generally want to see much development of subcommittees, especially if he heads one of the important control committees of Congress—House Rules, House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, House and Senate Appropriations. Tight conservative control of these five committees can thwart many legislative programs of the most liberal Congress. As has been noted, the work of the first three does not lend itself to subdivision, while the work on appropriations demands it. If it were physically possible to perform the burdensome work of the appropriations committees without subcommittees, one can be sure that conservative chairmen would do so. As it is, they have to content themselves with careful appointment of subcommittee chairmen. For a conservative chairman, perhaps the next best thing to having no subcommittees is to have numbered subcommittees without specified jurisdiction and to assign bills to them according to their responsiveness to his desires. All 87th Congress examples were in the House, and the chairmen were all Southern conservatives of the older generation: Carl Vinson of Georgia, chairman of Armed Services[10] and 77 at the beginning of the Congress; Brent Spence of Kentucky, chairman of Banking and Currency,[11] 86; and John McMillan of South Carolina, chairman of District of Columbia, 62.[12] Vinson works largely through *ad hoc* subcommittees established to handle specific pieces of legislation, an approach which has been characterized as "the chairman's secret weapon." Finally, the fact that the major part of the work of Senate Government Operations and House Post Office and Civil Service is performed by the full committee can be explained in part by the fact that both chairmen are Southern conservatives.[13]

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[9] The House Ways and Means Committee has made use of *ad hoc* subcommittees but has not given them power to recommend legislation to the full committee. In the old days of tariff legislation, the majority members of this committee regularly caucused as a sort of subcommittee to mark up the bill, in order to develop a united front when the bill was reported. See E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York, 1935).

[10] This committee has not had subcommittees with clear jurisdiction since the Republican 80th Congress.

[11] One subcommittee on housing has considerable autonomy.

[12] Chairman McMillan did not abandon subcommittees with assigned jurisdiction until the 86th Congress.

[13] It should also be noted that Senate Government Operations is one of the smallest committees in the Senate and all members have two other committee assignments, so there is relatively little membership pressure for the creation of subcommittees.

Not all chairmen resist the development of subcommittees. Some may subdivide committee work from a desire for greater committee democracy. Clare Engle, when he was chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, deliberately held his committee with a loose rein. He took a hand in drawing rules which provided for a unique degree of democratic participation in committee activities and a large measure of subcommittee autonomy. Or some may create subcommittees for some strategic reason. It may be a move to prevent a rebellion on the part of the members, which seems to have been the reason for the creation of some subcommittees on House Education and Labor by Chairman Barden; or it may be a desire to maintain friendly relations with outside groups. The chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reportedly found it advisable to divest himself of direct contact with the problems of the aging, for he wanted to remain on good terms with the American Medical Association. A subcommittee was created in the 86th Congress to handle this subject and it was given great autonomy. In the 87th Congress it was made a select committee of the Senate and thus divorced entirely from the Labor Committee.

Two other factors play a part in encouraging the creation of subcommittees, the large size of the House and the desire of outside groups for regular points of contact in Congress. There is certainly pressure for the establishment of subcommittees in the House, which acts as a counterbalance to the tendency of House chairmen to maintain more centralized control. There are more members looking for something to do, and more demands from them for some means of achieving public recognition. Secondly, both non-governmental pressure groups and government agencies find it to their advantage to have subcommittees, preferably with permanent staffs, with which they can work. As an example, both Judiciary subcommittees on immigration, one chaired by Representative Walter and the other by Senator Eastland, provide a point of contact for interests believing in a restrictive immigration policy. Liberal interests in the field have given strong support to Senator Philip Hart's special judiciary subcommittee to investigate problems connected with refugees and escapees.

Most subcommittees are organized to handle a specific functional problem of government such as agricultural production, Indian affairs, education, flood control or disarmament. Some committees, however, have experimented with different bases of organization. The House Agriculture Committee, for example, has two sets of subcommittees, one concerned with broad agricultural problems such as farm production, and another with specific agricultural commodities. Some staff members prefer the former as a means of getting committee members to take a broader view of agricultural policy. Committee members themselves seem to prefer the commodity organization as a better means of representing their specific clientele interests.[14] It is significant that the commodity subcommittees generally win if there is a jurisdictional dispute between them and the functional subcommittees.

In another variation, both House and Senate foreign affairs committees have subcommittees organized on a geographical basis (Europe, Africa, etc.) as well as those organized to handle such functional problems as disarmament and national security. They are all called "consultative" subcommittees and they are used primarily as a means of liaison with the Department of State.[15] Legislative proposals are handled by the full committee or by *ad hoc* subcommittees, though recently the House committee has begun to assign some bills to the consultative subcommittees. This practice may lead to jurisdictional disputes as to whether a matter should be referred to a geographical or a problem subcommittee.

Subcommittee organization in the Senate is rarely identical with that of the parallel House committee. Where their jurisdiction falls into natural subdivisions, subcommittee organization is more likely to be similar. The Interior committees are examples; incidentally, they are the only committees to have maintained almost the same subcommittee organization since the 80th Congress. The two committees on Government Operations, on the other hand, have a far more vague jurisdiction, encompassing the entire field of government. Their subcommittees tend far more to reflect the interests of the chairmen and individual members.[16]

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[14] Charles O. Jones found that, with three exceptions, members of the House Agriculture Committee in the 85th Congress served on subcommittees which dealt with commodities produced in their districts. "Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), p. 358.

[15] The activity of these consultative subcommittees varies greatly with each chairman. Senator John F. Kennedy's African affairs subcommittee, for example, was largely inactive because its chairman found other demands on his time more pressing.

[16] In the 86th Congress, the House Committee on Government Operations had these subcom-

Even though the House and Senate Interior Committees have an almost identical subcommittee pattern, this fact does not seem to lend impetus to bicameral subcommittee cooperation. In fact, there is very little cooperation between House and Senate subcommittees. A questionnaire sent to all committees produced only four examples of joint subcommittee hearings held in recent years: the District of Columbia committees on tax problems, government operations committees on intergovernmental relations, the judiciary committees on the Immigration Act of 1952 and the public works committees on Niagara power. Six sets of committees on Niagara power. But six sets of parallel committees reported fairly close staff cooperation along subcommittee lines.[17]

III. CONTROL OF SUBCOMMITTEES

Neither the House nor the Senate maintains any kind of detailed control over subcommittee organization. This may seem surprising, for subcommittee recommendations often become the law of the land without suffering major changes in the full committee or in the entire Congress. It is in keeping, however, with the general pattern of committee autonomy and the lack of any very effective party discipline.

The rules of the House and Senate do specify certain procedures which must be followed by subcommittees. For example, all subcommittee hearings, with certain stated exceptions, are to be open, and a subcommittee quorum may not be less than one-third of the membership save at a meeting for the purpose of taking testimony.[18] Laxity in matters of procedural fairness has raised civil liberties issues from time to time in the course of subcommittee investigating activities, particularly when contempt penalties are invoked. An extensive literature deals with this topic, which is outside the scope of the present study.

The parent house has occasionally called for the establishment of specific subcommittees or instructed certain subcommittees to carry out a designated task, but the overwhelmingly prevalent practice is to leave these decisions to the committees.[19] The parent house may also specifically call for a subcommittee report to be made directly to the floor without the intervening approval of the full committee.[20] Again, however, practice overwhelmingly dictates that the full committee approve and submit subcommittee reports. The major house control is that of granting additional funds for subcommittee staff and expenses beyond the ten positions (four professional and six clerical) automatically allowed each committee by the Legislative Reorganization Act. Committees, however, are rarely denied their requested budgets.

The most effective controls over subcommittees lie clearly in the hands of the individual committees. Whether these controls are exercised by a dominant senior minority of the membership or by a majority of the full committee varies from one committee to the next. There is likely to be a tug of war between the chairman, often joined by other senior members, and the junior members. The latter may attempt to win greater control because they do not agree with the policies of the senior members, because they are impatient with committee inactivity on a particular topic, or even because they seek the publicity that can come from a skillfully timed subcommittee investigation. Chairmen are generally fearful of letting too much power slip into the hands of members. Many chairmen are painfully aware that a subcommittee, especially an investigating subcommittee, can capture the limelight and severely limit the freedom of action of the parent committee. A subcommittee tail, in other words, has more than once wagged a committee dog.[21] Often, though by no means always, chairmen are conservatives reluctant to share power with their more liberal junior colleagues. Again, a chairman may hold out against delegating subcommittee powers to individual committee members because he lacks confidence in their competence or readiness to discharge committee duties adequately.

In this struggle, the chairman deals from a stacked deck. He should be able to maintain

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mittees: executive and legislative reorganization, military operations, government activities, intergovernmental relations, foreign operations, and monetary affairs; the Senate Committees had: investigations, reorganization and international organizations, and national policy machinery.

[17] Committees concerned with appropriations, armed services, District of Columbia, foreign affairs, judiciary and labor.

[18] See section 133 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, P.L. 601, 79th Cong., 2d sess.; House Rule XI; Senate Rule XXV.

[19] Charles L. Watkins and Floyd M. Riddick, *Senate Procedure* S. Doc. 93, 85th Cong., 1st sess. 1958), p. 156 and Asher Hinds, *Precedents of the House* (Washington, 1907), Vol. III, sec. 1754.

[20] *Senate Procedure*, p. 529 and *Precedents of the House*, Vol. IV, sec. 4551.

[21] For a fascinating example see Bernard Schwartz, *The Professor and the Commissions* (New York, 1959).

control even against rank-and-file rebellion, unless he is politically inept. He can, in most cases, establish subcommittees, determine their size, establish party ratios, appoint the members, maintain *ex officio* membership, control the referral of bills and either assign or hold back staff and money for subcommittee operations.

The power of a chairman to establish subcommittees has been challenged in the courts on the ground that a competent tribunal must be created by resolution of the full committee. A federal Court of Appeals, however, stated that "it is the unvarying practice of the Senate to follow the method of creating and appointing subcommittees which was employed in this instance."[22] This allows the chairman primary control over subcommittee structure. As already noted, he may allow no subcommittees, work primarily by means of *ad hoc* subcommittees, create standing subcommittees but give them numbers and assign them no continuing jurisdiction, or he may establish standing subcommittees with clearly outlined jurisdiction and some degree of autonomy.

Subcommittee members are chosen by a variety of methods, depending upon custom and individual committee rules. They may be designated by the chairman alone or in consultation with the ranking minority member. Appointments may be designed to punish slackers or to punish enemies and reward friends. Often senior members will be appointed to more subcommittees than junior members, as a means of preventing the newer men from gaining too much control—or introducing their apprenticeships gradually, as a chairman might prefer to put it. Membership approval of appointments is not required on a majority of committees. Those interested in limiting the powers of committee chairmen often advocate rules that subcommittee chairmen be chosen on the basis of seniority, so as to remove an element of discretion, and hence influence, on the part of chairmen. The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs is the only one which has such a provision written into its rules, but the pattern evidently is widely followed. One of the major reasons for this is that senior members are often unwilling to sit under junior subcommittee chairmen in the seniority-conscious Congress. In the 86th Congress eighteen House committees had subcommittees and in half of these no senior member of the majority party had been by-passed in the choice of subcommittee chairmen.[23] In the Senate, five of the fourteen subdivided committees followed seniority.[24] Interestingly, in the less party-oriented Senate, two Republicans were allowed subcommittee chairmanships in the Democratic 86th Congress. J. Glenn Beall of Maryland was chairman of the business and commerce subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia and George D. Aiken of Vermont, of the Canadian affairs subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. In both these cases, the geographical proximity of the senator's constituents to the subject matter of his subcommittee's jurisdiction gave him a special interest (and prerogative?) in the assignment, there being no Democratic senator from either Maryland or Vermont.[25]

Party ratios on subcommittees may also be controlled by the chairmen, since the full house exercises no control here. The full committee is less likely to reverse the decisions of large subcommittees, especially with a safe majority party margin. Yet sometimes a small subcommittee can serve a chairman's needs, for he may be helped by absenteeism in the minority party. The ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Armed Services asked, unsuccessfully, at its organization meeting in 1961 that the party ratio on the special investigations subcommittee be raised from three-to-two to four-to-three, so that "at least two members could be present most of the time."[26] Occasional complaints reach the stage of floor debate, as in 1951 when Clare E. Hoffman called for a resolution instructing the chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations to divide subcommittee membership between Democrats and Republicans "in as near as possible the same ratio that exists in the House" instead of using this device to "punish members who voted against his pet idea of the way appropriations bills should be handled."[27] A survey of subcommittee ratios during the 86th Congress shows little uniformity. Both houses had roughly two-to-one party ratios, and yet only six Senate subcommittees and no House subcommittees had ratios less favorable to the minority party than two-to-one, and the great majority were more favorably divided.[28]

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[22] Meyers v. United States, 171 F (2d) 800 (1948).

[23] One or more senior members did *not* hold a subcommittee chairmanship on the committees on Agriculture, Appropriations, District of Columbia, Education and Labor, Government Operations, Judiciary, Post Office and Civil Service, Science and Astronautics, and Ways and Means. Neither the Rules nor the Un-American Activities committees have subcommittees.

[24] One or more of the senior members did *not* have a subcommittee chairmanship on the committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, Government Operations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Judiciary, and Rules and Administration. Neither Aeronautical and Space Sciences nor the Finance committee had subcommittees. District of Columbia and Foreign Relations each had one Republican subcommittee chairman.

[25] Prior to the 84th Congress, the Judiciary Committee had a reciprocity custom, after a change in party control, of giving the previous chairman of the full committee a subcommittee chairmanship. Senator Wiley was chairman of patents in the 81st and 82d Congresses. Senator McCarran was chairman of judicial machinery in the 83d Congress.

Chairmen and ranking minority members often retain *ex officio* membership on all subcommittees. While this may not mean that these committee leaders attend regularly, it is another means of exerting control if a need is felt. The rules of ten of the twenty House committees give *ex officio* membership to both chairman and ranking member, while in the case of Armed Services and Judiciary, only the chairman is automatically a member. There is no provision for *ex officio* membership by ranking minority members in the Senate, but the chairman is made a member in five of the sixteen committees.

The less automatic the referral of legislative matters to subcommittees, the greater the chairman's powers. In three House committees in the 86th Congress, for example (Armed Services, Banking and Currency and District of Columbia), subcommittees had no clear field of jurisdiction and referral was entirely at the discretion of the chairman. Other committee chairmen have used this device from time to time in the past. Charles Wolverton, Republican chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce during the 80th Congress (1947–1948) reportedly abolished subcommittee specialization because he was in basic disagreement with some of his senior Republican colleagues. Even the timing of referral can be a means of exerting the chairman's power. Lister Hill of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee does not refer important legislative matters until he has done careful preparatory groundwork, whereas in many committees, referral is handled by the clerk in a routine fashion.

Chairmen are also in a position to control committee staff assignments. Most prefer to rotate staff members and not have them permanently assigned to a subcommittee. If a subcommittee can call a permanent staff its own it has taken a major step toward independence from the full committee. In the 86th Congress a total of sixteen subcommittees (a sixth of the total) had their own staff. These were subcommittees of Banking and Currency, Government Operations, Judiciary and Public Works. In the Senate, as might be expected, there was evidence of greater subcommittee autonomy. Forty-one—roughly half of the 86 subcommittees—had their assigned permanent staff. These were subcommittees of Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Government Operations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Judiciary, Labor and Public Welfare and Rules and Administration.[29] The quality of subcommittee staff varies greatly. Particularly on the Senate Judiciary Committee—and despite the admonitions to the contrary in the Legislative Reorganization Act—positions are used as patronage appointments for various subcommittee members, and this practice generally results in inefficiency of operation. Some newer members of this Committee carefully refrain from asking to have their men taken on the staffs so that they will not have to reciprocate when they have a subcommittee of their own.

Chairmen can make skillful use of the allocation of funds to subcommittees. A subcommittee appropriation with few strings attached allows great freedom in the hiring of staff and other subcommittee activities. Also, the allocation of travel funds can be used effectively to reward and punish members.

Finally, a chairman may, in the case of investigating subcommittees, withhold or restrict the subpoena power. Bernard Schwartz, recounting his experiences as staff man for the legislative oversight subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, spoke to this point:

> If Moulder [the subcommittee chairman] and I were given the subpoena power and the authority to secure a competent, loyal staff, we would

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[26] House Committee on Armed Services, "The Organization of the House Committee on Armed Services," Committee print, Feb. 16, 1961, p. 9.

[27] *Congressional Record*, 82d Cong. 1st sess. (1951), p. 1174.

[28] The Senate exceptions are Appropriations subcommittees for commerce, interior and treasury; Judiciary's subcommittees on patents, codification and constitutional rights.

[29] This information has been gathered from House and Senate telephone directories, legislative calendars of the various committees and interviews with staff members of the 36 committees.

have obtained the very tools we needed to undertake a thorough probe which no one could control.[30]

Taking all these factors into consideration, the Senate Finance Committee is the most centralized committee in Congress. It has no standing subcommittees whatsoever. Its budget is one of the lowest. In the 87th Congress the Committee had a staff of six, only one of whom was carried as a professional. While supposedly it uses the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, some of the less senior members on Finance claim that this staff is readily available only to the three top majority and two top minority members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means committees who make up the membership of the Joint Committee.[31] There is much dissatisfaction with the situation among those members of the Committee who disagree with Chairman Byrd's ultra-conservative views, but there are not enough of them to wrest control.

By all odds, the House Committee on Government Operations is the most decentralized committee in Congress. During Clare Hoffman's chairmanship in the 83d Congress, committee members not only mutinied, but even more unusual, they discussed the whole affair at some length on the floor of the House.[32] Representative Hoffman attempted to cut down on the activities of his standing subcommittees. He made great use of *ad hoc* subcommittees consisting of two Republicans and one Democrat, appointed Democrats without consulting the ranking minority member on the Committee, and in at least one instance evidently failed to notify the ranking Democrat of such a subcommittee's creation. These *ad hoc* subcommittees, according to the charges of the majority, conducted field investigations timed to influence local elections. Rebellion finally took place on July 15, 1953, when members voted 23 to 1 (6 members abstaining) to prohibit further creation of *ad hoc* subcommittees save by resolution of the full committee. They further voted to grant virtual autonomy to the five existing standing subcommittees, giving each the power to appoint staff members and to fix their pay, to subpoena witnesses and to hold hearings outside Washington. Throughout that Congress subcommittee chairmen signed their own expense vouchers. Even in defeat, however, Hoffman retained his powers to refer bills to subcommittees, and to approve the printing of subcommittee hearings and reports; and he used these to harass the rest of the committee members.[33]

Hoffman's successor, Democratic chairman William L. Dawson, a Negro from Chicago, has encountered no rebellion of this sort; he has also been either unwilling or unable or unambitious to centralize committee control greatly since the 83d Congress. As a result, subcommittees have large permanent staffs and sizeable budgets. They are housed often at some distance from the Committee headquarters, and they issue their own press releases and carry on their own mailing operations.

How is it possible to find in Congress such extremes of centralization and decentralization? Part of the answer lies in the differences between the two committees. The Senate Finance Committee has a fairly clear jurisdiction, and one that is not easy to parcel out among subcommittees. House Government Operations, on the other hand, has a broad, vague jurisdiction, and its work lends itself to subdivision. Further, the subject matter of Finance is far more important than that of Government Operations, and the conservative coalition in Congress seems determined to keep control of this committee in its own hands. Another part of the answer lies in the differing personalities of the two chairmen. Byrd is an accomplished politician who has done many favors and won many allies. He is sensitive to human relations and knows how to loosen his reins of control a little when he senses incipient rebellion. Hoffman, on the other hand, is a lone operator who had few legislative friends and had alienated President Eisenhower at the time of the 1953 revolt. He even failed to win the support of other committee chairmen with his floor comments on the episode, which were clearly calculated to bring them to his side:

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[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

[31] It has been claimed that the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation is a device for keeping staff services from the more liberal, less senior members of the two revenue committees. This seems most applicable to the newer members of the Senate Finance Committee. Junior members of House Ways and Means say that they can get all the assistance they need from the Ways and Means staff which is three times as large as that of Finance. It may well be true that liberal members would not receive congenial staff assistance from any of the staff members of the three committees involved.

[32] *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), pp. 9092–9097, 9103–9107, 9242–9254, 10352–10363.

[33] Reportedly, it took great pressure from President Eisenhower to get chairman Hoffman to refer to subcommittees the proposals to establish the Second Hoover Commission and the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

> There is nothing unusual in the desire of subcommittee chairmen to increase their authority, to be free agents, to give jobs to an unlimited number of employees, or to hold hearings in this country or elsewhere, wherever fancy or reason might create a desire. . . . Once let this desire prevail and no chairman of any committee of the House will be able to stem the drive for authority and the House itself will be without control over the activities of its members.[34]

This "drive for authority" will continue to express itself in the subcommittee structure, though only rarely in as extreme a form as he confronted. Subcommittees allow greater specialization in the legislative branch in an era which puts a premium on specialization. They also give a flexibility to the seniority system, by allowing less senior committee members to play effective legislative roles. These advantages and the gradual coming to power of younger, more organization-minded chairmen must inevitably cut into the degree of centralized control maintained by such old-time chairmen as Harry Byrd and Carl Vinson.

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[34] *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), p. 9094. In a brief interview granted the author on August 19, 1960, Congressman Hoffman would only comment that the whole affair was the work of national labor leaders.

QUASI-PARTISAN CONFLICT IN A ONE-PARTY LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM: THE FLORIDA SENATE, 1947–1961*

MALCOLM B. PARSONS
The Florida State University

A standard approach to American politics, national, state, or local, distinguishes the two-party and one-party systems, with a range of modifications in between.[1] Florida has long been described as a one-party state, part of the "solid south." Since Reconstruction days, and until very recently, the Republican party there has had virtually no state and local organization, virtually no public office seekers nor office holders, virtually no registered voters, and virtually no supporters at the polls. In recent years this state of affairs has been in perceptible change. Traditionally Democratic Florida went Republican in the last three presidential elections. Indeed, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman are the only Democratic presidential nominees to have won Florida's electoral support since 1924. In the past decade there has been a marked increase in registered Republican voters, in Republican candidates and votes for them; and the state and local Republican organizations have expanded and otherwise appeared to be viable. These political changes seem to be related to other changes—industrialization, urbanization, growing wealth and a population explosion whose principal cause has been immigration from other states, mostly northern.

Yet Florida congressional, state and local politics, with few exceptions, remain essentially the politics of a one-party state in the sense that holding offices at these governmental levels is virtually monopolized by the Democratic party, and in the sense that when competition for them occurs it still occurs predominantly within the Democratic party. It is a matter for speculation, beyond the scope of this study, why the two-party breakthrough has succeeded in, and has so far been chiefly confined to, presidential elections. But it is a matter for investigation, and the subject of this study, how far intra-Democratic state factional divisions conform to the workings of a two-party system. It remains to be seen whether this factionalism is related to emergent Republicanism in an evolutionary or causal sense.

It is assumed in this paper that the political system in Florida is in transition; that the attitudes, beliefs and preferences of a substantial number of Florida citizens find inadequate accommodation and expression within the national, state, and local components of the traditionally predominant single party. It is further assumed that these aspects of change in the Florida political system are reflected in the operations of the state's one-party legislature.

I. HYPOTHESIS AND METHOD

This paper reports an investigation of the Florida Senate, 1947–1961, designed to test the following hypothesis: *that there is a pattern of conflict within the one-party dominance of the Florida Senate, displayed on such issues as the control of its presidency and committees and in its divisions on controversial roll call votes, that approximates the operations of a two-party system; and that this pattern occurs along a line of opposition between constituencies of continued Democratic dominance in the face of social change and emergent Republicanism, and Democratic constituencies that lack any strong semblance of either.*[2]

There are many studies of legislative behavior in two-party settings.[3] The principal

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[1] See Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June 1954), p. 477 ff.

[2] The hypothesis is related to the suggestion of the Committee on American Legislatures of the American Political Science Association in 1954, that in states lacking a strong two-party system "factionalism . . . may have much the same effect. . . . " Belle Zeller (ed.), *American State Legislatures* (New York, 1954), p. 192.

[3] The seminal study of party and legislation is A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," *Annual Report of the American Historical Society for the Year 1901*, Vol. I (1902), p. 319 ff. In the Congress, see Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), and David Truman's case study, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959). In state legislatures, see William J. Keefe, "Party Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly," *Northwestern Univ. L. Rev.*, Vol. 47 (March 1952), p. 55 ff., and "Parties, Partisanship, and Public Policy in the Pennsylvania Legislature," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June

difference in the Florida setting is the traditional one-party system.[4] This study is of the Florida Senate rather than the House of Representatives, or both, because of the nearer monopoly of the Democratic party in the Senate;[5] because only senators are chosen from single-member districts; because the Senate with longer terms and fewer members is regarded as having the greater influence; and because of the economy of effort in dealing with one rather than both.

To test the hypothesis in this study, the Florida senatorial districts were classified with respect to three equally weighted variables: (1) the degree of population growth, 1950–1960; (2) the degree of Republican presidential voting strength, 1950–1960; and (3) the degree of Republican gubernatorial voting strength, 1960. It was assumed that cleavages in the legislative behavior of nominally Democratic senators could be correlated with the differences thus identified in their constituencies. A crude Index of Change ranging from 1 to 4 was used to differentiate each senatorial district on the basis of its mean position on all of the three variables, as follows:

Variable 1—Degree of population growth, 1950–1960

1 = less than 68% of the state's rate of growth
2 = 68% to 99% of the state's rate of growth
3 = 100% to 149% of the state's rate of growth
4 = 150% and more of the state's rate of growth

Variable 2—Republican presidential voting strength, 1950–1960

1 = Democratic in all three presidential elections
2 = Republican in one presidential election
3 = Republican in two presidential elections
4 = Republican in all three presidential elections

Variable 3—Republican gubernatorial voting strength, 1960

1 = less than 15% of the gubernatorial vote Republican
2 = 15% to 29% of the gubernatorial vote Republican
3 = 30% to 44% of the gubernatorial vote Republican
4 = 45% or more of the gubernatorial vote Republican

For example, the 30th senatorial district (the Ft. Lauderdale area), ranked four on each of the three variables for a mean Index of Change of four. The 2d senatorial district (the Pensacola area), ranked two on the first, one on the second, and two on the third variable for a mean Index of Change of 1.6.

In applying this procedure to the thirty-eight senatorial districts and mapping the results (see Map), it was apparent that the alignment might be made sectional by drawing a nearly diagonal line to bisect the peninsula, leaving twenty-three districts in the northern section, and fifteen in the southern section. Each of the twenty-three northern districts had an Index of Change of 2.3 or less:

2.3— 2 districts
2.0— 4 "
1.6— 3 "
1.3— 2 "
1.0—12 "

The mean index of these districts was 1.35. With one exception, each of the fifteen southern districts had an Index of Change of 2.6 or more:

2.3—1 district(s)
2.6—1 "
3.0—3 "
3.3—4 "
3.6—2 "
4.0—4 "

1954), p. 450 ff.; Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," *id.*, Vol. 46 (December 1952), p. 1046 ff.; Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," *id.*, Vol. 49 (September 1955), p. 773 ff.; David R. Derge, "Urban-Rural Conflict: The Case in Illinois," in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 218 ff.; Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," *Western Pol. Q.*, Vol. 14 (June 1961), p. 473 ff.

[4] For a study in a one-party setting see Murray C. Havens, *City versus Farm? Urban-Rural Conflict in the Alabama Legislature* (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1957); however it has certain methodological weaknesses which are identified and discussed by Derge, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

[5] From 1947–1961, only one Republican has served in the 38-member Senate, and only in the sessions since the 1952 elections. He has been elected from the single-county Pinellas district (St. Petersburg).

The mean index of the southern districts was 3.35. The one exception was an interior district, included in the southern section only for the purpose of geographical symmetry, or simplicity. The twenty-three Democratic northern senators come from districts of scant (if any) population growth and stable Democratic presidential and gubernatorial voting behavior. The fifteen southern senators, with the single exception noted, come from districts of heavy population growth and increasingly significant Republican presidential and gubernatorial voting behavior, though all but one of them are nominally Democrats.

This alignment is not what has been traditionally called urban-rural conflict, although it has some of those characteristics.[6] Following Friedman, constituencies with cities of 50,000 and more population may be classed as urban; constituencies with cities 15,000 to 50,000, as mixed; and constituencies with cities under 15,000 in population, as rural.[7] On this basis, using 1960 census data, the twenty-three northern senators come from two urban, six mixed, and fifteen rural districts; the fifteen southern senators come from ten urban, three mixed, and two rural districts. Two of the state's eight standard metropolitan areas are in the north, six are in the south.

Key has demonstrated that "The cleavage between metropolitan residents and rural and small town dwellers has become a most significant foundation for dual systems of state politics."[8] This study in the Florida setting views the situation from a somewhat different conceptual perspective. As Friedman has said:

> conflicts which superficially may be described as setting urban areas against rural areas are more satisfactorily explained in terms of conflict among social, economic, and cultural interests which have incidentally been associated with urban and rural areas, at least in the past.[9]

The hypothesis was tested by seeing to what extent the north-south sectional alignment was actually reflected in the operations of the Florida senate during the period 1947–1961. This period was used because its beginning marked the inception of the present senatorial apportionment and because it coincided with the period of recent political and population change. In this study those who control the senate were defined as those who regularly held its presidency, its key committee chairmanships, membership on its key committees, and who regularly prevailed in controversial roll-call votes. To the extent that sectional alignment provided an accurate perspective for viewing the senate, one would expect the data to show control in the hands of the numerically larger group of northern senators, with the smaller group of southern senators cast in a minority role.

II. FINDINGS: CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENCY

The President of the Senate has customarily been chosen by a caucus of the members at the beginning of the biennial session two years before the one in which he was to hold the position. For some time it was the practice to restrict the caucus to the holdover senators, *i.e.*, that half of the total number whose terms ran two years beyond the immediate past election. Since 1957 the entire membership has participated—with the exception of the single Republican, as this is a Democratic party caucus.

Of main concern in this study were two powers of the President: his power to appoint members of committees and designate their chairmen, and his power to refer bills to committees.[10] An important use of the latter is multiple referral, *i.e.*, referral of a bill to two or more committees, which increases the difficulty of getting measures to the floor and facilitates killing them.

All presidents during the eight sessions 1947–1961, as well as the president-designate for the 1963 session, were from constituencies in the northern section of the state.[11] (See Table I.)

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[6] V. O. Key, Jr., for example, perceived "an imperfect sort of sectionalism" in Florida, but noted that "the political differences between the two areas are not ordinary sectionalism; they are in fact rural-urban differences." *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949), p. 92.

[7] Robert S. Friedman, "The Urban-Rural Conflict Revisited," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (June 1961), p. 481 ff.

[8] V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York, 1956), pp. 229–230.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 485.

[10] Two other features of the office may be noted. Florida has no Lieutenant Governor; the President succeeds to the Governorship when it becomes vacant. This feature of the office has been prominent since Senate President Charley Johns succeeded to the Governorship in 1953 upon the death of Governor Dan McCarty. And after the 1961 legislative session, Senate President W. Randolph Hodges was appointed by the Governor to be state Conservation Director. He did not resign as Senate President; under an Attorney General's opinion he is expected to occupy both posts until another Senate President is named in the 1963 session.

[11] In 1955 a senator from the southern section, Harry King, was designated to serve as President

In the preceding nine sessions, 1929–1945, there had been four presidents from the northern section and five from the southern section. A total of nine presidencies had been held by senators from the southern section during the 19 biennia from 1907 to 1945.

III. FINDINGS: CONTROL OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMANSHIPS AND MEMBERSHIPS

From 1947 to 1961 the Florida Senate worked with 38–40 standing committees per session,

TABLE I. FLORIDA SENATE PRESIDENTS AND THEIR HOME DISTRICTS, 1947–1963

Session	President	City	District Index of Change
1947	Clarke	Monticello	1
1949	Brackin	Crestview	1.3
1951	Sturgis	Ocala	2
1953	Johns	Starke	1
1955	Davis	Madison	1
1957	Shands	Gainesville	2.3
1959	Johnson	Quincy	1
1961	Hodges	Cedar Key	1
1963	Carraway	Tallahassee	1.6


NORTHERN SECTION
23 Districts
Mean Index of Change: 1.35
SOUTHERN SECTION
15 Districts
Mean Index of Change: 3.35
INDEX OF CHANGE
Low (1–2.5)
Intermediate (2.6–3.5)
High (3.6–4)

Sectional Alignment of Florida Senatorial Districts, Based on an Index of Change, 1950–1960.

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of the 1957 session. He never served, however, as he resigned from the senate to stand trial and conviction on charges of bribing a Representative from his county not to oppose him in the 1956 Democratic senatorial primary.

TABLE II. THE TEN MOST AND THE TEN LEAST IMPORTANT COMMITTEES OF THE FLORIDA SENATE WITH NORTH-SOUTH SECTIONAL* CORRELATES OF THEIR CHAIRMANSHIPS AND MEMBERSHIPS, 1947–1961

Average Value on Scale of Importance†	Committee	Chairmanship Rate %	Membership Rate %
4.0	Appropriations	87.5 North	70 North
4.0	Finance and Taxation	100 North	63 North
3.94	Rules and Calendar	62.5 North	74 North
3.73	Constitutional Amendments and Governmental Reorganization	92 North	70 North
3.52	Education	50 North-South	58 North
2.89	Welfare	62.5 North	70 North
2.78	Roads	62.5 North	73 North
2.68	Judiciary "A"	50 North-South	50 North-South
2.31	Miscellaneous	62.5 North	54 North
2.31	Judiciary "C"	87.5 North	73 North
1.31	Oil and Natural Resources	62.5 South	53 South
1.26	County Organizations	50 North-South	50 North-South
1.23	Building and Loan Associations	60 South	57 South
1.22	Transportation	62.5 South	52 North
1.15	Pensions and Claims	62.5 South	63 North
1.10	Legislative Management and Population	64 North	74 North
1.10	Industrial and Atomic Energy	66.6 South	52 South
1.0	Publicity and Advertising	50 North-South	54 South
1.0	Corporations	62.5 South	54 South
.68	Veterans Affairs, Radio and TV	50 North-South	52 North

* See Map. Perfect correspondence with the sectional distribution of senate seats would show proportions of 60.5 North and 39.5 South on all Committees.

† Rated 0–4 in terms of power, influence, and prestige on questionnaire returned by 76% of a panel of experienced members of the Florida press.

each of the 38 senators holding at least one chairmanship. For my purposes, therefore, it was necessary to determine objectively the relative importance of the committees. To this end, they were ranked on the basis of the collective judgment of a panel of experts, consisting of twenty-five members of the press having extensive experience in reporting sessions of the Florida Legislature.[12]

There was some manifestation of northern dominance of the chairmanships of the ten most important committees, and southern dominance of the chairmanships of the ten least important committees over the entire period, 1947–1961. (See Table II.) Yet for these twenty committees and eight sessions the sectional pattern did not seem to be statistically significant: χ^2 for the array was 12.40, d.f. $=1$, and $p < .005$; the ϕ coefficient of contingency $= .03$. However, for these twenty committees in the four most recent sessions, 1955–1961, statistical significance of the sectional pattern was more convincing: $\chi^2 = 16.64$, d.f. $=1$, and $p < .005$; $\phi = .46$. Restricting the analysis to the five most and the five least important committees over the entire period, 1947–1961, statistical significance of the sectional pattern improved: $\chi^2 = 19.06$, d.f. $=1$, $p < .005$; $\phi = .51$. And using only these ten committees and only the four most recent sessions, 1955–1961, the correlation was highly significant: $\chi^2 = 18.04$, d.f. $=1$, $p < .005$; $\phi = .71$. The sectional pattern, then,

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[12] A questionnaire was mailed to each. The standing committees of the Senate were listed beside a scale of five possible judgments as to their importance: most, much, some, little, and least. Each member of the panel was asked to use this scale to appraise the committees in terms of power, influence and prestige. There was 76 per cent return, and the responses were tabulated on the basis of 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 points for each designation of a committee corresponding to the adjectives on the scale. The values were averaged for each committee, and the committees were ranked accordingly.

TABLE III. COMPARATIVE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SUPPORT FOR THE MAJORITY ON CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS, REGULAR SESSIONS OF 1949 AND 1957, FLORIDA SENATE

Index of Support for Majority	1949				1957			
	North		South		North		South	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
High (67–100)	8	35	10	67	14	61	0	0
Intermediate (51–66)	6	26	1	6	8	35	4	27
Low (50 and below)	9	39	4	27	1	4	11	73
Totals	23	100	15	100	23	100	15	100

operated in control of committee chairmanships most notably in the period 1955–1961, with northern senators dominating the chairmanships of the most important committees, and southern senators dominating the chairmanships of the least important committees.

Committee membership showed substantially the same pattern. (See Table II.) The statistical operations were not performed for membership, though, because the data showed a majority of northern members on all of the most important committees during most of the sessions and because of the long-settled practice of chairmen controlling their committees by casting proxy votes, a practice influenced by the large number of committees, multiple committee membership, and the pressure of legislative work in the sixty days of a biennial session.

IV. FINDINGS: SECTIONAL DIVISIONS ON CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS

An overwhelming majority of roll calls in the Florida Senate are perfunctory and unanimous. This reflects the traditional way of handling local bills, and the function of committees in compromising or killing controversial general legislative proposals before they reach the floor. Nevertheless, a sizeable number of divisions occur at roll call on matters of general legislation. In this study a roll call was defined as controversial if the majority comprised less than 70 per cent of those present and voting. There were 666 such roll calls during the period 1947–1961, the number per regular 60-day session ranging from 49 to 88.

A number of techniques were used to test the hypothesis with respect to roll-call voting behavior. The first was an Index of Support for the Majority, computed for each senator as the ratio of the number of times he voted with the winning majority to the total number of controversial roll-calls in a given session.[13] The computations were mapped so as to show constituencies of high (67–100), intermediate (51–66), or low (50 and below) Indexes of Support for the Majority, and the resultant patterns were compared with the sectional alignment. A map was prepared for each of the eleven regular and special sessions, 1947–1961. None of the support patterns for the five sessions, 1947–1953, was even roughly comparable to the sectional pattern of the model. All of the support patterns for the six sessions, 1955–1961, were strongly similar to the sectional pattern of the model. Comparison of two representative sessions (see Table III) indicated that, for 1949, senators from the northern districts were distributed by approximate thirds among the high, intermediate, and low support categories; whereas two-thirds of the senators from the southern districts were high, somewhat less than one-third low, and the single remaining senator intermediate. In the 1957 session three-fifths of the northern senators were in the high category, more than one-third intermediate, and the one remaining senator low. In marked contrast, approximately three-fourths of the southern senators were low, and the balance intermediate. For the 1949 distribution, with the high and intermediate categories consolidated, $\chi^2 = .49$, d.f. $= 1$, and $p > .10$; the ϕ coefficient of contingency $= .01$. However, for the 1957 distribution, with the high and intermediate categories consolidated, the statistical significance of the sectional pattern was convincing: $\chi^2 = 18.19$, d.f. $= 1$, $p < .001$, and $\phi = .69$.

Additional techniques with respect to roll-call voting behavior were applied to sessions in

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[13] This index is simpler than the Shapley-Shubik Power Index as it relates only to the function of degree of participation with the majority, whereas the Shapley-Shubik Power Index relates also to the function of the size of the majority. See L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (September 1954), p. 787 ff.

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF COHESION INDEXES FOR NORTHERN SENATORS BY SUBJECTS OF CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS, 1955–1961 REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Subject of Controversy	Total No. of Roll Calls	Number of Roll Calls Northern Senators' Cohesion			Per Cent of Roll Calls with High and Intermediate Cohesion (%)
		High (71–100)	Intermediate (41–70)	Low (Below 40)	
1. Legislative Reapportionment	35	20	13	2	94.3
2. Congressional Redistricting	5	1	3	3	80
3. Legislative Management	4	2	1	1	75
4. Miscellaneous	4	0	3	1	75
5. Race Relations	16	8	4	4	75
6. Constitutional Revision	15	8	3	4	73.3
7. Political Processes	7	4	0	3	57
8. Agriculture and Conservation	7	1	2	4	42.8
9. Regulation of Business	80	16	15	49	38.7
10. Education	13	3	2	8	38.5
11. Finance and Taxation	34	1	11	22	35.3
12. Codes and Judicial Processes	40	1	5	34	15
13. Roads and Highway Safety	24	1	2	21	12.5
14. Health and Welfare	21	0	2	19	9.5
Totals	305	66	66	173	Ave. 43.2%

the period 1955–1961, when the sectional alignment could be observed to be operating. These techniques were designed to test the cohesion of the northern and southern groups and the extent of inter-group conflict on controversial roll calls, which were classified according to subject. The Rice Index of Cohesion was used to test the unity of the total membership of a group.[14] The extent of inter-group conflict was measured initially by percentages of the total number of northern and southern senators opposing one another, and then more rigorously through the use of the Rice Index of Likeness[15] and the chi square test of the null hypothesis.

There were 305 controversial roll calls in the Florida Senate, 1955–1961. The twenty-three northern senators maintained high (71–100) or intermediate (41–70) cohesion on 43.2 per cent of them. (See Table IV.) The fifteen southern senators maintained high or intermediate cohesion on 50.1 per cent of these roll calls.[16] (See Table V.) The tables show the smaller southern group to be more cohesive than the larger northern group, but both groups maintained significant cohesion on a large number of roll calls and through a wide range of subjects of controversy covering, in the judgment of the writer, every important kind of issue that confronted the Senate.[17] It is not surprising that

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[14] Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), p. 207 ff. Relative tests of cohesion have also been used, which reflect the percentage of a group voting on a particular roll call. The principal limitation of such relative tests is that in operation they tend to an elastic definition of the group under scrutiny, by assuming for purposes of measurement that it only comprises those of its members who vote on a given roll call. For example, if 50 per cent of a group voted "aye" and the remainder abstained from voting, a relative measure would show perfect cohesion of those voting, but the Rice Index would show a complete lack of cohesion for the entire group. The problem that each measure deals with, in its own way, is that of construing the significance of the non-voter. In this study the Rice Index was used precisely because it assumes that members of a defined group who do not vote on a roll call contribute to the group's lack of cohesion.

[15] Stuart Rice, *loc. cit.*

[16] Two southern seats and one northern seat deviated consistently from the patterns of sectional alignment on controversial roll calls. The rural northern seat from the St. Augustine district sided consistently with the southerners, while the southern seats from the urban Fort Myers and rural Kissimmee districts sided consistently with the northerners.

[17] A detailed analysis of different policy preferences is in preparation. Here it is only intended to suggest the range of subjects through which group conflict and cohesion may be traced. The 305 controversial roll calls, 1955–1961, were grouped

TABLE V. DISTRIBUTION OF COHESION INDEXES FOR SOUTHERN SENATORS BY SUBJECTS OF CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS, 1955–1961 REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Subject of Controversy	Total No. of Roll Calls	Number of Roll Calls Southern Senators' Cohesion			Per Cent of Roll Calls with High and Intermediate Cohesion (%)
		High (71–100)	Intermediate (41–70)	Low (Below 40)	
1. Legislative Reapportionment	35	24	10	1	97.1
2. Health and Welfare	21	14	4	3	85.7
3. Miscellaneous	4	1	2	1	75
4. Race Relations	16	4	8	4	75
5. Political Processes	7	0	5	2	71.4
6. Constitutional Revision	15	9	0	6	60
7. Agriculture and Conservation	7	1	2	4	42.8
8. Regulation of Business	80	10	24	46	42.5
9. Roads and Highway Safety	24	4	6	14	41.6
10. Congressional Redistricting	5	1	1	3	40
11. Education	13	3	1	9	30.7
12. Codes and Judicial Processes	40	3	9	28	30
13. Legislative Management	4	1	0	3	25
14. Finance and Taxation	34	3	3	28	17.6
Totals	305	78	75	152	Ave. 50.1%

both groups maintained the most consistently high cohesion on questions of legislative reapportionment which directly affected their standing in the Senate. The ranking of controversial subjects by the per cent of roll calls with high and intermediate cohesion is similar for both groups—*i.e.*, cohesion on one side evoked cohesion on the other. With the exception of Congressional Redistricting, Legislative Management, and Health and Welfare, no subject's rank on the northern list is as much as eight positions removed on the southern list; three subjects (Legislative Reapportionment, Constitutional Revision, and Codes and Judi-

TABLE VI. PER CENT OF SOUTHERN SENATORS OPPOSING NORTHERN SENATORS ON CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS ON WHICH AT LEAST 60% OF NORTHERN SENATORS VOTED TOGETHER, 1955–1961 REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Per Cent of Southern Senators Opposing Northern Senators	Number of Roll Calls—Per Cent of Northern Senators Voting Together				
	60–69	70–79	80–89	90–100	Total
90–100	0	0	6	1	7
80–89	1	15	23	16	55
70–79	5	6	12	5	28
60–69	12	19	12	9	52
50–59	5	5	3	0	13
Below 50	27	14	1	0	42
Totals	50	59	57	31	197

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into the following thirteen categories (there was an additional "miscellaneous" catch-all) with an example of the kind of issue placed in each: (1) Agriculture and Conservation—establishing marketing standards for navel oranges; (2) Codes and Judicial Processes—abolishing the defense of entrapment in prosecutions for bribery; (3) Congressional Redistricting—providing for twelve congressional districts based on the 1960 census; (4) Constitutional Revision—authorizing the Legislative Council to prepare a revision of the state constitution; (5) Education—providing a chancellor over the presidents of the state universities; (6) Finance and Taxation—requiring consideration of specified factors other than full cash value in assessing the value of property for tax purposes; (7) Health and Welfare—authorizing cities to set and enforce minimum housing standards for human habitations; (8) Legislative Management—amending the rules to provide for open committee meetings; (9) Legislative Reapportionment—proposing changes in the number of legislative seats and reapportioning on that basis; (10) Political Processes—exempting non-statewide candidates from the requirement of reporting campaign contributions and expenditures; (11) Race Relations—providing for referendum to close racially desegregated schools; (12) Regulation of Business—providing for minimum retail price-fixing for alcoholic beverages; (13) Roads and Highway Safety—establishing a South Florida Turnpike Authority.

cial Processes) occupy identical positions on both lists; and five subjects are only one position apart.

One measure of the variable intensity of inter-group conflict is indicated in Table VI. These data show that from 1955–1961 at least 60 per cent of the northern senators voted together on 197 controversial roll calls—*i.e.*, on nearly two-thirds of the total of 305 controversial roll calls during that period. Further, on 142 (over three-fourths) of these 197 roll calls in which at least 60 per cent of the northern senators voted together, they were opposed by at least 60 per cent of the southern senators. On only 42 (just over one-fifth) of the 197 roll calls did less than one-half of the southern group oppose the northern. Of the total of 305 controversial roll calls, then, 155 (fully half) were marked by identifiable degrees of inter-group conflict.

The data in Table VII represent a refinement of the concept of inter-group conflict through use of the Rice Index of Likeness and the chi square test to offset the possibilities for random occurrence of the distributions. Table VII shows that 132 (not quite half) of the 305 controversial roll calls, 1955–1961, were characterized by significant north-south conflict. North won 84 per cent and south 16 per cent of these contests. Sixty-one per cent of all roll calls were won with high cohesion, and 39 per cent with intermediate. The contested roll calls ranged through all thirteen subject-matter categories. In each category, north won 75 per cent or more of all north-south conflict roll calls except on Legislative Management, Roads and Highway Safety, Health and Welfare.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The data tend to support the hypothesis. During the period 1955–1961, in particular, there has been a quite stable, cohesive bi-factionalism in the one-party Florida Senate. It has been consistently demonstrated with reference to control of the Presidency and the committee system. It has characterized divisions on controversial roll calls about half the time, significantly more often than Democratic-Republican cleavage has characterized roll-call divisions in recent sessions of the two-party United States Congress.[18]

TABLE VII. DISTRIBUTION OF SIGNIFICANT NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT* ROLL CALLS, BY SUBJECT, WON WITH SPECIFIED COHESION,† RANKED BY PER CENT NORTH WON, 1955–1961 REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Subject of Controversy	Number of North-South Conflict Roll Calls	Won by											
		North		South		North when Voting with:				South when Voting with:			
						High Cohesion (71–100)		Intermediate Cohesion (41–70)		High Cohesion (71–100)		Intermediate Cohesion (41–70)	
		No.	%	No	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1. Codes and Judicial Processes	4	4	100			1	25	3	75				
2. Congressional Redistricting	4	4	100			1	25	3	75				
3. Political Processes	4	4	100			4	100						
4. Legislative Reapportionment	35	33	94	2	6	18	51	15	43	1	3	1	3
5. Constitutional Revision	11	10	91	1	9	8	73	2	18	1	9		
6. Finance and Taxation	10	9	90	1	10	1	10	8	80	1	10		
7. Regulation of Business	31	26	84	5	16	16	52	10	32	4	13	1	3
8. Race Relations	15	12	80	3	20	8	53	4	27	2	13	1	7
9. Education	5	4	80	1	20	4	80			1	20		
10. Agriculture and Conservation	4	3	75	1	25	1	25	2	50	1	25		
11. Legislative Management	2	1	50	1	50	1	50			1	50		
12. Roads and Highway Safety	4	1	25	3	75			1	25	3	75		
13. Health and Welfare	3			3	100					2	67	1	33
Totals	132	111	84	21	16	63	48	48	36	17	13	4	3

* Significant North-South Conflict Roll Calls are those in which the Index of North-South Likeness is less than 60, and according to the chi square test the probability of a random distribution is not greater than .01.

† A Significant North-South Conflict Roll Call won by Northern Senators is one in which the majority winning the roll call comprises a majority of Northern but not Southern Senators; such a roll call won by Southern Senators is one in which the majority winning the roll call comprises a majority of Southern but not Northern Senators.

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[18] "The Democratic and Republican parties took clearly opposing positions on only 115, or 36 per cent, of the 320 roll-call votes in 1961. . . . The analysis, new this year, examined only those votes

The alignment so manifested in the Florida Senate has paralleled to a significant degree a sectional alignment of the constituencies. The majority faction has corresponded to those relatively unchanged districts of north Florida where little if any threat to the traditional political monopoly of the Democratic party is perceptible. The minority faction has corresponded to those Democratic constituencies of south Florida that are involved in emergent Republicanism and concomitant population growth, social and economic change.

This kind of sectional alignment, then, provides a useful, if limited, way of describing and analyzing certain aspects of conflict within a nominal one-party system. Other aspects would require other techniques. Further, even though there is an impressive correspondence between this kind of sectional alignment and certain aspects of the system, it must not be inferred that the only cues in legislative behavior are related to this cluster of attributes. The attitudes, preferences, perceptions and interactions of legislators, apart from constituency influences, provide other sorts of cues.

In the period 1947–1961, quasi-partisan sectional conflict, and with it, cohesive factions, developed in the one-party Florida Senate. Whether this or something like it will continue in the years ahead, or whether the system will develop in a *bona fide* two-party direction, depends on causal relationships that are still obscure.

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on which a majority of voting Northern Democrats and a majority of voting Southern Democrats took the same position, and were opposed by a majority of Republicans." *Congressional Quarterly*, Vol. 19, Weekly Report No. 47 (Nov. 24, 1961).

GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: A STATISTICAL NOTE ABOUT AMERICAN CITIES

JOHN H. KESSEL
University of Washington

The commission plan and the city manager plan–new forms of city government launched during the early years of this century—were both devised in response to local circumstances, but were soon being heralded as improvements over the then universal mayor-council system. Enthusiasts for both of these new governmental structures claimed many advantages for them. The hopes for the city manager plan seem to have been somewhat better founded, but the passage of time has shown that both plans had limitations which the reformers did not foresee.

Almost all of the early discussion about the relative merits of the three plans neglected the role of political environment. Proponents of the different systems deduced their arguments from "the principles" on which the plans were based. A three-year study of the actual operation of manager government in the late 1930s called attention to the importance of varying local conditions. "The tremendous variety of local political conditions and administrative habits apparent in the fifty cities covered by this survey," the authors concluded, "makes it impossible to [give general answers to] many questions about the city manager plan."[1]

A more explicit concern with the effects of the political environment was shown in two important papers published in the early 1950s.[2] Specific questions were raised about the affinity between the city manager system and medium-size cities, and the apparent fact that the manager plan was more frequently adopted by cities which were either growing or declining in size. The authors also noted the concentration of manager adoptions in one-party states, and suggested that this plan had a depressing effect on the level of party activity. And they thought it significant that business groups generally supported introduction of the manager system while labor often opposed it.

1960 census data show that the city manager



FIGURE 1. Governmental Form and Community Size

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[1] Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 258.

[2] Wallace S. Sayre, "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities," *Public Administration Review*, 1954, pp. 253–258; and Inter-University Summer Seminar on Political Behavior, "Research in Political Behavior," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December 1952), pp. 1003–1032.



FIGURE 2. Governmental Form and City Growth Rate, 1950–60

form now has been adopted by a majority of the medium-size cities. Though the majority is a bare one, 1960 is the first census year which has found the city manager plan the most common in any size-class of cities. The mayor-council system continues to dominate in the very large cities and in the small towns. The distribution of the three plans in cities between 250,000 and 500,000 and in those between 10,000 and 25,000 is very close to that which would occur normally. Therefore it is now possible to speak of three significant groups of cities in this context with dividing lines slightly above 250,000 and slightly below 25,000.

The failure of large cities to abandon the mayor-council plan has been much discussed in the literature. The most common explanation is that the political environment is so complex—there are so many competing interests—that a premium is placed on political leadership which can arbitrate the contest for the stakes of power in the city, and be held responsible by the electorate for its success or failure in doing so. Less has been done in analyzing the politics of the small towns. It would be consistent with our knowledge of small communities to argue that a well defined structure of socio-economic power, and widely shared norms of behavior, are usually decisive elements in the political environment of a small town. The "natives" ordinarily are well aware of the nature of this power structure and the content of these norms. Thus a local resident would probably reach decisions which would accord with local folkways in most situations, and wait for a "sense of the community" to crystallize when a novel problem came along. A city manager who accepted his cues about correct behavior from outside professional sources would be much more likely to act so as to upset the social equilibrium or violate certain local norms.

These speculations about the dominance of the mayor-council form in large cities and small towns are consistent with each other. They could be summarized by stating that a frankly political form of government is often found where there are interests which must be deferred to, or whose claims must be arbitrated, before a policy decision is made. This would imply that when the reverse is true, that when there is no one who can claim deference, or when there is a single dominant group which is disposed to cooperate with the policy maker, then viable conditions exist for a professional administrator. The question is simply whether negotiating skill or professional expertise is more important in any given situation. We have reason to suspect that political aptitudes are necessary in a small town or big city. In the medium-size city, therefore, we should look for conditions which do not call for a special talent for judicious compromise, but which do present problems beyond a layman's grasp, that can be analyzed by one with a manager's technical training.

It is possible to test these hypotheses, at least in a preliminary fashion, by inspecting certain characteristics of the medium-size cities. (Note in Figure 1, that the frequencies of use of each of the three plans are almost constant for this group of cities.) Figure 2 shows a very strong relationship between the growth rate of these communities and the structure of their governments. There is a high probability that a rapidly growing community will have adopted the city manager system. The mayor-council form is closely associated with cities having relatively stable populations. And the commission form, in the single category in which it appears to be related to the political environment, is found with striking frequency in cities which lost population in the last decade.

These findings modify earlier speculation that the manager plan is associated with growth *or* decline in population, but are compatible with our ideas about the political and administrative conditions appropriate to each system. A rapidly growing city faces many administrative problems in the course of providing the streets, sewers, and other services required by the expanding population. Since so many new people are arriving the political patterns tend to be rather amorphous. A professional administrator is less likely to face organized opposition. In cities with stable populations, on the other hand, political pressures are apt to be well defined and persistent. Solutions to novel problems are not called for so often as the ability to appease long-standing rivalries. This situation would call for the political responsiveness of the mayor-council system. The concentration of commission governments in declining cities is also of interest. Unless these cities *want* to reduce their populations, it would seem that the commissioners are unable to respond to difficult conditions or that the influential persons in these communities lack the ability to initiate a switch to another form of government.

The states having the highest percentages of medium-size cities with manager plans are Virginia, North Carolina, California, Texas, and Florida. States with marked concentrations of mayor-council cities in the 25,000-to-250,000 range are Indiana, Connecticut, and Ohio. The manager cities, as has been noted frequently, are either in one-party states or in states in which the formal party organization is rather weak. The mayor-council cities are more often found in competitive two-party states. This, in itself, is an insufficient basis for concluding that the introduction of the manager plan depresses party activity. Competitive two-party systems, after all, were not to be found in Virginia, North Carolina, California, Texas, or Florida before the spread of the manager system. But the survival of strong party organizations in Connecticut, Indiana, and Ohio is suggestive. If we are correct in assuming that the mayor-council system flourishes best in environments which require political skills, then it would follow that these same skills could contribute to vigorous party organizations.

Another way of testing our hypotheses is to look for the presence of some group in the community which would be especially dependent on political activity because of its exclusion from alternative agencies of community integration. We therefore computed the percentage of foreign-born in the population over twenty-one for each city which had a population between 25,000 and 250,000 in 1950.[3] This percentage was chosen to isolate within the potential electorate a group which had arrived too recently for successful assimilation. As Figure 3 shows, the higher the percentage of foreign born in a city, the more likely it is that the city will have a mayor-council form of government. The city manager plan, on the other hand, has been adopted most often by cities composed almost entirely of native-born residents.

We see here an association between the mayor-council form of government and the presence of a sizeable group which lacks social and economic opportunity. Newcomers are rarely offered invitations to long-established men's clubs or seats on the board of directors of a leading bank. As they lack opportunity to express their opinions through social and economic channels, they must voice them through political institutions if they are to be heard at all. And it is precisely in the communities where there is such a need for political opportunities for community participation that the mayor-council form has been most frequently retained. We also see that the manager plan has been adopted most frequently when most of the residents grew up in an American culture. It is possible that the values in such a community would be not only homogeneous, but would also correspond to those of a professional manager.

If we turn from the ethnic composition of the

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[3] These data, and those on the percentage of the labor force in a given occupational category, were not available for 1960 at the time this study was made. Therefore we are dealing with a different, and smaller, group of cities. The reader will also note some minor differences in the number of medium-size cities between Figures 1 and 2 and between Figures 3 and 4. These are caused by variations in the availability of data.



FIGURE 3. Governmental Form and Minority Groups: Percentage of over 21 Foreign Born in the City Population



FIGURE 4. Governmental Form and Economic Base: Incidence of Three Systems in Different Types of Cities

city to its economic organization, we can do more than simply infer the existence of an important group whose values correspond to those of a professional manager. An analysis of the governmental forms used by cities having differing economic characteristics can be derived from Howard J. Nelson's "Service Classification" of cities.[4] Nelson computed the mean percentage of the labor force engaged in given occupations in some eight hundred and ninety-seven urbanized areas. He then calculated the standard deviation from each of these means. He was thereby able to classify a city as, for example, "manufacturing" if the percentage of the labor force so engaged was more than one standard deviation above the mean percentage employed in manufacturing in all urbanized areas. In the case of manufacturing, to continue the same example, his calculations led to the conclusion that at least 43.1 per cent of the work force should be employed in manufacturing for an urban area to be so classified. Similar calculations enabled him to identify unusual concentrations of the labor force in personal service, retail trade, finance, the professions, public administration, wholesale trade, transportation, and mining. If an urbanized area had no unusual concentration of the labor force in any of these categories, Nelson designated it a diversified area.

Figure 4 indicates a decreasing use of the manager plan by medium-size cities if they are arranged in this order: personal service, retail, finance, professional, public administration, wholesale, transportation, diversified, manufacturing. This is suggestive for three reasons. First of all, this ranking seems to be directly related to the size of the area within which business is conducted. In the four "manager-type" classifications—personal service, retail, finance, and professional—there exist significant concentrations of businessmen whose principal market is to be found within and immediately around their own city. Diversified cities, by definition, lack any abnormal concentration of businessmen, and the industrialists in manufacturing cities are likely to be concerned with regional and national markets. A second reason for the suggestiveness of this ranking is the probability that a retail store or an establishment rendering some kind of personal service will be locally owned. A factory, on the other hand, is much more likely to be owned by stockholders and to have its main offices in some distant commercial center. Thus we see that the manager cities tend to have concentrations of local businessmen whose interests are directly related to their own communities. The mayor-council cities either lack such concentrations of businessmen, in the case of the diversified cities, or are neglected by absentee owners who are often preoccupied with national affairs. It is not implausible to assume that the small businessmen in the manager cities supply the consensus which enables the manager to concentrate on administrative problems.

A third implication of this economic classification concerns the nature of the labor force employed in these occupations. The white collar employees in retail stores and financial establishments, to say nothing of the professionals, are prone to regard themselves as self-sufficient. Industrial laborers, on the other hand, are likely to suffer the same kinds of socio-economic handicaps mentioned earlier in connection with ethnic groups. They need political channels for expression, channels which the mayor-council system is more likely to provide.

There are, of course, limits to this kind of statistical analysis. The most important is that the whole argument rests on an assumption that, given the adoptions and abandonments of the past fifty years, each governmental form will be most frequently found in that environment which is congenial to it. There are many reasons for the adoption of one system or another which have little to do with the suitability of the political environment. State laws may encourage one form and prohibit another. Local interests may advocate a different plan from the one they have, simply because they perceive some tactical advantage in changing the ground rules in their favor. A community often imitates the legal structure favored in a neighboring city. A small town frequently lacks the budget to hire a manager. And inertia often causes the retention of a governmental system long after it has ceased to function effectively.

The reader must judge for himself whether this evidence is sufficient to support the hypotheses which have been suggested. But whether we have correctly identified certain linkages between the political environment and governmental structure or not, it should be clear that some sorts of linkages do exist. We should sweep away the lingering traces of disciplinary parochialism which still contaminate the study of urban affairs. A few students of public administration still hold that a given form of government is intrinsically superior to any other. Some latter-day Marxists still insist that industrial captains exercise the real power in any community. And certain sociologists would have us believe that "upper-upper" families are able to manipulate affairs because of their status and prestige. If the data we have reviewed are valid, then none of these arguments are correct. Neither a study of organization charts nor an identification of socio-economic elites is, in itself, a sufficient explanation of urban politics. Neither the formal structure nor the political environment is independent of the other. Studies of legal form and political setting must take into account the influence of the one on the other. Only in this way will we be able to unravel the puzzle of the relationships between them.

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[4] Howard J. Nelson, "A Service Classification of American Cities," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 31 (July, 1955), pp. 180–210. This classification was similar to the "functional classification" of the *Municipal Year Book* except that the latter is based on arbitrary cutting points. The functional classification did not permit identification of any correspondence between economic organization and governmental form.

"RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT," SEPARATED POWERS, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS: AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA[1]

J. ROLAND PENNOCK
Swarthmore College

Political scientists today are more cautious than they used to be about comparing forms of government and evaluating their virtues. Moreover, in such comparisons as we do make, we rightly lay more stress on party systems and even more informal aspects of government than on constitutional forms. Yet much of what is said by way of comparing and evaluating the disciplined and programmatic type of political party with the American type carries an undertone of the old arguments. Virtues once attributed to the British style of Parliamentary government, honorifically tagged "responsible government," are now associated with "party government," while the evils earlier (and still) attributed to the separation of powers are now frequently laid at the door of a weak party system. To be sure, many who criticize the American constitutional and political arrangements for irresponsibility make no claim that the British system is superior.[2] Yet when a committee of leading political scientists studied the operation of our party system, its recommendations were based upon the conviction that disciplined and programmatic political parties, after the English model, should be our ideal.[3] It therefore still seems worthwhile to gain all the knowledge and insight we can about the operation of such a system in its native habitat and to compare its operation with our own political and constitutional system.

The view of the British system of government—both formal and informal—that has gained for it the designation "responsible government" may be briefly summarized. The system simplifies the alternatives placed before the electorate. It energizes and activates public opinion. Responsibility for public policy is centralized, clearly located, and easily subjected to popular control. Beyond this point the theory, seldom articulated, seems to be that the Government, with the benefit of its synoptic view of the public scene, will seek majority support by acting in the general interest. (In this way, the dubious concept of rule by "a majority" enters into the theory.) Conversely, special interests, particularly those associated with "pressure groups," are less able to secure a definition of the public interest on their own terms. Since pressure groups frequently are interested in legislation requiring the expenditure of public funds, more or less directly for their benefit, this aspect of the British system might be expected to manifest itself especially in connection with such expenditures. The inability of Parliament to vote funds in excess of the budget, and the well known device of Treasury control, as well as the disciplined and programmed nature of political parties, all seem to support this expectation. There are, to be sure, other advantages believed to flow from these features of British government, such as a more rational, coherent, and self-consistent legislative product; but the present article will be confined to the question of vulnerability to demands of special interests for subsidization.

The major objective of this essay is to apply to this problem the findings of a comparative study of the politics of agricultural subsidies and price supports in Britain and America during the postwar period.[4] The general method followed is to combine empirical data from the case study with *a priori* arguments in such a way as to contribute both to the appreciation of the arguments and to their evaluation. The case material has two aspects, each of which has importance in itself and also gains support from the other. First, there are the substantive results. Political scientists, for understandable reasons, are inclined to focus largely upon governmental processes; yet surely the results—in terms of public policy, however formulated, adopted and executed—are normally of primary importance. It is true that effectuated policies tend to elude objective evaluation. In this case, however, the policy results—in pounds and dollars—are objective enough, though hard to isolate for measurement. To be sure, there are other difficulties, with which, as we proceed, we shall have to cope as best we may. Are the situations truly comparable?—a problem with almost any comparative study. Are variations in results properly attributable to specifiable aspects of the political process? At this point the second aspect of the study—its procedural side—becomes significant. Analysis of process, of the steps leading up to the results, may be useful not only for its own sake but also by adding to or subtracting from the plausibility of the conclusions suggested by the substantive comparisons. In other words, if we identify a difference in results not clearly growing out of differences in the situations, and if we also identify phenomena on the procedural side that might lead to such a difference in results and in a given instance provide every evidence of having done so, we are better off in our search for understanding than we would be if we confined ourselves to investigation of either results or processes alone.

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[1] The basic research from which the materials for this article were drawn was made possible by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, for whose award the writer is deeply grateful. He is also indebted to Professor Charles E. Gilbert for helpful criticism and suggestions.

[2] See for example, James M. Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York, 1949) and Stephen K. Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York, 1950).

[3] "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," Supplement to this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950). For a more recent statement of a similar point of view and for a plea for an outright scrapping of the separation of powers in this country in favor of cabinet government as essential to responsible democracy, see Howard J. McMurray, "The Responsible Majority—Some Reflections on Political Parties," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (June, 1958), pp. 175–182.

[4] For the most part the study was confined to the first decade following the Second World War, although in a few instances materials have been drawn from later years.

In point of fact, the substantive comparison gives no support to the view that parliamentary government, British style, has any special immunity to group pressure.[5] If anything, it appears that the balance is tilted in the opposite direction. From 1954 to 1961, Britain subsidized her farmers, by most tests, much more heavily than did the United States. For the benefit of a relatively much smaller percentage of the population, British farm subsidies during that period were absorbing nearly three times as large a share of the gross national product as the American. (The detailed figures, using various bases of comparison, together with a discussion of technical and other difficulties in making the comparison, are set forth in the Appendix.) Moreover, the economic position of British farmers, as compared to the rest of the population, has improved tremendously over the prewar situation—far more than in the United States, where the relative standings are apparently about the same.[6] And more to the point, this relative gain on the part of British farmers appears to be entirely attributable to the subsidy, which in fact constituted roughly two-thirds of their net income.

But, it might be argued, there may be good reasons, quite apart from group pressure, why the British should support agriculture more heavily than we do. There is no simple, conclusive answer to this. Nevertheless the writer has carefully examined the justifications advanced in each country for subsidization, to try to gain some sense of whether they are more powerful in Britain than here. Most of the arguments, like the claimed sociological advantages of the small, family farm, are equally valid or invalid for the two countries. Two arguments, however, the validity of which is debated by the experts, apply uniquely to Britain. They are the strategic argument—that British agriculture must be kept in good fettle so that production can be quickly expanded in the event of war and blockade—and the balance of payments argument—that an expanded agriculture minimizes the drain on foreign exchange for the purchase of feedstuffs. The first of these is not seriously regarded by most of the experts[7] but it undoubtedly possesses a considerable (though probably declining) appeal to the populace at large, inclining the electorate more favorably to agricultural subsidies than they otherwise would be. To what degree the relatively high subsidies are attributable to this factor it is impossible to ascertain. The second uniquely British argument, that of the balance of trade, being more technical, has more appeal in Government circles than with the citizenry. Yet it seems unlikely that the Government has been greatly moved by this argument, although on one occasion they used it as an excuse for setting supports at a higher level than could otherwise be justified.[8]

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[5] Note that in selecting British government for this study, we are taking the example and type of parliamentary government that should, according to orthodox theory, present the sharpest contrast to the presidential system.

[6] Between 1938 and 1957 national income in the United Kingdom increased by 266 per cent, while farming net income increased by 461 per cent. On a *per capita* basis, national income increased approximately 237 per cent, while farming net income went up by 475 per cent (for persons engaged in agriculture). In the United States, contrasting 1957 with the 1935–39 average, the total net income of the farm population from farming sources increased by 141 per cent (150 per cent from *all* sources), and their *per capita* income from farm sources rose by 215 per cent (from *all* sources 285 per cent), while the personal income of all persons was increasing by 285 per cent, on a *per capita* basis. In other words, in the United States, the average income from farming failed to keep pace with that of the rest of the population, while in the United Kingdom the farm population advanced at about double the rate of the country as a whole. (Calculations are based on figures from the *Annual Abstract of Statistics* [1958] and the "Annual Review and Determination of Guarantees, 1958" [Cmnd. 390], for the United Kingdom; and, for the United States, from *The Farm Income Situation*, No. 169, July, 1958, United States Department of Agriculture, and the *Economic Report of the President*, January, 1962.)

One other general difference in the agricultural situations of the two countries may be relevant. In the United States, farming is considerably more diversified and a far larger proportion of total farm output consists of feedstuffs—grain, etc., fed to hogs, cattle and poultry—and of agricultural products not destined for consumption as food—cotton, tobacco, soybeans for industrial uses, etc.—than in Britain. In the one case, one farmer's price is another farmer's cost, and in both cases the purchasers are not consumers, nor even wholesalers distributing to consumer markets, but rather industrial processors, large commercial organizations and the like. So it may be that conflicts of interests among farmers reduce their political and bargaining strength. And if it is thought that the large buyers to whom these products are sold are better able to assert their interest in lower prices than are unorganized consumers or the suppliers who cater directly to consumer markets, then it might be supposed that the combination of forces working to limit farm subsidies would be relatively stronger in the United States than in Britain. But this is an oversimplified picture, blurring the market effects of farm co-ops, chain store processors, etc., and the political effects of federalism, a bicameral Congress and rural over-representation. There are too many factors to disentangle here, and their net effect in combination is not clear.

It might plausibly be argued that the difference in support levels is to be accounted for neither by governmental systems nor by different felt needs, but by the effectiveness of farm organizations. Most British farmers are members of the National Farmers Union of England and Wales, or the N.F.U. of Scotland. For purposes of representing farmers at Price Reviews (negotiations with the Government for subsidies) and similar occasions, the Unions act as one. There are also commodity groups and regional differences within the national unions that occasionally give the N.F.U. national headquarters a hard time. Nonetheless the degree of bargaining and pressure group unity they maintain is remarkable. American farmers have no such monolithic organization. Many are unorganized. The others are members, often duplicating members, of numerous commodity groups and of certain general purpose farm organizations, of which the American Farm Bureau Federation—with a claimed membership of 1,591,777 farm families out of a total of 5,382,162 farms in 1953—is the largest. Farm Bureau membership is drawn most heavily from the corn-hog area of Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, and from the South. Its political orientation is conservative. The National Grange, with under a million members, is the second largest general farm organization, while the National Farmers Union, with perhaps 200,000 members during the period in question, heavily concentrated in Colorado, Minnesota and the Dakotas, represents a more militant and politically liberal group.

To what extent this difference in the pressure group organization in the two countries qualifies any conclusions that might be drawn from the comparison it is difficult to say. The tendency toward monolithic social, economic and political structures that pervades English life manifests itself in two mutually contradictory ways, however, as far as it is relevant to our present concern. It tends to produce strong, centralized political parties and it also facilitates the formation of strong pressure groups, each representing virtually the whole of the interests affected. Here, it might be argued, we have a stand-off. The homogeneity of the country produces strong pressure groups and it also produces strong parties, the better to withstand the pressure groups. The homogeneity of the pressure groups may itself owe something to the concentration of power in British government.

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[7] They reason (1) that stockpiling can probably meet the challenge of a blockade, especially in view of the probability that a major war in the future will not be extended over many years, and (2) that in any case continuing dependence on foreign sources for food supplies is the best means of assuring the maintenance of a large merchant marine, which in the past has proved invaluable in the event of attempted blockade.

[8] My justification for this statement is partly that government economists themselves, in private conversation, lay little stress on this argument and freely admit that subsidies should be lowered; and partly it is that economists generally, even agricultural economists, are divided on the validity of the argument, with the weight of opinion perhaps on the side of doubting it. Austin Robinson has argued the case for subsidies to save foreign exchange; see "The Problem of Living Within Our Foreign Exchange," *The Three Banks Review,* March, 1954, pp. 3–19. Other economists have disputed his interpretation and contend that, if anything, the balance of payments argument calls for limitation of agricultural subsidies; see Derek T. Healey, "Increased Agriculture or Increased Exports?," *Westminster Bank Review,* May, 1955, pp. 10–12, and Colin Clark, "Britain's Dependence Upon Agricultural Imports," *loc. cit.,* November, 1956 pp. 9–11.

Although we might leave the matter here, it is perhaps desirable to comment on the sharp policy division between the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union.[9] It is by no means clear that this division of forces weakened the pressures for subsidy. A single, all-inclusive organization is not necessarily more aggressive because of its unity; it must find a program that can win the support of most of its members. A smaller, regional organization, heavily representative of one or two commodities, can be more radical. Was even the Farm Bureau less aggressive in support of agriculture than the N.F.U. in Britain? Both organizations in practice recognized the necessity for some retreat from the wartime levels of subsidies or price supports, yet both wished to preserve the bulk of their wartime relative gains. In the United States, however, the Farmers Union was unwilling to make this concession. Inasmuch as this country, unlike Britain, had at least one organization fighting for a more radical and expensive program than featured the war time experience, it might as plausibly be argued that any difference between the two countries with respect to pressure groups would lead one to anticipate a higher rather than a lower rate of government support for farming in the United States.

So much for the substantive comparison. The end result of agricultural politics in the two countries has been to produce heavier subsidization (in one form or another) in Britain than in the United States, instead of the reverse, which orthodox theory would lead us to anticipate. We have briefly canvassed two out of three possible sets of factors that might lead to this result: the needs or justifications and the organization of interests most directly affected. On balance, it appears doubtful that there is enough here to account for the difference in results, although one can certainly not be dogmatic on the point. At the very least, the substantive comparison suggests the need for examining the matter procedurally—that is, for looking at the processes by which key decisions were made in the two countries and asking whether or not they give support to the standard propositions about the two forms of government.

If the electoral alternatives are kept simple, the man in the voting booth can understand them and wield his power effectively, and anything that strengthens the political effectiveness of the voter-at-large tends to weaken the special interests—so runs the argument. How do the two forms of government stack up in this regard? In one sense there can be no doubt whatever that the British form wins hands down by this test, for at election time there is but one question for the voter to answer—is he for the Government or against it?—with the further possibility that he may have one additional choice if he is against it. There is no question of splitting his ticket. But if we are considering a particular subject, such as agricultural subsidies, the realistic question is whether there is any alternative at all. Since the Second World War there have been five general elections in England. Throughout this period agriculture was the beneficiary of heavy subsidies.[10] At none of these elections was the extent of agricultural subsidy a point at issue between the parties. Yet the policy being pursued did not lack for critics. Such journals as the London *Economist* kept up a continuous drum-fire of criticism of agricultural policy under both Labour and Conservative Governments, alleging that subsidies were too high. An occasional Member of Parliament, like Stanley Evans, lashed out against "featherbedding" the farmers.[11] And the weight of opinion of economists, including agricultural economists, favored the view that the subsidies were at a higher rate than was justifiable. On the other hand, the farmers frequently complained that their profits were not keeping pace with the rising standards of living of other occupational groups. Nonetheless, at no election did the level of subsidies become an issue between the parties. Agricultural policy was greatly debated, but the debates consisted in such matters as rival claims for credit for the benefits the farmers had received, charges that the program was being badly administered, that farmers lacked confidence in the Government (or in the Opposition, as the case might be), and so on. Labour, by promising the reinstitution of bulk purchasing and other devices, tried to hold out the prospect of greater price stability, but was careful not to suggest that average prices would be higher (or lower).

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[9] The difference can easily be exaggerated if we are thinking about the general level of subsidy. Both organizations favored expenditure of government funds for disposal of farm surpluses in a variety of ways. Both favored price supports. The Farmers Union favored continuation of rigid supports at 90 per cent of parity for "basic" commodities. The Farm Bureau favored supports on a sliding scale, depending upon the supply situation. The Farm Bureau program, a modification of which was enacted in 1954, almost certainly involved a somewhat lower subsidy rate than would have been entailed by the Farmers Union program. On the other hand, in view of falling commodity prices, the Farm Bureau shortly after this date supported the "Soil Bank" program, which was enacted and which involved a much greater subsidy than any possible saving that might have been brought about by the lower support rates.

[10] Until about 1953–54 the Government bought all farm products at fixed prices. Although these prices were much above the level charged for the food (the Government paying the difference), it is possible that no subsidy would have been needed during this period of food shortage had prices been allowed to find their own level. In other words, it might be argued that the sub-

The sensitivity of the parties to the farm vote is nowhere better demonstrated than by the difficulties generally experienced by the Liberal Party in squaring its free-trade, anti-subsidy principles with electoral expediency in the matter of agricultural policy. In 1953 the Party Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the gradual abandonment of guaranteed prices and assured markets for agriculture. Not only did this action call forth heated debate but, after the adoption of the resolution, a prospective Liberal candidate for Parliament announced that "speaking for at least twelve prospective Parliamentary candidates, we do not feel we can fight an election on the present policy, and give notice that we can not do so."[12] Presumably as a consequence of this pressure, the resolution adopted in 1954 was much more qualified.[13]

A nice test case is supplied by a by-election held in the Division of South Norfolk in January, 1955. The election was of particular interest because the constituency is marginal as between the major parties and highly agricultural, being in the heart of one of the major farm areas of England. The writer followed the campaign closely, attending several campaign meetings. The constituency was actively cultivated by the candidates and by their supporters ranging all the way up to the Minister of Agriculture himself, Mr. Heathcoat Amory, on the Conservative side, and to Messrs. Hugh Gaitskell and Anuerin Bevan on the Labour side. Both sides insisted that they would maintain subsidies, with no "whittling away," while hinting that their rivals were not altogether reliable in this regard. Neither made any suggestion of increasing the subsidies.

The pattern revealed for this campaign was substantially duplicated in the general elections of 1955 and 1959. In the latter year, for instance, the Conservative election manifesto pledged continuance of the long-term assurances to agriculture, continued support to horticulture by means of tariffs and also by means of new improvement grants to the extent of £7½ million. Labour promised to improve farm security, which, it claimed, had been "whittled away" since 1951, and to give the farmer "protection against unfair foreign competition."[14]

In the United States the picture was quite different. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, permanent legislation, provided for price supports for "basic" commodities by means of loan and purchase arrangements at rates varying in accordance with a formula relating the percentage of "parity" at which they would be supported to the supply situation. By agreement of both parties the operation of this Act

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sidies during this period were really consumer subsidies, redistributing the available food among consumers rather than income among producers. For our purposes, then, the elections of 1955 and 1959 are of greatest significance, for by that time free market conditions prevailed and farmers depended heavily upon direct subsidy.

[11] Evans, a Labour M.P., was forced to resign as Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Food for persisting in this kind of criticism, including such charges as that the taxpayers had had to pay £12 million during the last year for the production of surplus potatoes. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 475, col. 1042. The promptness with which the Government called for Evans' resignation and publicly disavowed his views made it clear that they had no intention of being tagged as favoring any diminution of agricultural support.

[12] *Farmer and Stock-Breeder,* Vol. 67, p. 57, April 14–15, 1953. And see *The Times,* April 4, 1953, p. 3, col. a.

[13] *Farmers Weekly,* April 30, 1954, p. 42.

[14] D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London, 1960), pp. 260 and 275.

had been suspended during the war and afterwards in favor of provision for a rigid support of basic prices at ninety per cent of parity. This temporary legislation was scheduled to expire on December 31, 1948. By a series of extensions, however, the fixed supports at 90 per cent of parity were not allowed to die until six years later. By stages during this period the Democratic Party became identified with maintenance of the "rigid" support system while the Republicans championed a "flexible" arrangement. An Administration-sponsored bill providing for flexible supports was enacted in 1954 with overwhelming Republican support in both Houses, while the Democrats opposed the flexible principle (with its inevitable lowering of the extent of price support) by more than three-to-one. These positions have been adhered to subsequently and were reflected in the party platforms for presidential elections. In short, the American voter, unlike his British opposite number, had a significant electoral choice and accompanying possibility of control with regard to agricultural price supports during the 1950s.[15]

Closely connected to the question of choice and control is the matter of energizing public opinion, also a feature included among the reputed attributes of the British system. It is not really a separate point so much as a presumed consequence of clear issues and simple methods of popular control. There can be no doubt that where the parties in Britain are divided on an issue, both the system of parliamentary debates and the election system tend to focus attention upon, and arouse interest in it. But where party competition produces identical positions on a given point, as it tends to do, and as has been the case with the level of agricultural subsidies in Britain, no occasion for public discussion arises. In this country, on the other hand, substantially this issue has played a significant role at each of the last three presidential elections. This is not to argue that there is anything inherent in the American system that accounts for this difference, or that a similar situation would be found if we examined other policy areas. It is merely to point out that the alleged advantage of the British system does not always materialize and that in certain cases the advantage may lie in precisely the opposite direction.

Having said this much, the supposed merit of clear and centralized responsibility in British government has already been dealt with, by implication. The responsibility for the level of agricultural subsidies in Britain is clear; it is pin-pointed. There is only one catch: to oust the Government would not alter the situation, although there is an abundance of opinion in the country at large and among experts to the effect that a change is in order.

Among the *a priori* arguments advanced for the theory that British government is exceptionally well fitted to resist the demands of special interest pressures, perhaps the most frequently cited is the strength of party discipline. Members of Parliament, unlike members of Congress, are not generally susceptible to pressure from constituents to vote this or that benefit for them.[16] With rare exceptions, they will vote as the Whips instruct. Closely related to party discipline is the position of the Government. A single committee, the cabinet, thanks to the combination of the two-party system and strong party discipline, has the power, within limits, not only to formulate the Government's program but also to implement it. Its party members in the House are in the majority and they may be counted upon to support the Government's program. Since the Government will stand or fall, at the next election, on its record as a whole and before the electorate as a whole, so the theory goes, it will be to its interest to resist the pressures of special interests insofar as they appear to distort or run counter to the general interest.

How sound is this reasoning? Of course it is true that M.P.s seldom defy the Whips. But the Whips, as is well known, are two-way lines of communication. Through them the party leaders are kept informed of what the rank-and-file want and what they hear from their constituents and, even more pertinently, of how M.P.s, especially those from marginal districts, assess the impact of particular policies on their chances for reelection. Such information is of interest to party leaders in any democratic country. Even in the United States it is highly relevant to the party's welfare and to the outlook for its general policies. But in the United

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[15] This does not mean he would necessarily elect to use it. To vote his convictions on price supports might mean going contrary to his beliefs on other matters which he deemed more important.

[16] However, the writer was present in Westminster one day when a delegation of lobbyists for higher old age pensions called a large number of M.P.s, one by one, from the floor of the House, asked their position on the question and, if the reply was not fully satisfactory, informed them that canvassers would cover their constituencies informing the voters of their weakness on this matter. There is evidence to suggest that this kind of pressure was not without effect.

States a party may lose one House and hold the other or it may lose one or both Houses and hold the Presidency. And under such circumstances it may still see many of its policies effectuated—as was clearly demonstrated under the Eisenhower regime. In Britain, on the other hand, the winner takes all. Under such circumstances it is hardly to be supposed that the news that, say, a score of Members of Parliament might lose their seats at the next election unless something is done for the aged, *e.g.*, or for the farmers, will be without influence on the Government.

In this connection, we may well remind ourselves of Hatschek's law,[16a] according to which British political parties start out with well defined sets of principles but progressively lose them and become concerned primarily with obtaining and keeping power. We need only consider the most recent general election campaign to see Hatschek's conclusions substantiated. Each of the major parties seemed to be engaged in trying to prove that, at least in certain important respects, it was not so different from the other as had been thought. The Conservatives proclaimed themselves as the great supporters of the "welfare state," while Labour made light of its attenuated program of nationalization. Such a development undermines the theory that the Government—or for that matter either of the major parties—must have a consistent program. The parties tend to become as free as American parties to bid for the marginal voter, to try to build a majority by seeking the support of various special interest groups—especially those that are particularly aware of their interests and whose votes are believed to be shiftable.[17] Of course, insofar as a bid to one group must obviously be at the expense of other groups or of the whole, some limit is placed to this process. But it is well known that this protective mechanism is very sluggish. Producers tend to be more aware of their interests than consumers or even taxpayers. Moreover, the existence of a large number of traditional or ideological voters strengthens the hand of the special interests by enabling party managers to maneuver without fear of losses from their hard-core supporters. The British situation with respect to special interests may be put in a nutshell. The parties discipline their members, but no one disciplines the parties; and the parties are subject to the same electoral logic that operates in this country: they must bid for the support of interest groups. Another way to put the matter, using Robert Dahl's expressive phrase, is to say that in Britain, too, what passes for "majority rule" might be more aptly described as "minorities rule."

An examination of British agricultural politics during the postwar period provides numerous examples of the operation of this electoral logic. The case of Stanley Evans, above, is a clear instance of party discipline being used to prevent giving offense to a well-placed pressure group. Although Evans was somewhat of an extremist on this matter, the traditional orientation and class interest of the Labour Party is toward the interests of urban labor. Cheap food, rather than prosperous farmers, would seem to be their natural concern. Moreover, this is the definite and outspoken view of the Cooperative movement, which is affiliated with the Labour Party and sits regularly in its councils. Yet in recent times it has been the prospect of winning a few farm votes from their normal Conservative alignment that has consistently set the course of Labour policy.

How party discipline operates in this kind of situation is well illustrated by a revealing incident that occurred in late 1953 in connection with an Order, laid before Parliament for ratification, increasing the import duties on certain fruits and vegetables. This was an issue calculated to arouse Labour to an anti-farmer stand if anything would, because the cost of the proposed action would be borne directly by consumers. As a matter of fact Labour, then in Opposition, was sharply divided as to what position it should take. Many of its Members, especially those representing the Cooperative movement, were strongly opposed to the tariff increase. Indeed, it appears virtually certain that the Parliamentary Labour Party would have voted to contest the Order had it not been for a strong personal appeal by Tom Williams, Minister of Agriculture in the preceding Labour Government. Although the decision was close, and a number of Labour Members did express themselves vigorously against the order in the House of Commons, the significant fact is that the Party leadership threw its weight behind the farming interest, and prevailed.[18] Here was party discipline in operation—being used to force a reluctant majority to pursue a policy thought by the leaders to be essential for winning certain marginal districts. (Williams and other Labour leaders had often publicly expressed the view that Labour could not hope to return to power without winning back some of the country areas they had won in 1945 and lost in 1950.)

[16a] Julius Hatschek, *Englisches Staatsrecht*, Vol. II (1905), pp. 8 ff. Hatschek's law is described and discussed in Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, revised edition (Boston, 1950), p. 417.

[17] In an editorial entitled "The Electoral Auction," the London *Economist* bemoaned the fact that "election manifestoes have been corrupted into expensive shrimping nets for farmers', pensioners', tenants', cotton workers', shipbuilders', shipworkers', and cinema interests' votes. . . . " *The Economist*, September 26, 1959, p. 998.

Compared to this situation, party discipline in the United States is notoriously weak. Orthodox theory holds that weak discipline favors the special interest; but it is not necessarily so. Big city Democrats may refuse to go along with their party's policy of favoring high price supports—and they frequently do; and Republicans from agricultural districts may vote against their party's adherence to "flexible" price supports. Under such circumstances, special interests that are powerful in a minority of legislative districts may find it more difficult to obtain legislative support than under a regime of strong party discipline, operating as described above. On at least two occasions during the Eisenhower administration major price support legislation opposed to the official policy of the Democratic Party (which had a majority in both houses of Congress) and opposed by the House Committee on Agriculture, was yet enacted into law.[19]

The British system is also often thought to be less easily influenced by special interests than the American system because of the subordinated role of committees. Congressional committees have great power and are notoriously likely to be controlled by Congressmen favorably disposed toward the interests whose affairs come under their jurisdiction. It is frequently overlooked, however, that the British system, structurally very different, may lead to functionally similar results. Parliament regularly delegates many important decisions to the Government or to particular Ministries. When legislation takes this form, the Ministries, in certain respects, are cast in the role of Congressional committees: they have great power; their decisions are likely to receive less publicity than those of Parliament, and in any case the process by which they reach their decisions is not one of public debate and ordinarily involves no public scrutiny; they have a tendency—so at least it is alleged in England—to become favorably inclined toward the interests under their wing; and they are readily accessible to those interests.

The case of agriculture illustrates all of these points. The controlling legislation leaves the rate at which agricultural products will be subsidized or supported entirely to Ministerial discretion, operating within the broadest of statutory policy directives.[20] It is true that the Treasury stands always in the immediate background, breathing down the neck of the Ministry, but it must depend largely upon the Ministry's estimate of the needs of the industry. Moreover, all orders made under this provision of law must be made after consultation with representatives of the interests concerned. In practice this means that each year, at what is known as a Price Review, representatives of the Minister of Agriculture sit down with representatives of the National Farmers Union and, in an often prolonged series of meetings, negotiate the guaranteed prices for the following year. Each side is provided with an abundance of data. Certain agreed but rather vague standards guide them. But there is much room for judgment, and hence for haggling; for what are sometimes embittered arguments; and for plain horse-trading. It has been said on good authority that the final decisions are frequently made on the basis of considering the effect in certain marginal constituencies.[21]

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[18] *Farmer's Weekly*, December 18, 1953, p. 26; *Parliamentary Debates* (*Commons*), Vol. 521, cols. 2235–2237 and 2251.

[19] For an analysis of the voting on the first of these occasions, the Agricultural Act of 1954, see J. Roland Pennock, "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 167–210, esp. pp. 184–210. The situation was decidedly complicated by the fact that the largest of the farm organizations, the American Farm Bureau Federation, was opposing the "pro-farmer" policy of the Democratic Party. Consequently it is not a clear instance of a "general interest" prevailing over the organized special interest. Of the 47 Democrats who went contrary to their party policy at this time, however, over half were from metropolitan areas. Their defection can hardly be charged to the position of the Farm Bureau. Similarly the 23 Republicans who voted against the position of their Party and of the Farm Bureau were clearly voting for what they considered to be the special interest of their constituencies in high price supports.

[20] Agriculture Act, 1947; 10 and 11 Geo. 6, ch. 48. The relevant provision reads, in a passage reminiscent of an American party platform, that powers under the Act shall be used, through the devices of guaranteed prices and assured markets, to promote and maintain "a stable and efficient agricultural industry capable of producing such part of the nation's food and other agricultural produce as in the national interest it is desirable to produce in the United Kingdom, and of producing it at minimum prices consistently with proper remuneration and living conditions for farmers and workers in agriculture and an adequate return on capital invested in the industry." [Part I, 1, (1)] Full power to carry out the purposes of this Act are vested in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (now the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries), subject only to being laid before Parliament as an Order, which, theoretically, either House could veto.

The experience of the 1955 Price Review is hardly atypical. It had been the expressed hope of those charged with administering the subsidy policy that Exchequer liability could be progressively decreased at a rate approximating, or at least approaching, the increase in farming efficiency, then estimated at about £25 million *per annum* for products covered by the Review. Applying the principles that had been enunciated to the data as to changed costs and the like, and deducting the presumed efficiency increment, the result would have been no net change in guarantees and subsidies. In fact, however, the Ministry granted a net increase of about £40 million. The reasons advanced for this action were two: (1) that during the previous year crops had been seriously damaged by bad weather; and (2) that the balance of trade situation made it desirable to produce more homegrown feedingstuffs. However, the first of these reasons was not supposed to be relevant, since all figures are based on "normal" weather; and it was not even contended that the second argument was sufficient to justify the increases.[22]

To understand the Price Review of 1955 one must know that a General Election was imminent and that the farmers were known to be disgruntled. The mood of the annual meeting of the National Farmers Union in January was described in the pages of the *Economist* as one of "gloomy resentment."[23] A direct vote of no confidence in the Government's farm policy was narrowly averted; and, as it was, the Union condemned the Government for "gradually undermining" the provisions of the 1947 Act.[24] Off the record, Government officials in a position to know were quite ready to concede (and decry) the effects of the political winds. In Parliament, Labour members, not surprisingly, testified to the same effect. George Brown, Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture under the Labour Government, declared:

> The price this year was very nearly not an agreed one. It became an agreed price only because someone politically a little higher than the Minister came along and said, "There will be an election soon, and we must have an agreed price." The Council of the N.F.U. know that. My friends in the industry tell me what is happening.[25]

And Tom Williams, Labour Minister of Agriculture, asserted that the N.F.U. was on the point of voting its lack of confidence in the Government when the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his peace with them in a speech at the N.F.U.'s annual dinner.[26] Note that it was the Chancellor of the Exchequer who was chosen for this task. Possibly he was chosen (or invited by the N.F.U.) because he was a farmer. But if George Brown was right it appears that this was a clear case of political intervention, perhaps by cabinet action, to urge the Minister of Agriculture to go farther on behalf of the farmers than even he was prepared to do on his own initiative.

This incident will also serve as a comment on the frequently heard claim that the British Treasury is a powerful roadblock in the way of special interest demands upon public expenditures. Undoubtedly it is, in many situations; but it may also be acutely vulnerable to electoral pressures.

In appraising the argument for, and evidence of British vulnerability to the demands of a special interest group, it should be remembered, too, that British farmers constitute a small part of the population. As a percentage of total production, agricultural production in Britain is less than two-thirds as large as in the United States. In terms of the percentage of the labor force involved, the discrepancy is even greater. Nor is the distribution of farm voters such as to increase their political effectiveness; but rather the contrary.

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[21] One of the top Government economists dealing with these matters has been quoted as saying that the annual determinations of agricultural subsidy levels are "primarily political" and hardly susceptible of being explained or justified in terms of "statistical measurements." Private correspondence from J. H. Kirk, quoted in J. Anthony Mollett's "Britain's Postwar Agricultural Expansion: Some Economic Problems and Relationships Involved," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 41 (1959), pp. 3–15, at p. 9, note 15.

[22] See "Annual Review and Determination of Guarantees, 1955" Cmd. 9406; and The National Farmers Union of England and Wales, "Information Service," Vol. 10, No. 1, January/February, 1955.

[23] "Resentment on the Farm," *The Economist*, Vol. 174, Jan. 29, 1955, p. 345.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] *Parliamentary Debates* (*Commons*), Vol. 540, col. 1622, May 3, 1955.

[26] *Ibid.*, col. 1532.

Touching another of the weaknesses often attributed to the separation of powers, the division of responsibility, we must be careful to examine both sides of the ledger. Divided responsibility does muddy the waters and so complicate the task of a displeased majority wishing to enforce accountability for the act of commission or omission that occasioned its displeasure. This much is true. But how often, on a particular issue, is there a majority? When pressure groups secure special consideration, it is generally the work of an active minority translating its demands into law thanks to the passivity of a large number of legislators. In the American system there are many check-points to the exercise of power; this is the very meaning of the system of checks and balances. If the farm lobby wins at one point its opponents may effectively defend a roadblock at another. This is precisely what often happens. Critics of the system who emphasize vulnerability to pressure groups all too frequently point to examples of success at a particular point in the process without following through to the ultimate result. Moreover, when that ultimate result is to prevent action, it follows from what has just been said that it is by no means necessarily true that a majority will is being frustrated. On the contrary, the necessity of mobilizing more power, or making it effective at another point, tends to mean that there will be more debate, more public discussion, more general education with respect to the matter in question, with the result that other groups than those immediately affected, consumer groups, for instance, are aroused to support their own interests, with the further consequence that when action is taken it will have a wider representative base—and perhaps a very different one—from what would otherwise have been the case. There is every evidence that this is precisely what happened during the long debate over flexible *versus* rigid price supports. Farm leaders were outraged at moves by Secretary Benson that they interpreted as appeals for consumer support.

Finally, a special word should be said about the presidential veto power, even though it is one of the checks to which reference has just been made. Representing a national constituency, the President is generally in a better position that anyone else to resist the demands of particular interests. The same argument was cited in support of the view that it is to the interest of the Government in England to support a consistent policy, and one that does not give undue concessions to special interest. Applied to the presidency, this argument tends also to be subject to the same weaknesses. But here an important qualification is to be noted. A British Government desiring to remain in office is wholly dependent upon having its party continue to hold a majority of the seats in Parliament; hence it must consider the electoral situation in all of the constituencies. The President also has a large stake in having his party control the Congress. But it is not *so* large a stake. It is not all or nothing. He may remain in office even though his party is in the minority in both Houses of Congress and he may even continue to exercise very considerable power under such circumstances. To this extent the "general interest" base provided by the veto power is stronger than its equivalent under the cabinet system.[27]

For examples from agriculture, we may go back to the spring of 1946. Wool production had been heavily subsidized during the war and was in excess supply. In spite of recommendations by the Secretary of Agriculture and a special committee established for the purpose, Congress failed to act. The Secretary of Agriculture then discontinued all support of wool prices, which had been provided under general war powers. Congress responded by passing a bill which included among its provisions a special fee on imported wool. This provision ran directly contrary to our postwar foreign trade policy and its enactment threatened to wreck the Geneva Trade Conference, then in session. In spite of the strong opposition of the Department of State, the bill passed both houses of Congress. The President vetoed the bill and Congress sustained his action. A new bill, omitting the import fee provision, was thereupon speedily enacted. A special interest that was threatening our foreign economic policy was successful in Congress, but was checked by action of the President.

Eight years later another President was able to take advantage of the special interest in wool to prevent the success of a move in behalf of high price supports for basic crops which he believed to be counter to the general interest.

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[27] In referring to the "general interest" base of the veto power I do not mean to obscure the fact that the veto may be used in support of special interests. It should be pointed out, too, that the peculiarities of our electoral college system are generally thought to operate in such a way as to favor certain special groups. It is arguable, however, that in a crude fashion, this inequality is offset by the rural orientation of the legislative branch.

The President had recommended a system of production payments for wool, substituting this for commodity loans. He had also recommended reversion to a flexible price support system for basic crops, as already mentioned. The House Committee on Agriculture, apparently in a move to outwit the President, combined his wool bill with an extension of the then-existing price supports for basics at a fixed 90 per cent of parity. However, they had miscalculated. On the eve of the crucial vote, Secretary Benson himself is said to have carried the word to Congressmen from wool states that the President would veto a 90 per cent bill even though it carried the wool payments plan with it. Thus in the end Congressmen from wool states had to vote for flexible supports for basics in order to get their wool subsidy. Five out of a possible 32 did so. This is not a particularly strong case, but it at least suggests the possibility of a situation in which the threat of a veto might bring some pressure on one interest group to help check another.

Many cases can be cited when the bicameral system has tended to work in the same way—to obstruct the demands of special interest groups. In both 1948 and 1949 the House of Representatives first voted to prolong the operation of high price supports, ultimately acceding to the Senate's insistence on a downward modification. Only the Korean war prevented this action from being allowed to take effect. One may find other instances in which either one House of Congress or the other or both or the Administration has manifested a great—perhaps too great—sensitivity to agricultural interests and demands. Frequently, however, the requisite concurrence of all three is lacking.

In spite of what has just been said, it is often true that the inertia of government tends to favor the special interest. Where an emergency situation develops, Congress may act fairly quickly—especially if a well organized interest is prodding it; but, where legislation favoring a special interest is already on the books, it is difficult to get it removed even in the face of conditions that seem to call for such action. But for many situations there is a technique to counter this tendency, and Congress often sees fit to use it. This is simply the device of granting a demand for a limited period, requiring renewal if it is to be extended beyond the original grant. In this way the weight of governmental inertia is shifted. In the battles over flexible *versus* rigid price supports, the proponents of flexible (which in effect meant lower) supports always enjoyed the great advantage that inertia, and therefore the check and balance system, was on their side; for no action at all meant a return to an even lower level of price guarantees than they were proposing.

To summarize briefly what has been said: the purpose of this case study was to examine the commonly held belief that "responsible government," British style, is markedly superior to the system of separated powers in its ability to resist the demands of special interests—to examine this belief in the light of the evidence of postwar agricultural subsidies and price supports. From that evidence it appears that in Britain, the all-or-none nature of party competetion may make leaders extremely sensitive to the demands of pressure groups, and party discipline may be used to suppress elements in the party that would like to resist the demands of those groups. The American system, it is true, may be less responsive to a clear popular majority, when such a majority exists. But, in the more common event that only minorities have clear positions, these minorities have more hurdles to cross, more roadblocks at points where their demands may be checked, than similar groups face in Britain. No single case establishes a general rule. But viewing the case of agricultural subsidies and price supports in combination with more general analysis, the writer concludes there are strong grounds, at least, for doubting that the American form of democracy is any more susceptible than the British to the pressures of minorities.

APPENDIX

BRITISH AND AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES: FACTS AND ARGUMENTS

A comparison of rates of subsidy for British and American agriculture can only rest on approximations based on more or less arbitrary assumptions and allocations. The difficulties are several. In Britain, price controls were retained until 1953 and 1954. Before that, during the period of wartime and postwar shortages, the food and agriculture industry was heavily subsidized but (see note 10 above) it is arguable that the subsidies were consumer subsidies. In the United States, war-induced scarcities led to a similar ambiguity. Accordingly, the comparison is confined to the post-price control period.

For the United Kingdom, then, I shall use the years since the free market has been reestablished, 1954–1955 through 1960–1961. The average annual cost of agricultural support in the United Kingdom for that period amounts to $716 million.[28]

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[28] Computed from official data. See *Parliamentary Debates* (*Commons*), Fifth series, Vol. 618, cols. 21–22, Feb. 22, 1960; *ibid.*, Vol. 617, cols. 35–36, Feb. 9, 1960; and *ibid.*, Vol. 634, col. 71, Feb. 8, 1961.

TABLE I. FARM SUBSIDY COST COMPARISONS ON A PER CAPITA BASIS

	United Kingdom		United States	
	Number (in millions)	Subsidy *per capita*	Number (in millions)	Subsidy *per capita*
Population[a]	51.0	$ 13	164.3	$ 13.44
Population engaged in agriculture[b]	1.1	$ 651	9.0	$246
Farm operators[c]	.29	$2,469	5.4	$409

[a] Population figures are for the year 1955.

[b] These figures are for the year 1951. I am informed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food that their estimate of the present farm labor in the United Kingdom, reduced by a complex calculation to full-time male adult equivalents, is .9 million.

[c] The United Kingdom figure is from the 1951 census and is for "farmers and farm foremen." The Ministry of Agriculture, using different definitions, estimates that farm operators at present number about 350,000. (Information supplied by Mr. J. H. Kirk, Ministry of Agriculture, letter of February 10, 1959, to the author.)

For the United States, no such accurate measure of costs to the Treasury is possible. Here, in large measure, instead of paying a direct subsidy we (in effect) buy farm products and store them. Some of these stored commodities are eventually sold on the market, some are given away, and some are diverted to secondary (and less remunerative) uses. What our price support program for any given year will cost cannot be ascertained until long after the event, if at all—not, at least, until the commodities have been disposed of and the proceeds realized; these may be in blocked foreign currencies.[29] The costs actually realized each year can, of course, be calculated. These figures are made available by the Department of Agriculture and we rely on them here.[30] The comparisons set out in Tables I and II use the average of the realized costs for the six years endings June 30, 1960, the latest for which figures are currently available. The figure so derived is $2,209.6 million.[31]

TABLE II. FARM SUBSIDY COST COMPARISONS IN RELATION TO VARIOUS NATIONAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE FIGURES*

	United Kingdom		United States	
	Amount (in millions) Col. 1	Subsidy as a percentage of amount in Col. 1 Col. 2	Amount (in millions) Col. 3	Subsidy as a percentage of amount in Col. 3 Col. 4
Gross farm income	$ 3,699.9	19.3	$ 33,788	6.5
Net agricultural income	$ 843.1[a]	84.9	$ 11,473	19.2
Gross national product	$49,311.0	1.4	$400,300	0.5
Governmental expenditures (national govt.)	$13,821.6	5.1	$ 68,122	3.2

* All figures are averages for the six fiscal years 1954–55 through 1959–60.

[a] After allowance for excess of replacement cost over original cost of certain assets used during the period. (Cmnd. 390, pp. 11 and 12.)

Sources for both tables: United Kingdom: *Annual Abstract of Statistics;* 1951 Census, *Occupation Tables;* Cmnd. 390; and private communications from the National Farmers Union and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food; United States: 1950 Census; Census of Agriculture (1950); *The Farm Income Situation,* No. 169, July, 1958; *Agricultural Statistics, 1956.*

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[29] During World War II it may be recalled, the entire accumulation of price-supported farm surpluses from the depression years was disposed of at an over-all profit to the Government.

[30] It must be emphasized that we are considering the *cost of agricultural subsidies to the taxpayer.* Much of this sum is expended for storage and other costs that do not go to the farmer. Whether the farmers profit more or less than the cost of the program is, fortunately, not a question that need be answered for the purpose of this article. Incidentally, it would be a difficult question to answer for Britain as well, although there most of the costs of the program go directly into the farmers' pockets.

[31] This calculation includes all farm programs classified by the Department of Agriculture as "primarily for stabilization of farm prices and income" and also the item for Agricultural Conservation Payments. The latter is included to make the total comparable to the figures used for the United Kingdom where so-called "production grants" (*e.g.*, for lime and fertilizer) are used more or less interchangeably with "deficiency payments" and other forms of direct subsidy. Costs

At this point a possible objection must be noted: the cost to the public treasury is only part of the social cost of price supports. How much has been added to the consumers' bill for farm products by the existence of price supports? This question takes us into a far more speculative field than the calculation of costs to the government. What would prices be if they were not supported? The answer would depend in large measure upon how much would be produced in the absence of acreage controls. Even more difficult to calculate, and perhaps even more significant, is the effect of price guarantees in encouraging farmers to use more fertilizer, buy more labor-saving machinery, and in other ways improve their efficiency. It may be questioned, however, whether the average voter is much influenced by this factor. He hears about the cost of the farm program to the government, but it is doubtful whether he gives much thought to that part (very small at most) of the cost of a shirt or a loaf of bread that can be charged to price supports.[32]

Using the crude cost figures that have just been developed, then, the next step is to make them more comparable, as between the two countries, by reducing them to ratios or percentages of such factors as population, farm operators, farm income, national income, and governmental expenditures for all purposes. This is shown in the opposite page. It will be observed that, by all but one of these measures, during the period in question, British agriculture was subsidized at a much higher rate than American. For the one exception (subsidy *per capita* of total population), subsidy rates were substantially equal.[33] According to the other bases of comparison, the difference ranges (very roughly) from a factor of a little over one and one-half, using total governmental expeditures as the standard, to one of six in another instance (farm operators). Using a sort of rough average of these indices, it would not be grossly misleading to say that the rate of British agricultural subsidies was running, proportionally, at from two to three times the rate of their American counterparts.

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of the soil bank "acreage reserve program" are included but, following the practice of the Department of Agriculture, the soil bank "conservation reserve program" is excluded. If the latter were included, the average annual cost figure would be increased by $112.5 million, or about five per cent.

[32] It may be that, under exceptional circumstances, some public opinion can be stirred up against a particular program on the basis of its presumed effect in raising prices. The case of butter before Secretary Benson's cut in the support level of dairy products in the spring of 1954 may be a case in point.

[33] This basis of comparison, of course, leaves out of account the fact that *per capita* income in the United States is far in excess of that in Great Britain; hence the subsidy bears less heavily on the American taxpayer.

EQUILIBRIUM, STRUCTURE OF INTERESTS AND LEADERSHIP: ADENAUER'S SURVIVAL AS CHANCELLOR[1]

PETER H. MERKL
University of California (Santa Barbara)

In studies comparing the Bonn Republic with the Weimar Republic, few aspects of the former have received more attention from political scientists than its extraordinary political stability. Contrary to all expectations in the immediate postwar era, and under the same leadership, Germany's second try at parliamentary democracy has already outlasted the Nazi millennium and will soon have exceeded—successfully—the life span of its ill-fated democratic predecessor, the Weimar Republic. Interpretations abound which attribute the political stamina of the Bonn government to the economic prosperity of Western Germany, its Allied tutelage, its firm Western-oriented course, or its disenchantment with political extremism of either variety. Of particular interest to political scientists, however, are the theories which identify the political stability of the Bonn Republic with the "reign" of Konrad Adenauer from the beginning to this day.

At the time of the *Bundestag* elections of September, 1961, the octogenarian Chancellor had already governed the Federal Republic for three terms and there were abundant signs that his time was up. Having captured a majority of the *Bundestag* seats in the two previous elections, his Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) now lost their absolute majority to the two opposition parties, the Free Democrats (FDP) and Social Democrats (SPD).[2] The FDP was willing to enter a coalition with the CDU/CSU, but its chairman, Erich Mende, definitely rejected Adenauer as the new Chancellor in favor of Ludwig Erhard or any other prominent CDU/CSU politician. A coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD was an unlikely choice for reasons we shall return to. During the campaign, Adenauer's popularity had slipped far from the heights of public veneration[3] and the press claimed that he was already beginning to confuse things and names in public speeches and had lost his zeal and touch for appealing to crowds.[4] Most damaging of all, a revolt against him was threatening in his own party where an opposition, the *fronde*, had formed since the presidential elections of 1959,[5] centering around Minister of Economics Erhard, *Bundestag* President Eugen Gerstenmaier, and the Hamburg deputies Bucerius and Blumenfeld.[6] At the height of the election campaign, Adenauer's internal enemies publicly attacked him, when the old Chancellor made the mistake of questioning the personal integrity of the SPD candidate, Willy Brandt, a few days after the outbreak of the Berlin crisis. They began to campaign for Erhard; and the ambitious Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss (CSU), joined them in the last weeks before the elections. It was surprising that the CDU/CSU in spite of this internecine war managed to win a plurality at the polls.

Two days after the elections, therefore, when the 85-year-old Chancellor faced his Executive Board (*Parteivorstand*), angrily upbraiding his critics for showing him the door after twelve years of successful leadership, this seemed to be the end of the Adenauer era. Yet before the week was over, gasps of uncomprehending protest could be heard throughout the editorial offices of the German press. Cartoons appeared depicting Adenauer as a naughty child refusing to go to bed. Newspaper editors wrote the letter of resignation he should have written, and some compared him to the famous surgeon Sauerbruch who, stubbornly refusing to retire from the operating room because of his advanced age, had contributed to the death of several patients. Six weeks later, Adenauer had once more become Chancellor for at least another two years.

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[1] This study was made possible by a travel grant from the International and Comparative Fund of the University of California for which credit is due to the Ford Foundation.

[2] The popular vote was distributed as follows: CDU/CSU 45.4% (1957: 50.2); SPD 36.2% (31.8); and FDP 12.8% (7.7).

[3] "Protest ist keine Denkmalsschaendung mehr," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (hereafter referred to as *SZ*), Sept. 13, 1961.

[4] *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 6, 1961, p. 17.

[5] On this occasion, Adenauer at first decided to go into semiretirement by running for the largely honorific office of Federal President. He changed his mind, however, when he learned that his successor as Chancellor would be Ludwig Erhard, of whom Adenauer declared in public that he lacked the ability and stature for this position.

[6] "Brandt alias Frahm," *Der Spiegel*, Aug. 23, 1961, p. 18.

What had happened? Could Adenauer's survival against all odds be understood with the help of the various theories advanced by political scientists and other observers to explain his dominant role in West German politics? It is the intention of this study to reexamine these theories of Adenauer's leadership in the light of the revealing events accompanying the formation of his new coalition cabinet, and to supply a new explanation of this phenomenon of leadership and of the peculiarities of the West German political system which sustain it.

I

A cursory survey of the literature about the astounding stamina of Adenauer as a leadership figure shows a good deal of agreement among political scientists, journalists and other observers about the basic elements of his dominant role. Four major themes recur in most articles, books and comments about him: his personality, his international stature, his constitutional position and the plebiscitary character of West German democracy.

The personality of the Old Man is pictured as sly, authoritarian, paternalistic and single-minded. Sigmund Neumann, for example, describes him as

> . . . one of the great statesmen of the 20th century . . . astute and arrogant, committed and cynical, indefatigable and decent, stubborn and sensitive, autocratic and humane. . . .[7]

Richard Hiscocks speaks of "a mixture of judgment and forcefulness, wisdom and astuteness" and of "masterly political tactics" but criticizes his authoritarian attitude toward his cabinet and the *Bundestag*.[8] Arnold J. Heidenheimer, in his book on the subject, explains Adenauer's authoritarianism by pointing to his background as a politico-religious leader of the old Center Party and as the mayor of an important city, a quasi-feudal chief of great skill in dealing with the regional and socio-economic group interests of Weimar Prussia.[9] In another penetrating analysis of Adenauer's leadership, Heidenheimer draws attention to the fact that, as Lord Mayor of Cologne and member of the Prussian Council of State, Adenauer patterned his role in the bureaucratic tradition of leadership rather than in the Anglo-American tradition of party government.[10] Fellow politicians, the West German press and, in particular, the news magazine *Der Spiegel* often picture the Old Man as a crafty tactician whose chief technique seems to be to let things develop, deal with them one by one as they come up, and not to make any particular effort to force his own concept upon a world of contrary currents of opinion; in other words, a master of Bismarck's art of the possible. Other observers have called him primitive, sterile, unrealistic and lacking depth.[11]

A consensus of opinion also stresses the importance of his international stature for his authority at home.[12] For his West Germans, the Old Man symbolizes their return to a respected position among other nations. Adenauer's rise owes much also to the fact that the time was ripe for his concept of reconstructing the German position step by step from the Rhineland into a definite commitment to the West and to European integration. Georg Wolff in his recent series on Adenauer in *Der Spiegel* even goes so far as to suggest that the domestic policies of the Old Man have to be seen from the standpoint of foreign policy.[13] Guenter Gaus, in an editorial in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, sums up the secret of Adenauer's success and the likely end of his era of inflexibility in the following words:

> His imposing one-track-mindedness had to coincide with a corresponding attitude on the part of our Western Allies. Never letting anyone change his preconceived course enabled Adenauer to bring about reconciliation with France and earned him the friendship of John Foster Dulles. For a decade, his basic ideas have coincided so much with those in Washington and Paris that almost every one of his political decisions turned out to

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[7] In Taylor Cole, ed., *European Political Systems* (2d rev. ed., New York, 1960), p. 418; also Alfred Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie* (Duesseldorf: Rauch, 1960), pp. 418–20.

[8] *Democarcy in Western Germany* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 79, 122–7. See also Robert G. Neumann, *European and Comparative Government* (New York, 1960), p. 423 fn.

[9] *Adenauer and the CDU* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 235–7.

[10] "Der starke Regierungschef und das Parteiensystem: der Kanzlereffekt in der Bundesrepublik," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 2 (Sept. 1961), pp. 251–2.

[11] See especially the comments quoted by George Wolff in "Mein Gott—Was soll aus Duetschland werden?", *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 27, 1961, pp. 60–2.

[12] See Grosser, *op. cit.*, pp. 415–6; Sigmund Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 419; Hiscocks, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–80; and Heidenheimer, "Der starke Regierungschef . . . ," pp. 257–8.

[13] *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 15, 1961, pp. 57–69.

be right in the end. But who would claim that this will continue to be true?[14]

About the contribution of his constitutional position as Federal Chancellor to the durable dominance of Adenauer in West German politics, there is some disagreement. The Basic Law of 1949 attempted to strengthen the position of the Chancellor *vis-à-vis* cabinet and *Bundestag* in many ways, in the hope of forestalling the ministerial instability of the Weimar Republic. The chief device for this purpose was the so-called "constructive no-confidence vote," a modification of orthodox parliamentary government which requires the election of a new Chancellor for the overthrow of the incumbent. By this means, the framers of the Basic Law hoped to prevent the extreme wings of a multi-party parliament like the Weimar *Reichstag* from combining to topple governments solely for the sake of obstruction and chaos. One prolific writer on German affairs, Alfred Grosser, however, considers it most unlikely that the situation of the last years of the Weimar Republic will ever be repeated. Hence the "constructive no-confidence vote" has never been used in Bonn and plays no particular role in strengthening Adenauer's position.[15] On the other hand, Ruediger Altmann, a German political journalist, makes a strong argument for the importance of the "constructive no-confidence vote" in his recent book *Das Erbe Adenauers*.[16] He maintains that this device has brought about the virtual paralysis of West German parliamentarism by setting the price of insurrection against the Chancellor exorbitantly high. Before 1953, dissatisfied coalition partners would have had to line up a new coalition of small parties with the Social Democrats in order to exercise pressure against the Chancellor. Since 1953, and in the crisis year 1951, the price of insurrection would have included the breaking away of parts of the CDU/CSU to form a coalition with the SPD.

On balance, there seems to be some merit on both sides of the argument. A constitutional device designed for the prevention of the unique predicament of the Weimar Republic can hardly hope to be a panacea for all conceivable ills of a nascent parliamentary democracy. In fact, if the constructive no-confidence vote had been a part of the Weimar Constitution in 1930, it would have stopped neither the inundation of the *Reichstag* by a majority of totalitarians from the right and the left, nor even the legal—not to mention violent—ascent to power of Hitler. On the other hand, Altmann is quite right in suggesting that such a considerable modification of parliamentary government was bound to have a noticeable effect on the position of Adenauer with regard to his cabinet, the *Bundestag* and even his own party. But then again, Altmann's argument proves too much: while it may be true that a small coalition party in a pre-1958 French government, for example, could get the ear of the premier without such an extreme step as having to form a new coalition with the opposition, this was not a particularly desirable situation in the interest of democracy and good government. Regarding the supreme sacrifice of party unity, moveover, the dilemma of the labor wing of the CDU/CSU is not unique. It is found also in British parliamentarism where the wings of the party in power have no more authority over the Prime Minister than they can impose at caucus meetings by virtue of their votes. And just as the power of the British Prime Minister over the House of Commons cannot be explained without mentioning his party leadership, Adenauer's authority over his own party in the *Bundestag* is also largely a matter of party cohesion and party leadership. When the CDU/CSU tires of him—and that day may be near—it will replace him without straining the constructive no-confidence vote or any other formal part of law and constitution.

The fourth and perhaps most interesting part of Adenauer's leadership has been the development of West German democracy in the direction of plebiscitary democracy. Whether one believes that the authoritarian charisma of Adenauer made the West German elections into plebiscites for or against him, or that the Germans needed somebody like Adenauer in the wake of Hitler's dictatorship and the disillusionment with politics, there is no denying the fact. Friedrich Naumann, a German writer and politician, predicted this development even before the first World War and the sociologists Max Weber and Alexander Ruestow sought to encourage it under the Weimar Republic: the chief executive office in Germany has become the focal point of the authority of the state which is derived from the people and periodically reaffirmed by them although they do not directly elect the Chancellor. There are different ways of looking at this phenomenon. Erich Kuby, another German political journalist, feels that Adenauer owes his long tenure to the leadership cult by means of which the Germans are trying to drop their political responsibility into the lap of someone trustworthy so they can concentrate on their pursuit of happiness.[17] Hiscocks talks about "Chancellor democracy," a phrase also used by the German political scientist Theodor Eschenburg and widely adopted in the German press.[18] Heidenheimer, finally, who has dealt with this subject more analytically than anyone else, prefers the term "Chancellor effect" to connote the added authority of office by which Adenauer attracts a vast fringe of unpolitical voters, job seekers, patriots, people who never even vote in state elections and who often lack the interest and knowledge to understand Adenauer's position or the ideology of the CDU/CSU. Heidenheimer uses the same term for Adenauer's hold over a loyal following within his coalition parties, the "Chancellor party," which is said to be latent within the CDU/CSU and all one-time coalition parties of the Old Man. This "Chancellor effect" is partly the creation of Adenauer and partly the result of circumstances tending in this direction. After Adenauer's retirement, Heidenheimer believes that its benefits will accrue to any popular, forceful Chancellor, such as Ludwig Erhard or Willy Brandt.[19]

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[14] "Adenauer," *SZ*, November 4/5, 1961.

[15] Grosser, *op. cit.*, p. 415. Richard Hiscocks attributes to it a part of the responsibility for Adenauer's authoritarianism towards cabinet and Bundestag; *op. cit.*, p. 428.

[16] (Stuttgart-Degerloch: Seewald, 1960), pp. 31, 37, 41–2.

These four elements of Adenauer's tenacious dominance in West German politics, personality, international stature, constitutional position and the "Chancellor effect," are the basic conceptual tools offered in the endeavor to understand and explain Adenauer's survival against great odds in the almost seven weeks of bargaining over the new coalition government. His personality obviously had much to do with his success: his stubborn refusal to bow to the storm of public indignation and ridicule; the brazenness with which he seized the initiative both toward the public and within his own party;[20] the superior skill with which he outmaneuvered his chief rivals Erhard, Strauss and Gerstenmaier, and finally his future partners of the FDP. His international stature helped him little, although he lost no opportunity to show his own party leaders and the FDP negotiators letters and telegrams he had received from Washington. Later he insisted that he should be reelected soon, since President Kennedy was expecting him in Washington. His constitutional position also did not help him. It may on the contrary have made his prospective partners more wary of him: once they helped reelect him Chancellor, how could they be sure that he would retire at the agreed moment; how could they be certain of a reasonable measure of control over him short of forming a new coalition with the opposition? The charm of the Chancellor effect over the people had already worn thin and was used up even more rapidly by the refusal of the Old Man to resign while his people still respected and admired him. Only over his own party did his call for loyalty still have effect, especially after he had outmaneuvered the *fronde* and his most serious rivals.

Yet when one reviews the changing scenes and battles of the formation of the new Adenauer coalition, these four tools of analysis fall definitely short of explaining how and why Adenauer succeeded once more. They fail to explain, in particular, why Ludwig Erhard, the popular architect of the West German "economic miracle" and the choice for Chancellor of the people,[21] of large parts of the CDU, the FDP and the CSU, did not press through his demand to become Chancellor. Nor can they make plausible the failure of the ambitious Strauss (CSU) to take control of the situation and either to end or to limit to a transitional one-year period the tenure of the Old Man. Nor do they make intelligible the similar failure of Gerstenmaier, the popular and experienced President of the *Bundestag*. These three men certainly did not fail for lack of trying. Least of all can the four elements mentioned above explain the slow but inexorable collapse of the position of Mende and his FDP who started out dictating the end of the Adenauer era and ended up content with little more than an empty gesture of compliance with their minimal request: to share the control over German foreign policy.

II

Dissatisfaction with these explanations leads us to probe further into the structure and substructure of the political system which made it possible for Adenauer to weather the storm facing him after the 1961 elections. The stability of his leadership, it is submitted, is the consequence of two structural aspects of the West German system which are linked together and will continue to favor anyone with the qualities necessary to become the leader of the CDU/CSU. This statement presupposes, of course, that the political camp to the right of the SPD will continue to enjoy a popular majority. One of the structural factors is the equilibrium among the group forces of which the CDU/CSU is composed. We shall describe in this section how this equilibrium has operated in Adenauer's favor. The other factor consists of the forces which have increasingly driven the German multi-party system into a bipartite mold. After dealing with this second factor in the next section, we can draw the conclusions for any third party from the presence and interaction of these two structural aspects of the West German political system.

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[17] *Alles im Eimer* (Stuttgart: Goverts, 1960), pp. 203–7. See also Grosser, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

[19] "Der starke Regierungschef . . . ," pp. 254–61.

[20] The morning after the Bundestag elections, Adenauer called a press conference without consulting his party in order to assert his leadership toward the public from the start. Three days later he disarmed his Party Executive Board so successfully that they appointed him as chief negotiator for the coalition talks, thereby prejudging the question of his continued leadership.

[21] According to *Time* (Atlantic Edition), Nov. 10, 1961, p. 30, a public opinion poll gave Erhand 70% of the electorate over Adenauer as Chancellor. I have not been able to ascertain the source or verify the statistics.

By equilibrium among the group forces we mean a relative state of balance among several pairs of distinct and antagonistic groups within the CDU/CSU which tends to operate in favor of the *status quo*. This state of balance need not be static or exclusive of the wax and wane of individual groups. There can be shifts of emphasis or orientation owing to the changing weight of individual groups. It is essential to this concept of equilibrium, however, that there is a consensus among the groups not to wipe out one another at times of superiority and to give each group its due voice, according to its size, in the formation of the policy of the whole organization. Such an equilibrial system will tend to operate similarly to the American system of the great sectional and socio-economic interests, or "veto groups": a candidate for leadership or a new policy, in order to be accepted, must not arouse the strong opposition of any one group. Once a leader or a policy has become accepted and managed to unify the whole system behind it, however, efforts at overthrowing the leader or the policy face the same obstacle: the opposition of a single group, albeit a small minority, can frustrate them once and for all.

The CDU/CSU indeed operates like such an equilibrial system. It is composed of a number of distinct and separate groups which oppose each other in pairs and yet are held together by a consensus mixed of mutual respect, Christian Democratic ideas about government and society, and the tangible advantages of party unity: organized labor and organized business, Protestants and Catholics, centralists and states righters, on the one side Big Business and Big Labor, and on the other, the *Mittelstand*, *i.e.* farmers, small business and the civil service. Members and voters of the CDU/CSU come from all layers of society. A web of associations from the Catholic labor organizations to business and farm organizations and the far-flung system of church organizations ties the party to all kinds of groups and social forces in West German society.[22] An elaborate system of party committees on several levels, moreover, channels the programmatic demands of labor, business, the *Mittelstand*, refugees, local government organizations, women and youth groups through Social Policy Committees, *Mittelstand* Policy Committees, and further committees on communal policy, and the women's and youth organizations, respectively, into the policy-making agencies of the party.[23]

As in our equilibrium model, this system has called for a leader who is basically uncommitted to any one group. While Adenauer could not help being a pronounced Catholic, a man of business associations and a former local government official of considerable reputation, he has remained far from becoming the herald of any of these groups. He has bent over backwards to win the confidence of Protestants and to get along with organized labor and the states righters whose interests at times clash with those of the local government organizations. His role as a leader has been mainly that of a moderator and mediator among all the groups, a task which is also implicit in Christian Democratic thinking and in Catholic social philosophy.

This concept of leadership also implies a rather passive role in the making of domestic policy. Under such circumstances, the leader is not expected to come up with an imaginative policy of his own. He fares better if he is content with being the broker of the policy trends developed by the dominant groups of his party, or the executor of the resultant of the parallelogram of forces among these groups. As has been noted by many an observer, Adenauer has never exhibited a pronounced conception of his own in domestic policy.[24] Only in foreign policy, he has a definite commitment to European unification and to the Western alliance.

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[22] For details, see Gerhard Schulz, "Die Organisationsstruktur der CDU," *Zeitschrift fuer Politik*, Vol. 3 (1956), p. 161. On the theory of parties of integration, see Sigmund Neumann, "Towards a Theory of Political Parties," *World Politics*, Vol. 6 (1954), p. 501 ff.

[23] Gerhard Schulz, "Die CDU—Merkmale ihres Aufbaus," in Max Gustav Lange, ed., *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik* (Stuttgart-Duesseldorf: Ringverlag, 1955), p. 143.

[24] See the quotations in *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 27, 1961, pp. 64–5.

Adenauer's broker role becomes evident especially if we review the spectacular changes in the economic policy of the CDU/CSU in the period during which he headed his party in the Bizonal Economic Council and later in the Bonn government. The CDU programs of Neheim-Huesten (1946) and Ahlen (1947) still advocated a planned economy and the socialization of the coal industry,[25] thereby reflecting both the hard times and the dominance of the labor wing within the CDU/CSU which at that time also frequently entered coalitions with the SPD. Then came the rise of Erhard's "social market economics," coalitions with the FDP and the Conservatives (DP), and the Duesseldorf Principles of 1949 in which the "regulated competition" of *ordo* liberalism[26] replaced the earlier socialism. In the following four years, the CDU/CSU dropped its labor orientation more and more while its business and *Mittelstand* wing came into full control. After 1952, Erhard and his free enterprise policy increasingly fell out of favor with the protectionist interests of Big Business, the *Mittelstand* and the farmers. This new trend of the CDU/CSU reached its climax with the postponing of Erhard's anti-cartel bill until it was finally passed in an emasculated form in 1957, half a decade after it was first submitted.[27] But while the economic policy of the CDU/CSU thus traversed a half-cycle from socialism to recartelization, Adenauer remained party chairman and Chancellor without even once losing control, due to his lack of commitment and flexibility in domestic affairs.

With this party structure of the CDU/CSU and the corresponding leadership model in mind, we can reexamine the situation which Adenauer was facing after the elections of 1961. With his *Bundestag* majority lost, the Old Man had to choose between SPD and FDP as coalition partners. Apparently he preferred the latter because he would have to share less power with a small party, if for no other reason. However, the FDP had campaigned with the slogan "No more one-party dominance in Bonn" and a promise not to enter a coalition with the SPD under any circumstances—thus encouraging a good many dissatisfied CDU/CSU voters to vote for the FDP instead. It appealed in particular to right-wing voters who had so far voted for Adenauer. Widely acclaimed as the real winner of the 1961 elections, the FDP interpreted its gains as a popular mandate to overthrow the Old Man. Favored by the conservative character of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic and by the position of strength he had created for himself, Adenauer could afford to ignore the popular clamor for his resignation. But the adamant refusal of the FDP and the insurgents within his own ranks were a serious challenge to his survival as Chancellor. Knowing the way in which his party operates, Adenauer apparently decided to tackle his internal opposition first. Once the CDU/CSU had committed itself to reelecting him Chancellor, the fear of losing face would keep it from backing down before the small FDP which would have no choice, therefore, but to accept Adenauer or to go into the opposition. We shall see how the equilibrial system of the CDU/CSU helped the Old Man to stifle his internal opposition.

The FDP had counted on the assurances of Erhard, Strauss, Gerstenmaier and the Hamburg deputies of the CDU to topple Konrad Adenauer. Mende's sharp rejection of Adenauer as Chancellor of the next coalition was to give the cue for this internal revolution. To be sure, a party leader who has headed the government for such a long time is likely to have accumulated supporters who owe their position to him, in this case men like the Minister of the Interior Schroeder, or the Foreign Minister von Brentano. Adenauer also had personal friends from his home state who were likely to support him even at a time of declining popularity, such as the banker Pferdmenges or the trade unionist Blank. Yet it was doubtful whether such supporters were numerous enough to continue him in office against overwhelming odds. As Gerd Bucerius, the most outspoken of the *frondeurs*, argued persuasively in his weekly magazine *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Adenauer had come a long way from his peak in 1957 due to his age and immense burden of work. Unlike Erhard as a Chancellor, Adenauer's continued tenure of office would also cost the CDU/CSU very considerable concessions to the FDP in questions of personnel and policy.[28]

While Adenauer's "Chancellor effect" thus failed to save him at this crucial moment, the prospect of a coalition of the CDU/CSU with the FDP under Erhard set into motion the mechanics of the equilibrial system of the CDU/CSU. Wary of the economic and social policy of such an industry- and *Mittelstand*-dominated cabinet, the labor wing of the CDU/CSU utilized the general impasse to extract a number of concessions and promises from Adenauer in exchange for throwing its weight against the attempts to remove him. The CDU/CSU labor wing in the *Bundestag* and in the extra-parliamentary party apparatus has always been a factor to be reckoned with[29] and has lately moved more into the foreground under the leadership of Hans Katzer, the Executive Manager of the Social Policy Committees of the CDU/CSU. According to press comments, Katzer received specific assurances regarding the extension of the Law of Savings Premiums, the "social discount" in the stock of further denationalized enterprises, an increase in the workers' share of productive capital, a reform of corporation law, higher sickness benefits and family allowances, a stronger Cartel Office, and the establishment of an Economic and Social Council to extend labor co-determination above the plant level.[30] The labor wing would probably have preferred a coalition of the CDU/CSU with the SPD, but, rather than upset too much the balance of the equilibrial system, it contented itself with a firm commitment to its program of social policy by a CDU/CSU-FDP government.

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[25] See Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861–1961* (Frankfurt: Musterschmidt, 1961), pp. 183, 189; and Bruno Doerpinghaus und Kurt Witt, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU 1950* (Generalsekretariat der Arbeitsgemeinschaft CDU/CSU fuer Deutschland, 1950), pp. 226–9.

[26] *Duesseldorfer Leitsaetze,* July 15, 1949, Sonderdruck des Deutschland-Union-Dienstes. See also Carl J. Friedrich, "The Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (June 1955), pp. 509–25.

[27] "Wege zur Sicherung des freien Wettbewerbs, "*Das Parlament,* July 24, 1957, pp. 5–8.

[28] Dieter Schroeder, "Die Erben Adenauers muessen noch warten," *SZ,* Sept. 30/Oct. 1, 1961, p. 4.

Adenauer clearly stood to gain from the motion of the CDU/CSU labor wing to restore the balance as long as he was known to be flexible enough to return to the earlier CDU/CSU tradition of Kaiser and Arnold if need be. At the same time, he wanted to avoid becoming dependent on his new allies. This was the Archimedian point from which he could unhinge his entire opposition and yet retain his freedom of choice. He resolved, therefore, to swing the equilibrial pendulum all the way to the left in order to be sure of a reaction: one week after the elections, he invited the SPD leaders Ollenhauer, Brandt and Wehner for an extended discussion of German foreign policy which they had already requested months before. There was no mention of a "black-red" coalition, but most observers understood that the Old Man was exploring his only logical alternative for a coalition as long as the FDP refused to accept him. The reaction came instantly: the two top officials of the *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie* came to see Adenauer and assured him that they did not want Erhard as Chancellor either. CSU chairman Strauss and the CDU/CSU Minister President of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Kiesinger, hastened to express their horror of a "black-red" coalition. Most important, industry spokesmen put the FDP under pressure not to drive Adenauer to such an "extreme step." At this point Ludwig Erhard gave in and made it known that he no longer expected to become Chancellor right away. From this we can also gather that the *fronde* was a personal faction rather than one of economic interest. Without their favorite candidate, the internal opposition against Adenauer collapsed and, a mere ten days after the elections, the Old Man received the unanimous endorsement of the CDU/CSU caucus in the *Bundestag*. Erhard took it upon himself, in fact, to persuade his party to reelect Adenauer once more.[31]

At this point it may be well to stop and review the reasons for the failure of Erhard, Strauss and Gerstenmaier to end the Adenauer era. Erhard, who had accumulated broad support in the CDU/CSU as a result of his treatment by Adenauer after the presidential elections of 1959, seems to have underestimated the obstacles in the way of his immediate succession. In particular, he misjudged the tenacity of Adenauer when he saw him faltering during the election campaign and underestimated the power of the groups within his own party that have mental reservations about his economic policies. On the other hand, he overrated the power of public opinion and of his friends in the CDU/CSU and FDP to help him into office. Finally, neither Erhard nor any other important politician would have wanted to incur the odium of being Brutus to the eighty-five year old Caesar. Adenauer not only fought off Erhard's feeble attempt at insurrection, but added further insult to the long list of injuries which Erhard owes to him: when he was pressed by the Erhard faction to designate his Minister of Economics and Vice Chancellor as his heir apparent, he simply said that there were many CDU/CSU leaders who might succeed him some day. When Erhard proposed that as the Vice Chancellor and likely successor he ought to be given an opportunity to familiarize himself with his future duties and to participate in foreign policy decisions he was brusquely rebuffed. Finally, at the last stage of the negotiations over the new coalition with the FDP, Adenauer took away further substantial functions from the Ministry of Economics, a process which has gone on since 1952, in order to incorporate them into a new cabinet position for the FDP. This last slight occurred after Adenauer had already promised Erhard that no such transfer of functions would take place. The Minister of Economics consequently left the *Bundestag* at the election of the Chancellor, so as not to have to congratulate him, and the press attributed a good share of the negative votes to the incensed adherents of the humiliated Erhard.[32]

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[29] According to Dr. Juergen Domes of the Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft at Heidelberg University, the labor wing of the Bundestag CDU/CSU is the most cohesive and well-organized group of the parliamentary party, second only to the CSU Landesgruppe. Its strength has been consistently at 23 or 24% of the total, excepting only the period from 1953 to 1957. It also constitutes the largest single group within the Party Executive Board of the extra-parliamentary party.

[30] *Der Spiegel*, Oct. 11, 1961, pp. 27–8.

[31] See *SZ*, Sept. 25, 26 and 29, 1961.

TABLE I. SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE NEW COALITION

Time Period	Moves
Sept. 17 (Elections)—19	(1) *General Orientation:* Adenauer seizes the initiative, meets the press and sounds out the FDP and SPD about a coalition.
Sept. 19–27	(2) *Stage-Setting Maneuvers:* (a) The labor wing of the CDU/CSU throws its weight behind the Chancellor in exchange for certain promises; (b) Adenauer invites the leaders of the SPD for a discussion of West German foreign policy; (c) Franz Josef Strauss tries to decree a compromise, a transitional Adenauer Cabinet, with the help of his CSU; (d) Representatives of West German business and industry appeal to Adenauer and put pressure on the FDP in order to prevent a "black-red" coalition. (e) Adenauer gains the support of his party (Sept. 27).
Sept. 28–Nov. 7:	(3) *Actual Negotiations:* (a) First phase of negotiations between a reluctant FDP and a self-confident Adenauer; (b) Second phase: Unsure of itself, the FDP *Bundestag* caucus calls on the FDP Main Committee to make the basic decision of accepting or rejecting Adenauer; (c) Third phase: Bitter wrangling over the coalition contract between the two parties; (d) Final phase: Pressed by Federal President Luebke's threat to take action, the CDU/CSU and FDP come to a compromise.

Franz Josef Strauss, in contrast to Erhard, miscalculated the situation in that he expected to cut the Gordian knot with an energetic display of power. The ambitious Minister of Defense tried to force a one-year transitional Chancellorship as a compromise with the FDP upon the old Chancellor. As chairman of the CSU *Landesgruppe* in the *Bundestag,* he intended to use the votes of his Bavarian deputies as a lever to dislodge Adenauer and clear the way for Erhard. The CSU has always jealously guarded its last vestiges of autonomy against the CDU, and Strauss's efforts were generally interpreted as an attempt on the part of the CSU to reestablish itself as an independent party. However, Strauss's CSU deputies fell away from his cause one by one when they were supposed to vote against continuing Adenauer in office without any limitations. The Social Policy Committees and business and industrial interests of the Bavarian CSU, it seems, cherished their federation-wide interests in Bonn far more than the autonomy of the CSU. The Adenauer loyalists in the CDU/CSU were frankly delighted to see the ambitious Minister of Defense fall on his face. As some of his enemies claimed, Strauss wanted to help Erhard into the office of the Chancellor only in order to govern through him and in the hope of succeeding him soon. Now the Minister of Defense fell definitely out of grace with the Old Man who used to treat him fondly as the eventual heir of his system of inflexibility. At the inauguration of the new Adenauer cabinet, an occasion at which one can gauge the political future of a Minister by the seat which he occupies, Strauss no longer was in the front row as at previous inaugurations. Instead, his place was taken by a new pretender to the throne whom Adenauer favors as a counter-weight against both Erhard and Strauss: Heinrich Krone, the former caucus chairman of the *Bundestag* CDU/CSU who was given a cabinet post without portfolio in reward for his loyalty during the negotiations. To forestall Strauss's ambitions for the Foreign Office, moreover, Adenauer chose the old rival of the Minister of Defense, Schroeder, as the successor of von Brentano. Schroeder resembles Adenauer in his lack of commitment to any social or economic group of the CDU/CSU and in enjoying the firm support of the North Rhine Westphalian CDU. Strauss decided to give no more offense to his Chancellor. But twenty of his CSU deputies were said to have abstained from voting for Adenauer at the election of the Chancellor by the *Bundestag*.[33]

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[32] Guenter Gaus, "Der ewige Zweite," *SZ,* Sept. 29, 1961, p. 3. Also *Der Spiegel,* Nov. 15, 1961, pp. 23–6.

The third aspirant for the Chancellorship, Eugen Gerstenmaier, was considered very eligible not only in the eyes of his friends in the CDU/CSU, but also by the FDP, the SPD and by the Federal President, Heinrich Luebke (CDU). At the 1959 convention of the CDU at Kiel, he defended free enterprise against Katzer and the labor wing of the party and knew, therefore, that his chances of a quick ascent to power were no greater than those of Erhard. Hence he limited himself to encouraging Erhard and the *fronde* spokesman Bucerius who periodically and fruitlessly called for the resignation of Adenauer. When the Old Man was about to come to terms with the FDP on the basis of a coalition contract whose content was kept secret from the public and from the rank and file of the CDU/CSU, reprints of this document suddenly appeared in many German newspapers. First Strauss and then especially Gerstenmaier and his friends were accused of having leaked a copy of the contract to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in order to stir up the rank and file of the CDU/CSU against the coalition. The CDU/CSU deputies indeed appeared with newspaper copies of the contract at the final caucus meeting, and Katzer once more insisted that Adenauer abide by his pledge to the labor wing. But Adenauer seems to have convinced his party (1) that the passages most obnoxious to labor, *e.g.*, the injunction against extending labor co-determination above the plant level, had already been removed from the contract; and (2) that the coalition contract had little significance, either because it could not be legally enforced or because it was unconstitutional in content. The purposive indiscretion at any rate helped the Gerstenmaier group very little as long as Adenauer could claim that the newspaper versions of the coalition contract deviated from the signed original. In the end both Erhard and Gerstenmaier could be seen leaving the caucus room before the final vote on the new coalition was taken.[34]

In this fashion, Adenauer outmaneuvered the most dangerous threat to his continued tenure. Once the balances of the equilibrial system of the CDU/CSU had begun to rock up and down, the question of continuing an eighty-five-year-old man in the Chancellor's office seemed quite insignificant to the CDU/CSU group leaders as compared to the overriding importance of the relative position of each group in the system.

III

Once the CDU/CSU was solidly behind Adenauer, he could return to his negotiations with the FDP. Before we can fully understand his final victory over this party, we have to draw into account the forces which have driven the multi-party system of Weimar Germany into a bipartite mold. There may be some doubt whether the long evident trend toward a two-party system in Western Germany was not reversed by the 1961 elections which cost the CDU/CSU its majority and brought a third party, the FDP, dramatic gains.[35] However, it appears that the FDP became a mere appendix of the CDU/CSU from the minute it pledged itself not to enter a coalition with the SPD after the elections, because thereby it allowed itself to become a mere instrument of CDU/CSU voters who desired to register their protest against Adenauer without voting for the SPD. This FDP pledge automatically made the SPD the only alternative to continued CDU/CSU rule and, by implication, made the FDP a splinter of the CDU/CSU which had split off from the mother party over some grievance and now wished to coerce it to mend its ways. If there had been any doubt about the dependence of the FDP on the CDU/CSU, it was quickly dispelled after the elections: for a while, there was still talk that the FDP would simply remain in the opposition, if it could not dislodge Adenauer from his post. Rumor had it that the

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[33] Hans Ulrich Kempski, "Die Kanzlerdemokratie in der Sterbestunde," *SZ*, Sept. 23/24, 1961, p. 3; and Josef Riedmiller, "Franz Josef Strauss auf der Waage," *SZ*, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 3. Also *Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst*, November 8, 1961.

[34] *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 15, 1961, pp. 26–8.

[35] Some observers have called the West German party system a one or a one-and-a-half party system because of the seeming inability of the SPD to challenge the dominant position of the CDU/CSU. However, the West German situation appears to be more like the alternating periods of Republican and Democratic supremacy before and after 1932 in the United States than like comparable post-colonial examples. *Cf.* Heidenheimer, "Der starke Regierungschef . . .," p. 241 ff.

FDP might prefer to do so in order to avoid the blame for some of the unpopular concessions which Western Germany might have to make with regard to Berlin and reunification.[36] But it soon became evident that the FDP had no such choice, quite apart from the lure of cabinet posts and patronage. It was driven by the same force which has reduced the number of political parties represented in the *Bundestag* from election to election, until in 1961 there were only two left to contend, the CDU/CSU-FDP and the SPD.

At first glance, the difference between the party systems of the Bonn and Weimar Republics is indeed striking and not easy to explain: the Weimar *Reichstag* was composed at times of more than thirty and never of less than eight distinct groups, of which none was able to get more than a third of the vote—except in the final Nazi landslide. There were the Communists, the Social Democrats, at least two middle-class Liberal parties, the Catholic Center, the Bavarian People's Party, the German Nationalists, and the extreme right, not counting the wax and wane of smaller groups in between. The new party system of 1945, by comparison, started significantly with the reappearance of the SPD and the foundation of the CDU/CSU as a broad "political rally to the right of the SPD," to which old Weimar politicians flocked, ranging from former left-wing Liberals (DDP) to the German Nationalists (DNVP). In comparison to these two great forces, SPD and CDU/CSU, there was little else to report: even at the time of its origin, the FDP barely escaped the "rally to the right of the SPD."[37] The Communists did not for long outlast the Sovietization of East Germany. Neofascist parties died out or were outlawed almost as fast as they were founded. The refugees and other splinter groups of discontent failed to survive the economic boom. Regional parties like the Bavarian Party (BP) and the German Party (DP), once called Lower Saxonian Land Party (NLP), did not fare well in Bonn. With the benefit of hindsight, one may say today that the trend toward a two-party system in West Germany was evident from the start.

What could have transformed the complex Weimar system into the far simpler system of the Federal Republic which in this way resembles the Anglo-American democracies? It was hardly the electoral system, a mixture of single-member district plurality with proportional representation, with the latter rather preponderant.[38] Nor can it be explained satisfactorily with the argument that the West Germans learned to shy away from political extremism, considering that most Weimar parties were not extremist in this sense. Even less plausible would be the statement that the German voters and politicians learned from the Weimar experience. The West German voters are not overwhelmingly in favor of a two-party system.[39] Nor would it be reasonable to expect such a self-conscious electoral conduct from any people, least of all the Germans whose interest in politics has been very low although their voting participation is high. Politicians also can hardly be expected to be motivated by such considerations: for years the FDP and other third parties have campaigned against the trend toward a two-party system and, at the *Laender* level, many CDU/CSU and SPD politicians favor their cause for practical reasons. The only frequently advanced argument which seems to have merit is that Adenauer's domineering role has tended to create two camps, one for and one against him. However, it should be noted that until 1961 the anti-Adenauer voters have always had other alternatives than to vote in increasing numbers for the SPD.

If these arguments fail to explain the change from the Weimar party system to the new bipolar trend, what others are available? A number. In particular, socio-economic and physical changes distinguish the Federal Republic from its predecessor. The Federal Republic is considerably smaller and economically more integrated than its predecessor. The loss of land and sectionalism, for example, removed the geographic basis of the bulk of German Nationalist support, and has softened the old states rights movements in various parts of the country. The dismemberment of Prussia and the new geopolitical situation at the fringe of of the Iron Curtain, moreover, has further reduced the causes of faction which might arise from many alternatives of foreign policy. The class structure of Germany, finally, which was still basic to the Weimar social and party system, was subjected to a long series of shattering experiences—the economic crises under the Weimar Republic, totalitarian and post-totalitarian reshuffling of rank and status, the impoverishment resulting from war, air raids and mass expulsion and, most recently, the socio-economic changes of a rapid economic boom. A few years after the end of the last World War, most Germans were fairly equal in economic terms, namely at the bottom of the economic ladder. The accumulation of wealth since that time has created a new society of status, expressed in the ownership of automobiles, washing machines, refrigerators and television sets, but hardly a society of class distinctions.[40] With the class lines went another important division of the Weimar party system. With most of the old causes of faction removed, a new alignment could form.

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[36] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (hereafter referred to as *FAZ*), Sept. 21, 1961.

[37] See especially Hans Georg Wieck, *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergruendung des Zentrums im Jahre 1945*, and *Christliche und Freie Demokraten in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden und Wuerttemberg, 1945/46* (Duesseldorf: Droste, 1953 and 1959).

[38] For details, see James K. Pollock, "The West German Electoral Law of 1953," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (March 1955), pp. 107–30. Also Gerhard Loewenberg, "Parliamentarism in Western Germany: The Functioning of the Bundestag," *ibid.*, Vol. 55 (March 1961), pp. 87–102.

[39] When in February, 1956, the Institut fuer Demoskopie asked a national sample: "Would you welcome it if only the CDU/CSU and the SPD were left in Germany?", only 36% of the respondents answered yes. Forty per cent said no and 24% were undecided. *Jahrbuch der Oeffentlichen Meinung, 1957* (Allensbach: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1957), p. 260.

One should also mention the organizational changes among parties and interest groups in the direction of greater simplicity and unity which have occurred between the time of the Weimar Republic and its current successor. In the political field, the CDU/CSU now unites Catholics and Protestants, Conservatives and Liberals, and the FDP consolidated the remainders of the several Liberal parties. The cohesion of Adenauer's coalitions and especially the formidable size of the CDU/CSU itself forced the organized interests to coordinate their efforts and align their organizations behind the majority party and its leader rather than trying to have a separate little political party for every little interest. There was also the consolidation of interest groups as a consequence of Nazi regimentation. Under the Weimar Republic, the major and minor interest groups from the trade unions to the farm, business and professional organizations of all kinds were divided along numerous lines according to class prejudices, ideological convictions, geographical considerations, economic interests and political preferences which added up to "an infinitely differentiated labyrinth"[41] and contributed considerably to the political chaos. This complex interest group system was rudely forced into a highly simplified and rigidly controlled "corporative mold" by the Nazis. After 1945, the reconstituted groups tried to undo some of the enforced group consolidations, but by and large retained much of the newly found unity. In most cases they no longer found the issues that once divided them very pressing and appreciated the political advantages of unity in a free society. The result was an interest group system so powerful and well organized that the German political scientist, Theodor Eschenburg, has called the Federal Republic "a federation of associated interest groups, churches, county and city republics,"[42] and interest groups are said to be closer to the voters than the political parties.

It is against this new background of simplified interest and party politics that the rise of Adenauer and his CDU/CSU has to be understood as a bundle of mutually reinforcing processes which have led to this concentration of political power and interests. Somewhat comparable perhaps to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal Democrats of the 1930s, the rise of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU to their dominant position was less a success of personal mesmerism than a great alliance of important interests held together by the ingenious integrative system through which the CDU/CSU allows them to satisfy their demands. Where the party committees and the more informal devices for channeling demands were not considered sufficient "access" for the more "respectable" groups, in fact, Adenauer personally acted as the master integrator who would satisfy the group demands as he saw fit.[43] The dissatisfied groups and interests left out by this great rallying around Adenauer's pork barrel then tended to support the SPD as the only opposition party capable of doing something for them.

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[40] About the socio-economic changes since the 1920's, see Thomas Wellmann, "Die soziologische Grundlage der Bundesrepublik," *Deutsche Rundschau* (June 1953), pp. 591–600. Regarding the "status symbols," about 30% of West German households in 1961 had television sets and washing machines, mostly of the wringer type. Forty-two per cent had refrigerators and there was one automobile for about every ten persons or three families.

[41] Gerhard Schulz, "Ueber Entstehung und Formen von Interessengruppen in Deutschland seit Beginn der Industrialisierung," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 2 (July 1961), 126.

[42] *Herrschaft der Verbaende* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1955), p. 87.

[43] As Drs. Wolfgang Kralewski and Rupert Breitling of the Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft of Heidelberg University told this writer, this aspect of Chancellor democracy has become more and more prominent during the last term of Adenauer. See also Altmann, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

Many SPD voters, to be sure, are still motivated by traditional attachments. But we must guard against the fallacy of seeing in the new alignment a class alignment. Public opinion polls conducted in 1956 by the *Institut fuer Demoskopie* have shown that the magic word *bourgeois,* which once separated parties like the CDU/CSU and FDP from the SPD and revolutionary movements at both extremes, has a most hazy meaning for the man in the street.[44] During the last federal election campaign it seemed, in fact, as if the new alignment had something to do with the participation in the great economic boom of Western Germany: those who felt the "economic miracle" had passed them by or was unjustly distributed voted SPD. The SPD also enjoyed the support of local government interests, especially in the big cities, of other consumer interests whom the Adenauer government forgot, and of the giant German Trade Union Federation (DGB) with which it has shared many goals. The bipolar arrangement of interests is both partially caused by and behind the new West German trend towards a two-party system.

IV

To return to our original question, what does all this have to do with Adenauer's continuation in office? Apparently, this new alignment of interests leaves no secure place for the FDP or for other third parties to the right of the SPD. The FDP is even more dependent than the CDU/CSU on industrial, professional and *Mittelstand* groups—in other words, on the whole combine of interests behind the governing coalition. Their financial support is vital to the party, but the party's fate is not nearly as important to these groups as the fate of the CDU/CSU which is far too large to be ignored or circumvented in the striving for favorable government policies. A brief review of the history of the FDP in Bonn will show that this was not the first time that the ability of the FDP to maneuver freely between CDU/CSU and SPD was curtailed by the group sponsors and finance sources of the Free Democrats.

Most notably in the 1953 elections, but possibly as early as 1949, the campaign contributions of industry to the FDP were made dependent on a promise not to attack the CDU/CSU but only the SPD. During the second term of Adenauer, the FDP became restless as the partner of a coalition in which the CDU/CSU alone possessed a majority of the *Bundestag* votes and repeatedly outvoted the FDP on key issues. In 1955 another restless coalition partner, the Refugees (BHE), drew the consequences and went into the opposition, leaving behind their leaders who had been cabinet ministers and now joined the CDU/CSU. Early in 1956, chafing over issues of foreign policy and a CDU/CSU threat to introduce an electoral law injurious to the FDP, restlessness turned into open revolt. The "Young Turks of Duesseldorf" broke up their coalition with the CDU in the state government of North Rhine Westphalia and joined with the SPD in a new coalition in order to demonstrate their freedom of choice. Adenauer forced the issue also at the federal level and sent the FDP to the opposition benches, again alienating most of its leadership in ministerial positions. This Adenauer faction of the FDP, sixteen deputies in all, split off, formed the Free People's Party (FVP) and ended up joining the DP, Adenauer's last surviving coalition partner. Immediately after the Duesseldorf rebellion the Sponsor Societies (*Foerderergesellschaften*), through whom the contributions of industry and business flow into the party treasuries of the government coalition, cut off all financial support from the FDP.[45] For the next three years, the FDP maintained a precarious freedom from such entanglement, though not from want. In the election campaign of 1957, the party hammered home the point that it could enter a coalition with the SPD just as well as with the CDU/CSU. The result was an alarmingly low vote (7.7 per cent) barely above the 5 per cent minimum required by law for representation in the *Bundestag*, while Adenauer won his biggest majority ever, 50.2 per cent of the popular vote. Under its new chairman, Erich Mende, a sobered FDP made its peace with the Sponsor Societies in 1959. Once more the vital funds began to flow, and advocates of FDP freedom, such as Thomas Dehler or Wolfgang Doering, were relegated more to the background. In the 1961 campaign, the FDP faithfully promised the voters not to enter a coalition with the SPD under any circumstances and thereby bought a short new lease on life. How long this lease will last, however, and whether it will stave off the merciless alternative between financial starvation and the deadly embrace of the CDU/CSU and the interests sustaining it remains to be seen.[46] The right-wing elements that switched their votes from Adenauer to the FDP in 1961 appear to be numerically too weak and politically too unreliable to assure the survival of the FDP between the two blocs. If they have voted CDU/CSU in the past they may do so again.

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[44] To the question "Do you feel that the SPD is a bourgeois party?", 36% of the respondents said yes and 35% no. Among workers the percentages were 40% yes and 30% no, among SPD adherents 48% yes and 34% no, and among adherents of the CDU/CSU 34% yes and 39% no. The question is ambiguous, to be sure, but the percentages of positive responses are far too large to have come from the extreme left wing with the exception of a small fringe. *Jahrbuch der Oeffentlichen Meinung 1957*, p. 266.

[45] See also Dieter Schroeder, "Mende's Ziel: Eine liberale Volkspartei," *SZ*, Sept. 23/24, 1961, p. 4. For more details about the Sponsor Societies, see the forthcoming publication of Rupert Breitling on this subject.

In 1960, the DP, which had lasted longest as Adenauer's coalition partner, met the same fate at his hands as the BHE and FDP before it. Deprived of some of its leaders, it was forced to go into opposition and finally concluded a disastrous electoral alliance with the remainders of the BHE in order to overcome the 5 per cent hurdle in the 1961 elections. The alliance failed in this attempt, and the last sequel of the DP story occurred like a bad omen for the FDP one week before the reelection of Adenauer as the Chancellor of the new CDU-/CSU-FDP coalition: the long-time chairman, founder and leading spirit of the DP, Heinrich Hellwege, ex-Minister President of Lower Saxony and Federal Minister, became a member of the CDU, taking with him a number of other prominent DP members.

These precedents explain a good part of the fear with which the FDP views Adenauer, its anxiety to replace him with Erhard and its distrust of the CDU/CSU in general. The course of the negotiations over the new coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP likewise bears out the thesis that the FDP has very little choice: the real situation of the FDP revealed itself within a week after the elections encouraged Mende to his proud words "Never again Adenauer" and Strauss to his abortive attempt to force the Old Man into a compromise with the FDP. Let us review the slow but certain retreat of the FDP from position to position, its high-handed treatment by Adenauer, and the tension which the painful process of retreat provoked within the FDP.

The erosion of the FDP position during the negotiations involved several distinct aspects. First of all, there was the question of the continuation of Adenauer as Chancellor. Then there were issues of coalition policy and of the FDP share of the personnel of the new cabinet. Finally, there was the controversial coalition contract between the two parties.

On the question of Adenauer's tenure of office, the retreat of the FDP began on the day when Adenauer won the unanimous endorsement of the new CDU/CSU caucus. Before that day, the kindest word about the Old Man had been a suggestion by the *FDP Pressedienst* to create an advisory position for ex-Chancellors in the cabinet. But now the *Freie Demkratische Korrespondenz* began to speak of "new aspects" which had arisen, namely the eagerness of the SPD for a "black-red" coalition and the withdrawal of Erhard as a candidate. At a rally for the by-elections at Cochem, moreover, Mende owned that, "Perhaps the FDP will have to examine whether it cannot give Federal Chancellor Adenauer its confidence for a transitional period."[47] In their despair, the Free Democrats tried to stall for time in the hope that Adenauer would not allow his international prestige to suffer from long delays during a state of crisis. As Mende put it, "Neither typhus, cholera, hunger or danger of war will break out if the new government is not formed right away."[48]

But it was not until a full month after the elections that Adenauer condescended to a declaration that he did not intend to serve another four years but would retire early so as to give his successor time to take charge of the office and to prepare for the elections of 1965. He would announce this intention in a letter to the caucus chairmen of the coalition, but would not name a specific date of retirement. Erhard undertook to defend this stand most eloquently before the CDU/CSU *Bundestag* caucus which endorsed it with warm applause. Unsure of itself, the FDP now responded by demanding a limitation of eighteen months and by turning the decision over to the Federal Main Committee of its extra-parliamentary party. It was a heart-wrenching decision for the FDP, but the Main Committee and even the former party chairmen Theodor Heuss and Reinhold Maier advocated entering a coalition with Adenauer. Mende still tried to allay the fears of the anti-Adenauer wing of his party with the argument that the FDP could topple the Old Man after two years, if necessary, by leaving the government or refusing to pass the budget.[49] And thus it came to pass that the FDP contented itself with the vague promise embodied in the coalition contract:

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[46] One of the most popular election posters of the FDP in the 1961 campaign read "People who think ahead vote FDP." Toward the end of the coalition negotiations, a new version of this slogan made the rounds: "People who think ahead might as well vote CDU to begin with."

[47] *SZ*, Sept. 29, 1961; and Guenter Gaus, "Die FDP und ihr Wankelmotor," *ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1961, p. 3.

[48] *Der Spiegel*, Oct. 11, 1961, pp. 25–6.

> The coalition partners take as their point of departure that the CDU chairman Dr. Konrad Adenauer will not occupy the office of the Chancellor for the entire legislative period.[50]

On the closely interrelated issues of personnel and policy, the FDP was not much more successful than on the question of ending Adenauer's tenure. At first glance, the biggest obstacle to agreement seemed to be the position of the FDP on foreign and defense policy. In 1956 the FDP had left the government, because, according to Thomas Dehler,

> . . . we recognized the political sterility behind the swashbuckling policy of strength, saw the goal of German reunification recede into the distance and watched the tensions in Central Europe rise instead of fall.[51]

At its Frankfort Convention in March 1961, the FDP suggested a policy of disengagement, greater flexibility in negotiating for reunification, and, in a pointed rebuff for Strauss, stated that military policy was not a purpose in itself but only an instrument of foreign policy. Germany should support NATO only until its future political and military status after reunification could be secured by a European system of mutual guarantees.[51a] Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, on the other hand, insisted on the continuation of their old foreign policy as their minimal demand for the coalition. If this had really been so important to the CDU/CSU it should have entered a coalition with the SPD rather than the FDP. But this goes to show that the domestic reasons attracting CDU/CSU and FDP to each other, the same reasons which produced the trend towards a two-party system, were much stronger than the adamantine insistence of Adenauer on his policy of strength or the "new foreign policy" by which the FDP had distinguished itself both in 1956 and in the 1961 elections.

Then the negotiations turned to matters of economic and social policy where the preferences of the FDP were known to clash with the promises which the CDU/CSU labor wing had extracted from Adenauer as well as with some details of social policy which the *Bundestag* had already enacted into law. Here too, the FDP dropped its demand for a revision of existing legislation, whereupon agreement followed all too quickly. In a short meeting of two hours at which no representative of the CDU/CSU labor wing was present, Adenauer convinced the FDP that there was enough common ground in economic and social policy between their two parties to skip specifics. Since there were rumors about a sell-out of the labor wing goals in the coalition contract, Hans Katzer wrote later in *Soziale Ordnung*, one of the publications of the Social Policy Committees, that the contract contained no provisions that stood in the way of an extension of labor co-determination above the plant level or of the introduction of a compulsory levy for the trade unions.[52]

The discussion of ministerial posts for the FDP began in the midst of the negotiations over questions of policy. The CDU had indicated that it would agree to a ratio of five FDP, four CSU and nine CDU ministers, not counting the Chancellor. But by the time Adenauer had slipped in his new protégé, Krone, and yielded to the pressure of CDU/CSU women for a female minister, the CDU share had increased from nine to eleven without any adjustment for the FDP. A brief look at the ministries the FDP received shows how small its share in the making of government policy was to be. Its biggest catch, the Finance Ministry, is no longer the position of strength it once was under Fritz Schaeffer (CSU).[53] Three further FDP ministries, Justice, Refugees and Federal Property, are not positions of great leverage. The fifth ministry, European Coordination, was painfully carved out of the functions of Erhard's Ministry of Economics. The CSU, by comparison, received two important ministries, Defense and Interior. Furthermore the FDP was granted five state secretaries in ministries it did not receive.[54]

The spirit of distrust which lay over the unequal alliance of FDP and CDU/CSU prompted the FDP to search for further guarantees for a true partnership. A coalition contract is not new in German political practice: previous coalition governments at the federal and *Laender* levels, both under Weimar and until 1957 also in Bonn, had committed their policy agreements to paper. The campaign proclamation of the FDP for the 1961 elections had ended with a statement of readiness to join a coalition "in the spirit of partnership," provided that "(1) the political and material aims of the government coalition are committed to writing; (2) all important political questions are discussed and decided by a common coalition commission."[55] As it was laid down in the coalition contract, this commission is to review in weekly meetings all bills and policies emerging from within the cabinet or coalition parties in the *Bundestag* before their submission to cabinet or *Bundestag*. It is composed of the chairmen, vice-chairmen and executive managers of both *Bundestag* parties and occasionally also of experts from the two parties. This formula carefully excluded the party chairman and Federal Chancellor Adenauer.[56]

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[49] *SZ*, Oct. 23, 1961.

[50] *FAZ*, Nov. 7, 1961.

[51] *SZ*, Oct. 2, 1961.

[51a] XII. *Ordentlicher Bundesparteitag der FDP 23. bis 25. Maerz 1961 in Frankfurt/Main* (Bundesparteileitung der FDP, Bonn, no date), pp. 20–3, 81–4, 126.

[52] *Soziale Ordnung*, November, 1961.

[53] *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 22, 1961, pp. 25–6.

[54] For a list of the new ministers, see *FAZ*, Nov. 15, 1961.

As already pointed out, this coalition contract embodies in some detail the principles of the foreign, defense, constitutional, economic and social policies agreed upon between the two parties. To be quite safe, the FDP also inserted into the contract the following clause:

> The chairmen of the coalition parties and caucuses are obliged to see to it that the coalition parties in the *Bundestag* will not vote in changing majorities; in particular, that individual groups of the coalition parties in the *Bundestag* do not form majorities in some cases with the opposition.[57]

This injunction against a possible combination of the CDU/CSU labor wing with the SPD in voting for projects of social policy and perhaps also other details of the coalition contract provoked a major crisis in the negotiations over the coalition. After fruitless efforts by the CDU/CSU to revise "the FDP paper," as Adenauer called it, Strauss devised the following preamble for it:

> The contents of coalition policy are the notes edited by representatives of both parties on October 20. This document *together with the other papers submitted during the coalition negotiations* represents basis and goal of our common task.[58]

This passage (italics supplied) meant nothing less than that all kinds of memoranda and notes handed to the FDP leaders during the meetings would have just as much force as the coalition contract itself. The FDP caucus rejected this preamble by a vote of 50 to 10. The German press had already blossomed forth with headlines about the "final agreement," when it turned out that the coalition negotiations had once more reached an impasse. It took considerable efforts on the part of Adenauer to overcome the new distrust aroused by this last maneuver. Finally the FDP had the signatures of both parties on its contract, with which it hoped to make up for what it lacked in power and stamina for this *societas leonina*, the coalition between the lion and the mouse.

The efficacy of such a contract under these circumstances is doubtful. First of all there is the question of good faith on the part of the CDU/CSU: the *SPD Pressedienst* claimed that at the signing of the contract by the CDU/CSU, Adenauer told his party that he considered the contract worthless and therefore its questionable constitutionality[59] a moot issue. Then there is its dubious tactical value. To be sure, the FDP has a very real power to walk out on Adenauer if he should violate their agreements. But how can the FDP coerce groups of the CDU/CSU not to break the contract by voting with the SPD? By leaving the government coalition and forming a new one with the SPD or encouraging the CDU/CSU to do so?

We can also gather the limitations upon the FDP's freedom of choice from the treatment which the party had to endure at the hands of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU as well as from the tensions arising within the party. There was no lack of public statements by CDU/CSU leaders accusing the FDP of being "unrealistic," "disloyal" and an object of understandable distrust. Very revealing, too, was the dispute between SPD and CDU/CSU over whether the *Bundestag* President should have two or four Vice Presidents. The CDU/CSU preferred the latter, which would enable it to give one Vice Presidency to the CSU. The FDP at first inclined to the SPD solution, yet was soon persuaded to vote along with its coalition partner. But even its initial thought of independent action was far more than the CDU/CSU intended to tolerate from the FDP.[60]

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[55] *Aufruf der Freien Demokratischen Partei*, zur Bundestagwahl 1961.

[56] Erich Mende, "Regierungspartnerschaft und Koalitionsausschuss," *SZ*, Nov. 25/26, 1961, p. 4; and Thomas Dehler, "Die Stimme der FDP," *Abendzeitung* (Munich), Nov. 9, 1961.

[57] A perhaps less obvious but quite real purpose of this clause might also have been the prevention of cooperation between the CDU/CSU and SPD in matters of foreign policy and European integration, two other fields in which the SPD position is much closer to Adenauer's policies than that of the FDP.

[58] Dieter Schroeder, "Der grosse Zank um das Koalitionspapier," *SZ*, Nov. 4/5, 1961, p. 3; also the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, Nov. 4, 1961.

[59] The coalition contract violates arts. 38 and 65 of the Basic Law. Art. 38 declares that Bundestag deputies are not bound by instructions such as the injunction against voting with the SPD but only by their consciences—which apparently have never been an obstacle to strict party discipline. Art. 65 designates the Federal Chancellor and not a coalition commission as the agency which determines the principles of government policy. See Guenter Gaus, "Ein Koalitinosabkommen ist nicht bindend," *SZ*, Nov. 11/12, 1961, p. 4.

The tensions within the FDP provoked by the new coalition with Adenauer also bore witness to the violence done to the party by the circumstances. The initial rejection of Adenauer had behind it a determined minority composed of FDP politicians who remembered his past treatment of the party all too well, others who toyed with the thought of playing the "national opposition" during the international trials and tribulations that lay ahead for Western Germany, Hamburg deputies who feared the wrath of the voters in the imminent state elections, and the Young Democrats who impatiently awaited the end of the Adenauer era. Accepting Adenauer after rejecting him so emphatically was extremely embarrassing and apt to make the FDP the laughing-stock of Western Germany. Under the pressure of events, the internal fronts pro and contra Adenauer soon crystallized. Some state parties, *e.g.*, Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine Westphalia, were for a coalition with the CDU/CSU because they feared that continued resistance to Adenauer would diminish their chances of participating with the CDU in their state governments. In other states, such as Hamburg, Hesse and the Saar, on the other hand, the opposition to Adenauer was so bitter that the state party chairmen of the latter two eventually resigned their positions when the last doubt about his survival vanished.

Three or four weeks after the elections, the FDP leaders in the *Bundestag* were so unsure of themselves that they proposed to call a party convention or at least the Federal Main Committee of their party in order to share the responsibility with the whole party and to avoid offense to the anti-Adenauer minority. After some discussion they called the Main Committee, a body composed of sixty advisory members—mostly *Bundestag* deputies—and 96 voting members of whom 31 were members of the Party Executive Board and 65 were state party delegates. Adenauer made it difficult for the Main Committee to decide in his favor by insisting a few days before its meeting that he would tolerate no limitation of his tenure, no change in the Foreign Office, and no revision of past legislation on social policy.[61] Still the Main Committee endorsed a coalition with Adenauer and the record of the coalition negotiations to this date, provided that Adenauer's term was somehow limited and that the personnel of the Foreign Office was to the party's satisfaction.[62] But in the end, there was a feeling both among FDP and CDU/CSU deputies that the birth of the new coalition called for a personal sacrifice. Since they had not been able to topple the Old Man, another whipping boy had to be found to save the face of Adenauer's would-be assassins. The *Deutsche Zeitung* published a cartoon showing in the background a guillotine operated by the leaders of the FDP. In the foreground, Mende is imploring Adenauer for "a head, a little head, a very tiny head." Next to Adenauer stands the victim, Foreign Minister von Brentano.[63]

V

While the political rigidities of the West German system and in particular the persistence of the coalition of interests have prolonged Adenauer's life as Chancellor, they have not been able to remove the causes of his growing weakness: his reelection by the *Bundestag* revealed the waning of his political power. With the prolonged coalition crisis, his popularity reached an all-time low. During and after his visit to Washington, his system of foreign policy showed signs of coming apart at the seams. Least reparable of all, his aged physique responded to the strain of it all with illness. The days of the Adenauer era are numbered.

On November 7, 1961, six and one-half weeks after the elections to the *Bundestag*, Konrad Adenauer for the fourth time was elected Federal Chancellor. Of the 490 deputies present, not counting those from Berlin, he received 258 votes, a slim margin of eight more than he needed. There were 206 votes cast against him and 26 deputies abstained. Forty-nine deputies of his coalition parties either abstained or voted against him. The composition of this internal opposition in the new

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[60] *FAZ*, Oct. 18, 1961.

[61] *Der Spiegel*, Oct. 25, 1961, p. 28.

[62] *SZ*, Oct. 23, 1961.

[63] Dieter Schroeder, "Bonner Planspiele um Ministersessel," *SZ*, Oct. 14/15, 1961, p. 3. For the cartoon, see the reprint in *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 1, 1961, p. 21.

TABLE II. CHANCELLOR ELECTIONS BY THE *Bundestag*, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961

Year	Legal Number of Deputies	Votes Necessary for Election	Deputies Present	Deputies voting		
				Yes	Abstaining	No
1949	402	202	389	202	44	142
1953	487	244	467	305	14	148
1957	497	249	476	274	9	193
1961	499	250	490	258	26	206

coalition government can only be guessed. About 15 FDP deputies may have voted no. Twenty abstentions were said to have come from the CSU. This leaves about eight no votes and six abstentions for the *frondeurs* and friends of the offended Erhard in the CDU. The size of this negative vote surprised many observers, although the press had often estimated Adenauer's secret enemies in the CDU/CSU to number between forty and fifty. If we compare this Chancellor election with the previous elections of Adenauer, it becomes quite clear that his margin of safety has not been so small nor his opposition so large since 1949 (Table II). We can also attempt similar comparisons of the size of his internal opposition in these election years, although we cannot say with certainty when deputies in the opposition parties crossed party lines to support him and thereby made up a deficit in his own coalition parties (Table III). But even a very rough estimate shows clearly that the opposition to Adenauer within the parties of the government coalition has never been as great as at this time.

The decline of Adenauer's popularity is accelerated by the public sentiment that his whole political system is in need of drastic adjustment and that he is not the man to bring it about. Since the conservative Basic Law deliberately frustrates such sudden popular passions as the desire to remove a party leader from among the eligible men for the office of Chancellor, West Germans experienced the coalition crisis as a crisis of democracy. As CDU Vice President von Hassel wrote in the *Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz*, the critical attitude of the public toward the parties, democracy and the state in reaction to the elections and coalition negotiations has assumed forms reminiscent of the last phase of the Weimar Republic. Other observers call for the democratization of the Basic Law and express their fear that once more, as in 1848, 1908 and 1928, constitutional reform will be delayed in Germany until it is too late.

Already the state elections of Hamburg have shown a significant drop in electoral participation as compared to the last state elections and the federal elections of 1961. But the need for responsibility in foreign policy is no less than in domestic policies, and the real dilemma appears to lie in the accumulation of unsolved problems rather than in the difficulties of any single question. We can conclude, with an editorial writer of the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, that

> . . . the case has now arisen that thoughtful opponents of Adenauer's policies wish he would continue to stay in office, the longer the better, so that one would not have to deal at once with everything that has been left unfinished during the last twelve years. But even if we gain a breathing spell in this manner, the day is near when the politics of the Federal Republic is no longer made by one man.[64]

TABLE III. INTERNAL OPPOSITION AT CHANCELLOR ELECTIONS, 1949 TO 1961

Year	Coalition Parties	Total Coalition	Voting Yes	Internal Opposition	Total Noes and Abstentions	SPD Deputies
1949	CDU/CSU-FDP-DP 139 52 17	208	202	None (?)	186	131
1953	CDU/CSU-FDP-DP-BHE 244 48 15 27	334	305	About 15	162	151
1957	CDU/CSU-DP 270 17	287	274	About 2	202	169
1961	CDU/CSU-FDP 242 67	309	258	49	232	190

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[64] Guenter Gaus, "Adenauer," *SZ*, Nov. 4/5, 1961.

HAGGLING FOR THE EQUILIBRIUM: THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE AUSTRIAN COALITION, 1959*

Frederick C. Engelmann
University of Alberta, Calgary

On May 10, 1959, Austrian voters, in giving overwhelming support to the coalition that has been governing them since 1945, split their ballots about as evenly as possible between the two competing coalition partners. The Socialist Party (SPOe) obtained 50.3 per cent of the vote cast for the coalition parties; but the People's Party (OeVP), despite a rigorous system of proportional representation,[1] moved into the new Parliament with 79 seats, a plurality of one over the SPOe. The election of 1953 had shown strikingly similar results. Then, the Socialists had not been able to translate the electoral tie into a complete governmental equilibrium.[2] This time, stung by losses sustained in the government negotiations after the OeVP's victory in the 1956 parliamentary election, and encouraged by its own victory in the 1957 presidential election,[3] the Socialists demanded the formation of a government based on perfect equality of the two partners. They had waged the campaign with a plea to the voters to place the ship of state in equilibrium,[4] and the voters had responded. For eleven weeks following the balloting, OeVP and SPOe engaged in coalition renegotiations which are recounted and analyzed in this study because of the light they throw on the nature of the rigid coalition that has become postwar Austria's contribution to the taxonomy of political institutions.

I

The rigid coalition between OeVP and SPOe has been introduced—though scantily—to the American reading public. While critics and objective observers agree with Austria's leading politicians in the assessment that the coalition was a response to the civil-war tension of the First Republic,[5] outside observers have generally been satisfied to present the coalition system primarily as a double-veto, double-patronage arrangement of two political organizations.[6] Such a characterization, though

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[1] The system, using the Hagenbach-Bischoff method within the basic districts (25), and the d'Hondt method for the figuring of remainders in the superior districts (4), is described in U. W. Kitzinger, "The Austrian Electoral System," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 12 (1959), pp. 392–404. Representation is based on population. Since the birth rate is higher in predominantly OeVP areas, seats come slightly more cheaply to that party; hence the discrepancy between the pluralities of votes and seats in a close election.

[2] In 1953 the Socialists, with 50.5% of the major-party vote, obtained 73 seats, and the OeVP 74. Though the OeVP had declined to this position from a 10-seat advantage in 1949, it was able to maintain its 6:5 preponderance in ministries, though it had to make concessions in policy matters. A revision of the ministerial balance was averted by the OeVP in view of the fact that the SPOe had been, if anything, unduly successful in 1949. In that year, the party, though not victorious, had seized control of the nationalized industries from the coalition partner.

[3] In 1956, the OeVP obtained 45.96%, the national-liberal opposition (FPOe) 6.52% (a total of 52.48%), against 43.04% for the SPOe. In 1957, Wolfgang Denk, the OeVP-FPOe candidate, received 48.88%, while Adolf Schaerf, the Socialist candidate, was elected with 51.12% of the vote.

[4] The equilibrium theme, which will be discussed throughout this paper, was emphasized, with apparent success, in a widely displayed Socialist election poster which showed the ship of state listing dangerously toward the side of the People's Party. For a presentation of the poster and a discussion of its impact on the campaign, see *Forum* (Vienna), Vol. 6 (1959), pp. 167–169; see also Matthias Glatzl, "Die Zahlen der Wahlen," *Oesterreichische Monatshefte*, May 1959, pp. 2–4, and Kitzinger, "The Austrian Election of 1959," *Political Studies*, Vol. 9 (1961), pp. 119–140, at p. 125.

[5] For accounts of these tensions, see Adam Wandruszka, "Oesterreichs politische Struktur," in Heinrich Benedikt (ed.), *Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich* (Vienna, 1954), pp. 289–485; and Charles A. Gulick's monumental and detailed, but strongly biased, *Austria from Habsburg to Hitler* (Berkeley, 1948).

[6] The only American scholarly writing dealing entirely with the Austrian coalition is Herbert P. Secher, "Coalition Government: The Case of the

justified by the practices of the coalition, fails to do justice to the true nature of Austria's governing alliance. A description of this alliance and of any institution and process through which it operates must come to grips with the central socio-political fact in the life of post-1918 Austria: the Republic had developed under conditions of cleavage so deep as to leave it with a high potential for—and a sporadic actuality of—civil war. The coalition must be viewed as an effort to establish minimum consensus in the face of this cleavage.[7]

Once the Treaty of St. Germain forbade the *Anschluss* of German Austria to Germany, each of the three powerful party-interest-ideology combines—aptly called *Lager*[8]—within the young republic attempted to impose its image on the state. These *Lager* were the Catholic clerical, the Marxist socialist, and the German national; the first two each claimed the steady allegiance of about two-fifths of Austria's voters, while the national camp was the weakest until strengthened by Hitler's rise to power in Germany. The *Buergerblock*[9]—an anti-socialist coalition, mostly under clerical domination—governed Austria from 1920 on, with the Social Democrats in total and generally nonconstructive opposition. Some of the political warfare among the three *Lager* was carried on in the streets by para-military organizations. But, despite eighteen years of Christian Social rule, no *Lager* had any lasting success in making itself the state. The Social Democrats were smashed in the frantic attempt of the Mussolini-backed Christian Social dictatorship to establish a united front against Hitler; the Christian Socials and their sterile Patriotic Front were in turn smashed by the Nazis; and the Nazis themselves went under with the ruins of the Austrian section of the Thousand-year Reich. But the seven years of Austria's obliteration by Germany had given some of the leaders of the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials the opportunity to reflect on the tragedy of the First Republic's socio-political tension, often during common imprisonment in Nazi jails and concentration camps. Then, at least a few individuals developed the notion that the two non-national *Lager* would have to collaborate in resurrecting a liberated Austria.[10] The presence of the Red Army in Vienna and Eastern Austria in April, 1945 shaped these notions of collaboration not into a two-party coalition, but rather into an anti-Fascist concentration of Communists, Socialists, and People's Party.[11] Only the sheerest luck, and grave miscalculations of Austrian Communists, led to inter-Allied agreement on free elections to be held in all of Austria in

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Second Austrian Republic," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 791–808. The coalition is discussed in Richard Hiscocks, *The Rebirth of Austria* (New York, 1953), pp. 46–52, and in Gordon Shepherd, *The Austrian Odyssee* (New York, 1957), pp. 183–188; it is also partially the topic of Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," *Social Research*, Vol. 24 (1957), pp. 127–156, especially pp. 136–152, and of Gulick, "Austria's Socialists in the Trend Toward a Two-Party System," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (1958), pp. 539–562. For a trenchant but only partially valid account of the coalition, with undue emphasis on its personnel practices, see John MacCormac, "The Improbable Coalition that Governs Austria," *Reporter*, January 23, 1958, pp. 33–37. Hiscocks and Gulick (for all his Socialist bias) deal seriously with the basic aspects of the coalition, especially the socio-political and psychological ones, while Shepherd and Secher are concerned more with a critique of its policy-making and personnel practices. Particularly incisive and, at the same time, sympathetic observations on the coalition are contained in Gustav E. Kafka, "Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der politischen Parteien im modernen Staat," *Veroeffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer*, Vol. 17 (1959), pp. 53–102.

[7] The juxtaposition of these terms stems from S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), pp. 21–22.

[8] *Lager* means camp, or armed camp. The term stems from Wandruszka, *loc. cit.* See also Alfred Diamant, "The Group Basis of Austrian Politics," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 18 (1958), pp. 134–155.

[9] *Buergerblock* (bourgeois bloc) coalitions consisted invariably of the Christian Social (Catholic clerical) Party, and, simultaneously or alternately, of the Pan-German Party and the Agrarian League, both nationalist groups.

[10] Varying accounts of Socialist-Catholic contacts during the Nazi occupation can be found in Alfred Kasamas, *Programm Oesterreich* (Vienna 1949), pp. 12–13, and Adolf Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Erneuerung 1945–1955* (Vienna, 1955), pp. 21–22.

[11] The most detailed account of the formation of the concentration government is found in Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Wiederaufrichtung in 1945* (Vienna, 1960), pp. 69–86. The formation of the Austrian People's Party—in most respects the successor of the Christian Social Party—in 1945 is reported most reliably in Lois Weinberger, *Tatsachen, Begegnungen und Gespraeche* (Vienna, 1948), pp. 243–248. For the original basis of party collaboration see Kafka, *loc. cit.*, p. 86n.

November, 1945. These elections, in which only the three concentration parties were allowed to compete, gave one half of the vote to the OeVP, and only 5.4 per cent to the Communists.[12] Prior agreement to divide major offices and portfolios according to the proportion of parliamentary seats obtained made the hitherto equally represented Communists a junior partner in the concentration. In a wage-price crisis in 1947, the sole Communist minister resigned from the government, and an OeVP-SPOe coalition, the vision of some of the common suffers of Nazism, remained.

During the years leading up to 1955, when the Austrian State Treaty ended the occupation on the part of the U. S., Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., the coalition regime and its stability gave Austria maximal unity *vis-à-vis* the occupying powers. The coalition made it impossible for any of these powers to take advantage of Austrian internal politics, it enabled the impoverished country to profit fully from Marshall Plan aid, and it gave Austria the necessary strength to deal with Russian chicaneries. Through the occupation period, then, the coalition was a virtual necessity for Austria, and its strong support by the electorate in 1949 and 1953 was to be expected. By 1955, the coalition had become so much part of the post-war political scene that it was able to attain massive electoral victories in 1956 and 1959.[13]

The continuation of the coalition beyond 1955 shows that it is more than a marriage of convenience. The fact that it binds the chief political exponents of the two major *Lager*[14] gives it a second, socio-economic, dimension, especially since the rigid *Lager*-interest tie-up of the First Republic—excellently demonstrated by Alfred Diamant[15]—continues in the Second Republic. Austria has today, to be sure, a supra-partisan Trade Union Federation (OeGB), but all of the workers' unions are led by Socialists and the OeGB is therefore led by its Socialist fraction. Elections to the Chamber of Labor, moreover, show heavy Socialist majorities. Peasants, on the other hand, are heavily in the camp of the OeVP, both organizationally and electorally. The same can be said of the business community, and of many of its white-collar employees.[16] The coalition is thus more than a political coalition of the two major political parties with an extremely stable vote and a history of tense relations; it is also a social coalition between the leaders, organizations, and the bulk of the members of Austrian business and agriculture on the one side, and the leaders, organizations, and the bulk of the members of Austrian labor on the other. The congruence between these social and political line-ups remains despite recent signs of some social mobility, and despite the loosening of the ideological fronts on both sides, of which the principal tokens are the withdrawal of the Catholic church from partisan politics,[17] and the adoption of the new Socialist Party program of 1958.[18] The interests themselves have come to understand one another better through their coalition dealings;[19] but the parties—in a special position in the Second Republic because they were the agencies that took the legitimate steps of reestablishing the Austrian Republic in 1945[20]—maintain their primacy in political life. Thus, at this time when *Lager* mentality tends to decline, the organizational rigidity of the *Lager*, and therefore their political relevance, remain as strong as ever.

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[12] The OeVP gained 49.9% of the vote, the SPOe 44.7%. The OeVP obtained 85 seats, an absolute majority; the SPOe, 76 seats; the Communists, 4 seats.

[13] This statement remains valid even when it is conceded that the vast majority of Austrian voters vote primarily for one of the coalition parties, and only secondarily for the coalition itself. The voters are of course acquainted with the coalition partners' pre-election resolve to continue the coalition; also, a private public-opinion poll, taken in 1958, showed 90% of those asked as favoring the continuation of the coalition. This poll was commissioned by anti-coalition elements; most friendly to the coalition were housewives, with 94% affirmative replies, and least friendly upper- and middle-income groups, with 86% affirmative replies.

[14] The third *Lager*, the nationalist, does not participate for the very reason that the coalition began as a union of non-Nazi Austrians. The formally organized national-liberal party (League of Independents, VdU; since 1955 Liberal Party, FPOe) does not contain all of Austria's former active Nazis, nor are all of its adherents former active Nazis. The party was licensed in 1949 after a Socialist drive to bring about the launching of a second non-Socialist group, which would end the parliamentary majority of the OeVP; see Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Erneuerung*, pp. 238–247; Oskar Helmer, *50 Jahre erlebte Geschichte* (Vienna, 1957), pp. 247–248.

[15] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 136–141.

[16] For Austria's chamber and interest structure, see Secher, "Representative Democracy or 'Chamber State': The Ambiguous Role of Interest Groups in Austrian Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (1960), pp. 890–909. Elections held since those reported by Secher have shown similar results.

[17] In 1945 Cardinal Innitzer prohibited political activity and office-holding on the part of the Catholic clergy; Schaerf, *op. cit.*, p. 189. This prohibition was in sharp contrast to the practice of the First Republic. Then, Ignaz Seipel, a cleric, was the principal leader of the Christian Social Party, and twice Federal Chancellor.

[18] The program, drawn up by a committee headed by Benedikt Kautsky—the son of Karl

In addition to the political and social aspects of the Austrian coalition, a psychological one should be noted. The equality of the parties is to some extent itself the result of two inequalities. The Socialist Party is the better and more rationally organized, and it commands more readily mobilized resources.[21] The People's Party, on the other hand, continues to enjoy a psychological advantage which stems from Austria's past. Neither of the two parties can claim to be the legitimate successor of the Habsburgs; but the Christian Social rule from 1920 to 1938 identified that party with the state—an identification that continues to live in the minds of most people who are not in the Socialist camp.[22] It leads to apprehension on the part of the SPOe that it might at some future date be again relegated to a position of permanent opposition.

The political culture within which the Austrian coalition operates is a typical representative of the Continental European political system as described by Gabriel Almond.[23] The Austrian *Lager* correspond to Almond's three components, the Catholic pre-industrial, the older middle-class, and the industrial.[24] While the older middle-class sub-culture is weak and partially submerged, the two major components of Austrian society continue to show elements of what Almond calls an alienation from the political market. But the hard-won realization in the Second Republic is that bargain they must, and the coalition emerges, in Almond's terms, as a set of institutionalized under-the-counter transactions,[25] a *modus vivendi* between the two main forces in a cloven society.

II

The coalition operates in an extra-constitutional area. Its modes and procedures are set by formal agreements between the parties and by practices that have developed since 1945. The process of the coalition will be explained in the following schematic statement.

The dissolution of Parliament (agreed upon prior to the expiration of the four-year term in all cases after 1949) takes place by agreement of the coalition partners, yet most accounts agree that each one of the premature dissolutions resulted from the challenge of one of the partners.[26] The campaign does not start officially till the election date is set, but party newspapers and press services on both sides immediately launch attacks on the partner, which exceed in severity the normal day-to-day criticism each party makes of the partner's policy proposals or vetoes, and of the administration of ministries controlled by the partner. Each partner issues an election manifesto that contains favored policy proposals, and party speakers and the party press labor the issues selected for emphasis by the party executives. At some point, each of the parties announces its intention to continue the coalition after the election, though the OeVP is likely at least to hint at the possibility of including the national liberal opposition (FPOe) in the coalition, if only to strengthen its bargaining position.[27]

Kautsky—and adopted on May 14, 1958, says: "Socialism and Christianity, the religion of love of one's neighbour, are entirely compatible with each other. There can be no conflict between a Socialism which is based on ethical convictions, and the religious communities, so long as the latter avoid using the machinery of the state for the attainment of denominational demands. . . ." SPOe, *The New Programme of Austrian Socialism* (Vienna, 1958), pp. 6–7.

[19] Secher, *loc. cit.* note 16 above, pp. 904–906.

[20] This point is emphasized by Kafka, *loc. cit.*, pp. 66–67.

[21] The party, united by Victor Adler in 1889, is one of the truly remarkable political organizations of political history; witness its sudden and effective resurrection in 1945, after eleven years of suppression. Its most formidable potential resource is the strike threat it wields through its domination of the OeGB. Paradoxically, the party also controls Austria's largest private bank, the *Arbeiterbank*.

[22] The writer will offer evidence for this and similar assertions in a later work on the Austrian coalition and democracy.

[23] "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 391–409.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 405–408.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

[26] The dissolutions of 1953 and 1959 were urged by the OeVP, that of 1956 by the SPOe. The challenger sustained losses in every case.

[27] See note 14. For a detailed, though hostile, account of OeVP efforts to include the VdU in the coalition (in 1953) see Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Erneuerung*, pp. 328–331, 334–336.

Since the election is not expected to bring about a massive shift of votes, the slightest change in the popular vote and in the distribution of mandates is noted emphatically on either side, in speeches of party leaders and by the party press. The election is followed by negotiations to which both party executives appoint committees. These committees go about the task of renegotiating the terms of the coalition in the light of the election results. There are proposals and counterproposals, some submitted with diplomatic discretion and others broadcast by the party press services. Most of the time and effort of the negotiators is spent in changing, however slightly, the distribution of portfolios between the partners, and their relative influence over government corporations and nationalized industries. Policies receive but scant notice, and the resulting government declaration is essentially a somewhat compromised addition of the competing election manifestoes.[28] The distribution of portfolios, as well as the agreed-upon arrangements concerning government corporations and nationalized industries, are laid down in the final coalition pact.[29] From then on, policy-making, which in all essentials requires agreement of the two partners,[30] tends to take place in an essentially quantitative manner. The coalition committee, a body containing the five principal leaders of each of the partners, normally clears policies only when the negotiators of one party have bought agreement to one of their policies by agreeing to a policy proposed by their partners. These joint policy agreements, called *Junktim*, are, next to the *Proporz* (the much discussed and criticized double-patronage system by which the coalition partners divide public employment between their adherents),[31] the main point of attack on the coalition from the opposition and the independent press. A *Junktim* may be pointed to with pride by the party press on both sides, or the partner may be attacked for having exacted an undue or an irrelevant price. A refused *Junktim* is almost always made the subject of attacks on the coalition partner.

While the distribution of portfolios has been the main business of all renegotiations of the coalition since 1949, only few have ever changed hands. Finance, education, commerce, and agriculture—portfolios connected with business, agriculture, and religion—have always been the domain of the OeVP; while the Socialists have kept interior, justice, and social welfare—portfolios connected with labor and with the internal protection of the republic. Civil service rules make it impossible to remove all civil servants of the other party (a problem for Socialists only, since virtually all civil servants of the First Republic were non-Socialists), but the government departments just mentioned have become the distinct domain of one or the other of the coalition parties.

III

Four aspects of the negotiations following the election of 1959 should be noted particularly: first, the implementation of the equilibrium; second, the role of President Schaerf; third, the tension between clericalism and liberalism in the OeVP; fourth, Socialist insistence on the rigid coalition. Concerning the first aspect, the People's Party's predominance gained in 1956 had been turned into an equilibrium between the partners, which could be implemented on the governmental level only after protracted haggling. Regarding the President's role, he entered the scene after Julius Raab and Bruno Pittermann, their parties' chief negotiators, had failed to reach agreement. Schaerf, though himself the former leader of the SPOe, exercised (for the first time in republican history) the function of a *"pouvoir neutre."*[32] His mediating solution, for which he enlisted the aid of the caucus leaders of the Parliament, not that of the deadlocked

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[28] In 1959, the government declaration was an amalgam of the wishes of both parties. Earlier declarations had reflected primarily the policy intentions of the chancellor.

[29] Prior to 1956, the coalition pacts were secret. Schaerf, claiming as his justification the publication (in 1954) of the 1949 pact by a VdU journal, published the 1953 pact in *Oesterreichs Erneuerung*, pp. 332–334. The 1956 and 1959 pacts were published in pursuance of inter-party agreement; *Wiener Zeitung*, June 27, 1956, p. 1; July 26, 1959, p. 1.

[30] The struggle over exceptions to this unanimity requirement (the so-called coalition-free area) is one of the major themes of the two subsequent sections of this article.

[31] Secher, *loc. cit.*, MacCormac, *loc. cit.*, and others have overdrawn the specter of the *Porporz*. The system applies to the personnel of the governing boards and management of government corporations and nationalized industries, but not to the ordinary bureaucracy. There is, on the other hand, no regular merit system; rather, with exceptions, the party of the minister dominates the appointments to his department. For an accurate description of the *Proporz* see Kafka, *loc. cit.*, pp. 87–91.

[32] For an earlier account of the position of the President, see *ibid.*, p. 82.

Cabinet leaders, was to continue the coalition under Raab's leadership. In respect to the situation within the OeVP, its defeat brought to the fore the tension between its main body of clericialism and agrarianism on the one side, and its liberal wing on the other. This tension, which became apparent in the Kamitz episode (discussed below), continues to beset the party and colors its attitude toward the coalition, which is opposed in whole or part by the liberal wing.

The final aspect, Socialist insistence on the rigid coalition, was manifested in the political, social, and psychological tension of the pre-campaign sparring, the campaign itself, and the negotiations. The OeVP, having tasted victory in 1956, felt a yearning for at least part of its First-Republic primacy. To the SPOe, the removal of the abolute veto on coalition policy would bring about the domination of labor by business and agriculture. If anything, the party's apprehension of a resurrection of the *Buergerblock* was heightened by the gradual removal of socialists from other European governments.

In 1956, the OeVP had outpolled the Socialists largely because of its stand against the nationalization of the enterprises acquired by Austria through the State Treaty of 1955 (oil, civil aviation, broadcasting).[33] In the negotiations, the SPOe lost control of already nationalized industries to a bipartisan body (IBV)[34] in which the Chancellor had the casting vote. One year later, Adolf Schaerf, the SPOe leader, was elected President over a supra-partisan surgeon nominated by Raab; one of the winning slogans was the balancing of a "black" chancellor by a "red" president.[35] The discrepancy of these election returns, a stroke suffered by Raab, alleged intransigence of Pittermann, and a number of scandals (involving primarily, but not solely, the OeVP),[36] all but paralyzed the coalition by 1958. The OeVP, as plurality party, had been the author of most of the items in the government declaration of 1956; in its eagerness to enact some of them despite Socialist opposition (a circumstance necessitating a loosened-up coalition), it wanted to move up the parliamentary election, not due till 1960. The Socialists for their part were in no hurry to go to the polls.

Raab forced the election issue in a statement of March 5, 1959, which contained the following:

> In the interest of maintaining Austria's political stability, we will have to rejoin in a coalition once more after the next election. What will have to be changed is the present rigid form of the coalition pact, which contains in practice an absolute veto for a partner who is not willing to negotitate, a feature preventing necessary decisions in vital questions.[37]

The Socialists, whose consent was required for a premature dissolution, agreed on a May 10 election, reminding the voters in their reply of "... the opportunity to decide against the autocracy of one party and for the continuation of ... political and economic collaboration. ..."[38] Thus, even before the campaign began, the issue was joined between a reluctant and an eager partner, a situation enhanced by a Raab statement that a three-party coalition (including the FPOe) should be contemplated after the election.[39]

The opposing manifestoes, issued at the official start of the campaign, April 1, brought little that was surprising. While the Socialists came forward with such doctrinaire terms as "collective economy" and "property gained through labor," they mainly advocated a stepped-up welfare program and steps against political patronage.[40] The manifesto of the People's Party stressed the "Raab-Kamitz Kurs," since 1952 the party's Erhard-like economic program, while some sops were thrown in the direction of the clerical wing. While both programs advocated further collaboration within the coalition, the OeVp noted sternly: "The coalition loses its meaning when, through the egotistically partisan veto policy of the SPOe, it degenerates into a dictatorship of the minority over the majority."[41]

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[33] The OeVP voting percentage climbed from 41.26% in 1953 to 45.96% in 1956. The FPOe voting percentage showed a corresponding decline, from 10.95% in 1953 (VdU) to 6.52% in 1956. The Socialists more than held their own, rising from 42.11% in 1953 to 43.04% in 1956. In Vienna, however, where the fortunes of the SPOe are watched most closely, its percentage fell from 50.15% to 49.73%, and it actually lost 36,692 votes. The decline, expressed mostly through abstentions, was ascribed by many to the considerable increase in streetcar fares in 1955 by the Socialist city government. The writer was told that many thousands put streetcar tickets instead of ballots in their voting envelopes. For a discussion of the internal issues arising from the State Treaty, see Secher, "Coalition Government," *loc. cit.*, pp. 799–807.

[34] The letters stood for *Industrie- und Bergbauverwaltung* (Industrial and Mining Administration). From 1956 to 1959, the IBV was the parent body for the government of the nationalized industries.

[35] See note 3. Schaerf's voting percentage of 51.12% in the face of bipartisan opposition contrasts with Socialist parliamentary-election percentages of 42.11% in 1953, 43.04% in 1956, and 44.79% in 1959.

[36] The scandals are described concisely by Kitzinger, *loc. cit.*, p. 123. The OeVP, as the party of business, is bound to sustain damage from alleged scandals, just as alleged unseemly trade-union practices are bound to hurt the Socialists.

[37] *Wiener Zeitung*, March 6, 1959, p. 1.

[38] *Id.*, March 7, 1959, p. 1.

[39] *Id.*, March 12, 1959, p. 2; *Die Presse*, March 12, 1959, p. 3.

While the bulk of the mutually dull campaign oratory dealt with economic issues, the question of the future nature of the coalition—already foreshadowed by Raab's statement on the FPOe and by the OeVP manifesto—was raised sharply by the main liberal exponent on on the side of the OeVP. Reinhard Kamitz, Minister of Finance, non-party member, and spokesman of Austria's larger industries, said to the press on April 3 that "in his opinion, only questions of foreign policy, the currency, and the budget were to be based on common decisions, everything else, if agreement could not be reached, was to be left to the decision of the Parliament."[42] To the Socialists, Kamitz' statement smacked of a new *Buergerblock*, since the reference to the Parliament could only mean an OeVP-FPOe majority outvoting the SPOe. In response, the Socialists developed the theme of the need for preserving the *Gleichgewicht* (equilibrium), the alternative to which was *Alleinherrschaft* (sole rule) by the OeVP. The theme, by nearly general agreement the most potent of the campaign, was countered only feebly by the OeVP with the assertion that to give chancellorship and presidency of Parliament to the party of the "red" President would lead to pure Socialist domination.[43]

When 94 per cent of the Austrians cast their ballots on May 10,[44] the majority of those relatively few voters who do not have a fixed party allegiance had voted for the reestablishment of the equilibrium between the coalition partners. They did so all over Austria: the People's Party share of the vote decreased in each of the twenty-five electoral districts, and the Socialists' share increased in each district. The total vote for the coalition parties remained quite steady; but the Socialists, 127,000 votes behind the OeVP in 1956, received 1,953,935 votes, the OeVP, 1,928,043. As in 1953, the higher birth rate in OeVP-dominated areas gave the People's Party a plurality of parliamentary seats: they captured 79 as against 78 for the Socialists. What may be called the epitome in equilibrium was reached: one party had an infinitesimal vote advantage, the other the minimal advantage in seats, and a "black" chancellor would continue to balance a "red" president.[45]

IV

Elections under the Austrian coalition, Uwe Kitzinger writes, serve " . . . to furnish a revised index of strength according to which the organized groups can bargain to settle their differences."[46] This bargaining includes the distribution of portfolios and the mode of party collaboration; questions of public policy are left generally to inter-election rather than to the post-election bargaining. Both parties delegated their real leaders to the post-election negotiations of 1959—each of them seven (including the five delegates of each party to the permanent coalition committee).[47] The

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[40] *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, March 29, 1959, p. 1.

[41] *Neue Tageszeitung*, April 3, 1959, pp. 1–2. The economic program of Raab and Kamitz as an election issue is analyzed by Kitzinger, *loc. cit.*, pp. 126–127.

[42] *Wiener Zeitung*, April 4, 1959, p. 2. For Socialist rejoinders, see Oskar Pollak's editorial in *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, April 12, 1959, p. 2, and Pittermann in *Salzburger Nachrichten*, April 14, 1959, p. 10.

[43] Maleta in *Wiener Zeitung*, April 18, 1959, p. 2.

[44] Information in this paragraph was compiled from official returns. Note also Kitzinger's analysis, *loc. cit.*, pp. 137–140.

[45] There is some room for argument as to what the voters intended. Hans Thuer-Porta (*Salzburger Nachrichten*, May 16, 1959, p. 18) argues strongly that the voters voted for the predominance of their respective parties, and not for the equilibrium. The writer, however, is not convinced by this argument, especially in view of the equilibrial election outcomes of 1953 and 1957, which were of course known to the electorate. One OeVP aide told the writer that his party, by going into the voting with 82 of 165 seats and not asking for a majority mandate, actually asked for a moderate defeat. As is usual in Austria, there are, in the interpretation of political phenomena, three "truths": one "black," one "red," and one anti-coalition.

[46] Kitzinger, *loc. cit.*, p. 123.

[47] When asked about the desirability of having real power vested in an extra-constitutional group, a leading Socialist politician said to the writer: "In no country is there a complete congruence between official and real leaders. In Austria, at least, everyone knows who the real leaders are: the ten members of the coalition committee."

OeVP delegation, headed by Chancellor Julius Raab, included representatives of the party's constituent federations, of the provincial parties, and of liberals and industry; the SPOe delegation, headed by Vice-Chancellor Bruno Pittermann, included representatives of the trade unions and of "red" Vienna.[48]

This negotiating committee of fourteen delegates first met on May 21, after Raab had been redesignated as Chancellor. Not until two months later, after one major crisis and a successful presidential intervention, were they to emerge with the product of their protracted bargaining: an implementation, on the governmental level, of the equilibrial verdict of the voters, and an essentially negative answer to the OeVP's foredoomed demand to change the basis of the coalition.

It was on the latter issue that the first post-election exchange between the parties dwelled: the OeVP demanded a strengthening of Parliament,[49] while the SPOe, pointing to the voters' "... clear refusal of the plans for the domination by one party ..." insisted that "the future government of the two parties can only be a government based on the complete balance of forces."[50] The OeVP persisted with its demands for free votes in Parliament in its first comprehensive proposal to the negotiating committee, on June 5. The same proposal suggested that the foreign ministry be ceded to the SPOe, in order to approximate a balance of portfolios.[51]

The slumber that had settled over Austrian politics during the dull first post-election month was rudely interrupted by a terse announcement, on June 13, emanating from private talks between Raab and Helmer, both party organization men tied by a long-standing friendship. The announcement stated that Raab had proposed "... the taking over of the Federal Ministry of Finance by a minister of the SPOe. ..."[52] The foreign ministry was to stay with the OeVP and, said the OeVP press, the Socialists, after all their attacks on Kamitz, should now themselves be saddled with the responsibility for the management of Austria's economy. The Socialists accepted Raab's proposal and nominated Kreisky for Minister of Finance.

The "Kamitz sacrifice," as the episode came to be known, must of course be accepted as a sincere attempt by Raab to reactivate the deadlocked negotiations. Yet, more basically, it was also an attempt of the leader of the OeVP's traditional, Catholic, pre-industrial organization to assert primacy over the spokesman of liberal-national industrialism. Raab's offer, by the way, closely followed similar attempts by Konrad Adenauer to exclude Ludwig Erhard, the manager of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, from political leadership. The immediate violent reaction of organized industry and of the non-clerical OeVP provincial organization of Styria[53] showed that the basic issue between Catholicism and liberalism, and between small shopkeepers and industrialists, was clearly understood. Industrialist pressure and the votes of numerous provincial delegates led to the almost unanimous reversal of Raab's offer when the OeVP Executive met on June 15. Yet the repudiated leader was immediately given a vote of confidence and asked to resume negotiations with the Socialists, but on the basis of the withdrawal of the Kamitz sacrifice.[54]

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[48] In addition to Raab and Pittermann, the delegates were: for the OeVP, Alfred Maleta (parliamentary caucus chairman and then general party secretary), Alfons Gorbach, the present Chancellor (provinces), Reinhard Kamitz (liberals and industry), Josef Kraus (peasants), Johann Wagner (commerce and small business), and Lois Weinberger (Catholic workers and employees); for the SPOe, Franz Olah, labor's strong man (then parliamentary caucus chairman, now OeGB president), Oskar Helmer (then Minister of the Interior), Karl Waldbrunner (Minister, then for Nationalized Industries, now of Transport), Bruno Kreisky (now Foreign Minister), Otto Probst (central secretary), and Felix Slavik (Vienna).

[49] *Wiener Zeitung*, May 14, 1959, p. 2.

[50] *Id.*, May 12, 1959, p. 2.

[51] *Id.*, June 6, 1959, p. 1. In view of Austria's dependent status till 1955, and the neutrality imposed by the State Treaty, an independent foreign ministry had not heretofore been considered essential. Such considerations seem to have guided the OeVP when it selected this ministry for an offer. Another consideration was the decision, most likely reached by that time, to retire Felix Hurdes as President of Parliament and to replace him with Leopold Figl, then the Foreign Minister.

[52] For the original offer and immediate comments, see *Wiener Zeitung*, June 13, 1959, p. 1; *Die Presse*, June 13, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, June 13, 1959, pp. 1–2, 4.

[53] *Die Presse*, June 13, 1959, pp. 1, 3; June 14, 1959, p. 1; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, June 13, 1959, p. 4; June 15, 1959, pp. 2, 5; *Wiener Zeitung*, June 14, 1959, p. 2; *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, June 14, 1959, pp. 1–2.

[54] *Wiener Zeitung*, June 16, 1959, p. 1; *Die Presse*, June 16, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, June 16, 1959, p. 1; *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, June 17, 1959, folio 1.

The episode indicated that seven years of "Raab-Kamitz Kurs" had enlarged the basis of the OeVP to include liberals who do not have Catholic organizational ties. Although Kamitz exchanged his key post for the presidency of the national bank in 1960, his supporters continued to exert, and still exert, the influence they showed in this episode; despite the outcome of the election and the negotiations of 1959, they continued to struggle against the rigid coalition, and they continue even today.

The withdrawal of the Kamitz sacrifice again paralyzed negotiations, until the SPOe, on June 25, proposed a reversion to the settlement of 1953, when the electoral verdict had been almost identical.[55] The proposal marked a shift in Socialist tactics: no longer were aspirations in the field of finance to be pursued, but the direction of nationalized industries, lost in 1956, was to be recaptured. This new Socialist push appeared successful, and by early July there was general agreement that the SPOe was to control foreign affairs as well as nationalized industries; only details remained to be worked out. On July 7, negotiations broke down over a relatively minor issue concerning the government of the nationalized industries, and Raab resigned.[56]

At this point, President Schaerf acted as *deus ex machina*. Aided by a suggestion of the OeVP Executive to the effect that negotiations should continue in small committees, he devised a roundabout scheme to reach his objective: a continuation of the coalition under the leadership of his erstwhile political opponent, Julius Raab. This objective would prepetuate the partnership of the political parties and the socio-economic partners, and it would insure that both parties would be led by pro-coalition elements. The roundabout scheme was to place the deadlocked negotiations into hands other than those of the leaders. In fact, the delegations nominated by the two parties did not include a single member of the government. On July 9, Maleta, Kraus, Gorbach (OeVP) and Olah, Probst, Slavik (SPOe), all members of the large negotiating committee, met with Schaerf's instructions to solve the governmental crisis by July 11. In order to underline the new spirit of negotiation, they even moved from the Chancellery (the traditional meeting-place of coalition committees) to the Parliament building.[57]

Agreement was reached in the evening hours of July 10. While details were to be spelled out later in the law delineating the functions of the ministers, in the government declaration, and in the coalition pact, broad outlines of the settlement emerged immediately. The Socialists were to control the now autonomous foreign ministry, whose boundaries with the OeVP-controlled ministry of commerce were spelled out. The IBV was dissolved, and all powers of management of the nationalized industries were lodged with the Socialist Vice-Chancellor. The result of this new distribution of portfolios was to give each party six ministries, and to reestablish the equilibrium between the parties in the economic sphere. In addition, Socialist influence over nationalized banks, the tobacco monopoly, and broadcasting was increased. The mode of collaboration, to be expressed in the new coalition pact, was yet to be worked out by a committee consisting of Maleta, Gorbach, Olah, Slavik, and legal counsel.[58]

On July 17, Raab, sworn in as Chancellor for the third consecutive time, read the government declaration to the Parliament. Though the declaration had been discussed by spokesmen of both coalition partners, it did not emerge as an integrated whole, but was essentially a restatement of some of the electoral demands of the two parties. It therefore resembled more the State of the Union message of a weak president than the Speech from the Throne, and the extent of its fulfillment would depend on day-by-day negotiations in the coalition committee. On the economic side, the declaration did not suggest any major departure from what the OeVP had considered "its" Raab-Kamitz course all along, indicating the essentially consensual nature of such matters as currency stability, full employment, and wage-price stability. A controversial item included by the OeVP was the demand for a stepped-up emission of "people's shares" in nationalized enterprises.[59] Socialist policy dominated the section on housing, but the program to increase the construction of dwellings had been agreed upon by both parties. The OeVP's desire for an increased development of apartment ownership was incorporated also. The People's Party appears to have determined the formulation of the sections on agriculture and religion. While the demand for a general education law stemmed from the OeVP platform, demands for school construction were taken from the Socialist election program. Guides for the general development of pension laws showed some similarity to the Socialist platform as did the demand for a widespread merit system in public employment.[60]

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[55] *Wiener Zeitung*, June 26, 1959, pp. 1–2.

[56] *Id.*, July 7, 1959, pp. 1–2; July 8, 1959, pp. 1–2; *Die Presse*, July 7, 1959, pp. 1–2; July 8, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, July 8, 1959, p. 1; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 7, 1959, p. 3.

[57] *Die Presse*, July 9, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, July 9, 1959, p. 2; *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, July 9, 1959, folio 1; July 10, 1959, folio 2.

[58] *Wiener Zeitung*, July 11, 1959, p. 1; *Die Presse*, July 11, 1959, pp. 1, 3; July 14, 1959, p. 1; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, July 14, 1959, p. 2.

[59] "People's shares" in nationalized industry had been included in the government declaration of 1956, but the SPOe had blocked nearly all action on what it alleged would constitute reprivatization of public property.

In the brief parliamentary debate on the government declaration, Maleta admitted that his attempt, to turn over to the free decision of the Parliament such matters as were not agreed upon by the coalition committee within a reasonable time, had to be given up. "Coalition means a bond. The fixing of a coalition-free area, meaning an area without such a bond, amounts to squaring the circle."[61] These remarks about the inevitability of a rigid coalition were the first public intimation that the OeVP had failed in its prolonged attempt to establish a coalition-free area in which important decisions could be made by parliamentary majorities rather than by coalition agreement. The decision actually had been made earlier. Under the signatures of Raab, Maleta, Pittermann, and Waldbrunner, the 1959 coalition pact had been concluded as early as July 16. It was published in the press on July 26. The central policy-making provisions were quite similar to those of the 1956 pact. Article I, Section 5, reads as follows:

> (a) Government bills on which the coalition parties represented in the government have reached unanimous agreement as to substance and form, are, on account of their importance, binding on the two coalition parties as represented in the Parliament. Fundamental proposals for amendment require the assent of the coalition committee.
>
> (b) If no decision was made to require such parliamentary support, both coalition parties have a free hand in Parliament.[62]

The formulation of conditions under which there is to be a coalition-free area differed in only one respect from the 1956 version. Then such an area was to obtain only "if in deciding a government bill the Government has resolved to release to the discretion of the coalition parties the parliamentary treatment of a government bill."[63] All the OeVP gained in attempting to establish a coalition-free area of parliamentary discretion was thus a provision for a free vote whenever the coalition committee failed to bind the partners, instead of when the free vote had been agreed upon specifically. The facts of Austrian party discipline and the prevailing mode of operation of the coalition committee render it improbable that the revised clause will bring about any noticeable change.

Thus, the SPOe had not only reached the equilibrium in the distribution of portfolios, it had also prevailed on the question of the mode of colaboration. The SPOe had claimed that one of the foremost mandates of its "equilibrial victory" would be the maintenance of the rigid coalition. The OeVP had asked the voters for more freedom and lost votes and seats in the process. The Socialist "victory" in 1959 left the coalition as rigid as ever.

V

The basic questions decided by the negotiators in their eleven-week haggling were the same that had been decided in previous post-election negotiations. These questions were: "Who gets to do what?" and "On what terms do things get done?" The first question took up most of the time of the negotiators; on the second, they merely confirmed what can be interpreted as the verdict of the electorate.

The length of the negotiations over the distribution of portfolios can be understood only when one realizes that while the Austrian coalition is a government coalition, departments of government belong, as a rule, to one party or the other. The Hapsburgs once maintained their position in the Holy Roman Empire by maintaining their *Hausmacht* in Austria, Bohemia, and Silesia; the Austrian parties maintain their governmental position through phenomena like the Socialist *Hausmacht* in social welfare and the People's Party *Hausmacht* in education. Looked at in the light of individual ministries that are under one-party domination, the Austrian coalition has in fact, as has been observed several times,[64] two *Reichshaelften,* like the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. To carry the comparison further, one could consider the 1959 settlement an *Ausgleich* like the Austro-Hungarian settlement of 1867.

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[60] For the complete text of the declaration, see *Wiener Zeitung,* July 18, 1959, pp. 1–3.

[61] *Id.,* July 22, 1959, pp. 1–2.

[62] *Id.,* July 26, 1959, p. 1.

[63] *Die Presse,* June 27, 1956, p. 1.

[64] The comparison is made with particular poignancy and humor in Roland Nitsche, "Die Jungwaehler werden entscheiden," *Die Weltwoche,* May 1, 1959, p. 27. See also Kafka, *loc. cit.*, pp. 92–93.

The 1959 *Ausgleich* was just about as evenly balanced a settlement as could be obtained.[65] The making of the Foreign Office into a full ministry and its transfer from OeVP to Socialist control, and the transfer of the over-all management of the nationalized industries from the bipartisan IBV to the Socialist Vice-Chancellor, did away with the People's Party's preponderance in governmental strength. As a result of the 1959 negotiations everything was balanced: in the economic sector, the OeVP controlled finance and commerce; the SPOe controlled nationalized industry, transport, and electricity. Control of the *Exekutive* (the armed force) is divided, leaving the OeVP in external control with the army, and the SPOe in internal control with police and *Gendarmerie.* Agriculture is "black," social service "red." The OeVP controls education, culture, and religious affairs, the SPOe foreign affairs. The OeVP's over-all leadership through the chancellorship is balanced by Socialist control of justice.

Since the coalition marriage is not only one of convenience but also of distrust, the parties check each other in several respects. There is the shared control, already mentioned, of the economy and the armed force. Control of foreign affairs is divided into Socialist control of the general diplomatic apparatus and OeVP participation in foreign-affairs decisions through the ministries of trade and defense. Finally, there are OeVP state secretaries in the Socialist ministries of the interior and of foreign affairs, and Socialist state secretaries in the OeVP ministries of trade and defense.

With the question of "Who gets to do what?" solved by maximizing the equilibrium solution, there remained the question of "On what terms do things get done?" Prior to 1959, proceedings had been based on bipartisan agreement. The twin formula of no government bill without bipartisan agreement, and disciplined bipartisan vote in Parliament for every government bill, was under the fire of those who agitated for a coalition-free area. It was to this, the area of decision making, that the OeVP wanted to extend the preponderance it enjoyed in the division of portfolios after the 1956 election. The outcome of the 1959 negotiations was of course the maintenance of the two-party equilibrium in the area of policy-making, by keeping rigid the decision-making features of the coalition pact.

An accounting for the arduousness of the 1959 coalition renegotiations must go beyond a recognition of the amazing electoral balance shown in the voting of May 10. The difficulty in reaching agreement emerges more clearly when the socio-economic aspects of the Austrian coalition are taken into full consideration. The fourteen men who did the negotiating were not just the representatives of rival party organizations; seven of them represented labor, and the other seven a coalition—uneasy at times—of business, agriculture, and white collar employees. It was never seriously questioned that the "black" social partner would retain control of affairs most directly related to business and agriculture, and the "red" social partner control over affairs closest to labor. The point driven home by the representatives of labor was that social partnership as they understood it could only be had by allowing them a codetermination of, and thus a veto on, all policies. The equilibrium registered in the settlement was thus a social as well as an electoral equilibrium.

Furthermore, the negotiations of 1959 constituted a Socialist effort to establish the psychological equilibrium between the two parties and, simultaneously, between the two social partners. Enough remained of the memory of the First Republic to keep alive the image of the OeVP as the governing party, with the SPOe at best in the role of a co-governing party. Most elements in the People's Party, especially the Catholic-clerical ones, knew throughout—either because of conviction or by necessity—that a revival of a First-Republic-type *Buergerblock* government would be ruinous. Yet, OeVP demands for a coalition-free area did much to call back ghosts of the First Republic, especially when these demands were made by such liberal elements within the OeVP as Kamitz or Josef Krainer, the Governor of Styria, or by such independent liberal-bourgeois elements as the Industrial Federation or Austria's major non-party newspapers, the Vienna *Presse* and the *Salzburger Nachrichten.* All of these elements displayed confidence that the eight FPOe deputies would side with the OeVP whenever economic questions on which there was no agreement within the coalition might be determined by a free vote in Parliament. The extremely strong opposition voiced by these elements to Raab's proposal to sacrifice Kamitz and appoint a Socialist minister of finance only increased Socialist uneasiness over the psychological imbalance between the partners. Only the granting of most of its demands and the recognition of a thoroughly rigid coalition by the OeVP sufficed to convince the Socialists themselves that they were *"gleich stark"* (equally strong).

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[65] For Kafka's interesting observations on the "unstable equilibrium," see *ibid.*, p. 95.

Most equilibrial was the role of President Schaerf. In the absence of any reliable public-opinion data on the 1959 election[66] it would yet seem reasonable to infer that the election was decided by the same narrow segment of voters that had brought about Schaerf's election to the presidency in 1957: a relatively small group of non-socialist independents who voted the Socialist ticket.[67] It was therefore only proper that the same President who was elected by these equilibrium voters should use the weight of his office to help bring about the equilibrium solution: a perfectly balanced government, headed by a "black" chancellor to balance himself, the "red" President. It was ultimately Schaerf's personal intervention which kept Raab from forcing the formation of a minority government under Pittermann, and which prevailed upon Raab himself to head the new government. The people had voted for the equilibrium, but it was reasonable to infer that not only a "black" chancellor, but the venerable person of Julius Raab himself, was part of that equilibrium. And Schaerf, one of the authors of the coalition system, was able to use his office as *"pouvoir neutre"* between the parties, yet partial to the coalition.

Most of the nine-tenths of Austria's voters who supported the major parties on May 10, 1959, voted primarily for the party of their choice; yet most of them knew as individuals that they were in effect casting a vote for the continuance of the coalition. By giving equal votes to the partners, they voted for an equilibrial coalition with a rigid pact, though many realized that this involved all the evils and frustrations of the *Junktim* in policy-making and the *Proporz* in administration. Their response to the OeVP campaign indicates that they feel safest under a system which guarantees social peace, under a rigid pact, through the co-determination of issues by the representatives of both the Catholic and the industrial sub-cultures. Their support—prudent rather than fervent—of the coalition registers their feeling that, even with declining ideological acrimony, the organizational fact of the *Lager* persists—especially among professional politicians—and that the system institutionalizes the kind of political bargaining for which Austria is ready.[68]

Repudiators of the system are not restricted to the pitifully weak Communists, the ineffectual FPOe, and a few high-minded liberal intellectuals. More important loom Austria's independent newspapers and the non-clerically oriented segment of Austria's industry and finance. The latter, long rallied around Kamitz, have been working, with partial success, ever since the Kamitz "sacrifice" on strengthening their influence in the OeVP. In fighting the double shackles of the coalition, they also attempt to overcome clerical, agricultural, and small-business domination of the People's Party. As Austria's industrialization progresses, and her prosperity increases even more, they may eventually win both struggles.

Meanwhile, as long as Austria remains a typical example of a Continental European political system, and one with a civil-war memory at that, neither party is likely to be willing to entrust the country's government solely to the other. Austria may have to approximate Anglo-American political homogeneity, at least to the extent of the Scandinavian countries, before a government-opposition relationship between the two major parties will be considered a stable alternative. Barring this homogeneity, the two major political forces of Austria will continue to prefer the limited bargaining of the coalition to a government-opposition alternation, certainly as long as the present party-interest structure and present social conditions remain. The slide-rule implementation of the electoral verdict of 1959 was a necessary manifestation of this limited-liability arrangement which is Austria's way of bridging, with minimum consensus, her continuing cleavage.

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[66] There is, however, the 1958 poll referred to in note 13; see also note 45.

[67] Such a mythical voter is described in a little ditty made available to the writer by its author, the drama critic and humorist Hans Weigel. After much soul-searching about his coming vote, this mythical voter opines: "If one could only tell for sure that the 'blacks' will come out ahead, one could safely vote for the 'reds'."

[68] Kafka argues the latter point cogently; *loc. cit.*, pp. 96–97.

THE PEDAGOGY OF DEMOCRACY: COERCIVE PUBLIC PROTEST IN INDIA

DAVID H. BAYLEY
University of Denver

Throughout the history of Indian politics in the 20th Century runs a curious and disturbing thread. Both before and after the achievement of independence in 1947, large segments of the Indian populace felt that the institutional means of redress for grievances, frustrations and wrongs—actual or fancied—were inadequate. Since the British withdrawal a fuller panoply of democratic procedures for influencing government has been introduced, but a basic suspicion persists that government is still alien and elite—although now the separation is based upon indigenous social division rather than upon foreign conquest and race. The fact is that the gaining of independence has marked very little change in the use of the more direct and agitational modes of public suasion. The Congress Government has been treated to an almost constant tattoo of demands supported by the same techniques popularized during the independence struggle, such as hunger-strikes, black-flag demonstrations, the courting of arrest, impeding of public business, and violent riots.

For the statesmen of contemporary India the continuation of public protests and agitations constitutes a unique problem. They are charged with the task of building a stable democratic polity. Yet they are constantly confronted with a bewildering array of methods of suasion which, if they do not fall altogether outside the bounds of democratic permissibility, at least constitute the development—or continued development—of a supplementary system of representation and redress. In solving this problem, Indian statesmen are severely limited in the means to which they may have recourse. They must create the social, psychological, and economic requisites of democracy without resorting to means which are themselves patent departures from the canons of democratic theory. Put briefly, the question which perplexes and constrains India's leaders is, how can Indian democracy be strengthened democratically? Within these limitations, both of ends and means, the architects of the country's political future must contend with the many forms of coercive public protest so characteristic of its political life.

I

Coercive public protest has three attributes: (1) it is aggregative;[1] (2) it is public, as opposed to conspiratorial or clandestine; and (3) it imposes a constraint upon government by its presence and actions. Coercive public protest can thus be distinguished clearly from the public excitations and clashes which spring more particularly from social cleavages and which are not directed at affecting the decisions of formally constituted governmental authority.

Coercive public protest may have a specific or a generalized object. For instance, participants may barricade the house of a district magistrate or chancellor of a university, demanding from this particular individual a specific response of accommodation or at least of strong sympathy. On the other hand, coercive public protest may be directed against a more generalized state of affairs with no single, readily discernible focus of action. "Satyagrahas" by railroad commuters, in which all train travel along a rail line is blocked as a protest against late-running trains, are an example of this. The object, if articulated at all, is to dramatize by disrupting; the target is simply officialdom.

Coercive public protest has assumed six primary forms in modern India: (1) processions and public meetings; (2) hartals (work stoppages not aimed at employers), boycotts, and strikes; (3) fasts; (4) obstruction; (5) courting of arrest; (6) riots. These general type-forms can be divided into two main groups, the legal and the illegal. In turn, the category of illegal protest can be subdivided into the violent and the non-violent. These distinctions may be organized schematically as shown in diagram on next page.

Not all of these forms of protest fall outside the preserve of democratic tolerance. Processions and public meetings are an accepted part of democratic interaction. Obstruction and the

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[1] Coercive fasting is an apparent exception to this, although its intermediate effect, by building suspense, is to focus the attention of an ever-growing audience on the faster and his demands.

			RECURRENT TYPE FORMS
PROTEST	Legal		Processions and public meetings, Hartals, boycotts, strikes Fasts
	Illegal	Non-Violent	Obstruction Courting of arrest
		Violent	Riots

courting of arrest are known in India as *satyagraha,* or nonviolent civil disobedience, and were made popular by Mahatma Gandhi. The dividing line between obstruction and courting of arrest is artificial, to be sure, but the distinction highlights the two most prevalent modes of protest assuming the guise of *satyagraha.* Some of these campaigns, for example, are designed to bring a particular phase of community or governmental activity to a halt. By paralyzing, the *satyagrahis* coerce. The primary motive in this case is not to break the law—although the *satyagrahis* would not shrink from this if it were necessary. On the other hand, other non-violent civil disobedience campaigns have as their avowed object the challenging of constituted authority by deliberately violating promulgated laws and rules. The mark of accomplishment is to be arrested and hauled off to jail. The frequent organized defiance of orders issued under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows police authorities to ban the assembly of five or more persons in designated areas, are instances of law-breaking *satyagrahas.* So, too, are those campaigns in which people refuse to pay taxes. The distinction between the two forms of *satyagrahas* involves a difference in mode of behavior and the degree to which one intention or the other predominates in the minds of their leaders.

Although violence may be ranged upon a continuum with other forms of coercive public protest, as above, it is an extreme form which stands apart in two particulars. First, violence lacks the element of self-control, corporate and individual, which is a feature of most nonviolent protest. Violence usually involves a bursting of restraints. It may, of course, be carried on with dispassionate sang-froid; but generally it is not. Second, the goals to which non-violent agitation is directed are a good deal more definite and explicit than those which impel violence. In violence, self-control, reason, and purpose are generally overmastered by emotion and the individual or group lashes out indiscriminately.

Let us now examine more carefully the precise problem. Specifically, is there indeed a need for corrective action on the part of the Indian Government? What would be the consequences of allowing coercive public protest to go unrestrained?

In part the answers to these questions are dependent upon the proportions the phenomena have assumed; for it could hardly be argued that isolated instances, even if violent, posed a significant threat to the maintenance of Indian democracy. A detailed examination of these proportions is beyond the purview of this paper. Instead, I shall proceed on the basis of two assertions: (1) the Indian Government is faced with a pervasive and continued threat to the maintenance of law and order and (2) law and order are jeopardized to an extent known only extremely infrequently in either the United States or the United Kingdom and then never for prolonged periods of time.[2]

II

What interests and concerns are affected by these manifestations? Why should a government concerned with the strengthening of democracy feel impelled to undertake constraining action toward coercive public protest of this magnitude? At least six closely connected reasons may be given for governmental anxiety and action:

First: coercive public protest imposes an economic burden upon the nation. This cost is a consequence of the physical destruction visited upon public and private property, the loss of life and health to individuals, the disruption of services, and the diversion of resources, time and energy from constructive economic programs to the essentially neutral task of maintaining law and order. In an economy already straining to the utmost for rapid economic development the cost may be unacceptable, spelling the difference between Plan success and Plan failure. Political protest in any form, but more particularly in its illegal forms, causes some reallocation of resources;

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[2] For the evidence supporting these assertions see my Ph.D. dissertation, "Violent Agitation and the Democratic Process in India," Princeton University, 1961.

established industrial nations may be able to afford it, India perhaps cannot.

Second: one of the most fundamental duties of any government is the preservation of minimal conditions of law and order. No government, whatever its political form, can outlive a successful challenge to its ability to meet this need. If the government is unable to contain violent public protest and enforce its rules and regulations, it may lose its justification for existence, its claim to legitimacy.

Third: coercive public protest which succeeds in its object of affecting the decisions of government represents a derogation from majority rule. It is possible, of course, that demonstrators sometimes present a truer picture of majority sentiments than the elected representative sample. Rather special circumstances must exist to support this hypothesis, circumstances which in the Indian case are most uncommon. Usually, coercive public protest has been the tool of an aggrieved minority. As such, it strikes at the basic premise of democratic government, namely, that the will of the majority as expressed in free elections and through elected representatives is sovereign. If coercive public protest is seen to succeed, the representative integrity and efficacy of the erstwhile democratic government will be lost.

Fourth: coercive public protest represents not only the introduction of a supplementary means for the suasion of government, but a fundamental threat to the rule of law. If laws can be disregarded, sloughed aside arbitrarily, the prospect of equality and impartiality before the law is destroyed, and the efficacy of constituted means of representation and adjudication is impaired.

Fifth: as a result of the destruction of the rule of law and of the rule of the majority, a sort of Gresham's Law begins to affect the nature of political responses. Direct action and recourse to social violence—either threatened or actual—begin to drive out the orderly, constitutional responses demanded in a democratic state. Every success for direct action sets a precedent for its utilization by other groups and individuals. Coercive public protest, if allowed to go unrestrained, will be more widely imitated and become an even greater rival to the processes of peaceful change through democratic government.

Sixth: democracy demands a considerable measure of social discipline in order to work successfully. Coercive public protest involving forms which are illegal or violent represents a breakdown of discipline. It is based upon the destructive principle that certain ends justify recourse to undemocratic means of resolution. If government fails to apply its sanctions, it allows new linkages to become established between ends and means. Due to the default of government, people are permitted to persist in the belief that certain deeply felt needs, desires, or interests are beyond compromise and that extreme solutions are appropriate to satisfy them. Social accommodation based on compromise tends to give way to a series of internecine wars. The failure of government to restrain coercive public protest represents a failure to secure acceptance of legitimate rules established to govern the relation between articulated wants and the procedures for their fulfillment.

These, then, are the consequences of giving coercive public protest its head. The Government of India has often demonstrated that it is well aware of them. Law and order have often been the subject of parliamentary debate and of *ad hoc* comments by Prime Minister Nehru and other leaders of government. Moreover, special reports on police firings and repeated investigations into important disturbances, as in Assam in 1960 and 1961, have brought out clearly the obligations which rest upon government. Rather less attention, unfortunately, has been given to the other side of the problem, namely, to an examination of the possible consequences of successfully restraining coercive public protest. Yet it seems elementary that any policy which would trench upon a widespread social response must be based on an appraisal not only of need but also of probable repercussions. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to an initial reconnaissance into these neglected regions.

III

It is important to realize, first, the theoretical implications of a policy of social control in any nascent democracy. Democratic political theory has always recognized that coercion and even violence are sometimes justifiable means for resisting the encroachments of government upon the preserve of human rights. There are boundaries which no authority can be allowed to traduce without provoking, justly, a violent response on the part of its oppressed constituents. The crucial question endlessly debated, and not only by political theorists, is where are these boundaries to be drawn? Are there any principles which can guide policy-makers in the permissible use of organized social power? From time to time in the history of the western democracies first principles have been laid down, often in the form of constitutional clauses or statutory laws; but such strictures are not absolute or immutable. Fundamental rights are to some extent contingent upon circumstances. Thus, when the Government of India becomes engaged in devising a policy to cope with coercive public protest, it is establishing *de facto* boundaries to permissible governmental regulation. It is engaged, like it or not, in giving operational content to the fundamental rights contained in Part III of its written constitution. In preserving law and order, the Government of India is determining a balance between the inalienable prerogatives of the individual and the legitimate concern of the State. These are the stakes.

Let us look now at the probable response of the Indian people to any policy directed to the repression, or at least regulation, of coercive public protest. Since the *raison d'être* of a policy of restraint is the strengthening of democracy in India, our search is for types of feedback incompatible with the long-run development of a stable democratic polity.

The first probable result of a repressive policy is the heightening of the feeling of impotency and frustration among the people. Underlying this supposition is the familiar hypothesis that social protest acts like a safety-valve for the social system, permitting the dissipation of accumulated discontent. Public displays of anger and dissatisfaction serve the purpose of allowing the people the appearance of an opportunity for lashing out at their milieu in general and for the representation of their smoldering resentment to persons in positions of responsibility. Coercive public protest, according to this hypothesis, represents catharsis. Or, it can be described as the syndrome of socially acceptable responses to situations of stress acknowledged to be such by the group. This alternative formulation underscores the fact that coercive public protest is a human response conforming to a pattern, which, specifying both occasioning stimuli and resulting modality, is familiar to the entire society.

The safety-valve hypothesis—in either of its formulations—points to the important fact that coercive public protest may have social utility. Overt mass responses of anger or disaffection may be functional to the social system. Eliminate this mode of expression and the society might crack apart in other even more serious ways. In the words of one Indian observer: "In India, agitation is not always bad; in fact, in a country [such] as ours it may be dangerous to limit popular urges in inter-election period[s] to strict constitutional methods of petition."[3]

This view is supported by the observation that coercive public protest often exhibits a formalistic character. In many of its outbreaks there seems to be a tacit reference to rules so that participants and law enforcement officials alike operate within a set of shared expectations. Of the illegal forms of protest, *satyagraha* campaigns most often exhibit this peculiar structured quality. They are, for instance, usually announced publicly well in advance of their occurrence. The *satyagrahis* are schooled in the tactics of the campaign and are kept under strict discipline. An excellent example of this occurred in May, 1956. A *satyagraha* was offered on Netaji Subhas Road in central Calcutta in defiance of an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The campaign had originally been called to protest the proposed merger of Bihar and West Bengal. When the proposal was withdrawn the organizers continued the demonstration as a protest against the general attitude of the Government of West Bengal toward the issue of linguistic states. Police organized the target areas at noon on May 7. One thousand constables and 400 officers were brought to the scene. Large crowds of office workers began to gather to watch the confrontation. The procession of *satyagrahis* appeared in view about 2:15 P. M. and were roundly cheered and applauded by the spectators. The 76-year-old leader of the march climbed upon the back of a bullock cart and read a statement of intent and belief to the assembled throng. He was then ceremonially daubed upon the forehead with colored paste and liberally garlanded. Supporting himself on his bamboo staff, he descended from the cart and moved slowly toward the police cordon. The police allowed him to pass through and then bundled him into a waiting police van. One by one, groups of *satyagrahis* followed their leader through the cordon, there to receive similar treatment. Crowds of volunteers from leftist parties made way for them through the by then dense crowd of onlookers. During the deliberate violating of the law conch shells were blown and flowers were thrown upon the protestors. Representatives of the office employee's union in the Dalhousie Square area gave an orange to each male member of the *satyagraha* just as he crossed the line.

The circumstances of this particular occasion may have been extreme in modality but the mood of ritualistic participation is characteristic. The most common occasions for structured trials of strength with the authorities are the promulgations of Orders under Section 144, usually banning the assembly of five or more persons in a designated area. Magistrates and police both seem to be aware that they are participating in a public game; accordingly police incitement is kept to a minimum and magistrates award only token fines of one or two rupees to those arrested. The purpose of such a movement is simply to break the law and the mark of accomplishment is the number of persons who voluntarily court arrest. In a "Save Hindi" campaign in the Punjab in 1957 it has been estimated that over 12,000 persons were arrested and detained.[4] Earlier, during two months in the summer of 1955, over six thousand demonstrators were arrested in the Punjab during the Akali Dal's "morcha" or protest.[5] Law breaking in such instances becomes the test of the adherents' perseverance and dedication. The failure of a campaign is marked by a dwindling of volunteers ready to dare arrest and the imposition of a jail sentence or fine.

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[3] *Parliamentary Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 7 (July, 1959), pp. 1–3, editorial.

These ritualistic agitations place the government in an awkward position. If the government does not proceed against all forms of law-breaking, however disciplined, straight-forward, and self-sacrificing, it tacitly condones the flouting of legally promulgated rules. It is then forced into making *ad hoc* decisions in each case based upon the nature of the threat posed to government and society. An element of hesitation and indecision is injected into the situation. Agitating groups begin to claim precedents from other agitations; they charge discrimination by the government; and they are encouraged to toy with the authorities, edging closer to the brink of serious action without actually crossing over. When government moves unsurely, the people, in turn, respond uncertainly.

The Government of India is caught in a cruel dilemma. If it is conceded that even illegal demonstrations are or may be functional to the system, then the government must consider very carefully the consequences of repressing in a blanket fashion all forms of illegal coercive public protest. On the other hand, if the government does not draw the line clearly at illegality, it must draw the line at much more vague and ambiguous points, such as whenever an agitation threatens public welfare, law and order, domestic tranquillity, or economic development. Since the seriousness of a threat depends upon circumstances, such decisions are bound to appear arbitrary, at the whim of officialdom.

In sum, in order to teach the easier lesson—that all law-breaking will be punished—the government runs the strong risk of closing off a necessary safety-valve and occasioning an even greater revulsion against the system of law enforcement.

Another effect of strict control of organized, illegal public protest is a deterioration of consensus. Democracy thrives on the feeling among its people of joint participation in the affairs of government; the feeling that government is a creature of the people; the feeling that it is amenable to change as a result of popular, or mass, pressures. The Indian people, new to self-government, have habitually thought of government as "They." One of the tasks of the Nehru Government has been, and will continue to be, to convert the image of government as something which happens to people into one of government as something in which people can participate. Every time, however, that the Government restricts the area in which people may maneuver and determine actions for themselves, it drives wedges of alienation between itself and the people. If the government is to win the trust of its people, it must appear to be sympathetic to their pleas. The repression of coercive social protest will seem to many as the negation of sympathetic concern, the denial of the right of petition. The new government, supposedly "of the people," begins to give the impression of becoming just another Raj.

It is ironical that government in India perhaps cannot in fact afford to be truly sympathetic; perhaps consensus must be founded on a pose rather than a reality. To the extent to which the Indian masses are unprepared to accomplish the social changes necessary to the radical economic development which they so stridently demand, the Government of India will be forced to choose between social disaffection consequent upon unfulfilled hopes, on the one hand, and social constraint which will impel requisite development, on the other. If coercive public protest reinforces movements for social change compatible with economic development, then the Indian Government can afford to be more lenient toward it. If, however, coercive public protest is the tool of movements in opposition to requisite development, the government cannot afford to be sympathetic.

In short, democracy demands consensus, but the government in India may not be able to build that consensus without pandering to movements whose designs are set athwart long-run economic development. Harsh social and economic decisions must be made in the next few years, decisions which may in the short run cause a forfeiture of trust among certain sections of the people. When these decisions occasion coercive public protest the government cannot afford to mitigate the feeling of alienation, but must, indeed, intensify it by dealing strictly with the manifestations of protest. The Government of India may thus find itself reinforcing an already unfavorable image.

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[4] *Indian Civil Liberties Bulletin*, October, 1959, p. 7.

[5] *Times of India*, July 13, 1955, p. 1.

A third form of negative feedback from governmental attempts at regulating public protest works through a peculiarly Indian syndrome. Mahatma Gandhi, during the protracted struggle for independence, capitalized upon traditional elements in Hindu religion and culture to develop his unique form of non-violent civil disobedience. *Satyagraha* stressed the element of individual sacrifice for a cause, for Truth. Unpossessed of political advantage or military strength, the Indian masses were taught to use their very weakness as an instrument of persuasion. The image of uncomplaining and non-violent self-sacrifice laid hold of the Indian mind, and resulted in the sanctification of the violated agitator.

The Gandhian political methodology is still very much a part of the Indian political scene. Unfortunately, it survives today, for the most part, without Gandhi's philosophical integrity or his immense compassion and understanding. What remains is the employment of passive resistance as a tool of naked coercion. There is example after example of governmental attempts at curbing popular protests that result in an intensification of what may be called the Gandhian "martyrdom syndrome." An increase in repression produces an increase in the numbers of people willing to champion the martyr's cause. Through this means the cause draws hitherto quiescent adherents who join not necessarily because they strongly approve the cause, but because the example of selfless sacrifice commands respect and reverence.

There are undoubtedly limits beyond whch repression would produce fear and apathy, rather than imitation and respect. During the independence struggle *satyagraha* worked in India precisely because it was directed against an alien race afflicted with an active Liberal conscience; it could hardly have achieved success in Stalin's Russia. But the government of modern India cannot transgress these boundaries either. The Gandhian legacy is most damaging to the Nehru Government because it, like the British government, is committed to democractic principles of social control.

The attractiveness of martyrdom before the law is readily apparent in Indian politics. Few members of Parliament have not served some time in jail, most often at the hands of the British. Parliamentary debates are replete with instances of members claiming special knowledge of the meaning of democracy by virtue of having been incarcerated by an anti-democratic regime, either British or Congress. Hardly a week goes by in the Lok Sabha without notice being given by the Speaker that some MP has become involved with the police, usually as a leader or prominent participant in some campaign of civil disobedience. A. K. Gopalan, former leader of the Communist parliamentary delegation, was the subject of the first test case under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950. S. P. Mookerjee, president of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, was detained under the same Act in Kashmir, 1953. He died in custody and the case became a dramatic *cause célèbre*. The respected Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, prominent leader in the Praja Socialist Party, was detained briefly in 1955. Reports of the arrest of lesser political figures or of esteemed members of the bar are legion. An MP from Uttar Pradesh was arrested in 1958 for defying a Section 144 order;[6] six Praja Socialist Members of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly were arrested, September, 1958, for leading a *satyagraha* against grain storage warehouses;[7] two senior advocates and eleven lawyers were taken into custody in Jaipur, July, 1958, for invading banned areas as a protest against the abolition of a High Court Bench in that territory.[8] The upshot is that no stigma attaches to an elected official who has run afoul of the law. On the contrary, politicians in India win their spurs by spending time in jail in the name of some righteous cause.

Speaking about the debasement of *satyagraha* which has occurred since Gandhi's death, Nehru had this to say in 1956:

> Then again, I am a little weary of hearing this word satyagraha hurled at me, and having heard this word many times in different contexts previously. When Gandhiji first used it and practiced it, when the time came he told us that nobody in India is a satyagraha except himself. He told us that, and quite rightly too. In spite of all our efforts, now everybody in India is a satyagrahi. Everybody who breaks the law, everybody who breaks heads is a satyagrahi. Every stone-thrower in India is a satyagrahi. This is most extraordinary, where words are misused and abused. Well, if a person wants to break a head, if I can stop him, I will stop him. But I do hope that the word "satyagrahi" will not be used in that connection.[9]

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[6] *Times of India*, May 20, 1958, p. 9.

[7] *Ibid.*, September 6, 1958, p. 1.

[8] *Ibid.*, July, 1958.

[9] *Lok Sabha Debates*, 28 May 1956.

Professional politicians have made cynical use of the Indian respect for self-sacrifice. Political groups deliberately seek to create situations in which martyrdom cannot be avoided. A lathi charge, a tear gassing, police arrests, court fines and jail sentences are provoked in order to publicize a case and whip up public support for it. The image is created of dramatic insurgence against overbearing and autocratic government.[10]

The following description by an Indian observer gives a detailed picture of the tactics of mob utilization:

> Processions have become a routine affair particularly in large cities. The technique is to have convergent processions surrounding the Legislative Assemblies when they are in session. There is dislocation of traffic when it is even normally most congested and there is a passionate shouting of slogans and fire-eating speeches. The processionists are inevitably held in check by an elaborate arrangement of the police force. Questions are raised by sympathizers inside the Legislature and the Government leaders are requested to meet a deputation from the procession. It is inevitably turned down and the signal for increasing the pressure of the procession is given. The police lathi-charge or tear-gassing the mob is welcomed by the leaders of the processionists in a morbid mood. If there is firing and some are wounded, it is considered a great victory for the day, once again demonstrating the callousness and the brutality of the party in power.[11]

As the preceding illustration would indicate, police firings provide the most emotion-laden instances of the utilization of suffering as a political weapon. Firing upon an unarmed crowd, even a belligerent and unreasonable one, immediately stirs up a wave of popular sympathy for the protagonists and hatred against the law enforcement authorities which engulfs and obscures the merits of the agitation. The issue uppermost in the public mind becomes the investigation and judgment of the action of the police. All thought of inexcusable provocation is wiped away by official killing. The defensive attitude of the government can be seen in the following rather plaintive appeal made by Mr. Nehru on the same occasion in 1956:

> There was no doubt reference to police *zulum.* It is a constant factor that is brought in everywhere because it is expected that everybody will immediately accept any charge of misbehavior by the police. The poor police is so used to be kicked and cuffed like that and always condemned. It is easy to make a charge against the police. . . . It is becoming intolerable always for this poor policeman to be condemned for trying to do his duty in the most difficult of circumstances. Let us punish the policeman when he is guilty or anybody else when he is guilty. But the stone-thrower becomes a hero and is taken out in procession—may be—and the poor policeman who gets the stone on his head is a person who is guilty of *zulum* and atrocities.[12]

A fourth possible result is the political advantage which may accrue to agitational parties and groups *vis-à-vis* the government. In a country where the meaning of democracy is as yet largely unfixed in the public mind and has not been hallowed by years of reflexive experience, a policy of the government designed to establish rules, particularly rules for the expression of public opinion, can be too easily labelled as anti-democratic by the opposition. If the Government passes a Preventive Detention Act, amends the Indian Penal Code to provide stiffer penalties for incitement to communal violence, arrests "satyagrahis" raiding grain storage warehouses, or simply cordons off troubled areas in large cities, it hands the banner of democratic rectitude to the opposition. Acharya Kripalani, for instance, a respected leader of the Praja Socialist Party, thundered against the Congress Government in these words during a debate on the Preventive Detention Act:

> It is not the Opposition, it is not the goondas,[13] it is not the black-marketeers, it is not even the Communists, it is you [referring to the Government] who are the greatest enemies of this infant democracy. If ever this democracy dies, you will be responsible for it. You may live for a day and be no more; but this will be the judgment of history to your everlasting shame.[14]

The Communist Party, especially, uses the law and order policies of the Government to present itself as the sole champion of democracy in India. Their thesis, proclaimed loudly from every rostrum, is that democracy means an absence of restrictions. Resistance by the Government to any popularly held belief or interest is *ipso facto* proof that the Government is anti-democratic. "Vox populi, vox dei" is the base line of their propaganda. The relation between freedom and regulation, between discipline and license, is a grudging lesson to teach in any country. It is doubly difficult to understand in India where the public is, first, largely unlettered and inexperienced in the ways of democracy and, second, so surfeited upon extreme portrayals of the nature and benefits of democracy. Any governmental policy of legal restriction will inevitably provide an opposition with an unparalleled opportunity to question the government's integrity and intentions.

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[10] The Communist Party, in India and elsewhere, has used this tactic for years. See Eugene H. Methvin, "Mob Violence and Communist Strategy," *Orbis* (Summer, 1961), pp. 166–81.

[11] K. K. Sinha, *Towards Pluralistic Society* (Calcutta: Writers House, 1957), p. 25.

[12] *Lok Sabha Debates,* 28 May 1956, Col. 9822.

[13] Hooligans.

[14] *Lok Sabha Debates,* 13 December 1954, col. 2731.

The fifth and most immediately serious consequence of a restrictive policy is the damage which it inflicts upon the position and prestige of the police and the law courts. The Indian police establishment must take the van in any attempt to discipline the masses, hence it becomes the primary target for abuse and vilification. The invidious position of the police is not an entirely new development in India, for they have been encumbered from the very beginning by the reputation earned when they were a paid tool of the British. People in India have not quickly forgotten that it was these same police who carried off friends and loved ones into detention, often to be held *incommunicado* for considerable periods of time. They remember the police breaking heads and firing tear gas squibs at non-violent demonstrators protesting for nothing more (or less) than the freedom of their country. An intensified policy of constraint resuscitates memories of this bitter period, memories which the police have strenuously sought to sponge clean since Independence.

The Law Commission, appointed by the central government, had this to say in 1958 about the stock of the police among the Indian people: "It must be conceded that in India, the police force as a whole is not, even today, regarded as a friend of the citizen."[15] This same theme was echoed in a recent article in the *Indian Police Journal* ". . . in actual fact, the feelings of the people toward the Police are anything but friendly."[16] In part, suspicion of the police can be traced to such ordinary factors as inefficiency, haste, lack of consideration, as well as the usual incidence of corruption, brutality, and partiality.[17] More important, however, in the opinion of the Law Commission, has been the extensive use of the police for law and order control. So serious has the trend toward non-cooperation with the police become among the mass of the people that the Law Commission recommended in 1958 that the investigating sections of the police establishment be separated from the law and order sections.[18]

The flame of antagonism toward the police is fanned constantly by opposition politicians, both in and out of legislative bodies. There is an axiom among these politicians that if violence occurs, it is the fault of police provocation. A Communist MP replied in these words to the Government's claim that there was a tendency to violence among the people: "How is this violence generated? Is it initially from the people or does it come as a reaction to police violence, the violence on the part of the executive?"[19] And another MP charged:

> If violence has occurred, it has occurred not because of any activities of the detenus. It has occurred on account of the activities of the police.[20]

In the Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1955, twenty-two Opposition MLAs tabled the following statement:

> It is true that the mob pelted the police with stones—that should not have been done—but when firing and lathi charges are resorted to indiscriminately, it would be too much to expect the people to be totally non-violent. The Government failed to understand the spontaneity of the people's demand and tried to suppress the will of the masses by force.[21]

Even the redoubtable J. P. Narayan has added his voice to the refrain:

> The Prime Minister has warned again and again that the days of street demonstrations and the like are over. But let me say humbly that as long as his Government and its officers do not act justly and fairly, there will be demonstrations and things like that. After all why should a lover of freedom and democracy get so upset? Are these not the usual processes of democracy?[22]

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[15] Law Commission of India, *Fourteenth Report* (Ministry of Law, Government of India, 1958), ch. 34, para. 36.

[16] B. N. Mullik, "Police Ethics," *Indian Police Journal*, October, 1960, pp. 1–10.

[17] See, for instance, a comment by the *Eastern Economist*, November 13, 1959, p. 758, about the police force in New Delhi.

[18] *Report of the Law Commission*, Ch. 34, para. 29–31.

[19] *Lok Sabha Debates*, May 30, 1956, col. 10059.

[20] *Ibid.*, December 22, 1953, Col. 2840.

[21] *Times of India*, November 23, 1955, p. 5.

[22] *Ibid.*, September 3, 1955, p. 5.

In the hands of J. P. Narayan such a comment cannot be dismissed lightly, for it sounds a note which has reverberated in modern political history. In the hands of a less scrupulous opposition such a doctrine can become a powerful cudgel with which to beat the government for any enforcement activities.

The police of India have become the chief whipping boys for all disorders. They can expect little cooperation from the people, and often not even a fair hearing of their case. The Indian Government has ample cause to hesitate before it embarks upon any policy which might augment this appreciable burden of hostility.

The attitude of the mass of Indians toward the judicial system is equally subject to deterioration as a result of government repression. Many Indians, particularly in rural areas, continue to exhibit what Sir Percival Spears has called a "slot machine" attitude toward the court system. The more tradition-minded Indian treats the courts not as a means of resolving disputes, of gaining justice, or of deciding the merits of a case, but as an instrument for getting all he can from a situation and, perhaps, for financially ruining his opponent. Courts become convenient adjuncts to personal vendettas. Furthermore, courts are not thought of as the arbiters of impartial justice or as the primary line of defense against the encroachments of predatory government. Rather, they are collaborators with government in the task of exploitation and control and they should be avoided at all costs. The story is told of the litigant who, when his solicitor triumphantly wired "Justice has prevailed," replied immediately, "Appeal at once."[23] Clearly, then, if government should tighten the laws governing public agitation and administer them more strictly, the courts, like the police, will become a focus of hostility. They will be forced to conform to an already distasteful image.

The Report of the Law Commission noted two disturbing signs in this connection. First, that there is a great reluctance on the part of potential witnesses to appear in court. Second, that perjury has been increasing alarmingly of late. "The sanctity of the oath has almost disappeared and persons seem prepared readily to make false statements on oath in courts of law."[24]

An impartial court system and incorruptible and trusted police force are cornerstones of the system of voluntary social regulation, or regulation by consent, which is the hallmark of democracy. The estrangement of the people from the police and judicial systems would represent an ominous portent for the future of modern India.

So far we have noted five possible disadvantages of a policy of limiting coercive public protest: (1) the stoppering of a socially useful or functional response; (2) the weakening of consensus between ruler and ruled; (3) the intensification of the Gandhian martyrdom syndrome; (4) the creation of a tactically advantageous position for the non-democratic political opposition; (5) the alienation of the people from the police and court system. These have one point in common. They work through the responses of the non-participant mass of the people, that is, through those who have played no part in the formulation or implementation of law and order policy. But there may also be negative effects which operate through the participating or ruling elite. I shall name three.

Restriction of coercive public protest impinges directly upon the ability of individuals and groups to dramatize dissident viewpoints and, hence, to affect the course of government policy. The need for some amount of restraint of this process is conceded. At the same time, however, a democratic nation must be quite sure that the rules for the separation of proper from improper protest are clearly formulated and impartially applied. Efforts to discipline the expressions of popular opinion, even for the most unimpeachable reasons, may end in the suppression of all unwanted opinon. Elitism in a country like India exerts a powerful hold over the official mind. Officials are already separated from the masses by a chasm of education, training, and experience. It would be very easy to extend a policy of tutelage in the rules of democratic interaction into one of authoritarian suppression of opposition viewpoints. The task of regulating coercive public protest must not end in the elimination of protest; the purpose of the policy should be the re-canalization of protest. Democratic pedagogy must not become a crutch to elitism.

In any policy of regulation officials should be entirely clear about their aims. The criterion herein adopted has been the creation of the social requisites for democracy. This is a very different goal from, say, yearly increments in per capita income or rate of industrialization. It is not efficiency which is the goal, but the peculiar kind of social interaction known as democracy. India is today straining tensely for economic development. It would be perilously easy to substitute a materialistic development criterion for a political one. The difficulty, then, with any policy of social regulation in India is that the bureaucratic impulse may supplant the pedagogic one.

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[23] *Statesman*, March 7, 1955, editorial, p. 6.

[24] *Report of the Law Commission*, ch. 40, para. 1.

Another risk is implicit in any attempt to limit the scope of political persuasion. The very nature of the task, namely, the inculcation of an understanding of the bounds of propriety in a democracy, suggests that any policy which places reserves of power in the hands of government will be less firmly restrained than in well established democratic states. The inertial conservatism of the people of the United States and England, trained for generations in democracy, causes the political system, when unbalanced, to return as a rule to the familiar ways. In India the familiar ways are not democratic. The society's homeostatic mechanism, whatever it is, will not impel the society back to an anterior democratic condition. Cures to any problem which require the concentration of large amounts of power in a few hands are less likely to be voluntarily relinquished when the moment of crisis is past.

Habituation to power, therefore, may be a destructive after-effect of controlling tightly the various forms of political protest so popular in contemporary India. This tendency among the agents of governmental authority may operate the more freely because of the relative absence of institutionalized countervailing forces. A return to the *status quo ante*, with regard to accretions of governmental power, would be more dependent upon the character, restraint, and commitment to democratic ideals of India's leaders than would need to be the case in long-established democratic countries.

A policy of social control may, therefore, by the manner of its impingement upon the ruling coalition buttress existing tendencies toward (1) elitist isolation, (2) the pre-eminence of exclusively materialist developmental goals, and (3) authoritarianism.

It should by now be clear that in designing policies for the regulation of coercive social protest, whether exacting or permissive, the Indian Government must steer between Scylla and Charybdis. There are grave dangers implicit in a too rigorous adherence to the letter of the democratic blueprint, and also grave dangers in disregarding portions of it. Decisions should not rest upon theoretical considerations alone. Dogmatic suppression of all forms of illegal, or even violent, protest might well be as damaging to the long-term prospects of democracy as an unperceptive lack of conern. Not doctrinal purity, but pragmatic viability within a framework of ideals, should be the guiding concern.

COMMUNICATIONS

EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO VOTE-COUNTING THEORY IN NOMINATING CHOICE

To the Editor:

Professor William H. Riker's essay on "Voting and the Summation of Preferences" (this Review, Vol. 55, December 1961, pp. 900–11) is a most useful contribution. It needs to be supplemented by some comment on the applicability of this material in the field of nominating choice; also on the applicability of experimental approaches to ascertain the frequency with which the problems that concern Riker may in fact occur in nature.

The best-known elections in the United States in which a choice among three or more alternatives is likely to occur are those involved in making party nominations. In either one party or the other, almost every presidential year has seen three or more candidates competing for a presidential nomination. Situations involving as many as six or seven candidates have been relatively common in state primaries, as for example those involving the gubernatorial candidates in Alabama and Texas in 1962.

If the work by Duncan Black and his predecessors to which Riker calls attention had been known fifty years ago, the evolution of primary elections in this country might conceivably have taken a somewhat different form. Black seems, in fact, to have produced a fundamental discovery showing why either plurality choice without a majority, or a run-off between the two leading first-choice candidates, can easily result in the selection of the "wrong" candidate if the candidate or candidates at the center of the spectrum happen to be weakest in first-choice strength, although strong in second- or third-choice strength—an event which one could suppose must be relatively common.

A simple illustration of a familiar kind will make the point. Suppose three candidates, A, B, and C, of whom A and C are leading, but are strongly opposed to each other. The supporters of each reject the other, but would be willing to accept B, the man in the middle. In this case, the distribution of the voters in terms of their preference orders might be about as follows:

Preference	Per Cent of Voters			
	40	15	10	35
1st	A	B	B	C
2d	B	A	C	B
3d	C	C	A	A

Black argues that in such a case, that candidate should be chosen who could defeat each of the others when paired against them one at a time, as B could do in the present case. Yet B would be defeated in any primary election decided on the basis of an initial plurality or of a run-off between the two first-choice leaders. Such a plurality defeat is exactly what happened to Governor Thomas E. Dewey in the 1948 Wisconsin primary, when the Republican vote divided Stassen 40 per cent, Dewey 24, and MacArthur 36—a situation, moreover, in which Dewey was undoubtedly the candidate of the center and could probably have defeated either of his opponents in a two-way test.

We used Blacks' work to some extent in *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (p. 315, n. 24, and p. 489. n. 7), but if it had come to our attention sooner and we had assimilated it more fully, our treatment of the alternative vote and of the hazards of plurality voting would have been somewhat different. In a more recent study, I applied Black's criterion directly in attempting to assess the results of the Democratic convention of 1960, and concluded, on the basis of the Gallup poll data, that Kennedy probably could have defeated each of the other candidates in a two-way test and could therefore be regarded as a majority choice of his party (David *et al*, *The Presidential Election and Transition 1960–61*, pp. 18–19). In this particular instance, there was no evidence of nontransitivity of social choice. The "Arrow problem" to which Riker devotes so much attention apparently did not arise, although on *a priori* grounds, the situation was especially conducive to nontransitivity because of the cross-cutting effect of the religious issue.

The Arrow problem is so intriguing intellectually that it is easy to overlook the paucity of empirical data demonstrating cases in which it actually occurred, despite the extensive discussion the problem has received over a ten-year period. If I understand Riker's essay correctly, he does not cite a single case of nontransitivity of social choice in an actual situation involving real people, although he refers at pages 909–910 to various types of experimental work leading to somewhat conflicting results. Gordon Tullock of the University of Virginia, co-author with James M. Buchanan of *The Calculus of Consent* (1962), tells me that he not is aware of any documented cases in the literature, and furthermore seems to be in at least partial disagreement with Riker on the frequency with which such cases might be expected if there were enough experimental work to provide a basis for a conclusion. On *a priori* grounds arising out of theories of his own, Tullock believes that actual cases would be quite infrequent in situations involving only three or four alternatives, although they would occur; while Riker seems to think they might occur rather often.

The subject is one that lends itself readily to classroom experimentation, as well as to use of sample surveys; and the problems involved in a simple lack of majority preference on a first-choice basis will always be important, whatever happens to the Arrow problem. In hopes of finding a factual example of nontransitivity on a legislative issue, as well as other potential results, I made up a ballot offering three alternatives, as follows:

A. Federal aid for public schools only
B. Federal aid for public and private (including parochial) schools
C. No federal aid for either schools

Each respondent was also asked to indicate whether he considered himself a Democrat, Neutral, or Republican.

This ballot was presented to a class in an introductory course in government and 68 usable ballots were obtained. The party split proved to be 24-D, 21-N, and 23-R. The numbers of students in the total group voting each preference order were as follows:

32	11	12	1	11	1
A	A	B	B	C	C
B	C	A	C	A	B
C	B	C	A	B	A

Policy A was thus a heavy majority preference on a first-choice basis, with 43 votes to 13 for B and 12 for C. Policy A was also the majority first-choice for each party group counted separately, although most of the minorities who preferred Policy B as their first choice were Democrats and most of those who preferred Policy C as their first choice were Republicans. Nothing approaching nontransitivity of choice could be found by taking any of these groups separately. Repeated further use of this ballot with other and varying types of groups might find some actual case of nontransitivity, but it doesn't look as easy as it did before the first attempt was made.

A similar experiment was made with a ballot offering four potential candidates for the Republican presidential nomination of 1964, namely, Nelson Rockefeller, Richard Nixon, George Romney, and Barry Goldwater. With four candidates, 24 different preference orders are possible. In a group of 70 usable ballots, 21 of these possibilities occurred at least once, 16 at least twice, and 10 at least three times; hence only summaries of the voting can be presented. The preference distributions were as follows:

Preference	Rockefeller	Nixon	Romney	Goldwater
1st	26	18	6	20
2d	21	24	16	9
3d	11	18	29	12
4th	12	10	19	29

In this group, no one had a majority as either first choice or last choice. Rockefeller would have been the winner on a first-choice plurality basis; a run-off would have occurred between Rockefeller and Goldwater. In this group, Rockefeller would win the run-off by 41 to 29—assuming no vote-shifting—and in this case a run-off would also produce the "correct" outcome, since Rockefeller could defeat each of the other candidates in a two-way race. Nixon, however, would have defeated Goldwater in a two-way race, 42 to 28, and it could be argued that if there is to be a run-off, it should take place between Rockefeller and Nixon rather than Rockefeller and Goldwater. On a Borda count according to the method of marks (see Black), by which 3 marks are given for each first choice, 2 for each second choice, 1 for each third choice, and 0 for each fourth or last choice, Rockefeller's count was 131, Nixon's 120, Goldwater's 90, and Romney's 79. In a two-way race, however, Romney would have defeated Goldwater by 37 to 33.

The results just given for outcomes in the various two-way combinations were derived from the original counting chart, set up as a series of tree diagrams in which each of the four first-choice possibilities is followed by its three second-choice possibilities, those in turn by their two third-choice possibilities, and those in turn by the corresponding fourth-choice possibilities. Use of such a chart greatly facilitates the original ballot counting and thereafter makes it possible to assemble results on any desired basis with a minimum of retabulation.

When the 23 Republican ballots in this group were tabulated separately, the preference distributions were as follows:

Preference	Rockefeller	Nixon	Romney	Goldwater
1st	5	7	2	9
2d	7	8	6	2
3d	5	4	9	5
4th	6	4	6	7

In this group, again no one has a first-choice majority, but Goldwater would be the winner on a plurality basis. In a run-off, however, Nixon would have his chance and would defeat Goldwater 13 to 10. On a two-way basis, Nixon defeats each of the other candidates, Goldwater defeats Rockefeller and Romney, and Rockefeller defeats Romney; there is no evidence of nontransitivity. The Borda count is Nixon 41, Goldwater 36, Rockefeller 34, and Romney 27.

The four candidates were arranged from left to right in the previous tabulations on the basis of commonly held opinions about their positions in relation to each other. The voting distributions on the tree diagrams, however, provide empirical evidence for an ordering in which Rockefeller and Goldwater occupy the polar positions, with Nixon nearest to Rockefeller and Romney nearest to Goldwater. Evidences of these relationships are apparent in all the diagrams, but especially in those for the 23 Republican voters, where Nixon was the second choice of all the Rockefeller voters, Romney was the principal second choice of the Goldwater voters, and Rockefeller was the second choice of most of the Nixon voters. Goldwater and Romney divided the last choice positions for the Rockefeller and Nixon voters, while Rockefeller and Nixon performed this office for the Goldwater and Romney voters. All of this suggests that the actual voting results can be used to array a group of candidates along a spectrum in the absence of other evidence, if the voting process provides a complete array of preference data, as it could at least in classroom experiments or sample surveys.

These experiments have been reported in part because the results have some intrinsic interest, but primarily to illustrate a method of experimentation that can be used either in the classroom or in sample surveys. This in turn suggests a number of conclusions of some potential interest to the profession:

1. An experimental method is available to demonstrate to students the complexity of preference structures in situations of multiple alternatives. Such properties of opinion as conflict and consensus or the lack of it can be studied. With the addition of other scaling devices, intensity could also be studied.

2. Used repeatedly, such experiments could be used to demonstrate some of the other properties of opinion, notably stability, instability, and latency—properties of special importance in the development of a presidential nominating choice.

3. Such experiments can be used to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in arriving at valid majority decisions in situations involving a choice among multiple alternatives of candidates or policies. This is the classic problem of the national party conventions and of any primary election where there has been no effective pre-election screening of the candidates.

4. Sample surveys along these lines, used effectively with adequate publication of the results, could do much to create a more informed public opinion in situations involving multiple alternatives, including preconvention proceedings on presidential nominations and primary elections in states where multiple candidacies are typical.

5. If some method of accumulating the results can be devised, it would be possible to obtain empirical answers to at least three questions on which answers are needed, namely, (a) whether existing primary election systems involving mere plurality choice or a run-off tend frequently to select nominees who are not in fact the majority choice of their party on any basis; (b) whether such systems tend to select from the extremes more often than from the center in situations of multiple candidacies, as Black implies at page 75 of his book; and (c) whether the problem of nontransitivity of social choice exists in nature with sufficient frequency to deserve consideration in the design of electoral systems.

6. In future election years, substantial research funds could appropriately be invested in sample surveys during the intervals preceding the holding of primary elections in a considerable number of situations involving multiple candidacies. It would be desirable to pretest situations involving three or more candidates that will be settled by a plurality as well as those that will be settled by a run-off. Sample surveys in as many as fifteen or twenty primary election situations in the same year could do much to clear up the questions raised in the preceding paragraph.

7. Finally, after the steps indicated, presumably it would be possible to develop a vote-counting theory in nominating choice, as well as an improved system for holding primary elections, that would not only rest on a sounder empirical foundation than is presently avail-

able, but could be understood by teachers, students, and opinion leaders after it had been produced.

If it is true that the existing plurality and run-off systems select from the extremes more often than from the center in situations of multiple candidacies, as Black's theories suggest, the result may be a type of instability or of adverse selection that complicates any movement toward a more effective two-party system in states where multiple candidacies are common. On the other hand, it is probably one of the virtues of the national conventions that they tend to move toward the center of each party in the search for a presidential candidate who can be nominated. The reasons why this is both true and necessary can probably be demonstrated if the appropriate kind of sample survey evidence is obtained in future years; and classroom experiments may be useful for the same purpose in the meantime. At any rate, an exploration of Black's theories has tended to confirm my own faith in the national convention system of presidential nominations.[1]

PAUL T. DAVID

University of Virgina

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[1] An article of mine on the presidential nominating process, in the Spring 1962 issue of *Law and Contemporary Problems*, deals more fully with some applications of the notions discussed here.

ON BRZEZINSKI'S USE OF HISTORY

TO THE EDITOR:

May I comment on some aspects of the article on "Deviation Control" in your March issue?

Since differences in organizational purposes may condition methods of action and the kind of organizational unity that is required, I question whether "the most vital and distinctive aspect of the activities of the Church," the "spiritual" aspect "which defines its unique character," "can be altogether excluded from consideration" in a discussion of tactics toward deviation. The role of concentrated force, the rationale of command and obedience, the methods through which cohesion is best attained may very well differ for an organization that hopes to achieve an external remodeling of institutions, through revolutionary seizures of power and through techniques of control preceding general consent, and for an organization that conceives its goal as a continually repeated process, inherently uncoercible, occurring within individual men. The Church has always been aware that diverse and spontaneous movements of thought and action initiated by persons apart from the hierarchy have been a major factor in its success (insistence on conformity of thought and method would have decimated the roster of saints—eliminating Aquinas, among others). As a matter of historical fact, the conditions within which the Church developed gave it no chance to become "a single homogeneous unit" in which "the center" could exercise a degree of control remotely comparable to that of Stalin in the Party. Both its purposes and its possibilities have required it to depend heavily on persuasion, reasoning, tradition, the rule of law, and diplomatic compromise; it has always had to combine an insistence on some fixed principles and procedures with an acceptance of a considerable degree of internal diversity and autonomy, open debate, and unresolved disagreement. Thus the conception of organizational unity within which issues of deviation are to be considered has never, I suggest, been the same for the Church as for the Party.

Moreover, the relation of doctrine to action differs for the two institutions. The dogmas on which the Church insists do not purport to be determinative of organizational policy in relation to the course of history; they deal with relationships presumed to be invariable; and the maintenance of the faith, believed to be divinely revealed, is itself an intrinsic part of the Church's goal. The concrete applications of the faith to moral conduct and organizational action are understood to be to some degree contingent on shifting circumstance, open to dispute, and subject to merely positive determination; but wherever conceptions of the ultimate, invariable relations of God and man are at issue, the Church is inherently committed to seek consistency and to insist on conformity. In principle, this means that the condemnation of a statement clearly incompatible with dogma already defined can not properly be subordinated to any tactical consideration; to suggest that the Church could maintain its unity through ignoring such a deviation is to suggest that it should abandon what it has always conceived to be its role. But the authoritative definition of doctrines not yet clearly defined must necessarily proceed with great caution and take into account the system of previous commitments and the consensus—or lack of consensus—of theologians. These distinctions, I suggest, are highly relevant to the cases of deviation that Professor Brzezinski treats.

Descending from principle to historical fact, I would also suggest that the Church's policies have always been conditioned by some major differences between its relations with other systems of power and those of the Party. It has never controlled much of the world's physical force; its economic resources have always been widely dispersed and hard to protect from the acquisitive interests of outsiders; there is a measurable difference between the Soviet Union and the Papal States as a base of operations and a concern of policy. Thus the activity of the Church has been generally dependent on a policy of peaceful co-existence; and, since the nature of its goals does not commit it to an ultimate antagonism to any system of political and economic organization as such, it has a superior capacity for compromise and stable alliance with other centers of power. Such alliances may compensate for, but do not abolish, its intrinsic vulnerability; in practice, such alliances have often been very entangling; and, obviously, the exact state of its relations with other forces at any given moment of history may be highly significant for the prospects of "deviation control."

Aside from these basic differences between the Church and the Party, other differences apply to the Church on the eve of the Reformation. Professor Brzezinski's summary of the Church as, like the Party, a proselytizing and "expansion-oriented" institution, in which "the success of any one unit of the movement" is "the source of satisfaction to the entire membership," is strikingly inappropriate to the Church of that period. It had then, as has often been observed, the characteristic pattern of an *ancien régime*. Except in Spain (and there, under monarchic impetus), it was not proselytizing nor oriented toward expansion. Its various institutional units (including the papacy) were engaged, with considerable mutual jealousy, in the pursuit of particularist interests to a degree that effectively prevented concerted action on the common problems commonly recognized as serious: internal corruption, the century-old Hussite heresy, the advance of the Turks. Its financial resources were under strain, maldistributed, and very noticeably often misspent for non-organizational purposes. Powers once demanded as essential to its operation—especially, control over the appointment of its own officers—had been, in large areas, relinquished. Its officials (including incumbents of the papacy) were too often ill-suited to and uninterested in the organizational functions and insensitive to new movements of public opinion. The *trahison des clercs* was well under way; popular respect for the *élite* was at an all-time low. Reform movements were still rudimentary. Is the problem of deviation in an *ancien régime* comparable to the problem of deviation in a revolutionary movement on the make? Early Protestantism could perhaps have provided case-histories somewhat comparable with the case of Titoism; but if one must seek a twentieth-century analogy to the situation of the sixteenth-century Church, some of the dilemmas of "capitalistic democracy" are at least as relevant as those of international Communism.

Aside from my distrust of Professor Brzezinski's premises, I am bewildered by his presentation of the case of Luther and the inferences he draws from it. I should have expected an assessment of tactics toward a doctrinal deviant to be based on a careful examination of available alternatives in the light of the total situation at the time: the immediate pattern of interests, purposes, antagonisms, loyalties; the immediate and potential resources of the organization and the deviant, including their immediate and potential allies; the content of the deviant doctrine, its implications, its compatibility or incompatibility with previous commitments, its potential appeal to others. Professor Brzezinski's *résumé* of factors that had in the remote past been useful to organizational unity and papal leadership is no substitute for an analysis of the instruments available in 1517. The Crusades and the military orders are as irrelevant to consideration of Leo X *versus* Luther as Danegeld and the Domesday Survey would be to consideration of the Stuarts *versus* Parliament. The mendicant orders and the universities were not the assets they once had been; one could plausibly argue that they had become liabilities. One wonders why Professor Brzezinski explains the theory of episcopal equality rather than the current theory and status of conciliarism; why he ignores such a vitally relevant topic as the current structure of ecclesiastical finance; why, disregarding the effects of the concordats and their English equivalents, he supposes that the transformation of the Church into a composite of national units was occurring only "underneath the surface" (and why he regards this as analogous to a transformation in the Communist Party, whose officers, I believe, have not yet been appointed by fellow-travellers); why, except for a vague allusion to "national power" (the Elector of Saxony?), he has nothing to say about the religious, political, economic, and intellectual situation in Germany.

His conception of the late-medieval Inquisition as an instrument of papal control and a parallel to the Stalinist purges is remarkable. Control of the Spanish Inquisition had been ceded to Ferdinand; it was an instrument of national unification and of reforming piety. Elsewhere, pre-Reformation applications of the Inquisition were typically sporadic and haphazard, largely dominated by local antagonisms, fears, and avarice, or by the local Inquisitor's professional zeal, and dependent on the collaboration of secular government. (Incidentally, there was an authentic campaign against witchcraft as such.) Professor Brzezinski's assurance that the Inquisition "doubtless" increased papal power is oddly at variance with the actual preoccupations of the Renassiance popes, notably tolerant of free-thinking and not greatly concerned with general leadership in the Church, which they regarded chiefly as the source of certain kinds of income to be spent on the local projects in which they were engrossed. Sixtus IV, in fact, had been willing to jeopardize the universal role of the papacy to transform it into an hereditary monarchy in the Papal States; this abortive project was not, I must add, an ecclesiastical version of "socialism in one country." Professor Brzezinski's summary of the Stalinist spiral ("the result of the purges was a further concentration of power at the center. The fear of violence intensified the violence, and the violence . . . intensified the fear") scarcely applies to the pre-Reformation Church, in which the ultramontane influence of the papacy was diminishing and was exerted largely through financial and political deals; in which doctrinal debate was carried on with more than usual freedom, and widespread, devastating criticism of every facet of the organization, including the papacy, went on unchecked; in which the most important interplay of fear and violence was connected with the activities of quite unpurgeable armies in Italy.

The Lutheran movement was not, of course, "the first major crisis of unity" that the Church had faced. It had struggled for centuries with Arianism; it was still vainly attempting to heal the centuries-old schism of East and West; it had successfully dealt with widespread popular heresies through a major effort requiring a variety of techniques; more recently, it had resolved a quarter-century schism, but was still unable to muster up sufficient resources of force or persuasion to counter the Hussite heresy. Moreover, when Luther first attracted notice, no one imagined that his theological statements, neither novel nor clearly heretical, would lead to "a crisis of unity"; his main teachings had been expressed a few years earlier by the French theologian, Lefèvre d'Étaples, with no effect on the popular mind. And, as between Luther and Friar Tetzel, it was Tetzel who talked heresy. Initiative in opposition to Luther did not come from "the center" (that easy-going connoisseur, Leo X, scarcely fits the role of Stalin), but from the Archbishop of Mainz and the Dominicans, whose zeal to get Luther silenced was directly motivated by his effect on their lucrative racket. Leo X had to be prodded into taking an interest in what he originally, and with fifty per cent accuracy, regarded as a "squabble of monks." Far from "precipitously" following a routine technique with Luther, Leo, bedeviled by conflicting pressures, had great difficulty in making up his mind what to do about him; the order of arrest of August, 1518 (based on an indictment, not a judgment) followed months of indecision and was quickly withdrawn; the subsequent prolongation of debate, which gave Luther wider publicity and assisted him to clarify his thoughts, was partly due to the influence of his various defenders, partly to the difficulty of catching him in any statement that could with assurance be "branded heretical," and partly to some political strategy with regard to the imperial election, which Leo, unlike Professor Brzezinski, considered worth taking into account.

Granting that the tactics adopted were unsuccessful, I remain unimpressed by the alternatives Professor Brzezinski proposes. His suggestion of a "quiet liquidation" of Luther, without "personalizing the conflict (!)," with a subsequent "open condemnation" (by whom?) "of the improper views" (which?) is quite enchanting, but not quite convincing. I assume that Professor Brzezinski does not mean that preventative assassination of every critic who might later have become a heretic or schismatic should have been adopted as a general Reformation-averting policy: aside from the sizable administrative difficulties it would have entailed, and some incompatibility with the Church's professed goals and habitual procedures, such a wholesale assault on the population of Europe could scarcely have been kept quiet and might, indeed, have contributed to the result it aimed to prevent. Assuming that he contemplates the preventative assassination of Luther only, I can only inquire how anyone could possibly have known, before the debate developed, that it would be Luther's "improper views," rather than those of numerous other people, that would spark an explosion —especially as no one had reason to think that an explosion was imminent. His alternative recommendation, that Luther should have been "ignored," may seem superficially more feasible; however, even if "the center" had "refused to engage in open debate," it could not possibly have silenced other debaters (I suspect that Professor Brzezinski is visualizing the Stalinist dictatorship rather than the pre-Reformation Church); and if Luther's views had developed under this stimulus, could the pope have continued to ignore them? Professor Brzezinski's confidence that, if Luther could have been eliminated or ignored, the Protestant split would probably have been averted is gratuitous. It tacitly assumes a number of highly controversial theses—about the causes of the Reformation, the indispensability of Luther's role, his mental processes, the reasons for his influence, the potentialities of alternative movements—that can not be taken for granted in this fashion. There is a mass of historical discussion on the difficult questions that Professor Brzezinski glides over here; apparently he is unfamiliar with the literature on the topic and unaware of the terms in which the discussion is, and must be, carried on.

The fact that Jansenism was successfully contained by somewhat different tactics is no indication that these tactics could have been successfully applied to Lutheranism. Professor Brzezinski's analysis ignores significant differences in the situations in which these two doctrinally somewhat similar movements appeared—differences that undermined the potential appeal of Jansenism, regardless of the tactics used. France was not Germany, with its special problems and frustrations; Jansenism lacked the significant political and economic connotations associated with Luther's religious teachings; the French kings had long since been entrenched, through generally satisfactory concordats with the papacy, in ecclesiastical rights that German princes gained only by going Protestant; even at the height of Reformation fervor, Calvinism had captured only a fraction of Frenchmen and, in the seventeenth century, the Huguenots were declining in numbers and zeal. Moreover, Lutheranism and Jansenism are separated by a period in which, unobserved by Professor Brzezinski, the Catholic Church had successfully remodelled and tightened its organization, cleaned up its scandals, rearranged its budget, improved the quality of its personnel, clarified many of its doctrines, developed new techniques of control and persuasion to fit the needs and temper of the time, regained the respect of its continuing members, intensified their religious earnestness, and embarked, with notable success in France and elsewhere, on a program of proselytization and expansion. (It had, one might say, adapted itself to the Cold War through ecclesiastical equivalents to, *e.g.*, the Dennis Case, NATO, the Common Market, and the Ford Foundation.)

Professor Brzezinski's thesis that experience with Luther had made the Church "deviation-conscious" and thus prepared it for a more moderate handling of the Jansenist problem slides over the fact that the Church had met many cases of "deviation" since the time of Luther and handled them in various ways, though usually with greater decisiveness and harshness rather than greater moderation. His account of the Jansenist controversy is distorted by his failure to notice that the Gallicanism of the French episcopacy and that of the French monarchy were by no means identical nor even, usually, allied; that the papal treatment of Jansenism was conditioned by several considerations besides a hope to keep the Jansenists in the fold; that when the Jansenists focussed their attacks on the Jesuits they quite accurately selected their actual opponent; that the French monarchy (*i.e.*, in effect, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV) was actively anti-Jansenist; that Mazarin and Louis XIV were, in fact, instigators of repeated attempts to secure more thorough-going papal condemnations. The chance that "France might be lost" had its roots, not in Jansenism, but in episcopal Gallicanism—which actually "became defiance" as a result of Innocent XI's intransigence on the quite undoctrinal issue of the *régale*, which temporarily allied the king and the Gallican bishops. The schismatic movement, however, quickly collapsed, since Louis had been playing for a limited objective and was thoroughly averse to heading a schismatic and potentially anti-monarchic church. There is no reason to think that Jansenist defiance could ever have had a greater effect.

Historical comparison can be valuable, but it is always dangerous—history is so annoyingly specific. I have argued that Professor Brzezinski's analogies and inferences are based on some serious misconceptions of the situations that he discusses. I have not commented on some incidental errors, not crucial to his theses.

EWART LEWIS

berlin, Ohio

ON METHOD, ANALOGY, AND DETERMINISM

To The Editor:

Much, if not all, of the disagreement between Mrs. Lewis and myself involves ways of looking at the world, of approach and method. She is concerned with making certain that the immensely complex pattern of reality is not distorted or oversimplified by theoretical analysis. I am concerned lest this admittedly complex reality does not obstruct entirely any theoretical analysis or suggestive generalizations.

Thus in comparing the Church and the Party it is not sufficient merely to list a series of factual parallels or differences. It is also essential to compare the two organizations in terms of their dynamic relationship to the world around them, the degree of homogeneity and doctrinal commitment relative to that world in different times, and not just one organization with the other. In this connection, two simple definitions are in order: "Analogy: A relation of likeness *between* two things or *of* one thing *to* or *with* another, consisting in the resemblance not of the things themselves but of two or more attributes, circumstances, or effects"; "Identity: Sameness of essential character. Sameness in all that constitutes the objective reality of a thing; self-sameness; oneness." (*Webster Collegiate Dictionary*, 1946, italics in original.)

Mrs. Lewis' comments, sometimes quite acute, might have been a great deal more relevant had she been more observant of these distinctions. Unfortunately, she did not. Thus much of her effort to prove that the Catholic Church is not the Communist Party is superfluous. I agree that it is not. However, to prove that it is not (*i.e.*, non-identity) is not to prove that there are no pertinent resemblances in orientation, function and organization (*i.e.*, analogy). To assert simply that there were, and are, significant differences, or that the Church's "conception" of unity "has never . . . been the same" as for the Party, or that the Papacy did not have the same power as Stalin, is to suggest that the only basis for making comparisons is a complete identity in experience and behavior, which is simply bad logic for then there would be nothing to compare.

Furthermore, my purpose was not merely to describe a certain similarity in events or patterns although I am pleased that Mrs. Lewis' delightfully specific historical treatise does not shake the factual basis of my effort. I was concerned with attempting some generalizations concerning deviation-control on the basis of the analogous organizational experience of two international, doctrinal movements which are "action-oriented." Mrs. Lewis, in her effort to demonstrate what appeared to me to be obvious differences between the Church and the Communist Party, may or may not be right when she states categorically that the Church conceived its "goal as . . . inherently uncoercible" but the fact is that coercion was used; and it was with organizational behavior, and its consequences, that I was concerned. It is also quite true that in the time under discussion the Church was not actively engaged in proselytization. I did not say it was. However, it did before and after the period under discussion; at a certain stage the Communist movement also was not actively proselytizing or expanding. That, however, does not prove that either movement is not "inherently committed to proselytization" and *extra ecclesiam, nulla salus* was taken literally for a long time, with certain operational consequences. (Incidentally, Mrs. Lewis' description of the inner decay of the Church on the eve of the unity-crisis bears striking resemblance—I hope she will forgive me—to the inner corruption of the Kremlin in the years 1945–1948, so well described by Djilas in his recent *Conversations with Stalin.*)

Her defense of the Inquisition as an instrument of "reforming piety" is quaint although not central to the issue at hand. (From the point of view of the orthodox Stalinist, the purge was also a "reforming" instrument of purification.) However, even her generous version of it does not contradict the proposition that its effect was the dogmatization of the movement and centripetal political pressure. Furthermore, in her effort to depict the late-medieval Church as a pluralist, tolerant community of prayerful pacifists practising "open debate and unresolved disagreement," Mrs. Lewis ignores such minor details as the burning of John Huss and Jerome of Prague by the Council of Constance or the little military expedition led by Cardinal Cesarini, the Papal legate, to suppress the deviants in Bohemia. Nor were the Crusades as anachronistic to Papal Power as she alleges; as late as 1459 Pius II organized a Congress of European princes in order to prepare one.

Mrs. Lewis is somewhat too hasty in alleging that I consider the factors which made for the growth of Papal power to be the factors of power available to the Papacy for dealing with Luther. They were not. In the course of a very brief summary I had no intention of exploring all the ramifications of the relationship between the Papacy and Luther—as I also did not when dealing with the Stalin-Tito conflict. Instead, I wished to point to certain specific errors of judgment in the center's handling of the crisis. That Luther was not taken seriously in the beginning is quite true but it is not much of an argument. Neither was Tito—but so what? Her subsequent comments, designed to demonstrate that other means also would not have been very effective (although she does find the thought of assassinating Luther "enchanting"!) strongly imply that the Reformation was inevitable, *irrespective of what the Papacy did* with regard to Luther. Contrary to this rigid notion, H. Jedin in his authoritative *A History of the Council of Trent* indicates clearly that errors in handling Luther were of some importance. I suppose a determinist could argue that National Communism was inevitable, irrespective of Stalin's handling of Tito. Determinists have always the advantage of arguing backwards from events which did happen, but that does not necessarily establish the true causes of the events or the degree of probability of alternatives.

Contrary to Mrs. Lewis, the Luther case was "the first major crisis of unity" which the Church, as the type of doctrinal, *international* organization defined in my paper, had faced. So was Tito with respect to the Communist movement, irrespective of Trotsky, Bukharin, the Mensheviks, etc. Conceding Mrs. Lewis' superior knowledge of medieval history (which with justification she explicitly stresses) I am not unaware of Arianism, the East-West schism, etc. My point is that both Christianity and Communism have experienced organizational transformations in relationship to new forms of social-political organization as well as their own expansion.

Lastly, Mrs. Lewis' argument that the Church was more effective against Jansenism because it "had successfully remodeled and tightened its organization . . . clarified many of its doctrines, developed new techniques of control and persuasion . . . " etc., simply elaborates some of my own points. (Mrs. Lewis describes these as "ecclesiastical equivalents to, e.g., the Dennis Case, NATO, the Common Market, and The Ford Foundation." Might we have avoided our disagreement had I used the word "equivalent" instead of analogy?) The Church had learned its lesson, it became more effective, finally it succeeded. However, here too, Mrs. Lewis falls victim to a propensity to substitute determinism for explanation. Thus in a curious contradiction to her perfectly sound and apt observations cited above, Mrs. Lewis concludes by flatly asserting that "There is no reason to think that Jansenist defiance could ever have had a greater effect." Either her first point quoted above is quite irrelevant or her second quote is quite untrue.

To sum up: Mrs. Lewis' criticism suffers from a confusion of analogy with identity which makes it difficult for her to understand a comparative study; from a consequent misunderstanding of my purpose, which was to generalize some principles of deviation-control and not merely to establish factually descriptive symmetry; and from implicit determinism.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
Columbia University

TO THE EDITOR:

I agree with Professor Brzezinski that the difference between us is partly one of approach and method. But may I restate that difference? There are of course no identities in history; but I would argue that cause-and-effect conclusions drawn from a comparison of non-identical historical situations can be safely made only if one examines, for each instance, the differences as carefully as the resemblances. How otherwise can one know whether the differences were not crucial to the outcome? And if one does not examine equally the context of differences, how can one be sure that what appear to be similarities are really similar?—My position is certainly "determinist," in the sense that I am accustomed to think that historical processes are determined by the interplay of many factors, and that I can conceive of no way to establish what might have been the effect of changing any single factor except through examing its role in relation to the whole situational context. I consider it debatable whether a different tactic toward Luther could have averted the Protestant Reformation; I see no reason to believe that Jansenism, however defiant, could ever have induced the splitting off of the French church; but I think that the burden of proof is on Professor Brzezinski, and that he has failed to shoulder it.

But our difference is also, I think, a dispute on questions of fact; we apparently disagree widely as to the *analogies* between the Church and the Party "in terms of their dynamic relationship to the world around them, the degree of homogeneity and doctrinal commitment relative to that world," in the periods under consideration. It was, I thought, precisely from this viewpoint that I criticized Professor Brzezinski's opinions about the state of the Church on the eve of the Reformation; and an assessment of "the dynamic relationship" of the seventeenth-century Church "to the world around it" seems to me rather significantly affected by our differences of opinion as to whether it was still "seeking new formulae for doctrinal and organizational unity" or had already found them; whether its post-Reformation adjustments had tended toward less or greater doctrinal rigidity; and what was the actual posture of "the most influential Catholic monarchy in Europe."

Two specific points in his reply require some comment. I apologize to him for having misinterpreted his phrase, "its first major crisis of unity." His assumption that the stages of Church and Party history can be made comparable through the use of extremely different time-scales confused me; and, since the Church had been, in many important respects, "a composite of nationally-based units" ever since the break-up of the Roman Empire and the conversion of the barbarian kingdoms, I failed—and still fail—to understand where in its history Professor Brzezinski locates an "internationalization" of the Church that both corresponds to the Party's conquests of the states of Central Europe and also enables him to define the case of Luther as a subsequent "first." Second, without any wish to "defend" the Spanish Inquisition, to discover "pacifists" in the pre-Reformation Church, or to ignore the burning of Huss and the Cesarini expedition, I continue to wonder just how "the power of the center" had been increased by applications of violence that were made by an institution it could not control, were guided by purposes distinct from its own, and that failed to accomplish their intention. The effective "pluralism" of the structure of power in the pre-Reformation Church, the comparative doctrinal tolerance of the Renaissance papacy, and the conspicuous existence of "open debate and unresolved disagreement" are, I believe, commonly recognized features of the Church of this period; it cost me no "effort" to state them.

EWART LEWIS

Oberlin, Ohio

TO THE EDITOR:

While Mrs. Lewis is right that the issue is primarily one of method, her argument that it is incumbent upon me to examine all the similarities and all the differences between the medieval Church and the Communist movement before generalizing about deviation-control is absurd. That she really does not mean it is shown in her listing of several "ecclesiastical equivalents to NATO, the Ford Foundation, etc." without once troubling to point out certain obvious differences. Her request is tantamount to requiring every medical researcher engaged in cancer research on mice for the purpose of discovering a cure for human cancer to qualify any findings by a statement that he realizes that a mouse is not a man, certain organic similarities apart.

For her flat assertion that Lutheranism had to come and Jansenism had to fail, her only argument is the deterministic one that this is how it turned out. My point was to suggest that methods used in handling these crises had some bearing on their outcome. Whether they might have succeeded in preventing a rupture is a matter of speculative judgment, and the demand for "proof" is simply unrealistic.

On the "internationalization" of the Church, my point was and is that this process was connected with the emergence of effective, homogenous political units with a sense of national identity. Her dating of this process is wrong. Finally, the center's power was both expressed and then maximized by initiatives such as the attempted crusade or the Cesarini expedition, a cumulative process, involving the dynamic interaction of the right to initiative and the consequences of such initiative, quite familiar to students of political power. The reader can judge whether her description of the pre-Reformation Church as tolerant of "open debate and unresolved disagreement," and her reference to the burning of Huss and to the Cesarini expedition against deviants are compatible.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Columbia University

REJOINDER TO CROPSEY

TO THE EDITOR:

Cropsey in his reply to my article (in the June issue, pp. 353–359) argues that in order to make my case I must refute certain of Strauss's assertions as to the implications of positivism and historicism, *viz.*, that positivism leads logically to historicism and that both positivism and historicism are vitiated by the application of each to itself. This, of course, is neatly to shift the burden of proof. I was only required to demonstrate that Strauss had not made his case. Cropsey deals with my argument concerning the relation between positivism and historicism by ignoring it. However, later in his essay he asserts that I admit the historicist implications of positivism because I refuse to argue that science itself is "more worthy than other pursuits." (p. 356) I still reply, as, indeed, I wrote in my original essay: it is not a contradiction to assert that the method of science is the only way in which to discover truth, and at the same time to recognize that there is nothing in the structure of the universe which justifies acquiring knowledge.[1]

Cropsey also rejects my characterization of Strauss's efforts as an attempt to fuse normative and descriptive judgments. I may misunderstand both Strauss and him here, but the following observations seem in order:

A. The proposition that one cannot describe without evaluating must mean, it seems to me, one of two things. Either it is psychologically impossible to do so, or, given the structure of reality, it is logically impossible to do so. Since, I gather, Strauss is not making a psychological case, he must be developing an ontological argument. To me such an argument involves the fusion by which I characterized it.

B. It is true that Strauss (as I indicated in my original essay) qualifies his argument by the word "important." Again, however, it seems to me that only two alternatives exist. Either it is possible to describe social phenomena without evaluating or it is not. Certainly Strauss offers us no coherent reason for limiting his claim to "important" phenomena only.

C. In his rejoinder Cropsey characterizes Strauss's position as simply that " . . . judgments of value are not to be excluded from the class of judgments as to fact, and that such judgments as to value cannot be excised from social science without sterilizing it." This argument seems to constitute a retreat from Strauss's original position. However, it does not strengthen his argument, for if judgments of fact and judgments of value are indeed different, although of the same class, it is not impossible on the face of it to make important judgments of fact without making judgments of value.[2]

Cropsey, incidentally, reverses my charge against Strauss and accuses me of confusing moral with other value judgments. Readers can verify this for themselves, but it still seems to me that when Strauss offers as examples of evaluation the terms "noble" and "base" and "prudent" and "imprudent," without distinguishing between them, in an attempt to prove the "objectivity" of value judgments, he is involved in a confusion of some sort.

Next, and most important, Cropsey denies that Strauss has shifted his position as to the dependence of natural right upon classical cosmology. (He does not, incidentally, deny my point as to Strauss's shift from Hobbes to Machiavelli.) His argument here is in two parts. First, he asserts that, in the passage I quote from *Natural Right and History*, Strauss is merely stating the conventional position, a position which his writing transcends. Second, Cropsey offers some positive arguments to demonstrate that, in fact, natural right is not dependent upon classical physics or classical cosmology.

As to the first, the passage I quoted from Strauss concludes as follows:

> The fundamental dilemma, in whose grip we are, is caused by the victory of modern natural science. An adequate solution to the problem of natural right cannot be found before this basic problem has been solved.
>
> Needless to say, the present lectures cannot deal with this problem. They will have to be limited to that aspect of the problem of natural right which can be clarified within the confines of the social sciences.[3]

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[1] Because I argue that the direction of a scientist's efforts may be determined by his interests or commitments, Cropsey builds up a fanciful case, whereby I am supposed to mistake Nagel's critique of Weber for his critique of Strauss and at the same time really to take Weber's position. Since any comparison of my position with Nagel's will reveal that the two are almost exactly the same, I can be confused on this point only if Nagel is. And the remarks made are only irrelevant to a rounded discussion of the relationship between science and values if one assumes the correctness of Cropsey's position. Compare p. 344 of my essay with pp. 486–7 of N. Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York, 1961).

[2] It is conceivable that Strauss and Cropsey are merely asserting that social scientists are forced to make judgments of significance. I considered this possibility while writing my original essay but rejected it because, frankly, I regarded such an argument as essentially trivial. No reputable social scientist in the empirical tradition would deny the point, but to use the term "value judgment" so broadly as to include under one rubric both these kinds of judgments and moral judgments proper is to prove one's case by definition and to obscure the issues involved. Particular judgments of significance are compatible with a variety of value systems, as is evidenced by the fact that many people who agree as to the relevant facts still disagree as to which course of action is morally correct in a given situation.

[3] Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (*NRH*) (Chicago, 1952), p. 8.

I defy any reasonable man to take these words as a summary of the views of others.

One can find additional support for my analysis on pages 78–9, 166, and 172 of *Natural Right and History*, but I should like, at this point, to quote from a review which Strauss wrote for *Social Research* somewhat earlier (in 1946) and which is reprinted in *What Is Political Philosophy?* (pp. 284–286). The review is of Anton C. Pegis (ed.), *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Strauss criticizes Pegis's introduction to the volume as follows:

> An introduction to the work of Thomas must point the way toward overcoming the typical present-day obstacles which prevent its genuine understanding. These obstacles are the two forces that dominate all present-day thought—science and history. With regard to science Pegis simply capitulates; he grants that there is "much bad science" in Thomas, yet he holds that this does not affect the value of his philosophy. Can one as easily as that get rid of the enormous difficulty presented by the inseparable connection between Thomas' physics and his natural theology? It would have been more fruitful to indicate why and how far the questions raised by Thomist, or Aristotelian, physics retain their full significance regardless of any progress that modern science has achieved by raising questions of an entirely different type.[4]

The passage speaks for itself.

As to the second, Cropsey offers two arguments designed to demonstrate that the natural right position does not depend upon classical physics. In the first he tells us that the natural is good essentially because it simply makes sense to call each thing "excellent" "in the degree to which it can do the things for which its species is naturally equipped." (p. 356) It follows from this that, since man is most naturally defined in terms of reason, both his natural end and his "excellence" are to be defined in these terms.

Of course, most contemporary empiricists would agree that it makes sense to characterize man (in contradistinction to other animals) by his ability to reason. Cropsey's statement of the classical position, then, does not differentiate it clearly from the modern.

The real differences between the classical (and I assume Strauss's) and the modern positions lie (1) in the analysis of what is meant by the word reason, and (2) in the implications of the classification. A definition of man as a reasoning animal does not logically entail the assumption of one "natural end" as against any other unless it can be demonstrated that it is *impossible* to say anything meaningful about men except in terms of the "natural end" or standard which is accepted. (One can, for example, agree as to the uniqueness of the capacity to reason and argue for an aesthetic life or a life dedicated to the acquisition of power.) I am convinced that Strauss recognizes this, and that his attack on what he calls the reductionism of modern science, and his insistence that neither man nor society can be understood except in terms of its "end," is based on this recognition.

Strauss can demonstrate this assertion in either one of two ways. Either he can argue that contemporary science, contrary to conventional belief, is teleological, or he can argue that while other natural objects can be analyzed non-teleologically man to be understood, *must* be examined in terms of a "natural end." Strauss does not attempt the first task, and, in fact, Cropsey now denies that he has to do so. The second involves tremendous difficulties, for somehow one must demonstrate that in some decisive way man is different from other natural objects. All that Strauss ever offers us here are remarks about man's reason and conscience. But both "reason" and "conscience" can be dealt with by a social science which (broadly) takes it s bearings from natural science.

The second argument involves an attempt by Cropsey to justify understanding provided by "the light of nature." This argument also involves an attack upon the verification principle. The statement that propositions must be capable of empirical verification to be meaningful, Cropsey argues, is not itself an empirical proposition, but rests on certain assumptions. He then suggests "intelligibility" as a criterion for knowledge and offers the example of the "unmoved mover." Cropsey is, of course, careful to disassociate himself from the example which means, presumably, that he cannot be held responsible for it. Let us examine the position and the example anyway.

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[4] It is true that at one place in *NRH* (not the passage Cropsey cites, but rather a passage on p. 94) Strauss does imply that classic natural right may not be logically related to classical cosmology. However, given the other evidence, all we can assume from this is that Strauss was of two minds on the question. I should say here that in summarizing Strauss's historical discussion I have, in one sense, been unfair. As far as I can determine Strauss's presentation of the views of the classics is in itself a demonstration of the reasonableness of these views, just as the use of the dialogue form in Plato's *Republic* is, through the example of Socrates, a demonstration of the virtues of philosophy. My failure to summarize the classics (as Strauss views them) in more detail is based on my conviction that no matter how reasonable some of these views seem, the systematic issues are paramount.

Incidentally, Cropsey's remarks as to the relevance of indeterminism (his statement of the principle is incorrect or at least one-sided) to a full discussion of the implications of contemporary physics do not, then, touch on the issues involved.

The assertion that knowledge must be related to observation is much more compelling than any particular empirical proposition. It is implicit in the very definition of knowledge itself. Unless we insist upon this assumption there is no conceivable way of differentiating fact from fantasy, of differentiating "intelligible" little green devils from "intelligible" automobiles. The requirement does not rule out propositions which, it is claimed, may constitute a *necessary* base for any particular set of statements or, indeed, for all of science. Unfortunately these tend, on the whole, to be extremely difficult to handle in any meaningful way. The assumption of an unmoved mover is neither more nor less self-contradictory than the assumption of a universe infinite in time and space, and neither of these (except for some comforting anthropomorphic elements in the first) is more or less contradictory than the assumption that the universe is its own unmoved mover.[5]

Finally, in my essay I argued that while Strauss cites America as the only country founded on the basis of an anti-Machiavellian tradition, the whole thrust of his analysis is to the effect that the American tradition is based on Locke, and, hence, represents "respectable" Machiavellianism. Cropsey's reply cites Strauss's chapter on Rousseau in *Natural Right and History* to prove that this interpretation is incorrect. However, there is no evidence in Strauss's writing that he regards Rousseau as having exercised any significant influence on the American experience. Thus, Cropsey's rejoinder is clearly irrelevant. Further, since Rousseau is regarded by Strauss as the source of modern totalitarianism, his remarks actually suggest that Strauss's critique of American values may be even more fundamental than I originally contended.

Just one minor point. Cropsey argues that my characterization of scientists as being motivated by their commitments and interests "incriminates" scientists and social scientists. His point is that by interest I must mean "self-interest." In my use of the term I was thinking primarily of "curiosity," but I accept Cropsey's expansion of it. Only a very sanctimonious person would refuse to admit that scientists and social scientists are motivated, in part, by the desire for professional advancement and recognition, or even by the feeling of power which comes from mastering an element of reality. It is indeed a bloodless morality which denies a role to legitimate self-interest of this type.

STANLEY ROTHMAN

Smith College

TO THE EDITOR:

The exchange between Professors Rothman and Cropsey on "The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy" (June, 1962) turns in one important instance on the well known remarks of Professor Leo Strauss at pp. 7–8 of his *Natural Right and History*. There Strauss speaks of the "victory," not the successes, of modern natural science. This victory "would seem to have" destroyed the teleological view of the universe, "of which the teleological view of man forms a part." The victory, in turn, poses a "fundamental dilemma": on the one hand men today can accept both a non-teleological moral doctrine and a non-teleological science, or they can accept a teleological moral doctrine and a non-teleological science.

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[5] Cropsey asserts that the verification principle rests on the assumption that "to be is to be sensible," and suggests as an alternative the assumption that "to be is to be intelligible." If I understand him correctly the following remarks are in order: First, the statement is simply not true. One may accept the *possibility* of the existence of objects which, by definition, cannot be "sensed," and still argue that we can only have *legitimate* knowledge of that which can in some way be related to sense experience. Second, the statement is inaccurate. The principle should be stated as: "to be is to be sensible or capable of being related to things sensed in certain determinate ways." Scientists believed in the existence of atoms before they had observed them or even were sure they could be observed. Third, the dichotomy is a false one. Contemporary empiricists would agree that "to be is to be intelligible," *i.e.*, capable of being related to a general body of knowledge and explained in terms of general scientific laws. The real difference between Cropsey and me lies in our views as to what constitutes "intelligibility." To the contemporary definition, Cropsey would add understanding in terms of some "end" or "essence." The statement "to be is to be intelligible" in Cropsey's terms requires the existence of such essences or ends.

Here—and this is the only instance if I may say so—I have some sympathy for Professor Rothman. This is not the best example of Strauss's clarity nor is there anything "perfectly obvious" about the position he adopts. Cropsey might better honor his mentor by acknowledging that the latter's work is not free of difficulties. And whether Cropsey would want to say so or not, I should venture to suggest that these difficulties stem essentially from the fact that Strauss has not worked out a metaphysics for himself. Indeed, this is the fundamental distinction between him and the "Thomists."

Finally, Cropsey should be aware that "Thomists" (they are not Straussians, after all) do not find themselves impaled on the "teleological moral doctrine"—"non-teleological science" horns of Strauss's dilemma. The exclusion of finality from the considerations of modern science is a "methodological requirement" of modern science—the necessary consequence of its empirico-logical structure. What is settled about the reality of final cause by the silence of the natural sciences? This silence points to the relationship between metaphysics and the modern sciences and to the resolution of the "dilemma."

JAMES M. ROHERTY

Mount Mary College

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Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–1961; *Hsieh,* Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era; *Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar.* The Sino-Soviet Dispute. H. ARTHUR STEINER 688

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–1961. By Donald S. Zagoria. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 484. $8.50.)

Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era. By Alice Langley Hsieh. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. xx, 204. $4.50 (Cloth); $2.25 (Paper.)

The Sino-Soviet Dispute. Documented and Analyzed by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. ix, 227. $5.00.)

Mr. Zagoria's analysis of the Sino-Soviet conflict is the product of a heavily documented effort to break the private code the antagonists employ in their open communications with each other and thus pin-point the specific issues around which the controversy revolves. He demonstrates that the conflict is a deep-seated and real one—not an elaborate fiction, as some have argued—which "became acute in recent years because some basic potentialities for conflict were brought to life by a series of developments within and without the Communist world to which Moscow and Peking had different answers and different needs." While believing that the causes of dispute cannot be eliminated by paper settlements, Zagoria holds "that Communist China and Communist Russia have much more in common with each other than with the Western world," and hence "that there are rational limits to the conflict between them" that operate to prevent a definitive rupture of their relations.

He finds the "seeds of conflict," as distinguished from basic causes or potentialities, in the 1956–1957 debate over de-Stalinization and in what he takes to be a "swing to the Left" in Peking begun in June 1957. Somewhat out of time sequence, he deals with the controversy over the Chinese people's communes in 1958–1959, seeing in this an exemplification of such "basic factors producing conflict" as the contests over power, economics, the pace of the revolution, and the different ideological perspectives arising from the Sinoization of Marxism-Leninism. He then passes to the origins of the dialogue on intra-bloc relations and global strategy in 1957–1958, as preliminary to explanation of the intensified controversies of 1959–1960, and concludes with an analysis of the Moscow parties' meeting in 1960 and the breach over Albania in 1961.

A secondary purpose of the study is "to demonstrate the value of the Communists' own stream of communications as raw material for penetrating through the dialectical fog to the political calculations and conflicts which lay behind it," although Zagoria concedes that "sometimes . . . the Kremlinologist [defined as "the analyst of Communist communications"] weaves a web of interpretations on too fragmentary evidence." A separate "note on methodology" identifies some ground rules of the occult art of Kremlinological content analysis, and suggests ways in which the incessant search of the "detective-scholar" for "indicators of political significance" leads him to find clues in many improbable places. Zagoria does not squarely face the fact that Kremlinology, instrumental as it may be, is at best an insufficient substitute for first-hand research in such original sources (now generally denied us) as stenographic reports of private meetings, internal communications, etc., as the vehicle for testing and validating hypotheses and assumptions concerning the purposes and motivations of others. Nor does he explain how the Kremlinologist evaluates third-hand journalistic reports, anonymously attributed to "private," "reliable," or "authoritative" sources, concerning the literal textual content of secret communications and conversations (although he appears to rely heavily for several key interpretations on such material from a wide range of papers reaching from *Link* and *Blitz* to *Deutsche Zeitung*, including *Observer* and the *New York Times*). Of course, all scholars who work the Communist beat are compelled to be at least part-time Kremlinologists and share Zagoria's dilemma, but the responsibility for discreet evaluation of sources and for qualifying the most plausible but unverifiable deduction is inescapable.

One of Zagoria's examples of the "polemical tone" of Sino-Soviet communications as one clue available to the Kremlinologist points directly to the problem of translation and raises questions which in a less exacting context might be merely academic. He quotes a sentence from the "Yü Chao-li" article in *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag) of April 1, 1960, from the official NCNA translation as follows: "It is *absolutely impermissible* for us to mistake certain tactical changes on the part of imperialism for changes in the very nature of imperialism." To Zagoria, "the language clearly suggests that someone, and someone in a position of authority, was doing precisely what *Hung Ch'i* said was impermissible. In this case, the 'someone' seemed to be Khrushchev." Various translations are possible, but in the original Chinese the first few words of the sentence ("*Wo-men chüeh pu-neng pa. . . .* ") are constructed in the first person plural, and a more literal translation would read: "We certainly cannot mistake . . . ," a reading which discounts the polemical tone and renders Khrushchev a less likely target. If such "communications" are intended to convey meaning to Khrushchev, it becomes germane to inquire whether his translators have rendered into Russian the punctilious sense of the Chinese original. And, since Khrushchev seldom (if ever) responds by citing chapter and verse, how is the Kremlinologist to be certain that he and Khrushchev have the same appreciation of a particular Chinese "message"?

Zagoria admits that interpretations differing from his own "are sometimes possible," and grants the reader "liberty to make his own judgment" of the significance of the material cited. To this end, he assertedly supplies "a substantial number of extracts from Communist media in part to enable the interested reader to form his own interpretations." At the same time, however, he muffles the warning bell by omitting such qualifying phrases as "the above suggests that," or, "it is likely that", in connection with interpretations where their use would be "appropriate," on the ground that "such qualifiers would soon become tiresome." In such a well-written book as this, where the author carefully pyramids his analyses within a structure characterized by a high degree of internal logical consistency, this policy makes it almost impossible for the reader to exercise a discriminating judgment—unless he happens to have available to him the same total mass of communications that Zagoria has used.

Thus, for example, Mao Tse-tung is represented as going to Moscow in November 1957 to obtain from Khrushchev some assurance that the Soviet Union would actually play a central role of leadership within the bloc and thus suppress the growing "confederal" tendencies to which the Chinese Communists had contributed in their 1956 policy statements. Several problems are involved: one is whether Mao's call of November 6, 1957, to "all socialist countries to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union" was an actual reversal of the previous Chinese policy of emphasizing "the need for genuine discussion rather than *diktat* in resolving differences within the Communist world. . . . " Another is whether the question of solidarity, which received basic emphasis throughout, was to be achieved by the leadership of the Soviet Union other than in the context of intra-bloc discussion which the Chinese seemed consistently to regard as the pre-condition of solidarity. Nearly every Chinese statement on the subject after 1957 mentions "leadership of the Soviet Union" only within the context of "solidarity," for which discussion appeared to be the necessary prerequisite. Chinese statements acknowledging the "central position" of the Soviet Union because of objective factors of size and development sedulously refrain from attributing to the Soviet Union any measure of ideological or moral pre-eminence. If Mao also had in mind to compel Khrushchev to employ advanced Soviet technology, (then only recently revealed), in the interest of a more adventurist revolutionary policy toward the West (as Zagoria persuasively argues), was it logically compatible for the Chinese to argue in support of a stronger assertion of bloc decision-making at a Soviet center, which would deny them and others the capability of challenging the course of policy then and subsequently followed by the Sovient Union? Zagoria structures his material so tightly and logically as to leave the reader with no awareness that alternative interpretations can be supported by a substantial documentation.

Similarly, the reader has no real alternative but to accept Zagoria's interpretation that the asserted change of Chinese attitude in Moscow had been preceded by a leftward swing in Chinese domestic policy after mid-June 1957. He finds the "best evidence for this" in the belated revival in September 1957 of the Chinese 12-year plan for agriculture, leaving the reader to infer from Chou En-lai's dispargement of it in 1956 that the plan had a highly leftist character and, from other statements, that it somehow foreshadowed the "big leap forward" and the commune movement of 1958. The reader is given no hint that the 12-year plan was cast in the mood of the "high tide of socialism" which saw the substantial completion of cooperativization and practical sequestration of private industry and commerce during *1956*, and that it was in largest part concerned with the technical improvement and rationalization of agriculture rather than with suggesting significant revisions of the collective system.

In connection with the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958, Zagoria considers the omission from the Mao-Khrushchev communique of August 3, 1958, of any reference to Taiwan to be highly significant in view of the "liberation" propaganda that had been waged in China in preceding weeks. But the same communique *did* refer to joint consideration by Mao and Khrushchev (accompanied by Malinovsky) of "major questions confronting the two countries in Asia and Europe," and their complete agreement "on measures to be taken to oppose aggression and safeguard peace"—formulations sufficiently broad to include both Quemoy (where Chinese shelling began within three weeks) and Taiwan, and at least capable of being interpreted as part of an arrangement under which a demonstration of Chinese military power against Quemoy would take advantage of the American obsession with the notion that an attack on Quemoy might be the prelude to an attack on Taiwan. Thus, the common Sino-Soviet interest in bringing the American intervention in Lebanon to an end would have been served. A careful reader would have difficulty in visualizing such admissible interpretation on the basis of Zagoria's presentation and data. This is not the place to perform an exercise in counter-Kremlinology on the detailed scale needed to validate the several lines of alternative interpretation not foreclosed by Zagoria's system.

In evaluating Zagoria's massive work on its substantive merit, however, there can be no doubt that he has contributed significantly to the solution of a great political puzzle of our day. Appreciating that Sino-Soviet conflict engages the politics of the entire complex of bloc countries, he probes in depth the core issues of organization, ideology, personality, economy, and political strategy and tactics that are reshaping the entire Communist world. With imaginative craftsmanship, he has pinned down and identified many essential elements of transition in a rapidly changing situation, and much that is to be written on his subject in the near future will probably take the form of postscripts to his present work.

Mrs. Hsieh's *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* is a RAND Corporation study in Hsietanology, if this term—borrowed from the official quarter in Peking—can be taken as a Chinese equivalent to Kremlinology. On the basis of Chinese statements and documents, Mrs. Hsieh concerns herself with the growing Chinese awareness of the effect of nuclear technology on military strategy after 1954, and its consequences for military doctrine and politics in China and on Sino-Soviet relations (including differences over nuclear weapons-sharing, dependence on the Soviet deterrent shield, etc.). In these respects, she explores Chinese materials on this specialized aspect of potential Sino-Soviet conflict more exhaustively than Zagoria, but their basic treatments of military factors in Sino-Soviet relations are not dissimilar. Mrs. Hsieh is much more generous in her qualifications of tentative suppositions, and candidly admits that "the range of considerations accounting for the September 1959 shift in [Chinese] military leadership is far from clear." She tends to equate expressed fears in 1955 of "sudden" or "surprise" attack with fears of "nuclear" attack, when legitimate fears of a sudden or surprise attack by conventional means from Taiwan could have been held following the December 1954 treaty between the KMT and the United States. Similarly, the discussion of the politics of "modernization" of the Chinese army seems to infer some equivalence between modernization with respect to conventional weapons (hardly discussed) and modernization of tactics and equipment in anticipation of some relatively early nuclear weapons-delivery capability. If the textbook by Ch'ao Chung-yao and others on *The Theory and Practice of Atomic Power* (*Yüan-tzu-neng ti yüan-li ho ying-yung*, Peking, 1956) is any reflection of the levels of nuclear information then available to the Chinese military, Mrs. Hsieh may have attributed an undue degree of sophistication to Chinese statements concerning nuclear warfare in the 1955–1956 period. The dilemma of identifying the "political" as against the "professional" characteristics of such a top-ranking military figure as Lin Piao is well illustrated by quotations from him that could be "worked" both ways, but in the end Mrs. Hsieh judges that the military reorganization of 1959 politicized the General Staff (under General Lo Jui-ching) and gave fuller responsibility for modernization to the Ministry of National Defense under Lin Piao. We cannot hold Mrs. Hsieh accountable for resulting difficulties in constructing a military organization chart!

The Sino-Soviet Dispute is a valuable reference collection of documents bearing mainly on the polemical development of that controversy during 1960. Richard Lowenthal's "Diplomacy and Revolution" is the most significant of the short introductory essays, and his views on the Moscow meeting of 1960 are partly incorporated by reference in Zagoria's treatment of the subject.

H. ARTHUR STEINER
University of California (Los Angeles)

Pricing Power and the Public Interest, A Study Based on Steel. BY GARDINER C. MEANS. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962. Pp. xxi, 359. $7.50.)

How can steel companies be induced to forego exorbitant profits, to set prices approximately at the level of the cost of services, and to keep them steady? One tested approach is to beat them with the heavy sticks of public authority, as President Kennedy did in April 1962 to threaten punitive taxes, to divert Government contracts from the offenders to others, to stimulate Congressional investigations, inaugurate criminal prosecutions, and raise the hue and cry on television and in the press. But the unaesthetic disorder and noise of this rout, its lack of grace and subtlety, the risk it courts of costly political reprisals—these are blemishes of procedure that Agamemnon could have had in mind when, in answer to the complaint of Menelaus, "Woe's me! I have no friends," he said, "Not if you slay them." Although it may seem like a piece of bribery to promote the public interest, Gardiner Means has devised a scheme to keep the steel companies from jacking up their prices and doubling their profits. The existing incentive system rewards managers who do both; he would give the bonuses to managers who did neither.

By now the analysis is familiar—and the early work of Mr. Means did much to make it so—that some business is big, although not monopolistic; that giant corporations are under the control of managers who do not own the enterprises they govern; that competition among the few is different from competition among the many; that competition among the few produces administered prices that exceed cost and subsidize social and economic waste; and that this concentration of pricing power is not only not in the public interest—it works actively against it. The experience of the steel industry since the end of the Second World War is, for the author, a Baedeker of bad practise. Until 1953, he says, price rises in the industry were commensurate with economic change, and were economically justified; but increases between 1953 and 1959 doubled profits from an average of 8% on investment to an average of 16% on investment, and they were not economically justified. The unwarranted increase in the price of steel contributed to the inflation of those years, and helped to create that sad travesty of upside-down economics—a recession (two of them) and inflation at the same time.

Now there is no bar in law or government against high profits in steel. Although economic urgency will, in a general way, control the most egregious forms of managerial cupidity, the decisions of steel managers about price enjoy a considerable immunity from quick and drastic economic retribution. That is to say, in a system of administered prices, the discretionary margin within which levels may be set is broader than it is in more extensively competitive enterprises. In the area of enterprise that Mr. Means calls "administered competition," the constraints of the market simply do not operate as they are supposed to when there is a multiplicity of small sellers and buyers, no one of whom is able by his entry or exit, to influence the price. Big steel has all the privileges of a free market without its discipline.

But because it is in the free sector of the economy, steel is also exempt from the regulation that Government imposes upon monopolies or near monopolies, the object of which is to do by rule what the interaction of thousands of enterprisers does in the classical theory, namely, keep prices somewhere near costs. In sum, it is characteristic of the "gray area" enterprises that they are neither monopolistic nor free, and that they enjoy some of the reputation of the second while they reap some of the advantages of the first.

Borrowing a rejected phrase from the literature of the law, Mr. Means thinks of these businesses as characteristically "affected with a public interest." The original formulation of this concept by Chief Justice Waite was intended to make valid certain forms of direct price control by the Government. Mr Means does not go so far. In another characterization, he describes the "gray area" firms as "collective enterprises," and he advocates legislation to establish a procedure for so designating them. The corporations to be defined as "collective enterprises" would be those showing "the existence of unregulated pricing power of sufficient magnitude to affect the corporation with a substantial public interest." In the steel industry, these might be the top eight firms, and would certainly be the top three—United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and the Republic Steel Corporation.

For the collective enterprises, measures of "economic performance" would then be devised, presumably by private management engineering firms, although this is not clear: standards which, if met, would realize the classical ideal of the well-tempered economy—the optimum use of resources in the satisfaction of wants. Once these gauges of performance were established, top managers who met the specifications would be given a bonus which, sweetened by certain adjustments in the tax laws (it would be taxed as capital gains, not income, for example), would surpass the net now allowed, and thus increase the incomes possible to the principal company officials. They would receive less than the most for overshooting or under-shooting their targets of performance. Optimum economic performance would presumably be assured or, at least, made more likely by this manipulation of economic incentives.

The place of the great corporations in the American society has been a concern of economists and sociologists for some time, but the subject has not attracted the attention of many political scientists. It should be a matter of central interest, inasmuch as the corporation in its internal governance and in its relations with society presents all of the familiar issues of political theory. And in the relations of the corporations with other elements of the economy and with the Government, there is much material to support empirical investigation into the behavior of power holders. What Means—like other commentators whose interest is not politics—tries to develop in default of work by political scientists is a political theory of monopoly power. How should we deal with these concentrations of private power in a democratic system? Galbraith says that other private powers will arise to countervail them. Mills says that they are already irrecoverably out of control. Berle thinks that the welfare of the society can be entrusted to the consciences of corporate commanders. Means would like to purchase their consent.

It would enrich understanding of the problem of the giant corporation in a democracy—it would enrich understanding of the specific proposals made by Mr. Means—if the insights of political science could be brought to bear. This would be true not only for the treatment of great themes of power and authority but for more modest matters of political practise and procedure. The author's proposal that Congress pass an Economic Performance Act, for example, seems a little unreal. He does not consider the necessary political circumstances under which Congress might consent to the characterization of big businesses as "collective enterprises," subject to unusual controls, but the prospect is probably not near. The political difficulties he slights could make the difference between the program he proposes and the pastiche he would get (if anything) from the traditional defenders of the "American way."

But if political experience has lessons for the author, it may also have lessons for the steel companies and other leviathans of enterprise who can make the economic deep "to boil like a pot." If they are to continue to enjoy extraordinary freedom from public control, they will have to conform, by private choice, their behavior to the standard that public authority may one day enforce. Or—to put the matter as it appears in *The Leopard*—"If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change."

EARL LATHAM

Amherst College

Changing Patterns of Military Politics. EDITED BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON (Volume 3, International Year Book of Political Behavior Research. The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. 272. $7.50.)

Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military. EDITED BY HARRY L. COLES. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962. Pp. 300. $7.00.)

These volumes are most welcome contributions to a field in which scholarly interest and systematic analysis has badly lagged behind public involvement. The subject matter encompassed by the designation "military politics" is vast—as indicated by the excellent bibliographical essay by Huntington in the volume he has edited—and the proliferation of topics discussed in these two symposia greatly complicate the task of a reviewer. It is impossible within the space available here to do justice even to the most important contributions—let alone twenty-one essays. The authors' interests ranged from lofty theories to detailed case studies, from civil-military relations in classical antiquity to the present time, in Western as well as non-Western countries. As Huntington put it disarmingly in his introduction to *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, a symposium of this sort is particularly vulnerable to the charge that it lacks unity and focus. But in that respect, it simply reflects the contemporary state of academic research on civil-military relations. Along with quite a number of theoretical models we have at present numerous case studies of varying quality. What seems missing is the link between the vast generalizations and the detailed investigations, as well as a more explicit distinction between normative and scientific analysis.

Changing Patterns of Military Politics includes three theoretical studies by Huntington, Lasswell and Rapoport which may provoke and even irritate, but never bore the reader. Huntington's stimulating discourse on "Patterns of Violence in World Politics" holds that the locus of violence in the world arena has shifted in recent years from the interstate to the intrastate level, particularly in the developing areas. Most important among contemporary forms of interstate violence seem to him revolutionary war and the reform coup d'état. The former he describes as essentially struggle between a ruling elite and a counter-elite, divorced from the existing political system, for support of a communal or socio-economic group that is more or less alienated from the existing political system. The reform coup, unlike the governmental coup—or palace revolution—and the revolutionary coup, Huntington perceives "as a healthy mechanism of gradual change, the nonconstitutional equivalent of periodic changes in party control through the electoral process." Based in part on what seem somewhat dubious analogies and assumptions, Huntington's major hypotheses deserve to be subjected to careful empirical testing so that the field may gain maximum profit from his challenging propositions.

In contrast to Huntington's essay, Harold Lasswell's "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today" advances a number of propositions which defy any efforts toward empirical validation. Brilliantly argued, like the original hypothesis of 1937 and 1941, the thesis "that the arena of world politics is moving toward the domination of the specialists in violence" seems to be based on the normative culture-bound impressions of an American liberal rather than the careful observations of a social scientist. Essentially, Lasswell's "developmental construct," then as now, seems to belong in the realm of moral philosophy rather than political theory. His essay sounds dire warnings about the future of civil-military relations in the United States in terms of traditional liberal democratic norms. The garrison state hypothesis provides for Lasswell the probable image of the future of our epoch and the only hope he holds out to us is that it may be possible "to civilianize a garrisoning world, thereby cultivating the conditions for its eventual dissolution."

One man's garrison state is another's school for citizenship, as David Rapoport's "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types" makes clear. According to his threefold typology, in the "Praetorian State" the military maintains the rule of a wealthy oligarchy over an impoverished population, in the "Civilian-and-Military Polity" it supports the nation's foreign policies, and in the "Nation-in-Arms" it provides the principal civic bond for the entire polity. "The dominant ethic of a nation-in-arms is public service—*virtu*—and it is best expressed in military duty," we are told. Sparta, in classical antiquity and Switzerland and Israel in modern times are cited as cases in point and the nation-in-arms is offered as "an ideal model for those interested in 'remaking' praetorian countries" today. Rapoport's categories seem practically useless for analytical purposes. Most developed countries are classed under the civilian-and-military type and underdeveloped nations under the praetorian type. Only little Israel and Switzerland qualify, according to Rapoport, as nation-in-arms, and his evidence here is not very convincing. While Lasswell sees the Garrison State as highly undesirable, but well nigh inevitable, Rapoport perceives the nation-in-arms as desirable but highly unlikely in most of the countries of the world.

Four case studies complete the volume edited by Huntington. Laurence Radway provides an analysis of the NATO Defense College. Philip Abrams considers recent efforts to make the British military establishment more "democratic" as well as professional, and Martha Derthick examines the politics of the national guard as a lobby in the missile age. Raoul Giradet, recently arrested for complicity in an attempt to assassinate President deGaulle, offers an enlightening presentation of the principles of the more sophisticated O.A.S. supporters in the French army. It should be read in conjunction with Richard Challener's contribution to the Coles volume on the role of the French military in the destruction of the Third Republic.

Total War and Cold War is more modest in both size and content, though scarcely cheaper, than the Huntington symposium. The eleven essays have a certain common focus, given by the theme of the 1959 conference on civil-military relations at Ohio State University, for which all but one were originally prepared. The useful introduction by the editor further underscores—and somewhat exaggerates—the basic unity in approach and plainly states that most of the essays are concerned with the "positive and constructive approach to civil-military relations" which holds that "the real problem . . . is not so much to recover the principle of political primacy as to modify and adapt it to present-day circumstances." In this respect, "political control of the military" is declared to be "little different" from "scientists, civil servants, and other technical types." With the exception of Hinton's essay on Communist China, all the contributions are concerned with civil-military relations in "advanced, industrial societies characterized by a fairly high degree of internal stability and of professionalism of their military." These are quite different and not comparable to civil-military relations in underdeveloped areas, according to the editor, and the latter countries were, therefore, arbitrarily excluded from consideration.

Given these restrictions, the authors tend to concentrate on the efficacy, nature, and extent of civilian control over the military in peace and war, in liberal democracies and in totalitarian dictatorships, in the past and in the present. A number of the papers have appeared previously in one form or another or elaborate merely on points which their authors have stated in earlier publications. While most of them add little that is new, they provide useful overviews of civil-military relations in Britian, Nazi Germany, France, the Soviet Union and China, and the United States which should be read in close conjunction with the essays in the Huntington volume.

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Michigan State University

Civil Liberties and the Constitution. BY PAUL G. KAUPER. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 237. $6.00.)

In 1961 Professor Paul G. Kauper delivered to the Special Summer School for Lawyers held at the University of Michigan Law School a series of lectures designed to illuminate the "critical areas in current constitutional development." Now fortunately in print, they are worthy of a detailed reading by all serious students of constitutional law. Although the lectures, by Kauper's own admission, are not exhaustive, they are sharply analytical and keenly perceptive in differentiating the subtle distinctions which the Supreme Court has made and continues to make as it attempts to strike a balance between conservation and creativity in the law. Each new term brings to the Court a rash of cases in the broad area of personal rights and liberties, and the Court must make such delicate choices that the logic of one alternative over another rarely points to a clear and unencumbered path.

In his first essay the author discusses the American concept of separation of church and state which he describes as symbolic but not very relevant to the American scene. Our plurality of states and churches makes the phrase legally meaningless, constitutionally indefinite, and useful only for conveying the twin ideas of the religion clause of the First Amendment. Kauper observes correctly that the truly important questions today arise not from any formal confusion of traditional church-state functions but from the practical problems arising out of their interrelationships. Very often the church and the state have identical interests and occasionally they exercise similar functions concurrently. After a careful discussion of governmental practices and Supreme Court decisions, Kauper concludes that the government can constitutionally aid such church-supported functions as hospitals, schools, and help for the aged and the needy. As a result of a growing secularization the state is merely taking over what was once a virtual church monopoly and the government now supports the *function,* not the religious institution. Kauper argues that since parochial schools serve a recognized public purpose they may be governmentally aided so long as the assistance is not identified with religious instruction.

In his discussion of recent decisions on obscenity the author concludes that the Court's use of the term "prurient" as a constitutional standard for determining obscenity is no substantial advance over the term "obscene" and that further clarifying opinions are needed. In any event the contemporary moral sense of the community as interpreted by jury or judge is what determines finally whether a book is obscene. Professor Kauper registers mild approval of Justice Harlan's (and the late Justice Jackson's) thesis that the Court ought to distinguish between the First Amendment as a direct limitation on Congress and its inclusion in the Due Process Clause as an indirect limitation on the states, with the latter being somewhat less restrictive and permitting the states a latitude under the police power that would be denied Congress because of the First Amendment. Of course, the Harlan position is meaningless so long as the Supreme Court continues to place obscenity, as properly defined, outside the protection of the First Amendment, thus permitting governmental restrictions on any level, federal, state, or municipal. Only if the absolutist concept of Justice Black becomes the standard for decision in this realm will the Jackson-Harlan viewpoint be worthy of consideration.

In a chapter on freedom of association Professor Kauper assesses the dramatic contrast between rights guaranteed those who affiliate with the NAACP as opposed to those who join the Communist Party. In the case of the former the state may not require public disclosure of its membership lists, but the federal government may require all Communist-action organizations to register and furnish a list of their officers and members. The Supreme Court has thus distinguished between types of associations in terms of lawful versus unlawful ends and purposes, and the freedom to associate, though not absolute, has emerged as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. Within this framework the author raises the concomitant question of non-association. May a person be required by law to pay dues to a labor union that carries on political activities with which he disagrees? The Court has skirted the issue but so far has given no clear-cut answer.

The two final sections of the book cover the complex and sensitive areas of private versus governmental action and the role of the federal government as a positive protector of civil liberties. The author suggests that the Supreme Court is still groping for a definitive rationale in these matters. He asks whether it is not the assurance of judicial protection that gives content and meaning to all private rights, and he observes that the critical question is "whether a court in protecting one man's interests is thereby subjecting another person to an unconstitutional impairment of his rights or liberties." There is no easy answer to the question whether enforcement of a trespass statute against Negroes who are staging a sit-in demonstration at a lunch counter is a denial of equal protection of the laws. A trespass statute cannot be enforced at the expense of constitutional rights, but unless a person can claim a statutory or common law right to enter a business establishment and be served, the owner may assert the right to choose his own patrons in a manner that will best promote his business. In this assertion of equally valid claims, the state may legally prefer to protect the owner's interest, which means that the state is protecting the right of a private business to discriminate against Negroes.

This leads Professor Kauper to his final lecture which deals with the recent bold and positive intervention of the federal government in what were formerly either state matters or private affairs for the purpose of protecting personal liberties. Of particular interest is his elucidation of the federal equity power as a means of enforcing equal protection of the laws. Characterizing the injunction as a "peculiarly effective and drastic remedy" because of its flexibility, adaptability, possible rapidity of issuance, and punishment capabilities without a jury trial, the author nevertheless aptly compares the current use of equity power with its application to labor disputes in an earlier period when, as today, the charge of government by judiciary was leveled at the courts. The reach of the equity power was clearly demonstrated in New Orleans during the 1960–61 school year when the desegregation crisis produced injunctions against the Governor, the Attorney General, a state judge, the Superintendent and School Board of New Orleans, and the state legislature. Even a private person whose active racial discrimination is normally beyond the scope of federal judicial authority may be snared in the equity net if he persists in interfering with court decrees which order desegregation.

In a few instances I do not hold with Professor Kauper's generalizations. For example, I find the balancing-of-interests test unsatisfactory as a judicial standard in civil liberties cases whereas he approves of it, albeit with some reservations. Moreover, I dissent from his persistent contention that one can ignore the wisdom of legislation in assessing its constitutionality. Prudence and constitutionalism are hardly mutually exclusive. But this does not detract from what is a solid treatise and a refreshing diversion from the contemporary output of sociological analyses of the Supreme Court. Not only has the author succeeded in disentangling the web of technical legal issues in the current civil liberties *mélange*, but he has provocatively framed the new, emerging questions which must soon find their way to the Supreme Court's docket.

ROBERT J. STEAMER
Louisiana State University

The Politics of Oil. BY ROBERT ENGLER (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961, Pp. viii, 565. $7.50.)

Although the relationship of organized interests and government has been a topic for speculation and comment by students of American politics from the days of the founding fathers, recent commentaries in professional journals attest the lack of a universally accepted interest-group theory. Undoubtedly a principal reason for the differing views currently held regarding the group approach to politics is that our knowledge of the manner in which groups organize for political action and function in the political arena is still fragmentary. If viewed in this context, Robert Engler's book, *The Politics of Oil,* is a significant contribution.

The author's central thesis is that the petroleum industry constitutes a private government which seeks to utilize public government to promote its goals of greater economic power and larger profits. Engler asserts that the oil industry "is increasingly public in every aspect except responsibility and profits." With ample documentation, he illuminates the pervasive efforts of oil to influence political decisions on the local, state, national, and international levels. Although he states that the focus of his study is on "the relationship of the new industrial system, as illustrated by oil, and the American political system," his account conveys the impression that oil is unique in its efforts to gain political advantages, for relatively little acknowledgment is made of the fact that there are other powerful economic and social groups competing for political influence.

The book could well serve as a handbook or manual on pressure group methods. According to his account, virtually the entire gamut of tactics and techniques available to organized interest groups have been employed by segments of the oil industry. Examples are cited of efforts to achieve unity of action within the industry and to influence public opinion, related business and professional groups, party platforms, the nomination and election of officials, the appointment of administrative personnel, and the decisions of both elective and appointive officials. Of particular interest is his discussion of oil's public relations activities, which illustrates the thoroughness with which oilmen have approached the task of shaping the political environment favorable to their industry. In this chapter he describes the well-coordinated efforts of committees and other organized units which have been created for the primary purpose of molding attitudes through such methods as institutional advertising, disseminating literature to the public schools, speakers bureaus, and other means.

Unfortunately, however, the author detracts from the potential influence of his study by engaging in a general criticism of the current social order in a manner reminiscent of the muckrakers of half a century ago. Throughout the volume, the author intersperses his discussion of the organization and political power of oil with discourses on "the corrosive impact of acquisitive society upon democratic assumptions." Cautioning that one should not "too quickly sort the heroes and the villains," he presents an analysis which indicates that few persons in public life have not been influenced in some fashion by oil. Regardless of the appropriateness of the muckraking approach during the Progressive era of American history, muckraking is no longer in style. In this age of continual world crises, a dispassionate approach would have been more effective.

The Politics of Oil illustrates the magnitude of the problems posed by powerful organized interests seeking economic and political concessions in a country with decentralized political parties and with a federal system of government characterized on each level by the tripartite division of governmental powers. The author, rejecting the notion that the countervailing power concept provides a satisfactory answer, suggests proposals which he believes are commensurate with the problems. Within the United States, he calls for a coordinated and well defined national oil policy with "careful study" being given to "placing oil in the category of a public utility." An entirely satisfactory solution, in his opinion, demands a "world approach," and "one step toward" such an approach would be achieved by "placing oil and all energy resources under international authority, with the United Nations as the parent body." Irrespective of the desirability of such proposals, the problems inherent in effecting them are obviously so overwhelming that comment regarding their feasibility appears unnecessary.

Many individuals who are aware of the campaign contributions and other political activities of oilmen, as well as the political controversies in recent years over such issues as the control of the tidelands and the regulation of the natural gas industry, will agree that a comprehensive study of oil and politics has long been overdue. While the reactions to this volume will vary according to the social and economic predilections of the readers, there will be general admiration for the prodigious research efforts of the author. In gathering the data for his book, Engler perused a wide variety of printed sources, including reports of congressional investigations and other government documents, memoirs and biographies, newspapers and periodicals, trade association publications, and corporation reports, newsletters, and other records. In addition he traveled widely interviewing oilmen, public relations personnel, lobbyists, government officials, and newspaper editors and reporters. The book is replete with the names of individuals and business organizations and with facts, figures, and statistics regarding the oil industry; but, because of the logical and coherent presentation of the material and the clarity of literary style, it is not dull or difficult reading. This volume is indeed a valuable source of information regarding the economic and political power-structure of the oil industry, and because of its factual information it should be read by public officials, political scientists, and others interested in American politics.

Henry A. Turner

University of California (Santa Barbara)

Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States. By Jean Gottmann. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. Pp. xii, 810. $10.00.)

Gottmann is a French geographer, a professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the School of Political Science at the University of Paris. Recently he has been a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. A man of considerable experience with government both in France and with various international bodies he is widely recognized as an expert on problems of metropolitan growth.

Far from assuming that the northeastern seaboard will, in time, become one monstrous city, a kind of indefinite extension of Times Square, Gottmann believes that the area contains forces and counter-forces which will develop great variety within its over-all unity. Megalopolis, the name which Gottmann applies to the Northeast, with its population of more than 38 million, is one of the largest industrial belts in existence and the greatest financial and political hub on earth. This study is not intended to be simply a portrait of the area and its people. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze and understand "the extraordinary dynamics they have created, in a place that was a wilderness three centuries ago, the enormous concentration of people and activities now achieved in Megalopolis. Nowhere else have men ever built anything comparable and with such a rhythm."

To be sure, the trend towards concentration of dense population in large urbanized regions has gradually become a worldwide characteristic of this century. But the northeastern region of the United States is unique in many ways. Megalopolis provides the whole of America with so many essential services, of the sort a community used to obtain in its downtown section, that it may deserve its nickname of "Main Street of the nation."

In this area the old distinctions between rural and urban do not apply any more. Even the people living in the so-called rural areas have very little to do with agriculture; "in terms of the interests and work, they are what used to be classified as 'city folks,' but their way of life and the landscapes around their residences do not fit the old meaning of urban."

Tomorrow's society, Gottmann asserts, will certainly be more urban than today's. More and more people will follow non-agricultural ways. In a sense, the Northeast thus might be considered "the cradle of a new order in the organization of inhabited space." Population trends, however, provide less insight into the nature of the area than do the inter-relations that exist between the processes that cause the growth, attracting certain groups and providing the means by which they could live and work together.

The author starts with a sketch of what he calls the dynamics of urbanization and shows in historical terms how the Northeast came to be what it is. Then he considered the modern revolution in land use, noting that urbanization devours time and space as well as food and industrial goods. The new patterns of intense living that have become normal in urban centers exert a strong influence on the economical and social foundations of society. The density of activities and of movement of all kinds is the most extraordinary feature of the new urban region, but they also present a dilemma. While the growth of the regions owes much to the automobile, now highway traffic jams are beginning to strangle city activities. Finally Gottmann points out the "many millions of people who find themselves neighbors in Megalopolis even though they live in different states and hundreds of miles from one another are barely becoming aware of the imperatives of such a neighborhood." These imperatives include transportation, land use, water supply, cultural activities, use of natural resources and government and politics.

In solving these challenging problems the political scientist can learn much from the geographer. The basic economic, social and political factors of Megalopolis are so interwoven that one is meaningless without consideration for the others. Land is partitioned in many ways—physically by rivers, bays, ridges and valleys, and also by administrative boundaries which frequently follow these same lines. The Hudson river, once a major physical barrier, today is more of a political one. It has not been much more difficult to overcome the physical obstacle of the Hudson than of the East River but it still costs more to cross it than it does the East River. Cheaper tolls on the East River point to the interest of both the city and the state of New York to favor development of territory under their jurisdiction rather than under another state.

In the past, administrative partitioning has favored local growth. Modern technology and economic progress, however, demand more regional integration. The multiplicity of governmental units has put obstacles in the way of economic growth and the more confortable use of the region's facility. "Financial entanglements are only the budgetary consequences of the governmental partitioning of a space crowded with people and activities."

Much of the discussion regarding problems of government in a growing metropolitan region is not new to readers of Luther Gulick, Victor Jones and Robert Wood. Indeed many of the techniques are similar to those used with profit in Raymond Vernon's New York Metropolitan Regional studies. But Gottmann brings a wealth of facts and a stimulating freshness of approach to these problems. Moreover, his study, profusely illustrated with 280 charts and maps, covers a much larger area than Vernon's and thus he is able to observe relationships between metropolitan clusters. As a foreign scholar who is no stranger to the American scene, Gottmann is able to draw upon a rich experience of more than 20 years of study of metropolitan problems. These are important factors in making his account particularly useful to American political scientists.

ROBERT H. CONNERY

Duke University

Genesis and Structure of Society. BY GIOVANNI GENTILE. TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION. BY H. S. HARRIS. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960. Pp. 228. $4.50.)

Giovanni Gentile was something of an enigma all of his life. He combined the ivory-tower qualities of the abstract philosopher with a passion—consistent with his philosophy—for direct involvement in politics and service to the "State," which he equated with the essence of the individual. Even as the present volume was being written, and shortly prior to his assassination during Italy's bitter civil war, he was the object of bitter attacks from both die-hard Fascists and elements of the Resistance who sought to destroy a political system that was partially his own handiwork. The volume will not erase the enigma. It represents not merely a philosophical exercise but also veiled reflections on Gentile's political past—as well as a rationale for his choosing to identify with a crumbling Fascist state, rather than with emergent democracy, when Il Duce appealed to him in 1943.

For those who would more fully understand a major figure in the Italian idealist school, this excellently translated work is required reading. In the space of 150-odd pages, the reader is treated to Gentile's trenchant hostility toward positivism, empiricism, liberalism—and to any system of thought that fails to understand that the "State is the common aspect of the will," that "positivism or any form of empiricism is absurd," that all forms of realism "are very naive," or that the idea of community as a collection of individuals "smashes and destroys the idea of human community, making it no more than an accident and depriving it of value as an end in itself—the only kind of value that matters." Gentile's anti-pluralist and anti-materialist views are clearly laid out, as are his notions regarding economics, the relationship of religion to the state, the relationship between "public" and "private" acts, the role of philosophers in politics, the problem of a plurality of "infinite" states, and many other subjects. There are more than the usual problems of obtuse Hegelianisms and idealist jargon here; there are also all sorts of contradictions which the translator is assiduous in recognizing and concerning which his frequent explanatory and critical footnotes are of considerable assistance. More than most Anglo-American students, Professor Harris knows and understands his Gentile. This, coupled with an extraordinary sensitivity to the nuances of the Italian language, results in a translation that is outstanding for its lucidity—as well as for its frank recognition of passages that might be the object of controversial interpretations. The volume, for many reasons, deserves more recognition than the translator (in a laconic footnote on page 7) predicts for it.

It is difficult, in the space of a short introductory essay such as Harris', to assess all of the problems concerning Gentile that Harris, himself, raises. Some of these problems are strictly philosophical and academic, concerning the translator's assertion that Gentile has often been misread and misunderstood in the Anglo-American world. I do not wish to enter the philosophical controversy, except to say that the essay itself contributes little to its resolution. The reader who is interested in such things will have to repair to the copious bibliography cited by Professor Harris.

Other portions of the introductory essay, however, deal with Gentile's relationship to Fascism, with the nature of Gentile's reforms of Italian education, and with the controversy regarding the impact of the reforms on the Italian school system. Professor Harris is clearly on strong ground when he differentiates Gentile from those in the Fascist movement who crassly sought to substitute a "nationalist" spirit of the party for the "national" spirit of "actual idealism." A superficial equation of the noble and moral constructs of Gentile with the crude practices of the Fascist state involves an injustice to Gentile of considerable magnitude. Those who view him as the willing "philosopher of Fascism," must come to terms with his controversy with the Vatican and his appalled response to the Lateran Agreements. Gentile clearly saw in Fascism a political instrument for the kind of revolutionary changes that Italian society so desperately needed (and needs!). He, like Bottai and many others, was bitterly disillusioned over the realization that ideas were cynically used, that Fascism was essentially sterile of any serious philosophical underpinning, and that anything—certainly any system of ideas—would be sacrificed in the overriding interest of maintaining and expanding power. The kind of state that Mussolini and his cohorts hammered out was clearly not consistent with the philosophical posture Gentile assumes in the volume he wrote in 1943.

Professor Harris, however, is sometimes carried away with his defense of Gentile, as for example, when he is critical of Lamberto

Borghi and others who have underlined the anti-democratic implication of the *Riforma Gentile.* It may be, as Harris claims, that Borghi is unfair to Gentile's "conscious intentions." But, if one is to judge at least in part by empirical consequences, it is obvious that what emerged from Gentile is a school system shot through with historicism, anti-liberalism, class-oriented curricula, authoritarianism, and all sorts of rigidities that have made the Italian educational system widely recognized as incapable of providing the kind of political socialization that a liberal democracy requires. Moreover, as the volume here reviewed clearly illustrates, fragments of Gentile's philosophy could clearly be utilized to justify the creation of a totalitarian school system as well as a totalitarian state. After all, it was not pure caprice or abject ignorance that moved Il Duce to affix his signature to sections of the *Enciclopedia* written by Gentile. It seems to be the unhappy lot of Hegelians that their true meaning and intentions are never fully understood by mortal men.

As the translator anticipates, it would be easy to poke fun at many of Gentile's formulations. For those who might approach the man and his work more dispassionately, the last ten pages of Professor Harris' essay provide a most lucid presentation of the basic structure of "actual idealism."

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA

Center for Advanced Study
in the Behavioral Sciences

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

A Theory of Foreign Policy. By GEORGE MODELSKI. (Princeton Studies in World Politics, No. 2. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. xi, 152. $5.00.)

This reviewer has come to look forward with anticipation to any new publication by George Modelski on the theory of international politics. His *The Communist International System*[1] was an analytical gem. His model was clearly defined and it was applied productively in the analysis of a body of empirical data. His second piece, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System,"[2] is an original contribution to political theory, for it makes the point that international political systems are political systems and are capable of being analyzed, at least in part, with the same conceptual scheme that one uses in the analysis of national political systems. It thus becomes possible to compare international political systems with national ones, and, furthermore, the conceptual scheme which Modelski employs is moving in a direction which will make it possible to compare international political systems with one another (i. e., contemporary subsystems of the international political system, or international political systems at earlier points in time).

It was, therefore, somewhat disappointing to take up Modelski's most recent publication and to find that it falls considerably short of the standard in the two pieces referred to above. It is understandable that his *Theory of Foreign Policy* should fall short of the quality of his other work, since it represents a recent revision of his doctoral dissertation, which he completed in June, 1954, for the University of London. I doubt very much whether Modelski writing today would have produced this kind of book.

Like most of us engaged in reconsidering the categories and analytical schemes of political theory, Modelski is greatly influenced by economic and sociological theory, particularly the former. This is so much the case that the book should properly be called "An Economic Theory of Foreign Policy," just as Anthony Downs called his book, "An Economic Theory of Democracy." Perhaps to an even greater extent than was true of Downs, Modelski distorts the data of politics in such a form as to render them susceptible of economic analysis. The ultimate goal toward which his theory is directed is to develop a "balance sheet for foreign policy." To make this balance sheet concept seem feasible, he uses a concept of power-input and power-output, which assumes that the means which go to make up power are exchangeable in some common currency. This is where his economic theory misled him, for the means of foreign policy are not exchangeable in a common currency. And what now occupies only a few pages of his book—an explication of the properties of the means of foreign policy—would have occupied several chapters had he been thinking as a political theorist rather than as an economic one.

He asks us to accept two conventions. The first of these is that we reduce political systems to policy-makers and their communities; the second, that we reduce the means of power to a total quantity of power. Modelski's contribution stops where it should properly have begun, first by placing foreign policy in the context of a sound theory of the political system and secondly by explicating the properties of the chief means of instruments of foreign policy, i.e., military, diplomatic, economic and communications means. Had Modelski proceeded this way, he would have found an opening between a theory of foreign policy and a theory of the international political system. While he rejects the theory of national power, he gives us a "theory of foreign policy power" which is equally regressive. It does not lead us forward to a more effective grappling with the empirical data of international transactions and the interactive structure which results from these flows, but offers a spurious simplicity and precision instead. Having said all this, the point should not be overlooked that Modelski has in his theoretical scheme potentialities of great promise. Let him apply his balance sheet theory in a few empirical cases and he will discover the bugs himself and produce a theory of foreign policy which will combine elegance with relevance in the style which his more recent work has led us to expect.—GABRIEL A. ALMOND, *Yale University*.

Beitraege zur Staatssoziologie. By KARL LOEWENSTEIN. (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1961. Pp. 485.)

This book gives the student of politics and constitutional law a convenient access to a number of articles written during various periods of an exceptionally fruitful intellectual career reaching from the declining days of the Wilhelminian Empire to the post-Stalinist world. The variety of themes included in the selection bears testimony to the author's erudition and catholic range of interest. Loewenstein's chosen method of comparative institutional analysis exercised against a background of intimate historical knowledge of the respective societies and with a constant endeavor of critical confrontation of legislative and constitutional enactments with the corresponding social realities may seem by now an uncontested line of scientific procedure. Yet, Ernst Fraenkel in his thoughtful introductory pages rightly reminds us of its comparative novelty. The author first brought it to bear on his studies of the unique "constitutional laboratory" of the French revolution and especially his justly famous 1923 studies on the sociology of parliamentary representation in 18th and 19th century England. Fortunately reprinted here (though regrettably unavailable in English) they still—after nearly 30 years—stand out as an exemplary picture of the interrelation of constitutional, social and party structure under the conditions of relatively orderly social change.

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[1] "The Communist International System," Research Monograph No. 9, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Dec. 1, 1960.

[2] "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System," *World Politics*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, October, 1961, pp. 118–143.

Among the other items included in the collection, also unavailable in English, the reader's attention should be specially drawn to the article on the constitutional monocracy of Augustus analyzing the process of transformation of Roman institutions, and the critical analysis of W. J. Mommsen's new work on "Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890–1920" showing the risks of reinterpretation under the changed horizon of later generations. The same piece, incidentally, raises some interesting questions as to the use of the charisma concept in present day society and also expresses considerable doubt as to the usefulness of the legality—legitimacy dychotomy. Did Loewenstein, as he says, never make use of the distinction "in his own scientific endeavors," because the analysis of so many stillborn, evanescent, social-reality-wise restructured texts has made him sceptical about attempts to set up untouchable core areas invariably claimed by all and any regimes? His stupendous knowledge of past and present regimes and his realistic analysis of the relations between political authorities and judicial agencies set up for the protection of such core areas—extended in the present volume so as to embrace the constitutional aspects of the South African tragedy—may have made him still more doubtful about the survival chances of specific value structures in a process of rapid change. Is the typologist par excellence of constitutional systems necessarily a relativist? In working his way through this exceptionally rich collection which unveils the kaleidoscope of shifting institutional arrangements and in this process draws a sort of balance sheet, the attentive reader will doubtless find enough food to draw his own conclusions.—OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University.*

The Herzl Paradox: Political, Social and Economic Theories of a Realist. BY JOSEPH ADLER. (New York: Hadrian Press and Herzl Press, 1962. Pp. 178. $5.50.)

Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) was the founder of political Zionism, the prophet of the modern state of Israel. His dramatic vision of statehood as the means to dislodge the Jews from the chronic peculiarity of their history and secure for them a normal place in "western" international society evoked an immediate response among the Jews of eastern Europe. It was they who soon became the dominant element within the Zionist Organization founded by the westerner Herzl, and while they carried Herzl's political solution of the Jewish problem to practical fruition they expanded the ideological context of this concept, making room for a messianic spirit and for social aspirations drawn from a variety of sources other than those which underlay Herzl's own thinking.

A brilliant visionary and charismatic leader, Herzl also exercised unusual diplomatic and political talents. He has been recognized as the most revolutionary figure in nineteen centuries of Jewish history. A prolific writer, Herzl formulated the core of his political analysis in the classic essay "Judenstaat" ("The Jewish State"), while his social ideas were developed in the later romantic novel "Altneuland" ("Old-New Land"). It is Adler's contention that the appreciation of Herzl's practical political genius has proven detrimental to the appraisal of his contribution as a social and economic thinker. As an addition to the Herzl literature Adler's book may stimulate a broader appreciation of the man and the thinker behind the Herzl myth. If the book fails to accomplish this it may be because Herzl's social thought emerges as a banal collection of half-digested ideological cliches, whether that be the fault of Herzl's thought or the author's analysis. A clue to the misfiring of the book may be its inadequate appreciation of Herzl's most original and profound political thought, his analysis of the Jewish problem. It is probably true that the quality of Herzl's thought on the Jewish problem has been neglected by followers and scholars captivated by his magnetic personality and practical political skill. It is now doubtful, in the light of Adler's essay, whether it is worth considering Herzl seriously as a contributor to the mainstream of social and economic thought.

This is a painful verdict to the present reviewer as an admirer of Herzl who would like, in Herzl's very spirit, to release the brilliant contributions of a galaxy of Zionist thinkers of the turn of the century from the academic ghetto of Jewish historiography, and to place them in their proper relation to the heritage of European social insights from which they are in large part derived. Adler's sincerity of purpose and apparent similarity of motivation render the verdict only the more painful to deliver. Perhaps the fault lies after all with the subject. One might have better luck with Syrkin and Borochov, who could hardly be accused, justly or unjustly, with Herzl, of utopianism.

Leaving unanswered the question of the quality or poverty of Herzl's social thought on its own merits without Adler's mediation, the inadequacy of Adler's study is apparent in his concluding chapter in which he tackles an interesting side-issue: the measurement of Herzl's influence upon Israeli social ideas and institutions today. One of the more fascinating problems confronting the student of Zionism and Israeli politics is the extent to which the eastern-European principals were or were not influenced by Herzl's social vision. The impact of the labor-Zionist leaders, especially Syrkin, Borochov, Gordon, and Ben-Gurion, who have shaped Israel's present social institutions, can certainly be broadly understood, plausibly analyzed, without reverting to Herzl. And yet the student cannot escape the suspicion, given the tangential patterns of correspondence, that links might be demonstrable between their social ideas and those of Herzl. But not only does Adler misunderstand the structure and trends of the Israel economy, he also lacks any trace of method in his attempt to connect its contours with Herzl's ideas. The following is typical: "Herzl's concern with town planning has also borne fruit in Israel. . . . It is curious that in the exceptional cases where the state has departed from Herzl's warning not to build shanty towns—as it did under the pressure of heavy immigration—much conflict has arisen. The feeling of insecurity and discontent bred in the *maabaroth* (temporary villages for new immigrants) has re-emphasized for the Israeli Government the wisdom of Herzl's insistence on model towns." As well say that the misery of Hooverville re-affirmed for F.D.R. the profundity of Jefferson's thought.
—NOAH LUCATZ, *Southern Illinois University*, East St. Louis Center.

The Measurement of Social Welfare. BY JEROME ROTHENBERG. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1961, Pp. XII 357, $7.95)

With great professional skill, even if not with distinguished gifts of lucidity, Rothenberg has provided an excellent survey of the economics of welfare as it has developed during the last twenty-five years. It is a branch of economics that, despite its frustrations, has clarified and illuminated many once badly posed issues. He has organized his survey around the problem of aggregating individual preferences into something that might be called social choice, giving prominence to Kenneth Arrow's formulation of the problem in *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York; Wiley, 1951) and to proposals from various scholars for resolving or bypassing Arrow's difficulties. Rothenberg's own original contribution is a proposal for a "useful, rather than merely a formally correct, welfare economics."

In elementary terms, the task of measuring social welfare is the task of ranking different social states so that in some useful sense one state of affairs can be said to be better than others. If economists sometimes think of this problem as a kind of technical problem in measurement, political scientists will recognize it as a set of problems in political philosophy fundamental enough to have engaged a long line of powerful intellects, all deeply respectful of the problem's subtleties and surprising scope.

Economists have advanced their work on this age-old problem by characteristic simplification. (Theirs is a profession whose reputation rests on its success with modest assignments.) They have postulated that the best state is the most preferred state; hence evaluation is no more than measurement of preference.

Whose preference? Everybody's. But economists have learned that the mere addition of preferences is not satisfactory—and is not possible anyway. So the problem, as they see it, is of somehow aggregating individual preferences other than by addition. It is a problem of finding some kind of a rule so that, given any combination of preferences in a population, one can declare a collective preference or preferred social choice.

No doubt the conversion of amorphous ethical questions into problems in measurement of preference does simplify. But the problem of evaluation remains formidable. For one's commitment to any rule for "aggregating" individual preferences would imply that one has finally managed to settle many of the great old controversies in distributive ethics. "Aggregate" is a deceptive word, a question-begging word; to aggregate individual preferences into collective preference is in fact to decide who ought to get what.

Rothenberg's proposal for making headway is to abandon the task of aggregating individual preferences by rule and instead "read off" the aggregation of individual values (whether preferences or not) by empirical observation, admittedly expensive and prolonged, of "those strategic social decision-making processes within the society which valuate the kinds of social states pertinent to the economic problem." He thus considers "treating the social ordering (or social preference scale) as the ordering of social states which results from the operation of those processes."

Rothenberg's proposal, which he sometimes refers to as a proposal to accept "prevailing values" as criteria, is an attempt to extend the applicability of the notion of consumer sovereignty. Within some limits, he is saying, whatever a society chooses tells us what we should rate highly. As he recognizes, the proposal therefore seems to have the flavor of "what is, is right." He meets this objection in several ways, all showing that one is permitted to distinguish between those social states that can be presumed to be validated by the decision-making processes and those social states that are in observable fact brought about. In a particular case, the social state brought about may reflect only an abberation of the decision process. Here a reader might imagine that he hears, from a kindred spirit looking over Rothenberg's shoulders: " . . . the general will is always right, and always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people will always have the same rectitude" (Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Book II, ch. 3).

With his proposal, which is put with more intelligence than my brief summary of it might imply, Rothenberg stumbles out of formal welfare economics onto the edge of a world that the political philosophers have never left. As a welfare economist, he is equipped with new devices for making sense of this world, devices not much used in political philosophy. Yet it is a bigger, more complex, tougher world than Rothenberg's glimpse into has permitted him to see. It is a world in which Rothenberg will be asked whether the key decision processes themselves need sometimes to be evaluated and how, when such an occasion arises, one would propose to do the job. It is also a world in which research evidence that any x is a prevailing value can be countered by argument that the population has merely been coerced, cajoled, or deceived into acting as though it valued x. And it is a world in which challenges to consumer sovereignty on principle are much more serious than they are in the special case of the market. To these and other difficulties Rothenberg is sensitive, and he has important things to say. Habituated, however, to the narrow defile of welfare economics, he does not explore the new land far enough to see how wide it ranges.—CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, *Yale University*.

Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy. BY MARTIN BIRNBACH. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 283. $6.00.)

This book attempts to extract the elements of a social philosophy from the writings of the Neo-Freudian psychoanalysts. Birnbach presents a short overview of Freud's system of thought and his social philosophy, discusses the Neo-Freudian departures from the Freudian scheme, and analyzes the ideas of six writers: Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Abram Kardiner, Harry Stack Sullivan, Franz Alexander, and Harold Lasswell. The purpose of the volume is to demonstrate that the ideas of these people constitute an important contribution to social philosophy.

What is this contribution? Allowing for many variations among members of the school, a few sentences will suffice to state it.

Man, in the view of the Neo-Freudians, has the capacity for psychic growth; some of them even claim that he strives for mental health. At the same time, man is a product of his social environment, so that growth may be helped or hindered by the individual's social experience. Culture and social institutions may be judged good or bad according to their ability to foster or impede individual growth. By this criterion, modern Western society must be judged wanting. Competitive pressures and the de-personalization of human relations generate anxiety, low self-esteem, and a tendency to regard all things, including one's self, as commodities in the market. This diagnosis of the modern world, together with humanistic principles, leads the Neo-Freudians to a variety of recommendations, ranging from the therapeutic principles of a Horney or Sullivan to the communal socialism of a Fromm.

The views of the Neo-Freudians can hardly be considered a coherent social philosophy, much less a political one. As Birnbach points out, they lack—with few exceptions—specific applications to political processes and programs of action. Nonetheless, they should be considered carefully by political scientists, for they challenge much of what has come to be the consensus of the profession. Lasswell (whom the author was wise to include although he scarcely qualifies as a Neo-Freudian psychoanalyst) has indeed pointed out that much of political life is pathological, partly because professional politics attracts people with serious personality defects, and partly because the symbols bandied about in the political forum tend to mobilize anti-social tendencies which ordinary people repress in their day-to-day relations with others.

Such views were heterodox a generation ago when they were first expressed, and they are perhaps even more heterodox today. For, having shed its earlier moral indignation over corrupt practices in public life, political science has come to believe in a latter-day *Fable of the Bees*—that the private vices of politicians and pressure groups make for public virtues. Conflict, it is believed, is almost invariably productive, and public debate is the life-blood of democracy. The pith of the Neo-Freudian and Lasswellian critique is that it denies this old-fashioned liberalism. Political competition, instead of resolving issues, may well serve to perpetuate them; and public debate, instead of leading to clarification, may bring only obfuscation and a hardening of positions. One cannot help being reminded of the pathetic futility of so many "great debates," domestic as well as international.

The Neo-Freudian position thus implies a psychology of conflict which could be a powerful tool for political analysis and an important ingredient of an ethic for the profession of political science. If much of competitive political behavior is motivated by anxiety and at the same time reinforces the anxieties from which it stems, we have here a self-perpetuating circular process similar in many respects to the typical course of certain mental diseases. Is it possible that the majority of the professional students of politics regard as healthy the very processes that careful analysis coupled with humanistic convictions would reveal to be symptoms of diseases? Are they doctors who advocate sickness and oppose health?

This, it would seem, is the weighty question which Birnbach attempts to raise through his examination of Neo-Freudian thought. Unfortunately, neither the question nor the content of Neo-Freudian thought emerge from the author's writing with the amount of clarity one might hope for. Psychoanalytic thought is, by itself, complicated enough and it is often far from lucid; yet Birnbach seems to complicate matters further by a dual allegiance to traditional political philosophy and to scientific method.

Whether or not Freud was really a philosophical materialist, and whether Fromm expounds a new version of the natural rights doctrine may be moot points. But what, except the satisfaction of scholastic curiosity, would be gained if such questions could be satisfactorily answered? Also, the author's frequent attempts to translate psychoanalytic propositions into the language of one or another school of social philosophy tend to make the conceptual apparatus more complex and less manageable.

At the same time, the author's commitment to scientific method (as he understands it) leads to rather surprising assertions. He claims that the Neo-Freudians have contributed to social philosophy a "qualitative" method which—for unexplained reasons—he also calls "deductive," as opposed to "quantitative analysis" and "induction." The "method" appears to consist in drawing conclusions about social processes from information obtained in the psychoanalyst's office. The advantage of this procedure is that it explores human motives in depth. While such depth may be very desirable, the "scientific" procedure here advocated seems to be analogous to exploring a salt-mine and deciding on the basis of the evidence gained that the earth's core is made of salt.

Nor is the author's concern with scientific validity quite credible. Take, for instance, his critique of Fromm's utopia.

> "Fromm's application of natural law theory has much to offer. . . . All will acknowledge the *good service* done by that doctrine in furthering the development of modern political institutions under the rule of law. . . . Very probably, however, it is insusceptible to validation [sic] by an empirical investigation of human nature and its formation . . ." (emphasis added).

In what sense does a theory have "much to offer" if it cannot be demonstrated to be true? Evidently, the author is not looking for truth but for an effective social myth—a formula which will do "good service." For the same reason the book makes no attempt to choose among alternative views on the basis of the evidence; rather, there is a tendency to accept and reject ideas because of the consequences to which they may lead.

Birnbach's lack of concern with evidence is further reflected in his choice of authors and texts. He reads exhaustively the writings of his six authors, but he ignores a large and varied literature of studies devoted to the empirical testing of psychoanalytic propositions, including the now classic study of *The Authoritarian Personality*. His is, rather, an interest in writers and schools, and his technique is chiefly that of scriptural interpretation.

The flaws of this volume are perhaps less those of its author than of the intellectual tradition from which it springs. Political philosophy, unfortunately, has foundered in a stale scholasticism. To require it now to be scientific is asking the impossible. To be sure, the factual assumptions upon which a living political philosophy must be built should be consistent with empirical knowledge. But this calls for a concern with evidence rather than the thought of particular writers. Beyond this, one cannot expect the ethical propositions of a social philosophy to be proven rigorously. They should rather, serve as value assumptions for empirical research and as standards of action in human affairs.—FRANK A. PINNER, *Michigan State University*.

Modern Government. BY DELL G. HITCHNER AND WILLIAM H. HARBOLD. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1962. Pp. xviii, 718. $7.50.)

This book, the newest in the Dodd, Mead series in political science, done under the advisory editorship of Professor David Fellman, constitutes an addition to the steadily growing number of texts for the introductory course. The authors are both at the University of Washington in Seattle. Their book is among the very good ones.

In basic organization of material, the book follows the accepted pattern for texts in this area. In order, it deals with the nature of political science—its dimensions, its methodology and its values; with the State—its evolution and differentiation from other social forms; with the evolution of democratic and antidemocratic ideologies; with constitutional government and liberty; with interest groups, parties and elections; with institutions of government-executive, legislative, judicial and administrative; and with international relations. More attention is given to this latter aspect of the subject than in the usual introductory text. Following a short epilogue, there is offered an excellent study guide to political science, covering over 50 pages. It includes listings of reference materials, classics, supplementary readings, periodicals and political novels. It even offers help in the preparation of investigative papers in political science. Beginning students should be grateful indeed for this section. An added attraction is also available to instructors in the course—in the form of an instructor's manual, offering useful suggestions for paper assignments, essay exam questions and multiple choice test items.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the book is its unusual balance. Overall, there is balance in the amount of attention devoted to each of the indicated aspects of political science. Further, within each of these aspects, there is balance in treatment. The authors do not get out on any political limbs. In their analysis of political methodology, for example, they recognize the utility of philosophy, history and empirical research alike, and gently chide some modern political scientists for their total concentration on the latter. In their treatment of democracy, there is the same cautious balance in viewpoint; fair and objective consideration of the modern challenges to democracy, especially communism and fascism, is offered. Even so, the authors elect for democracy, but with qualifications: "if western civilization has erred in its understanding of human life, democracy is meaningless. If we share its values we really have no choice."

The writing is sprightly, and frequently brightened with humor and insight—e.g., "a bottle drifting in the ocean is neither free nor unfree." In one respect the book might have been improved by giving more attention to regional international organization such as EEC. Surely, however, a book with so few faults as this one seems to have, is a very good book indeed.—Paul G. Steinbicker, *St. Louis University.*

Latin American Social Thought. By Harold Eugene Davis. (Washington, D. C.: The University Press, 1961. Pp. iv, 557. $7.00.)

Dr. Davis has selected wisely from myriad authors in presenting a spectrum of topics ranging from "beauty" to "Marxism." His volume's parts, although actually arranged by time periods, are headed: 1) "The Enlightenment and Independence," 2) "Liberalism and Utilitarianism," 3) "Positivism," and 4) "Twentieth Century Trends."

Part One (Bolivar, Cecilio del Valle) illustrates contradictions in Latin American thought, with European, North American and Roman Catholic influences contrasted to indigenous aspirations and spirit of revolt. Part Two (Alberdi, Sarmiento) rejects the scientific philosophy of history and the significance of emerging class consciousness. Part Three (Prada, Barbosa, Hostos, Rodo) reflects the conflict between Church and State, and largely accepts the scientific sociology of August Compte. Part Four (Manuel Galvez, Freyre, Arevalo, Figueres and Betancourt) shows the intellectual stimulation of European refugees, the influences of Marxism and of the Mexican revolution. Within the four Parts are 42 sections with biographical data on each writer, and Dr. Davis' characterizations of the man and his influence. There is a selected bibliography of fifty general works, of which a bare half dozen are in English. The absence of an index requires much digging to find patterns, comparisons or contrasts of thought: Marti on revolution is at page 259, the Mexican Luis Mora at page 150. Race is treated by the Brazilian Da Cunha at p. 219, by the Argentine Galvez at p. 424. Nationalism, federalism, regionalism, labor, race, law, marxism, democracy and education are the topics treated most frequently. There is surprisingly little on militarism or caudilloism, and nothing from a feminine pen. The volume consolidates years of gathering of materials and gives representation to some forty Latin American writers in excerpts from their important works. The translations are a bit uneven.

The Latin American writers are commentators upon, rather than the originators of, social thought or of political forms. The excerpts are replete with references to Spinoza, Aquinas, Hegel, Descartes, Locke, Bentham, Engels, Renan, Ortega y Gassett, Carlyle, Spencer, William James and Unamuno. Davis concludes that the Latin Americans are much more given to speculative thought than to descriptive analysis. This volume is a signal contribution in an area regrettably underdeveloped in our country and theirs. It has been a prodigious effort to bring us up to date after the two decades since W. Rex Crawford's "A Century of Latin American

Thought." But events move on, and subsequent to Dr. Davis' volume we have the writings and actions of Quadros and Goulart, of Arosemena and Frondizi, of Guevara and of Castro. And as the Vatican's *Rerum Novarum* of the last century marked many Latin American writings, so the 1961 *Mater et Magistra* may inspire and expand the bounds of social, political, and economic thought in Latin America in the next decades.—WILLARD F. BARBER, *University of Maryland.*

Political Ideas in the Modern World. BY D. B. HEATER. (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1962. Pp. 208. $3.00.)

Two things are attempted here. First, (and to this the author's major attention is directed) an analysis and evaluation is conducted of several salient contemporary political ideals and their enveloping movements. Secondly, there is an exposition of the proposition that ideas have consequences, and that the consequences at this particular time are not very pleasant. The entire presentation is directed to a politically and ideologically unsophisticated audience. "It is hoped that examination candidates for (British) university entrance, officers of the armed services preparing for staff college and those who are 'just interested' will find these pages of some use." To this end a rudimentary bibliography is included together with a set of examination questions.

The pursuit of the author's first purpose consists of a series of chapters devoted to nationalism, communism, democracy, and religion, respectively. The basic format of these chapters consists of an examination of the ideational structure appropriate to each movement, the history of the movement's development, and an analysis of the movement's influence in the significant areas of the western and non-western world. A clearer idea of the range of this book can be gained from the subdivision of the chapter concerned with democracy (running 43 pages) which includes: "Classical Greece," "The English, American and French Revolutions," "Utilitarianism and Liberalism," "Democratic Socialism," "The Basic Elements" (equality, popular sovereignty, humanitarianism, the rule of law, liberty), "The Myth of Totalitarian Democracy," "Conditions for Democracy," and "Conclusions." At this point it is only a formality to point out that Mr. Heater has spread himself rather thinly, but there is some merit here. His judgments are temperate throughout, as befits one writing primarily within the liberal tradition ("A strong following for a beneficient idea is, naturally to be encouraged, but fanaticism is always to be deplored."). A further strength (especially noticeable in the chapter treating of nationalism) rests in the wealth of meaningfully presented historical and other illustrative materials. This, to the reviewer, seems to be the book's principal merit; the "just interested" reader could not but gain from this a broader understanding of the forces shaping the modern world.

However, there are serious deficiencies involved in the overly simplified presentation of political theories and their development. Admittedly, Mr. Heater faced a difficult problem: the significant presentation of complex material to untrained readers, but simplification can bleed into inadequacy. E.g., the analysis of Marxism is routine; the grosser elements are introduced in terms not too remote from journalistic exposition. What is presented is a reasonably fair but quite casual examination. It is to be regretted that the major Marxian contributions to the social sciences and the resultant modification of non-Marxian political philosophies are not made more apparent. A more serious disability, given the author's intent, is the failure to adequately plumb the strengths of communism as an ideology.

Numerous other objections of this kind could be raised. In the final analysis this book is not an adequate base for *formal* college instruction. The ideas dealt with are too isolated and simplified to permit systematic elaboration. However, as was noted above, in less formal circumstances the book has substantial merit.

Finally, a few words must be said concerning Mr. Heater's second point: the thesis that a powerful malaise has fallen upon political philosophy to the detriment of mankind. Extended remarks to this thesis are unnecessary since the argument is not carefully developed but only briefly sketched in.

Heater holds that the evils to which ideas or philosophies have contributed substantially are twofold: the threatened destruction of civilization as we know it through war, and the engulfment of the individual by the state. His point is not that ideologies, *per se* are dangerous, but that we are attempting to use obsolete political philosophies dating from the 18th and 19th centuries. These are identified as the Benthamite form of liberal democracy, extreme nationalism and Marxism. In each case the idea's obsolescence consists in its assumptions not matching reality (e.g., Marxism doesn't fit the facts of welfare economics, etc.). This *disrapport* between reality and our political ideas partially explains our current predicament.

What is needed therefore, is a set of more realistic political concepts. However, Mr. Heater believes we are encumbered in this by the decline of political philosophy in the modern world; we have lost the propensity to generate alternative systems. He accounts for this failure in familiar terms (thus logical positivism plays its usual instrumental role, etc.).

In the last three pages there is a tentative solution based upon a "refurbished natural law" which seems to represent a cross between the "biological principle of the preservation and development of the human race" and a myth of unspecified content (to "excite the imagination as well as satisfy the intellect"). So much for one of our current problems; the second problem is killed with the same stone: "Natural law insists on the natural and indefeasible rights of the individual."

Mr. Heater has thus traced an outline of a reforming political ideal, one sufficient to overcome nationalism and its companions. The substance of the argument is less to be noted here than the style. It is remarkable when one sets about to oppose a monster in a manner so drained of passion, and when judgments are so muted, bangs and whispers can fall together.—William A. Ritchie, *University of Delaware.*

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process. Edited by Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett. (New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. xviii, 707. $4.95.)

Where Francis Heller (*Introduction to Constitutional Law*, 1952) and then Glendon Schubert (*Constitutional Politics*, 1960) proved the relevance of non-case material to casebooks in constitutional law, Murphy and Pritchett show the appropriateness of cases to a book of readings in the nature of the judicial process. Since these amount to almost a third of the items in the book and are marvelously revealing of the judicial process, I conclude that opinions in court cases will always remain central in the study of public law! Cases are not strictly parallel to statutes in being the end product of comparable processes, as is sometimes asserted nowadays. Cases are more than that if only in the many instances where judges relate factors that pushed them toward one decision rather than another.

This book reflects the tension between old and new ways in which political scientists and lawyers look at law. The new ways are at least as old as Holmes' *Common Law* and the old as new as the latest editorial piety that the Constitution is what the Framers said it was. Murphy and Pritchett, like many of the rest of us, find "there are many ways of looking at law and at the function of judges" and this is the feeling that marks their book. Yet they gesture toward current political science ideology by saying, awkwardly enough, that their book attempts "a behavioristic kind of analysis." Further, "we have heard much talk of the governmental process, the administrative process, the legislative process. The process type of analysis contrasts generally with the institutional approach, in which attention is centered on governmental structures and their legal status, functions and powers. Process analysis professes to go beyond the appearance to the reality, beyond the legal facade to the actual operating mechanism." But having made this bow the editors do not rely heavily on the work of political scientists who have recently sought unique approaches to the judicial process. These are by no means absent but they are not a prominent feature of the book and, moreover, Murphy and Pritchett do not themselves provide a behavioral overview of the subject.

What the book does is to give an eclectic view, a catholic view of American law, chiefly at the Supreme Court level, in relation to the rest of the political landscape. Juxtaposition of contrasting viewpoints, the staple of successful anthologies, is exquisitely achieved at a number of points: Joseph Perry's fresh "How I Got to Be a Federal Judge" next to the Brennan Hearings; Justice Frankfurter's appraisal of the 28 men who came on the Supreme Court without any prior judicial experience next to the Talmadge bill that would require Supreme Court justices to have five years of judicial service; Charles P. Curtis and Henry S. Drinker debating the ethics of advocacy; and Jack Greenberg and Edmond Cahn disagreeing on the social science testimony in the *School Segregation Cases*. Excerpts from seven decisions in Virgil Hawkins' case give one instance of several where the editors pursue a point to its logical (or illogical) end.

Courts, Judges and Politics is most clearly suited to undergraduate instruction in political science for several reasons. It is organized in a common-sense way, by topics, to illustrate the variety of conditions that hedge or help judicial action in the United States. It provides introductory essays that will give any student his bearings and fill the cracks among the readings. These essays, 18 in number in addition to the preface, treat theories of the judicial role, the characteristics of state and federal judicial systems, attributes and relations between bar and bench, and access to and sources of judicial review in a democratic government, among others. A collection of readings from Presidential statements, press conferences, messages and letters; from proposed bills, hearings, speeches on the floor of Congress, and statutes; from judicial opinions, court rules and *ex cathedra* writings of justices and judges; and from a range of academic sources the book reflects the range and diversity of the subject. It amply shows that the courts cannot be unzippered for study, apart from the fabric of society and its government. This is a book that opens many vistas, tells something about each one and indicates that there is yet more to learn. And since individual readings and their relation to others are often exciting, the book will doubtless capture the interest of many students.

The success achieved by Murphy and Pritchett in introducing students to the romance of the subject of judicial politics may possibly make this book inappropriate for graduate students. At least this is a deficiency I see when the book is measured by Whitehead's admonition that the stage of precision should follow that of romance. It fails in at least three ways to serve the interest of advanced students. First, it does not attempt a systematic framework for analysis in spite of the announced aim of contributing to the literature of political behavior. Second, it does not sufficiently mark out the historical dimensions of the topics under study. For one thing there is no indication on the face of the book that about 85 of the 125 odd readings are post-World War II. For another the underlying social, economic and political forces that have influenced the law in this period are not stressed. Third, the selections have been edited so that countless ellipses mark the textual cuts and an apology covers the omitted footnotes. This makes the book far less serviceable than it would otherwise be to serious students. The modern judicial craftsmanship of Black and Frankfurter is concealed by such omissions. This is all the more striking when we read Congressman Patman's charge of the influence of law reviews in Supreme Court citations. Academic craftsmanship is also marred when only parts, and not those dealing with methodology, of a Fowler Harper certiorari article and a Schubert game-theory article are included in a book of readings.

In sum, I think that full documentation is desirable in a book of readings on the judicial process to be used by advanced students. But Murphy and Pritchett have created an excellent, readable, exciting book on the key topics on the relation of politics to courts and judges.—CLEMENT E. VOSE, *Wesleyan University*.

A Century of Civil Rights. BY MILTON R. KONVITZ—WITH A STUDY OF *State Law Against Discrimination* BY THEODORE LESKES. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. VIII, 272. $6.00.)

Though the title implies more, this is a book on racial discrimination. The first part by Professor Konvitz is mainly a historical survey of developments at the federal level. The second part by Mr. Leskes supplies a similar survey at the state level. The materials used consist principally of statutes and court decisions. These are carefully analyzed and their significance assessed. Inevitably in such a work there is included, as in a bride's raiment, "something old and something new." The authors' combined efforts supply the reader with sufficient detail to enable him to follow the main lines of policy, both state and national, that mark attempts to overcome this problem.

The problem of civil rights is, of course, a matter of deep concern to Professor Konvitz. Much of his latest work covers familiar ground. Especially is this true of the content analysis of the Civil War amendments, the five congressional statutes enacted thereunder between 1866 and 1875 and the Supreme Court decision in the *Civil Rights Cases* that discarded most of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. All of this is a familiar story often told with greater detail than Professor Konvitz here attempts. More recent developments are possibly less well known. Of these, analyses are made of the recommendations of the President's Committee on Civil Rights (1947), the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the report of the Commission on Civil Rights created under this law, the Civil Rights Act of 1960, and the Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*.

Probably Professor Konvitz's most novel and interesting contributions are contained in the opening chapter in which he analyses the philosophical background of slavery and in chapter five where he speculates about the constitutionality of student sit-ins. The philosophical analysis traces the conflict between the institution of slavery and the idea of humanity from ancient times down to the present. The ancients believed that to be civilized one had to be a slaveholder and that slave ownership demanded brutality. These views were first challenged by the idea of humanity, with its emphasis on the dignity of the individual, that appeared first among the ancient Hebrews. It has taken over two thousand years for humanistic views to overcome pro-slavery views in the western world. The relevance of this to the American scene is apparent when the point is stressed that the American South removed itself from the mainstream of western thought and its conditioning influence. Slavery, to the southerner, was judged more in terms of race than economics. To him, a slave was not human, or if human, he was of an inferior species. This key difference accounts for the intransigence of the South against manumission and its willingness to adopt extreme repressive measures the residue of which still lingers on.

Student sit-ins present a delicate legal problem because they raise the issue of what action is "state" and what is "private." Professor Konvitz argues that repression of student sit-ins is "state" action and therefore unconstitutional. Clearly state legislation or municipal ordinances denying

Negroes access to places of public accommodation are void. The suggestion is also made that it is "state" action when proprietors of public places refuse service to Negroes merely in conformity with state and local custom. If these propositions are accepted, then the use of police to enforce either the state's or proprietor's race policy becomes state action and hence void. Chief support for this view is found in the restrictive covenant cases. A subsidiary argument is based on the doctrine of *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* that voids acts of enforcement of a valid law when racial discrimination is involved. These are reasonable arguments, but who would predict that they will impress the courts? Possibly those who employ statistics to analyze judicial behavior can give us some advance word.

Mr. Leskes, in slightly less than half of the book, makes a historical survey of state laws against discrimination and their interpretation by state courts. Since public attention tends to be focused more completely on federal than on state action, this portion of the book may, for most readers, prove to be the more informative. State laws and their interpretation by state courts are analyzed with reference to places of accommodation, fair employment practices, fair educational practices and fair housing practices. Approximately one half of the states now have laws on one or more of these subjects. A quick count reveals that Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Washington and Oregon have shown the greatest concern. These are followed closely by Michigan, Wisconsin, California and Colorado. While state courts have generally upheld these laws, they have shown some tendency to construe them narrowly. Mr. Leskes feels that the increasing tendency to place enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in the hands of administrators rather than courts will yield better results through the substitution of education and negotiation for prosecution as means of enforcement.

This book is a clear and concise analysis of the major efforts in the United States to overcome discrimination. It is not concerned with the even more extensive efforts, especially in the South, to preserve discrimination. While the authors' preferences are clear enough, the text is devoid of disputation or critical comment. Scholars, and especially the general reader, will find the book to be a most useful reference.—GLENN G. WILTSEY, *University of Rochester.*

Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative. BY JAMES A. ROBINSON. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962, Pp. x, 262. $5.50.)

One of the standard commonplaces in discussions of the separation of powers system of the United States is the observation that the policy role of the Congress has declined in the twentieth century compared to that of the executive. Woodrow Wilson was appalled at the dominance of Congress in policy-making at the beginning of the century; and, though he himself contributed to it, he might have been equally concerned had he viewed the pre-eminence of the Presidency at mid-century. Thoughtful students of the American policy-making process are troubled about the proper roles of the Congress and the executive in an era of harrowing domestic and international crises and of the complexity of problems, issues and alternatives.

It is in this connection that the present book makes a constructive addition to our understanding. James Robinson selects for investigation a policy arena which has traditionally involved the primacy of the President, that of foreign policy. He observes the subordinate role of Congress in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the President, concisely accounts for it, and then proceeds in a workmanlike fashion to dissect the patterns of influence within the Congress to the extent that it does affect the total foreign policy process.

In developing the theme that the primary influence of Congress in foreign policy is that of legitimating and amending policies originating with the executive partly because of "the changing character of the information or intelligence needs in modern policy-making," Professor Robinson employs a variety of data neatly tied together. He utilizes case studies, interviews with congressmen who occupied foreign policy positions during the 85th Congress, interviews with State Department liaison officers, and the personal and official papers of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, as well as the papers of other key figures in the foreign policy process since the New Deal. The book represents the employment of these varieties of materials blended together in a sophisticated way.

In terms of data utilization, it seems to me that the book makes its outstanding contribution in the manner in which case studies are made the basis of part of the analysis. Robinson presents, in capsulated form, twenty-two cases of foreign policy-making since 1933, from neutrality legislation to the Cuban decision in 1961. Special attention is given to the Monroney Resolution of 1958 as the clearest case of congressional initiative in foreign policy among those examined. The cases are presented, not simply for cumulative or illustrative purposes, however, but for their relevance either in suggesting or testing hypotheses about the behavior of policy-makers in the sphere of foreign policy.

From the viewpoint of findings, I found most interesting the analysis of the relationships between Congress and the State Department as a communications network. Professor Robinson hypothesizes that the more satisfied congressmen who play foreign policy roles are with inter-institutional information processes, the more likely they will approve Department policy. He finds three information processes significantly correlated with policy approval: satisfaction with responses to requests for foreign policy information, satisfaction with the Department's record for voluntarily furnishing foreign affairs information, and perception of weight given congressional opinion in Departmental decision-making. Further, his data suggest that congressional satisfaction with the information process may be more important for the congressmen whose party affiliation differs from that of the President than for the members of the President's own party. This suggests, says Professor Robinson, "that information processes and satisfaction with them may be an important element in establishing and maintaining bipartisan foreign policies."

The author is worried about the secondary, and still declining, role of Congress in the foreign policy process. While he recognizes and gives attention to some important ways in which the Congress has sought to retain some semblance of initiative in foreign policy-making, he suggests improvements in congressional organization and procedure so as to strengthen its initiating function. He agrees, after thoughtful consideration of its latent effects, with the proposal of the Brookings Institution that a National Security Policy Committee be created, as a joint committee either replacing or supplementing the work of present congressional committees, in order to facilitate coordination of foreign policy considerations. He urges greater centralization of leadership in the House and Senate, lamenting the passing of Lyndon Johnson's central role in the Senate and proposing transfer of coordinating powers in the House from the Rules Committee to the majority party leadership. Finally, he advocates increasing the size and professionalization of committee staffs, primarily to permit independent congressional study of long-range foreign policy objectives.

Here is a book both methodologically and substantively stimulating and thoughtful, clearly written, well-edited and printed, sweetened by the addition of three engaging appendices, and capped with an impressively extensive bibliography. It is a book to be highly recommended.—Samuel C. Patterson, *State University of Iowa.*

History of the House of Representatives. By George B. Galloway. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1962. Pp. xii, 333. Price $7.50.)

Rich in content, clearly and interestingly written, *History of the House of Representatives* succeeds in what it purports to do— ". . . to promote understanding of our national House of Representatives, where the public's business is performed."

By introducing the reader to the House of Representatives through a series of questions which confronted the writers of the United States Constitution, Mr. Galloway captures the interest of students of government and laymen alike. For among the problems encountered at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were questions so fundamental to our governmental philosophy that some of the governmental problems familiar to today's reader are the same questions raised in 1787 in different form.

The question of "What qualifications should be required of those who were to elect the Congress?" is currently raised in the literacy test bill initiated by the President and filibustered in the Senate. To the question "Should the members of the first branch of the national legislature be elected by the people or by the state legislatures?" one may answer that the House of Representatives is popularly elected, but present overrepresentation of rural areas raises the question of reapportioning seats to follow the population shift to urban areas. This, of course, has just been done, to some extent, based on the 1960 census, but ideal reapportionment certainly has not been achieved. To the question regarding the method of selecting the President we know that the original intention that the President be elected in most instances, not by the Electoral College, but by the House of Representatives found fulfillment only twice. But currently the question is raised in terms of electing the President by a popular majority instead of by a majority of the votes cast in the Electoral College.

Not only does this volume present a comprehensive history of the House of Representatives, but in it one finds factual data analyzed and telescoped in such a manner that one feels the relatedness of historical events to contemporary House practice and procedure. The line of development appears to depict movement from one stage to, in some instances, another almost inevitably logical stage of development. The chapter on the "Evolution of House Rules" is one such example.

Of particular interest to a reader who wishes to know about the relationship that exists between a representative and his constituents in a republican form of government is the chapter on "The Role of the Representative." This is another very basic question, yet unresolved in our system, and unresolved in the book. Should the representative reflect the wishes of his constituents, or should he vote according to his own beliefs and principles, or should he weigh the competing interests with each other and effect a compromise? According to the opinions cited in the book regarding the representative's view of his relationship to his constituency, more voiced the opinion that voters are to be listened to rather than to be followed. The representative is to vote his own belief, based not necessarily upon moral or ethical principles, but based upon a regard for the general welfare of the whole country. This is a vague, amorphous concept, difficult if at all possible to ascertain. It would appear that the general welfare, in the final analysis, is a concept based upon the individual representative's personal attitudes and opinions which are influenced by his desire for reelection.

Added to the text are ten valuable appendices which facilitate finding some specific information such as the number of laws enacted by each Congress since 1789 and the names of the Clerks of the House of Representatives.

In this volume we are given an over-all view of the history of the House of Representatives, not a jargon-ridden text nor a dry, technically detailed account of the history and workings of the first branch of the national legislature. The book is flavorful, informative, and useful.—LOIS B. MORELAND, *Spelman College.*

Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics. BY AARON WILDAVSKY. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 351. $6.75.)

This book has two main parts, either of which, with some editorial doctoring, might stand by itself. The first is a detailed history of the complicated Dixon-Yates controversy; and the second is a concluding chapter in which Wildavsky, in effect, backs off, looks at what he has written, and asks what may be learned from it.

The history of Dixon-Yates, although not easy to follow, is a scholarly summary of a huge quantity of data and will be very useful to historians and others interested in the details of the controversy. More casual readers may wonder whether the benefit received is worth the effort required to grasp the intricate account, but the history does convey a sense of the complexity of governmental decision-making and should appeal to teachers on that ground.

The concluding chapter contains some provocative ideas and is likely to be the most interesting part of the book to the majority of readers. One of these ideas is that the degree of inhibition exerted by stereotypes upon decision-makers' perceptions is likely to vary from one kind of issue to another. Decision-makers may look at a novel issue with fresh eyes and may perceive the relevant information available to them. But when they confront old and hard-fought issues they may draw upon a stock of prefabricated attitudes assumed to include all that can be appropriate. Wildavsky's hypothesis is that the Eisenhower Administration's inability to perceive a conflict of interest in the Dixon-Yates negotiations resulted from the fact that the battle of public vs. private power had been fought for so long and so bitterly that they, like the public power people, had accumulated a kind of standard kit of attitudes. The author suggests that there is likely to be an inverse relationship between the freshness of a decision-maker's approach to an issue and the duration and intensity of previous public conflict over the question.

I am not certain whether Wildavsky sees the use of AEC as the agent for buying Dixon-Yates power as the result of a choice between alternatives. But his evidence suggests that the Administration's assumption that it had some kind of responsibility to meet the power needs of Memphis was the crucial element in the employment of AEC. Although Wildavsky tells us nothing about the origin of this feeling of responsibility for Memphis, once the Administration accepted it (whether or not as the result of a considered choice), then the use of AEC and Dixon-Yates followed as a matter of course, since the Administration was ideologically opposed to expansion of TVA and surmised that it could not get TVA to buy Dixon-Yates power. The question of whether a decision, in the sense of a choice, was actually made is, of course, one that often comes up in studies of decision-making. As Raymond Bauer has written in an unpublished memorandum, "... accepted resolutions of [issues] X and Y may rule out all but one resolution of issue Z, so that when the parties begin to discuss Z they find that without intending to do so they have already taken a stand on Z."

To Wildavsky the ultimate decision of Memphis to build its own plant is an example of the superiority of a decision reached through group conflict over one hierarchically determined and imposed. The Dixon-Yates scheme was the first choice only of the Administration and Dixon-Yates; but the decision of Memphis, although the first choice of only one participant, was the second choice of all the rest. It was the solution that satisfied the widest range of preferences, and I judge that the range of preferences satisfied is Wildavsky's measure of the public interest.—OWEN STRATTON, *Wellesley College.*

The Political World of American Zionism. BY SAMUEL HALPERIN. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961. Pp. IX, 431. $8.00.)

This analytical survey, primarily concerned with Zionist efforts to win the support of our Jewish citizenry, should be of considerable interest to Americans of all religious persuasions.

Samuel Halperin provides us with a much needed objective study of developments in the

United States which were instrumental to the creation of Israel. Concentrating on the period 1929–1948 and beginning with the reactions to the Palestinian Arab riots of 1929, he shows how the Jewish community was slowly won over to accepting the views of Theodor Herzl. In 1896 Herzl "transfigured" the Jewish world with his thesis (in *The Jewish State*) that an independent Jewish nation was absolutely necessary if extinction of the culture and of its contribution to humanity was to be avoided.

The majority of American Jews, and their social and religious organizations, were not easily convinced. Until the community fully comprehended the enormity of the horrors being perpetrated by Nazi Germany, it was seriously divided on the question of supporting the Zionist political goal of a new Jewish Commonwealth. Committed, now as then, to a full espousal of this democracy, the heterogeneous leadership procrastinated. Only the Nazi blood-bath shocked it into a change of position, to ensure the salvation of the remnants of European Jewry.

Jewry's spiritual conception of Zion has been and remains quite apart from modern *Zionism.* A longing to be proud and free once again, near holy Mount Zion, was a dream sustaining displaced Hebrews for two thousand years. Dispersed like beads from a broken necklace they made their prayers for deliverance from wandering and oppression a rock of their faith. Behind that cherished vision is seemingly endless suffering, documented in the pages of histories which trace the inhumanity of man to man.

Regarding Zionist programs of this century, each of the three main branches of Judaism in the United States—Orthodox, Conservative and Reform—were cautious about converting the spiritual conception into the practical reality of a new Jewish state. That caution was manifested by considerable divisions amongst the faithful reflecting such divergent reactions as zealous adherence to Zionist programs, luke-warm agreement in principle, and positive anti-Zionist activities.

Professor Halperin deserves commendation for taking an emotionally-charged subject and treating it with scholarly precision and detachment. There is much value in his application of basic principles evolved by contemporary political scientists. He tests his material against the findings of specialists in the public opinion, propaganda, pressure groups and social psychology fields. The author avoids the temptation to take sides. He keeps to his promise that the "only moral I would impart . . . is that the associations observed constitute a legitimate segment of the American political scene and, as such, are to be neither condemned nor praised, but studied and understood."

Not the least consequential contribution of this research, is that it provides evidence that the overwhelming majority of American Jews finally came to espouse the Zionist cause in order to secure a haven for their co-religionists *outside* of the United States. They could not ignore their humane sentiments or the teachings of Jefferson and Jackson and Lincoln. They could not ignore the fact that the peril point had been passed by too many millions in Europe. Israel emerged out of tragedy, partly as a triumph of the Zionist movement. Sadly, that triumph, in large measure, was based on a social affliction cursing all mankind.—Bernard Rubin, *Boston University.*

The Farmer's Dilemma. By Stanley Andrews. (Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. vii, 184. Price $4.50.)

Mr. Stanley Andrews has attempted an answer to one of the tantalizing mysteries of the American scene. How can the American farmer be so abundantly productive and yet in almost continual, and worsening, economic straits? He answers this question in a well-written, interesting style. It is plain to the reader just where Andrews stands on this matter of "the farm problem." What he has to say has already been said many times before, for the most part, but his exposition is lucid and logical. The lay person would be well-advised to give this book a careful reading.

Andrews describes the farmer's dilemma in familiar fashion. The commercial farmer is one of the main remnants of our ostensibly competitive economy. Within this environment he is trying to maximize his profit. To do so, he attempts to reduce production costs by the efficient utilization of capital and technological improvements. Improved credit facilities, seeds, fertilizers, cultivation practices and the like have been employed and the farmer's rate of economic growth has clearly exceeded that of urban industry. Nevertheless, within about the last 40 years, the commercial farmer has only been prosperous when the nation has been at war, or in the early postwar years. Relative food costs to the consumer, in terms of his per capita income, have rather constantly decreased; meanwhile the cost-price squeeze has been slowly strangling the farmer.

The dilemma of the low-income farmer is of a different type. Price support programs are of little real value to him. Improved public credit has, to a very limited extent, helped improve his condition. The odds are strongly against him, however. If he moves to the city—which he has done and will continue to do—he is ill-prepared to enter into the skilled labor market or into a white collar job, so his economic position is about as weak as before.

Andrews describes what the federal government has done, particularly since 1929, to try to improve the conditions of both the commercial and the low-income farmers. He has been directly and importantly involved in the farm politics of the United States during the last 30-odd years, so he brings some new insights into an already well-told story. His analysis of the farm export programs is especially useful and challenging. In the immediate post-World War II period he was director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations in the U. S. Department of Agriculture. He concludes that our export programs have been basically "dumping" programs. We had to get rid of the mounting agricultural surpluses or cut back drastically on the production thereof. Congress and the farm organizations took the easier path—in the short run—and let the U. S. Treasury pay the bill in the form of Public Law 480 and other programs of that type.

Andrews does believe there is value in the export programs and in the domestic legislation which brought about the school lunch, special milk, and food stamp programs. In the area of foreign policy, the export programs have been downright harmful in some instances, clearly helpful in others. Andrews' insightful comments about our food policies relative to India, Pakistan, the southeast Asian countries, and Yugoslavia probably constitute the most original contribution the book has to make.

Why have the attempts on the part of the federal government to improve the farmer's economic condition been so costly and yet only minimally successful? Andrews answers that question accurately, in my opinion. First, for political reasons there has always been considerable "slippage" in the farm programs: too many loopholes, so to speak, for the farmers to take advantage of, legally to be sure. Secondly, the farm cooperatives have not developed the kind and amount of bargaining power which the farmer needs in order to be in an equal power position with those from from whom he buys and those to whom he sells.

Andrews believes that there are two alternative courses of action regarding the future of farming in America. Either the federal government steps out of the scene, at least in terms of meaningful price supports and production controls; or the federal government provides the farmer with price and income assistance which can be of some real economic value to him, for which the farmer will—if he chooses to do so by referendum—cut back substantially on his production. Either we will move to an "estate-based agriculture" in which our food will be produced by some 300,000–500,000 farms; or, we will legislate a supply-management program which will enable the "family farm" to survive and prosper. His choice is clearly for the second alternative.

To bring about the kind of an American agriculture which he considers to be in our national interest, Andrews states eight "fundamental problems" which will have to be resolved. His proposed "national farm policy" cannot be delved into in any detail here, but it resembles, to an important extent, the proposals made by President Kennedy to Congress in early 1962. He calls for "market allotments," "adequate" national food reserves for emergency purposes, an international "food bank," a "sound" international trade policy for agricultural products, more emphasis on assistance to low-income farmers, "fair food prices" to the consumers, farmer-choice in regards to the two alternative programs and—if the supply management route is accepted—farmer-administration of them, and certain structural changes in the bureaucracy of the USDA. All this will have to be sought for, he notes, in a period of declining farmer political power!

This book needs an index, but, much more importantly, it needs to be read.—Ross B. Talbot, *Iowa State University.*

The Development of the Social Security Act. By Edwin E. Witte with a foreword by Frances Perkins. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Pp. xix, 220. $5.75.)

This volume is a posthumous publication. The manuscript was originally prepared in 1936 at the request of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, but for some reason it remained for more than twenty-five years in the typescript stage, on deposit in the University of Wisconsin and Social Security Administration libraries. In its published form, the book consists of two parts. Part I, entitled "General History of Committee and Act," is a case study highlighting the principal personalities and political relationships involved in the formulation of the organic statute which laid the foundations of American social insurance and welfare policy. The immediate story starts in February, 1934, when the first Wagner-Lewis bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, but the major part begins with the President's message to Congress in June and the appointment of the author as Executive Director of the Committee on Economic Security in July. From that point until the signing of the bill a year later on August 14, 1935, the memorandum is an "instructive lesson in political dynamics, illustrating the interplay of ideas and interests within an Administration, the relations between the President and key persons in Congress (as well as their respective staffs), and the responsiveness of government to political pressures."

Part II, "Provisions of the Social Security Act," describes in detail how and why the major technical policy provisions of the law came to be written. The presentation is so similar in pattern and style to Part I that it is not clear to the reader why the two were not woven together. Presumably Dr. Witte was responding to different audiences and historical interests, and thought that clarity of the record would be promoted by making the differentiation. At all events, our published literature on the legislative process is now enriched by an outstanding example of participant observation at the highest policy level.

While the book can be accurately described as a legislative case history, it is much more than that. It gives a picture of a remarkable man at work, an expert in the field of labor and social insurance who was also skilled in the arts of research direction, interagency negotiation, legislative counselling, and continuous political mediation and coordination. Witte was called to Washington from a lifetime of work in state government and university teaching to act as secretary of a cabinet committee, a representative advisory council, at the same time directing a research staff and coordinating its work with the deliberations of a high-powered Technical Board of government experts in economic security. Under Executive Order 6757 (June 29, 1934), the (Cabinet) Committee on Economic Security was to report its recommendations within four months, (December 1). Considering the novelty, range and complexity of the problems, in retrospect it is truly amazing that this machinery was put into operation, the report delivered by December 24, and the President's message transmitting the Administration's program and draft legislation sent to Congress by January 17, 1935. There is a model here of one type of policy-formulating strategy in American national government, together with an account of the differences of opinion and principle among the experts that get mixed up with departmental interests and Congressional alignments to obstruct even the best-laid plans. Dr. Witte's analysis of the Advisory Council on Social Security points up the basic difficulties underlying the concept of group representation in politics, although he is careful to point out that group consultation is not only essential but highly constructive, when properly planned and competently conducted. Finally one is given an insight into the peculiar American legislative practice of giving technical assistance and political credit to politicians who oppose bills, thereby securing their support in ultimate passage.

With respect to the substantive issues of social insurance, the reader will find here authoritative explanations of why the same law provides for a wholly federal old age insurance system, a tax-offset scheme of federally-financed, state-established and administered unemployment compensation, and statutory grants-in-aid to states for the several categories of public assistance. The tax actuarial problems of social insurance are treated in a political rather than a technical perspective, which is simply to say the issues are described in the context as the responsible decision-makers visualized them rather than in the language of economics and insurance. There is no fictitious Congressional "Intent" or "Will" here; there are only persons acting in official and group capacities who took positions and, under political pressures, made agreements out of which public policy was forged.

It is a pleasure to note that two political scientists, Thomas H. Eliot and Joseph P. Harris, find frequent recognition throughout the pages of the book.—AVERY LEISERSON, *Vanderbilt University.*

Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion. BY CLINTON ROSSITER. (New York: Vintage Books, 1962. Second Edition, Revised. Pp. xii, 306. $1.45.)

Seven years after its original publication Professor Rossiter's instructive study re-appears, substantially revised, as a paperback. It could be called the sober second thought of a conservative, were it not that the author now explicitly disavows the label. He locates his position somewhere in the misty mid-regions between Peale and Niebuhr, between Lippmann and Kirk, between Reuther and Goldwater, and admits to being "at once the most liberal of conservatives and the most conservative of liberals." This is artful dodging, but Professor Rossiter may be permitted his little joke.

With a few slight qualifications the major definitions remain the same, as does the taxonomic approach of the early chapters. The useful distinction between Burkean Conservatism and normative American conservatism is retained, though the semantic difficulties have not been entirely overcome. Rugged economic individualism receives, as before, a stern rebuke. The views of Kirk, Buckley, Viereck and other not-so-new conservatives come in for more extensive criticism, though one looks in vain for an adequate analysis of the current Radical Right. The concluding chapters have been thoroughly revised, not merely to bring them up to date but to moderate the hortatory tone which marred the first edition. The excellent bibliography is duly enlarged.

The sober side of the new edition appears in Rossiter's sharpened stress on the difficulties of achieving the kind of reformed conservatism for which he calls. In the face of the "benevolent tyranny" of the dominant liberal tradition of the

United States, conservatism is a "thankless persuasion" indeed. It needs a "viable theory," but "the mere intention to spin out a full-bodied theory is somehow an unconservative impulse," and in any case experience must precede logic: "a conservative way of life must go before and shape a conservative pattern of thought." The conservative, says Rossiter, must hold the middle ground as mediator. But if, as this reviewer supposes, the task of mediation assumes the *givenness* of the positions to be mediated, how shall the conservative also act to brake the present slippage in the political spectrum which carries him willy-nilly toward the Radical Right? The issue of desegregation would seem to furnish a critical test of conservative doctrine, but here, Rossiter admits, the tradition affords no authoritative guide; "the signals are off," and each conservative must muddle through on his own. Seven years have made Rossiter rather less sanguine about the resolution of such dilemmas, yet they must be resolved if conservatism is to become intellectually coherent and relevant.

What, then, are the prospects? Rossiter's answer is ambiguous. On p. 237 he foresees "no sudden check or reversal in the glacial shift of the American intellect" to the Center and Right. But on p. 4 it appears that "we are not quite so conservative a country today" as in 1955. The campuses which in 1955 were said to "run over" with conservative academics now merely "shelter (if they do not exactly teem with)" them. Nevertheless, Rossiter suggests that "a reformed theory of American conservatism" enjoys "excellent prospects." How this can be when the "creative conservative" is expected to perform simultaneously as "the chief sponsor of change in American life, the chief opponent of the reforms that are needed to civilize it, and the chief mourner for the civilization that has gone forever" does not appear.—MICHAEL MCGIFFERT, *University of Denver.*

Six Crises. BY RICHARD M. NIXON. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1962. Pp. 460. $5.95.)

In this book the former Vice President gives us an account of the 1960 campaign for the Presidency; his 1959 encounters with Nikita Khrushchev; his tour of Latin America in 1958; his role in the events precipitated by President Eisenhower's heart attack in September, 1955; his fight to stay on the Republican ticket in 1952; and the fall of Alger Hiss. The book is loosely integrated by Mr. Nixon's efforts to describe his personal reactions in each of these situations and "to distill out of my experience a few general principles on the 'crisis syndrome.'" He disavows, however—modestly and rightly—any pretense to having written a scholarly treatise on conduct in crisis: once distilled, his principles ("Confidence in crisis depends in great part on adequacy of preparation," "Experience is a vitally important factor") turn out to be trite but true and *vice versa.* Scholars will find *Six Crises* interesting mainly as a source of footnotes to recent political history and as an intensely political man's exercise in looking at the past with an eye to the future.

Nixon's comments on his relations with General Eisenhower will provide some of the best fodder for footnotes. On more than one occasion the General was anything but helpful in Nixon's crisis hours. When the fund issue broke in September, 1952, Eisenhower remained out of communication with his running mate for five days—while the attack mounted, influential Republican newspapers called for Nixon's resignation, and the General himself implied in a statement to the press that Nixon would have to prove himself "clean as a hound's tooth." When the General's anxiously awaited call finally came through, he was to say, "I have come to the conclusion that you are the one who has to decide what to do. After all, you've got a big following in this country and if the impression got around that you got off the ticket because I forced you to get off, it is going to be very bad. On the other hand, if I issue a statement now backing you up, in effect people will accuse me of condoning wrongdoing." He recommended that Nixon put his case before the country in a television speech. Later Nixon, only an hour before he was to make that speech, was thrown into confusion by a new communication from Eisenhower headquarters: the top Eisenhower advisers, he was told, presumably with the General's agreement, wanted him to close his speech by submitting his resignation. On a second occasion Eisenhower could properly be charged with having created a crisis for Nixon. Announcing his own intention to seek re-election in 1956, the General evaded any commitment as to a running mate. Nixon, he said, would have "to chart his own course." This statement came after he had privately suggested that Nixon might consider a Cabinet post and had observed that the Vice President was running behind Earl Warren in the Gallup Poll. After several humiliating weeks in which Eisenhower gave him only the most equivocal indications of intent or preference, Nixon was finally forced to ask for a place on the 1956 ticket. In the 1960 campaign, Eisenhower embarrassed his heir apparent at least two more times. In a press conference he said that, if given a week, he might be able to think of an important decision in which Nixon had participated. He later explained that this was intended as a facetious sally, but Nixon regards it as having been a serious blow to his efforts to capitalize on the experience issue. Finally, in the last days of the campaign, Nixon tried to get approval for a White House announcement that the Justice Department would look into the arrest of Reverend Martin Luther King. His efforts were to no avail. Attorney General William Rogers was ready to act, according to Nixon, but the White House, for some reason, was not.

Although Nixon has these and many other inside stories to report, scholars must proceed with some caution when using *Six Crises* as a source. A statement about Alger Hiss's Woodstock typewriter has had to be corrected in later printings of the book and another—that Allan Dulles briefed John F. Kennedy on CIA preparations for the invasion of Cuba—has been denied by both Kennedy and Dulles. And these are not the only points on which Nixon's comments are apt to be misleading. He says, for instance, that

> Looking back, I suppose the politically expedient course would have been for me to grant without argument that we had been standing still for the past eight years and then to promise, if I were elected, to do everything he [Kennedy] had promised, and more besides.

He may be showing the same kind of wry humor here that Eisenhower displayed in his statement about Nixon's participation in the decisions of the Eisenhower Administration; but certainly it is hard to believe that a repudiation of the Republican record would have been Nixon's most expedient course in 1960, or that he believes it would have been. It is equally hard to accept at face value his characterization of the 1960 post-convention session of Congress as "one of the shrewdest moves" of the Democratic campaign. His reasoning: it pinned him to Washington because he might have to break a tie vote in the Senate, while Johnson and Kennedy could roam more freely, secure in the knowledge that they could arrange pairs for their votes.

Although he devotes relatively little space to the discussion of substantive issues in his book, Nixon's current political stance emerges with considerable clarity. He is critical of the "liberalists" who opposed the Un-American Activities Committee's investigation of the Hiss case but careful to note that liberalists "are not even remotely disloyal." He makes a thinly veiled (but nonetheless veiled) attack on the methods of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. He has harsh words to say, *passim*, about the Kennedy Administration's handling of the Cuban invasion and the Laotian crisis. By implication he charges Nelson Rockefeller with opportunism and hypocrisy. He remains a thoroughgoing Eisenhower Republican; any difficulties the General may have caused him, are no sooner described than excused. For Nixon Eisenhower was—and is—a great leader with an orderly, quick, far-ranging, and versatile mind whose "thoughts far outraced his speech."

Many of Nixon's asides will be of interest to students of image building, but one in particular will intrigue political scientists—his version of "the Great American Legend as to how presidential candidates are born and made":

> The legend goes something like this. A mother takes a child on her knee. She senses by looking into his eyes that there is something truly extraordinary about him. She says to herself and perhaps even to him, "You, son, are going to be President some day." From that time on, he is tapped for greatness. He talks before he walks. He reads a thousand words a minute. He is bored by school because he is so much smarter than his teachers. He prepares himself for leadership by taking courses in public speaking and political science. He drives ever upward, calculating every step of the way until he reaches his and—less importantly—the nation's destiny by becoming President of the United States.

Frankly, this reviewer had never been exposed to this account of the Great American Legend before, (it is most probably a Californian interpretation of a Massachusetts variation on the Legend) but was naturally flattered to learn that the members of his profession were central figures in it.—STANLEY KELLEY, JR., *Princeton University.*

The La Guardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City. BY CHARLES GARRETT. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 423. $8.50.)

Thirty Explosive Years in Los Angeles County. BY JOHN ANSON FORD. (San Marino, California: The Huntington Library, 1961. Pp. xv, 232. $6.00.)

Similarities and contrasts mark these two studies of reform movements in local government, dealing with the geographical extremes of the nation. The Garrett volume recounts machine and reform politics in our largest city over a century and a half, while Ford's work is a first-hand account of demographical changes and governmental reforms during three decades in the nation's fastest growing urban area.

The Garrett volume on New York City leads off with an analysis of machine and reform traditions in American municipal politics. Succeeding chapters carry New York City politics from the earliest days of Tammany Hall to the fusion movement of the early 1930's which put Fiorello H. La Guardia into the mayoralty. The heart of the volume deals with the La Guardia personality and his activities in the realms of administration, finance, the underworld, public welfare, structural changes in government, and the political campaigns that carried reform beyond its usual one-term duration. Garrett's conclusion covers the decline of reformism in New York City and the mayors and their administrations since the La Guardia years.

Historian Garrett displays insights into the motivations of bosses and reformers, and the differing conceptions of human nature upon which they pattern their actions. His purpose is not to write a biography of La Guardia, but to appraise machine and reform politics in the setting of La Guardia's three terms as mayor.

Professor Garrett is no hero-worshipper, for he sees Mayor La Guardia as a many-faceted personality—on the one hand, humorous, charming, sociable, sentimental, moralistic, while on the other, difficult to get along with, autocratic, impatient, opinionated, and vindictive. This reviewer cannot quarrel with Professor Garrett's summation of La Guardia as New York's greatest mayor.

The political scientist will find particularly valuable the discussions of fusion movements, charter reforms, proportional representation (toward which the author is sympathetic), and campaign techniques utilized in a metropolitan area. The author's notes are profuse, and show especially his use of newspaper files.

The volume by John Anson Ford is on social and governmental changes in Los Angeles County during the past thirty years. His vantage point was that of a participant-observer, having served on the county board of supervisors during twenty-four of those years.

Ford justifies the writing of this volume by citing the county's tremendous growth, diversity of its functions, and the microcosm it provides of the nation. In more than twenty brief chapters he summarizes and provides examples of metropolitan growth problems and attempted solutions. The varied and vast undertakings of Los Angeles County are catalogued and the author indicates the role of the board of supervisors in the government of the county. Of concern to political scientists are Mr. Ford's discussion of county charters, city functions and relationships to counties, the "Lakewood plan" (contract cities plan), financing, purchasing, and personnel procedures, planning and zoning, and establishment of the Los Angeles County sanitation districts—a case in intergovernmental cooperation.

Mr. Ford defines what he calls "the cancer in politics"—the mounting costs of political campaigning and the difficulties arising from dependency on a relatively few large contributors. Candidates frequently, he writes, tell their managers in effect: "Now *you* get the money, but don't tell *me* any of the details as to amounts or who the donors are." The author's proposal, basically the remedy of Theodore Roosevelt a half century ago, is that every voter should share on a minimal basis the cost of campaigning—a "poll tax." The registrar of voters would collect the estimated dollar per year per voter and disburse these funds to party and nonpartisan committees. "These provisions would not be a cure-all . . . but they would greatly lessen corruption and the inequities . . . ." The value of his proposal is not its novelty but the extensive practical political experience of the man who makes it.

This book centers on developments viewed by the author as accomplishments, and therefore seldom deals with shortcomings or failings. Critics go mostly unnoticed, while the author defends some of his past actions as a county official. Personal recollections serve as a principal source of information, for the volume is not documented.—Ross R. Rice, *Arizona State University.*

Hawaii Pono: A Social History. By Lawrence H. Fuchs. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961. Pp. ix, 501. $6.95)

"*Hawaii Pono* signifies that Hawaii is worthy of praise," explains Professor Fuchs, "since 'pono' means right or excellent." Hawaii is no longer an experiment in race relations for today it presents "the world's best example of dynamic social democracy." The explanation and support of this sweeping assertion is the primary task which Fuchs has set himself in this account of our "50th state, its people and politics, from annexation to statehood."

This attempt to portray the "big picture" necessarily invites comparison with that more popularized account of recent fame, Michener's *Hawaii.* Indeed, such a comparison is directly invited by Michener in a dust-jacket blurb in which he suggests that "a careful reading of *Hawaii Pono*" will enable the reader to "understand where I might have gone wrong in some of my interpretations and where I fell short of writing the detailed truth." Michener's well-taken commentary on his own work points to the essential difference between these two accounts. While both he and Fuchs paint on a broad canvas, Michener enjoyed that artistic license available to those whose writings lie in that never-never land which is located somewhere between the domains of fact and fiction. His historical-fictional technique enabled him to splash his canvas with vivid, undiluted tropical hues and occasionally to achieve brilliant literary effects at the price of considerable historical distortion. Fuchs, by contrast, has produced a more scholarly work which, if it attracts less popular attention, will nevertheless serve the more important long-term purpose of advancing serious research and writing on Hawaii.

Fuchs has succeeded in avoiding the sins of over-simplification in no small measure because of his remarkable capacity to bring together and coordinate the activities of a stalwart band of mainland and Island researchers from a number of disciplines, among them sociology, political science and economics. He and his assistants have labored mightily, both in the archives and in the field, and have produced an account of Hawaii which, if not correct in every detail, is none the less a thorough and largely sound piece of work.

Hawaii Pono presents in quick review a series of sketches of the major ethnic groups which have populated modern Hawaii. The perplexing diversity of Hawaii's social fabric becomes somewhat more understandable as viewed through the detailed account of the waves of immigration which first supplemented and then gradually replaced the native Hawaiian stock as it was decimated by disease and diluted through intermarriage. Fuchs depicts with warmth and sensitivity the ensuing human drama as Hawaii was repeopled by successive waves of Haoles (white men or Caucasians), Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos and many other peoples. This portion of Fuchs' work, while intensely interesting, covers largely familiar ground which has been rather intensively explored by such Island sociologists as Lind and Hormann of the University of Hawaii.

It is in his reporting and analysis of the politically decisive developments of twentieth-century Hawaii that Fuchs makes his most important contribution. He presents a balanced account of the rise of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union to dominance in Hawaii's union movement and a long-needed explanation of its role in Island politics. He handles in a constructive manner the politically explosive issue of the I.L.W.U. leadership's alleged Communist Party affiliations. Recounted here adequately for the first time to this reviewer's knowledge is the story of *Imua* (the Hawaiian word for "forward"), the militantly anti-Communist, anti-labor organization which provided the focal point of old-guard resistance to the rising force of unionism. Fuchs also provides a clear and useful account of the difficult battle for statehood. Somewhat less spectacular, but of deeper importance, is his explanation of the rise to political hegemony in Hawaii's legislature of the lawmakers of oriental ancestry, the sons and grandsons by and large of those Japanese and Chinese immigrants who were brought to the Islands as plantation laborers.

Fuchs has purportedly adopted a now conventional mode of analysis by claiming in the subtitle of his work that *Hawaii Pono* is "social history." Fortunately, this claim is largely belied by the work itself, for Fuchs is too sound a political scientist to restrict his analysis merely to social history. It is rather the rich drama of Hawaii's turbulent constitutional history which dominates his work and gives it structure, even when the author's primary emphasis is placed elsewhere. Accordingly, the attention of the political scientist is drawn persistently to *political* considerations, and he can hardly fail to be instructed by the panorama of constitutional changes which in less than a century and a half have transformed Hawaii from the absolute monarchy of Kamehameha the Great to constitutional monarchy, thence toward oligarchy and currently toward democracy. In the broadest terms, Fuchs thus provides an account of what might be termed "the changing regime in Hawaii," an account which at its best succeeds in relating constitutional changes to such related considerations as economic development, the acquisition of full rights of citizenship by plantation workers or their descendants, and the rise of a militant labor union movement. Fuchs reveals the primacy of the political by showing that the manifold problems associated with the cultural and ethnic diversity of the peoples of Hawaii have been resolved chiefly through the institutions of government.

Those who are skeptical of this interpretation may well ask themselves how it has come about that the contemporary Hawaiian polity differs so radically from that of a number of Latin American "banana republics" which it so nearly resembled some three-quarters of a century ago. In its plantation economy and semi-colonial status, Hawaii closely resembled Cuba. How is it then that the Hawaiian regime has moved strongly in the direction of egalitarian democracy while the planter republics of Latin America have all too frequently been transformed from oligarchies into tyrannies? To understand this difference we must go beyond *Hawaii Pono* in tracing the relationships between Hawaii's "social history" and the constitutional politics of the United States. One may well imagine that questions such as these are very much in the forefront of Fuchs' attention as he currently addresses himself to direction of the Peace Corps program in the Philippines, a nation whose constitutional development could profitably be contrasted to that of the Hawaiian polity.

Hawaii Pono will considerably facilitate the task of those mainlanders desirous of acquiring a rudimentary understanding of the politics of Hawaii, while Islanders will find this work useful in dispelling those opinions, myths and rumors which have provided a surprisingly persistent substitute for knowledge within their own community. Above all, it may be hoped that *Hawaii Pono* will provide impetus and encouragement to those scholars who are prepared to provide related accounts of Hawaii's excessively centralized governmental structure, business and labor monopolies and the politically crucial questions stemming from the Island state's unique concentration of land ownership, both public and private. —ROBERT HORWITZ, *Michigan State University*.

National Party Platforms: 1840–1960. COMPILED BY KIRK PORTER AND DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1961. Pp. 640. $10.)

It is a truism that American party platforms are not binding on the behavior of party leaders in office, and are often ambiguous trumpetings composed of a medley of themes, aimed at satisfying the various groups or publics to which the parties must appeal. Nonetheless, platforms do express the general, loose central perspectives or ideologies of our parties. A compendium of such statements over the last 120 years offers interesting tracings of ideological change and development.

The present volume, an enlarged edition of Professor Porter's earlier collection, provides an abundance of such materials. It ranges from the first declaration in the Democratic convention of 1840, through the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties and four minor parties in 1960.

Platforms have tended to grow longer as the years passed. Thus, the Democratic "resolutions" of 1840 take less than one large double-column page in this book, and even the tortuous Democratic planks of 1856 consume only a little more than three pages, whereas the defensive Republican platform of 1932 occupies nearly twelve pages and the "New Frontier" Democratic statement of 1960 takes twenty-six. Parties *can* be brief in modern times, as the Democrats were in a two-page platform in 1944. By and large, however, more and more items are included as the complexity of society gives birth to more and more interests and shadings of opinion whose claims must be recognized.

This compendium of platforms provides confirmation for the thesis that American major parties exhibit dualism in a moving consensus, as V. O. Key puts it. Again and again, the aims set forth by a party-of-movement in a given period and originally opposed by a party-of-resistance appear in the later statements of the erstwhile opposition party, though often in a muted, ambiguously formalistic, or modified fashion. Minor parties of protest and such schismatic eras as the 1850s and the Civil War aside, it is hard to find evidence for profound, continuing social cleavage in American party platforms.

It is interesting to note that of more than one hundred minor, fragmentary, or "third" party platforms included by the editors, scarcely a dozen were the products of parties whose position was significantly to the right of the contemporary major parties. The "Know Nothings" of 1856, the Coughlin-Lehmke Union party of 1936, the "Dixiecrats" of 1948, and the Christian Nationalists of 1952 are representatives of a scarce breed beside the would-be tigers of reform, socialism, or other left protest. Frustration, of course, was the common lot of virtually all of them.

The editors provide brief introductory notes to the platforms of each quadrennial campaign, but one could often wish that the notes were fuller and more informative. Thus, for example, we might like to know more about the circumstances of the framing of this or that major party statement, or about just who the Christian Nationalists were and what their impact was. This is a small complaint, however, about an already very big volume which will remain the standard collection of its kind.—WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788. BY JACKSON TURNER MAIN. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press for The Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, 1961. Pp. xv, 308. Price: $7.50.)

Like poor Patrick Henry, the Antifederalists seem to have been given the short end of the stick in American history in general and in the development of American political institutions in particular. Even the Bill of Rights, their major contribution, are popularly ascribed to Madison who introduced them to Congress only under Antifederal pressure. In part this situation is a natural one due to the unparalleled success of the Constitution. But, by way of contrast to the success of the Federalists, the opposition has been discredited to the point of appearing almost "un-American," to use a vague popular term. Historians have suspected their motives and chastised or pitied them for their lack of vision. With this book, which is a manuscript award winner from the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Professor Main has taken a solid step in the direction of re-assessment which should lead to a new understanding of the Antifederalist dilemma and appreciation of their approach to the problems of political organization.

The Antifederalists is a state by state analysis of Antifederal strength according to geography and the significant economic views attached thereto. The author found coastal, commercial, urban environs generally Federal, while the remote agricultural areas were Antifederal. He convincingly demonstrates that the pattern of alignment of forces found in the Constitutional debate of 1788–89 was initiated by the dispute over a Confederal impost beginning in 1781. He documents the close relationship between the economic issues of the day—impost, public debt, commercial advantages—and the Antifederalist camp. His analysis of issues follows the approach of Charles A. Beard. But whether or not his work is a "vigorous counterstatement to the revisionists," as the dust jacket states, is another question. Professor Main more than reasonably proves the close proximity of economic and political views, but he does not convincingly demonstrate that the relationship is a strictly causative one.

The second half of the book collects the Antifederal objections to national government and the various counter-proposals to the Constitution. Following these chapters is a convention by convention account of Antifederal defeat at the hands of the Federalists, whose superior organization, greater newspaper coverage and keen sense of political timing turned minorities into majorities and won the day.

Professor Main balances the need for generalization with that of accuracy and detail to present the kind of concise, over-all account essential to an understanding of the Anti-federalists. His abundant footnoting of sources is helpful, while the restraint evident in his conclusions is as refreshing as his straight-forward admission that some important source material is lacking.

While filling a gap in the history of post-Revolutionary War politics, to paraphrase the Introduction, the author does not assess the theoretical foundations of the Antifederal position. In this regard, his work is an hors-d'oeuvre rather than a main course. It contains short discussions on the meaning of "federal" and "democracy" before the Federalists succeeded in modifying these terms; the Antifederal view of the incompatibility of a large, diverse country and national government with a democratically based republic; and the Antifederal fear that centralized power would be destructive of liberty. This book is at its best in bringing to life and explaining the political dilemma of the Antifederalists. No less important, it points the way toward assessment and appreciation of their contribution to our political institutions.—Eldon Bowman, *College of Wooster.*

Design of Regional Accounts: Papers presented at the Conference on Regional Accounts, 1960. Edited by Werner Hochwald. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Pp. xx, 281. $6.00.)

This volume presents a series of nine papers dealing with various aspects of the design of regional accounts. In addition to the thirteen economists who wrote the major papers, seventeen commentators added their brief evaluations and criticisms. From the point of view of methodology, the approach here represented is one that might well be emulated in political science, for the critical interaction and interchange among a group of scholars exploring a frontier problem provides a stimulating volume.

This collection of papers is a part of the growing literature on regional economics, much of which has been sponsored and supported by Resources for the Future, Inc. This literature of the new regionalists is to be distinguished from that of twenty-five years ago by its greater rigor and by its search for operational concepts, models and data which can serve as a foundation for analysis and prediction. The interest in policy decisions remains strong, although there is frequent recognition of the primitive state of knowledge and the difficulties of acquiring useable data. Generally restrained is philosophical speculation as to the nature of regional development, and many of the unstated and unanalyzed major premises of earlier regional literature are avoided.

The difficult problem of regional definition has not been solved (if indeed it needs to be solved) and often the contributors make clear that they are speaking about metropolitan regions (the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the Census Bureau). This focus is not particularly justified, although it is clearly implied that these units are used because it is in the SMSA's where most significant economic activity occurs and for which data are collected and organized.

While in the first instance this volume will have a primary appeal for economists (Only the chapter by Edward B. Berman, "Impact of Local Government Policies on Local Capital Formation and Output," would seem to have an obvious political relevance), it is this reviewer's conviction that these papers and related literature should receive greater attention from political scientists. This conviction rests on two premises: *first,* that political-governmental decisions in the next decades will have to be made in the context of their economic effects, local as well as national, and *second,* that some of the most critical political struggles and conflicts in this period will concern the geographic allocation of public benefits (as well as costs).

Perhaps allocation questions will continue to be settled largely through group alliances and alignments, through horse trades and pork-barrel bargains. But in so far as political science may also be concerned with the development of more rational decisions, it may find the work of the new regionalists useful as indicating some of the constraints within which political decisions may be made. Perhaps, too, political science can build upon the work of the regional economists and upon their data, since their writings often seem oblivious to the nature of political decision-making.

In addition to the paper by Berman referred to above, the volume includes the following: "A General Structure for Regional Economic Analysis," by Werner Z. Hirsch; "Relative Regional Economic Growth: An Approach to Regional Accounts," by Harvey S. Perloff; "Investment Return as a Measure of Comparative Regional Economic Advantage," by George H. Borts and Jerome L. Stein; "Regional Breakdowns of National Economic Accounts," by Richard Ruggles and Nancy D. Ruggles; "Regional Income and Product Accounts: Construction and Applications," by Charles L. Leven; "Regional Account Projections in the Context of National Projections," by Louis Delwart and Sidney Sonenblum; "Microanalytic Models for Regional Analysis," by George H. Orcutt; and "The Role of Accounts in the Economic Study of the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Region," by Edgar M. Hoover and Benjamin Chinitz.—NORMAN WENGERT, *Wayne State University.*

The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher Education. BY ALICE M. RIVLIN. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961. Pp. xii, 179. Price $3.00, cloth; $2.00, paper.)

"Direct federal control (of higher education institutions) would in the end produce uniformity, mediocrity, and compliance. Verve, initiative, and originality would disappear. . . . We know of no one who advocates this central control. But those who advocate the extension of federal financial support are treading down this path."

Since 1952 when this warning was sounded by the Commission on Financing Higher Education,[1] the amount of federal aid and its contribution to total higher education income have continued to rise. Yet, the impassioned words of the Commission, though a mere decade old, have an anachronistic sound to the contemporary academic ear. Today lay leaders and educators are more closely in tune with the President's Commission on National Goals: "The federal role must now be expanded. . . .Federal aid to higher education must include increased scholarship and loan funds, support of research as an essential part of the educational process, and direct assistance for buildings and equipment."[2]

Though today the idea of increased federal aid is well-received, only an unusually optimistic educator-recipient would assert that the questions raised by the Commission a decade ago are no longer relevant. Dr. Alice Rivlin's comprehensive review points up the vital questions. Here is an informative account of the history and present status both of federal support for higher education and of issues of educational philosophy and public policy. In avoiding exhaustive treatment, Dr. Rivlin achieves a valuable overview, with documentation sufficient to illustrate forcefully the issues of policy raised by a continuing accumulation of federal programs and federal dollars.

The story begins with a clear statement of the "crisis" in higher education finance which makes this Brookings Institution study timely. In successive chapters it traces the origins of federal involvement through land grants and other aid programs, the development of federal support of research, programs of student assistance and of funds for buildings, and federal educational institutions. It focuses attention on the impact of changing federal policies upon the colleges, states the case against and for federal subsidies, and appraises principal alternatives in methods of assistance. The subject is treated from the point of view of an economist who is not blind to political reality or to other value considerations.

The timeliness of this study is underlined both by the rapidity of the growth of federal support and by the apparent inevitability that recent trend-lines will continue. The report warns that "Although the primary motivation of federal activity has not been educational, federal actions have profoundly affected the development of our system of higher education." In the report one finds assorted documentation for this statement but none is more impressive than the influence federal support for research has exerted upon higher education through its impact upon the relatively few universities in which it is concentrated. In 1957–58, 36 institutions received approximately 75 percent of all federal research funds for higher education; the same institutions produced a decided majority of all doctorates. These universities have in turn contributed directly, and indirectly through their graduates, to the current dominance of a point of view that places research and graduate instruction on a pinnacle so high that other important functions—such as undergraduate general education—are difficult to include in the same focus. Whether or not this emphasis is entirely healthy is debatable, but that it flows in no small part from the growth of federal support seems undeniable.

There never has been a clearly defined federal policy toward education. Yet, as the federal role increases, federal influence upon the educational system will increase. Against the background that Dr. Rivlin provides it seems important that a wide variety of programs continue to receive varied types of federal aid for there is strength in the very plurality of federal interests. However, the large number of federal agencies involved and the diversity of programs can be a source of strength, rather than a possibly fatal weakness, only if ways can be provided both for educators and for makers of federal policy to take a total view of present and future needs and of the impact or possible impact of present and future federal programs. The President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, the American Assembly (notably Douglas M. Knight), the American Council on Education, and others have concerned themselves with this important point, but little has yet been achieved.

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[1] *Nature and Needs of Higher Education* (N. Y., Columbia Univ. Press, 1952), p. 162.

[2] *Goals for Americans* ([Englewood Cliffs, N. J.], Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 7.

Dr. Rivlin's study points up the significance of higher education control and finance as areas deserving the attention of the political scientist *qua* political scientist as well as *qua* educator.—FRANK C. ABBOTT, *Montana State University*.

Constraint by Copyright. BY M. B. SCHNAPPER. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1960. Pp. 154. $3.75.)

Turn to page 80 of M. B. Schnapper's call of protest to the American people against extensive copyrighting of official material by public officials and you will find a reproduction of an advertisement that goes a long way toward making his case for him. The advertisement bears the name of the Chilton Co. of Philadelphia and announces publication of "The United States Secret Service" by Walter S. Bowen and Harry Edward Neal, at $4.95 in the month of March, 1960.

The title of the book is superimposed over a large and most official looking star bearing the words, U. S. Secret Service. The upper-left fourth of the advertisement contains in large type this eye-catching statement: "4 reasons why we predict this will be one of the best selling books of 1960."

The first reason given is this: "It's the first really authentic story of the U. S. Secret Service, taken straight from the files of the Service itself." Second: "It's filled with spine-tingling dramatic cases of how the Secret Service cracked down on the Mafia, broke up the Ku Klux Klan, arrested members of Congress for land frauds, investigated the Teapot Dome scandal, exposed one of the most gigantic foreign sabotage plots of all time, and much more." Still another reason: "It's written by a former Assistant Chief of the Service and the Official Historian of the Service."

This announcement of the Bowen-Neal book about the United States Secret Service suggests some pertinent questions to Mr. Schnapper. In the lines under the reproduction he asks: "Was the advertising copy writer merely indulging in over-statement or was he sticking pretty close to the truth? Did Messrs. Bowen and Neal obtain most of their material while in the Secret Service? Did either of them prepare for official purposes material constituting a substantial portion of their copyrighted book?"

Numerous other illustrations of the private copyrighting of public material are cited by the author who regards this as a serious evil that should be stopped as contrary to the free speech and free press guarantees of the Bill of Rights, contrary to the constitutional oath that every public official takes, and contrary to specific provisions of the Federal Copyright Act.

The widespread practice, as Mr. Schnapper puts it, is a resort to monopoly via copyright limitations which places "private property restrictions on and around a vast amount of official information that has cost the taxpayer countless billions of dollars." Since copyrights run for a minimum of 28 years and a maximum of 56 years, public information that goes into private commercial hands goes for a long time at the shortest.

But that is not all. Mr. Schnapper's analysis of the situation goes much further. For, to quote him again, "inherent in copyrighting by public officials is presumption of the right to suppress completely whatever they consider their personal property and arrogation of private authority to restrict access to or use of such property if and when they should see fit to disclose its nature."

Here, in short, is a matter about which relatively few Americans have thought anything and about which most have not thought even slightly. Yet it is a matter which should concern us all because it is our government and the materials at stake are owned by the people. M. B. Schnapper deserves widespread appreciation for heading up the effort to bring the abuse to widespread public attention.

The author is executive director of the Public Affairs Press in Washington. Significantly he says on his book's own copyright page: "Statements made by the author can be quoted without permission."—IRVING DILLIARD.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Franklin L. Burdette
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan. By Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. ix, 190. Price $3.75.)

Within the compass of a seemingly modest little book, the authors succeed in presenting an outstanding interpretation of the nature of party politics in contemporary Japan. The number of questions raised, the complexity of the factors analyzed, the wealth of evidence adduced, and the astuteness of the hypotheses advanced—all without clutter, confusion, or overcrowding—are remarkable for a work of this size.

The mass demonstrations of May–June 1960 serve both as the point of departure and as the concluding test case for this concise but wide-ranging study. Far from being Communist-inspired, anti-American, student riots, these demonstrations are shown to have been the greatest mass movement in Japan's political history, stemming from underlying domestic issues that pertain to the whole nature of Japanese politics. Thus the demonstrations "threw a strong spotlight on the changing character of Japanese politics and the continuing weaknesses of Japanese democracy."

The authors elaborate by examining the historical background, the general trends in postwar Japanese politics, the internal composition of Japanese parties, and the Japanese political process. In accordance with its announced design, the entire book manifests a strong historical sense which points up the cultural background, the element of timing in Japan's modernization, and the concept of Japanese politics as a developmental process. Also the work goes beyond mere analysis to project meaningful hypotheses about the Japanese political process. Finally the concluding chapter constitutes a case study against which these hypotheses are tested.

In a work so rich and variegated, readers will probably differ as to what aspects are the most significant. At the risk of distortion through oversimplification, it might be ventured that the main theme is the problem of reconciling borrowed political institutions with native social conditions. This dichotomy, however, is not simple. The borrowed political institutions are in effect being modified by the penetration of indigenous procedures, while the native social institutions are undergoing constant "Westernization," or, more accurately, modernization. At any time there is the necessity of finding some arrangement to bridge the differences between the two as they constantly shift in their relationship to each other.

Historically it has generally been the borrowed political institutions that had to be drastically modified to adjust them to the continuing "feudalistic" aspects of Japanese society. The political parties in particular thus took shape as closed groups operating in a closed society. Recently, however, accelerating socio-economic changes are so transforming Japanese society that it is now the political institutions that are lagging behind. While some contrary aspects persist, Japan has now become essentially an open mass society in which the established political components paradoxically continue to remain exclusive closed groups. Until this anomaly is corrected, Japan will suffer from dangerous tensions.

The characteristics of the closed party system are examined in considerable detail, supported by 24 pages of statistical data. The new open nature of Japanese society does not receive comparable attention. The preponderantly big business orientation of the conservative Liberal-Democratic party, and the almost exclusive identification of the Socialist party with one section of organized labor, are seen as conducive to class warfare. At the same time both parties are disclosed as being loose coalitions of tight little leader-follower groups more loyal to their respective factional interests than to their party, thus adding the instability of intra-party fragmentation to the tension of inter-party polarization. The so-called one-and-a-half party system—in which the conservatives, appealing almost as much to little business and agriculture as to big business, can always outvote the narrowly labor-class socialists—tempts the conservatives to arrogant abuse of parliamentary power and the socialists to forlorn resort to extra-parliamentary obstructionism, resulting in threats to democracy from both directions.

Meanwhile the recent socio-economic changes have created a large mass of intellectuals, technicians, white collar workers, people in the service trades, unorganized labor, and others who fail to find adequate representation in the existing closed party structure, who see no satisfying alternative as between the two major parties, and who are consequently alienated from the established political system. Whenever these politically unorganized but increasingly politically expectant classes are catalyzed by a special set of circumstances into united action, there is likely to be an explosive crisis. Some hope is seen in the emergence of multiple-interest, mass-based groups which will affiliate with political parties and so change the nature of the parties as to correct the imbalance between politics and society.

Stated thus baldly, these may not be especially startling ideas, but they are expounded with the cogency and insight one has come to expect of Professor Scalapino from his earlier masterly study of the prewar Japanese parties. This time the collaboration of a capable Japanese colleague lends added verisimilitude to the work.—KAZUO KAWAI, *The Ohio State University.*

The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan. BY DOUGLAS H. MENDEL, JR. With a foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. xv, 269. $6.50.)

Professor Mendel describes the foreign policy issues faced by Japan, Japanese public opinion concerning these issues, and the implications of popular attitudes for policy makers. In 1953 and 1957, Dr. Mendel hired and supervised teams of university students who personally interviewed samples of 500 voters for about one hour each. To discover rural-urban differences, his surveys were conducted both in a typical farming community (Izumo) and a metropolis (Osaka). Dietmen, prefectural governors, mayors, and municipal assemblymen were also interviewed. The polls of other investigators, notably of Lloyd Free and the *Asahi Shimbun*, are frequently cited, and they tend to confirm Mendel's own data. Popular attitudes remained fairly stable during the period covered. The Japanese public appears to be more divided over basic foreign policy issues than are Americans.

Dr. Mendel omitted nonvoters from his tables "because they tend to be inactive politically, disinterested in foreign affairs and usually made no response to questions." Since the normally apathetic may sometimes be mobilized for political purposes and may often be counted upon to support the decisions of others, it would seem that the attitudes of these "semisovereign people" might bear some study. "Politically inactive" people sometimes hold the political balance of power with surprising results for pollsters. The author frequently uses the plurality index, which shows the percentage spread between yes and no answers rather than indicating the percentages of yeses and noes. This somewhat confusing device has the advantage of simplifying many of the charts, but unfortunately fails to indicate the percentage of "don't know" answers.

Some of the data yielded by the surveys may come as a surprise even to fairly well informed observers of Japanese politics, but there seems little ground to dispute the accuracy of the statistical data. Much more work remains to be done, as Dr. Mendel suggests, in the scientific analysis of *why* people answered the pollsters as they did. It is, of course, difficult to measure the intensity of views or the propensity to action by means of questionnaires alone. Here Dr. Mendel has not come up with much quantified data, but does provide the reader with educated guesses.

Considerations of space apparently prevent the author from analyzing in depth the role of public opinion in the political decision-making process in Japan. The strikes and demonstrations against the U. S.-Japan Security Pact in 1960 made it clear that the foreign policies of the Government ran counter to the views of a substantial number of people. One is today tempted to view with some reservations Professor (now Ambassador) Reischauer's assertion in his foreword that on the whole the domestic and foreign policies of the

Japanese government appear to reflect "quite accurately" the general attitudes of the Japanese people. Partly because of the failure of the government in 1960 to appreciate what popular attitudes were, President Eisenhower's visit to Japan had to be cancelled and Premier Kishi had to resign. It appears that the Japanese government may occasionally disregard popular attitudes and adopt important foreign policies which have little or no support in public opinion. The government may assume such an autocratic posture because, in Diet elections, personal and domestic issues are often of greater importance than foreign policy issues.

The scope of Dr. Mendel's study is very broad, and he has apparently left no aspect of public opinion on foreign policy untouched. The richness of his data permits him to discover subtle nuances in attitudes and to relate these attitudes to specific age, educational, sex, and socioeconomic groups.

He finds, for example, that women are vastly more pacifist and neutralist in their views on rearmament and alliance than are men. Younger, better educated, and urban groups are much less favorably disposed to the American alliance than the older, less educated, and rural groups. It would appear that as this neutralist youth matures and the country becomes better educated and more urbanized, Japan may become less oriented towards America. The United States appears to be the favorite foreign country and the Soviet Union the most disliked of the respondents. There is widespread criticism in Japan of specific American policies, such as the maintenance of United States air bases in Japan, nuclear tests, and the occupation of Okinawa, but the principal complaint of the Japanese is the "selfish superiority" of the Americans. While Liberal-Democratic leaders are prone to support the revision of the disarmament clause of the Constitution, almost half of the Liberal-Democratic voters oppose the proposed revision. Public opinion on constitutional amendment, of course, is decisive, because proposed amendments must be submitted to popular referendum.

The book contains maps illustrating Japan's territorial disputes with South Korea (the Rhee Line and Takeshima), the Soviet Union (the Kurile, Shikotan, and Habomai Islands), and the United States (Okinawa and the Bonins). The data which Professor Mendel has painstakingly assembled is effectively presented and constitutes an important contribution to our understanding of Japanese political behavior and foreign policy.
—THEODORE MCNELLY, *University of Maryland.*

The Chinese Anarchist Movement. BY ROBERT A. SCALAPINO AND GEORGE T. YU. (Berkeley. Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1961. pp. v+81. Paper.)

A good deal of work has recently been done in the United States on the intellectual history of modern China and the University of California has been specially active in this. Though the Chinese anarchist movement died out in the 1920's it was an influence in the general ferment of ideas in the first quarter of this century when active discussion among all sorts of revolutionary groups influenced the thinking of the generation which still rules China.

As the authors point out, "It is most significant that the Chinese intellectuals had so short a time to adjust to the political currents of the modern world." While "The Japanese intellectual had had some four decades of Mill, Locke, Burke and Rousseau before he got the Fabians, Kropotkin, or Marx," only a few Chinese intellectuals had much contact with the West before the beginning of this century and not many until after the 1911 revoluton. "Then in less than a decade—and a decade filled with extraordinary political chaos—they were forced to cope with an unending variety of new, often conflicting ideas."

At the beginning of this century Anarcho-Syndicalism was a powerful force in the revolutionary movement in Western Europe and it is not surprising that the main inspiration of the Chinese anarchist movement came from France. In 1902 over twenty students travelled to France with a new Chinese Minister and two of these, from upper class Chinese families, became converts to anarchism. They were deeply influenced by Darwinism and the general prestige of science and attracted by the ideas of Kropotkin and Reclus. Anarchism seemed for them to be the "wave of the future," and their convictions became a strongly felt faith. The members of the Chinese anarchist movement adopted a code of personal austerity and devoted their efforts and resources to the cause, these efforts including the publication of a periodical and schemes to bring Chinese students to France.

The other inspiration of Chinese anarchism came from the anarchist movement in Japan. The movement was, therefore, largely a movement of Chinese students overseas reacting violently against the Chinese tradition and seeking the newest fashion in Western ideas as a new basis but also, in many cases, deeply influenced by the Chinese tradition in which they had been educated and trying to find some basis for their new ideas in the Chinese classical tradition.

After the 1911 revolution many of these students returned to China and formed the "Society to Advance Morality" with various grades of membership of which the higher ones were pledged not to take any part in government. The authors suggest that this had some adverse effect on the early republic by leading some of the few men available with competence and high standards of morality to refuse official responsibilities.

The high point of anarchism in China came in the years from 1916 to 1920. Thereafter it lost out in competition with Leninist Communism, both in China and among the Chinese students in Europe. Leninism offered a more effective programme of action and was more willing to appeal to nationalism.

The authors give a fairly long account of a controversy between Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, and an anarchist spokesman, Ou Sheng-pai. To meet the anarchist case, Ch'en had to make explicit the authoritarian aspects of the Leninist position—the masses, backward and emotionally unstable, could only be saved through "strict interference" by an "enlightened despotism." One can see echoes of the classical Chinese dispute between the Confucian view that man was by nature good and the Legalist view, here represented by Ch'en that man was by nature evil and could only be reformed by strict government. As in the China of two thousand years ago, the despotic Legalist system has been victorious, but the authors end by suggesting that anarchism represented the goal of "complete freedom for self realization within the limits of social justice" which has also been part of the Chinese tradition.—Michael Lindsay, *American University.*

Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950–1960. By J. D. Legge. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961. Pp. xiii, 291. $5.00.)

One of the most difficult problems confronting Indonesia since independence has been the development of a satisfactory and effective relationship between the centre and the constituent parts of the archipelago. In this carefully documented book, one in the series published under the auspices of the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell, Professor J. D. Legge of Monash University in Victoria, Australia, has sought to deal with the emergence of the system of local administration in Indonesia during the crucial years of 1950–1960.

In a nation of 90,000,000 people, 55,000,000 of them on the island of Java and the rest widely scattered about the islands, the problem of the administrative relationship between the central authority and local units would be certain to be a challenge. Mix this with the fact that Indonesia has a host of diverse ethnic groups and many different languages. Set it against a background of traditional autonomy for many of the local areas. Do this and the motto of the Republic, "Unity in Diversity," becomes more meaningful. It also helps to explain why local administration in Indonesia has had such an uncertain development thus far.

When the Dutch and Indonesians finally agreed to Indonesian independence in 1949, it was as a federal republic, The United States of Indonesia, that Indonesia was born into the family of nations. From the very beginning, the Indonesians professed distaste for this federal arrangement. This reviewer, who was in Indonesia at the time, can attest to the fervor with which the Djakarta government attacked the federal system; perhaps only the Irian issue has drawn such concentrated central government fire. In less than a year, the federal form had been abolished and a unitary form of government established.

Professor Legge, who made four visits to Indonesia between 1956 and 1960, painstakingly reviews the efforts of the Indonesian government to do two things: one to grant local areas as much autonomy as possible, and the second to enforce the authority of the central government in all areas. That these two goals have often proven difficult to reconcile in practice is shown through the experience with various legislative acts and presidential edicts.

RI Law 22 of 1948 of the original Republic of Indonesia, NIT Law 44 of 1950 for the State of East Indonesia, and Law 1 of 1957 were the main enactments dealing with local administration: the law of 1957 was the "high-water mark" in legislation for local areas. The provisions of these laws are analyzed in considerable detail by the author. Extracts from them are also reproduced in the Appendix to the book. A very useful "Glossary of Indonesian Terms" is also appended.

After tracing the modern origins of Indonesian local government, Legge devotes separate chapters to the areas and units involved, the role of the regional head or *kepala daerah,* the development of local councils, and the powers of both regional heads and councils. He also treats the problem of the development of the civil service at local levels, the matter of financing local administration, and the factor of regional feeling. His discussion of the role of the *pamong pradja* (territorial administrative service of the central government) is especially acute.

In Law 1 of 1957, it was stated that "The regional government is composed of the regional representative council and the regional executive council." Much of the story of local government in Indonesia since independence can be told through the analysis of what this statement came to mean in practice. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah (DPRD) or Regional Representative Council and the Dewan Pemerintah Daerah (DPD) or Regional Executive Council were both intended to bring about greater local participation in government and for some months there were signs of progress in this regard.

But along with the formal steps towards greater local participation, there were also other developments which did not bode well for the cause of local government. Various Army colonels in Sumatra and Sulawesi assumed the leadership in 1956 and 1957 of dissident movements directed against the central government. In February 1958 the so-called "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia" was proclaimed in Padang. The author feels that while a desire for greater local autonomy was involved in many of these struggles, other factors were also responsible.

Whatever the exact motivation for these uprisings may have been, the response of the central government in Djakarta was significant for local government. Under his concept of "guided democracy," President Sukarno announced that Indonesia was returning to the Constitution of 1945. Parliament was suspended and the role of political parties curtailed. In September 1959, a Presidential Edict No. 6, announced important modifications of the basic law 1/57 for local government. The controls of the central government over local units were drastically tightened. The move towards greater local autonomy was definitely halted.

Legge's book provides a valuable insight into the efforts of one new Asian state to develop satisfactory institutions of local government. It is a book primarily for the specialist; it should also be of use to Indonesian authorities involved in local government affairs. The book emphasizes the study of forms to a great degree, as the author himself points out. Later study may permit greater attention to the actual workings of Indonesian local government, but this is a first rate study of a complex and important subject.—Edward W. Mill, *Occidental College.*

Venezuela. By Edwin Lieuwen. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. x, 193. $4.00.)

Area specialists, students, and those simply curious about the prospects of the Alliance for Progress can all be grateful for this most recent addition to the series of introductory Latin American country studies sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Consistent with the format established in earlier volumes, the author deals briefly but perceptively with the geographic and social setting, history, economy, political dynamics and international relations of Venezuela, a country important at present not so much for the strategic significance of its enormous petroleum and iron ore wealth as for its crucial relation to that very vital question: Can fundamental social and economic reform be achieved in Latin America within the context of democratic procedures and institutions? In a very real sense, the contest between democratic and totalitarian techniques of development and reform, more familiar to most of us in the competition between India and Communist China, is being fought as strenuously, although on a smaller scale, between the Venezuela of Rómulo Betancourt and the Cuba of Fidel Castro. The still heterogeneous forces of reform in the remainder of Latin America will not be indifferent to the outcome. The radical nature of the experiment is indicated by the author's contention that "the key to understanding contemporary Venezuela is to appreciate the inexorable, but for the most part nonviolent, social revolution that has been sweeping that nation since the end of the Second World War. In this process, the class structure is being altered; wealth and property are being redistributed; the economy is being transformed; institutions are undergoing drastic changes, and political processes have come under the control, for the first time, of genuine reform elements." Given the country's history of militarist tyranny and the persistence of powerful opposition from both the traditional political right—certain segments of the military, the landowning aristocracy and the conservative faction of the Church—and the radical left, it is unhappily only too clear that the efforts of President Betancourt and the Acción Democrática party enjoy no guarantee of success. Nevertheless, Professor Lieuwen's treatment affords evidence which justifies a guarded optimism.

In view of the brevity required in a handbook of this sort, it is inevitable that some of the author's judgments will seem to the specialist insufficiently established or qualified. The course of events resulting in the revolution of 1945, and the actual extent of Acción Democrática's social, economic and political achievement from 1945 until its overthrow in 1948, for example, are subject to somewhat more controversy than the casual reader would gather from this account. Particularly with respect to the latter, a less exclusive reliance on Betancourt's own massive apologia, *Venezuela: Política y petróleo,* would have been advisable. To refer to a very minor point, this reviewer would also like to suggest that not even the notoriously unreliable character of Latin American statistics can justify including the village of Lagunillas in the list of principal Venezuela cities with an alleged population of 200,000. Something on the order of 5,000 would be considerably more probable. Such criticisms—perhaps quibbles would be a better term—can detract little, however, from Professor Lieuwen's excellent and skillful summary of a situation so complex and a range of materials so varied. He is to be congratulated on a job very well done.—Richard D. Baker, *University of Oklahoma.*

Government and Politics of Uruguay. By Philip B. Taylor, Jr. (New Orleans: Tulane University, Department of Political Science, 1960. Pp. 285. $3.00.)

Professor Taylor has provided us with a carefully written report on key aspects of government and politics in a small, relatively advanced republic of Latin America. There is much emphasis on description of institutions and evaluation of policy as well as a wealth of data useful to those interested in development of analytical schemes for cross-cultural examination of political phenomena.

The report is essentially pessimistic in contrast with some earlier studies. The author is telling us that failure to make painful adjustments can only lead to intensification of growing currents of violence with consequent hazards for political stability and moderate government.

Most strategic aspects of Uruguayan political groups and governmental institutions in the 1960's clearly bear the mark of the gifted statesman, José Batlle y Ordoñez, who dominated the country's politics for the greater part of the first half of our century. Since Batlle's death in 1929, the complexity of the system has increased to the point that its operation mystifies most Uruguayans outside those making a career of politics. The result has been a widespread sense of futility in the face of clearly felt need for change.

Too much effort has been directed toward establishment of machinery for temporary accommodation of group interests and too little attention has been given the need for decision-making capability with regard to basic reforms. The "pact of the parties" has never produced power distribution arrangements supported by permanent consensus and has remained a stopgap device for dividing governmental spoils and control. Proportional representation has not helped to mobilize popular support behind the coherent, enduring majorities so necessary for solving basic problems. Under PR it is not uncommon to have a national party, a national party fraction or subparty and territorial subparties all proposing lists of candidates. Aside from the small, disciplined "ideological parties"—the Communists, the Socialists and the Catholics—the pattern of fluidity in formation and dissolution of coalitions is the keynote of politics.

Hundreds of organized special interests have thrived on this fragmented party situation and parties and subparties have come to depend upon financial and voting support of the special groups. The plural executive for which Uruguay has received such notoriety among students of government has not had a mitigating effect upon the general picture of fragmented power since the majority group of the so-called National Council of Government generally is divided on major policy questions and is unable to provide the necessary leadership for legislative action.

Inflation, poverty and the threat of revolution, Castro style or Fascist style, have increased significantly during the past five years; but it is difficult to change. Interests have been built upon poor administration of government services and enterprises and upon inadequate budgeting and accounting arrangements. Improvements in these areas might help; so would some concern for austerity, e.g., cutbacks in government services, surplus personnel and subsidies. The crux of the matter has been, and continues to be, the incapacity to make decisions that hurt the powerful interests, i.e., the incapacity of government to mobilize the power necessary to promote a more effectively functioning society.

—L. Vincent Padgett, *San Siego State College*

Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara. By Herbert J. Spiro. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Pp. vi, 185. $1.95.)

The pace of development of the political process in tropical Africa is proving a sharp challenge to practitioners of the techniques of comparative government. Herbet J. Spiro accepts the practicality of imposing a formal schemata for the interpretation of the turbulent events of the past decade. "To identify the most persistent political patterns in the new states and the independence movements that brought about their establishment I have used the method worked out in my *Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy*. . . . Before examining the degree of success achieved along methodological lines, the value of the book as a lively account of the impressions gained by an exceptionally well equipped scholar from a year's experience in sub Saharan Africa in 1959–60 should be stressed. Shrewd judgments and imaginative flair combined with meticulous preparation have produced some notable observations on current African politics. However, the author is entitled to an evaluation based on his objective, which was to provide a new perspective for understanding the African political scene in relation to the rest of the world.

In *Government by Constitution*, Spiro stresses the importance of prevailing values. "Prevailing values—the goals in pursuit of which people act in politics—affect the functions of seemingly similar institutions. More than that, dominant values shape the very raw material of politics: the problems that the political system is facing." This viewpoint leads to the conclusion that "completely novel types of political association may be coming to life in Africa." Judgment of the African political process in terms of Western constitutionalism is considered inadequate. This provides a healthy and exciting start to a fresh appraisal of African governmental processes. Presumably the next step would be to outline the nature and specific character of both "prevailing" and "dominant" values in current African society. It is on this point that the author's method as applied to the African situation must come under question. What are the opportunities for a Western scholar from a background of university life in the United States to assess dominant values of a culture as ill documented as that of tropical Africa? Spiro gives somewhat cavalier treatment to the contributions from the period of colonial administration on the grounds that "they concentrated on the apparently static aspects of 'native' society, which could be manipulated in the interest of the European administration." Possibly true, but what are the alternatives to the experience of decades in the field, accepting responsibility for the solution of day to day problems?

De Tocqueville comes immediately to mind, and we could wish for the appearance of a modern counterpart on the African scene. Even a cursory reading of the French scholar impresses one with the degree of his reliance on the statistics and the governmental documentation of the times. Is there anything approaching a sufficiency of basic materials for a scholarly appraisal of the true objectives of African society at the present time? A glance at the selected bibliography at the end of the book is not reassuring, particularly in light of the omission, perhaps deliberate, of the classic *East Africa Royal Commission (1953–1955) Report*. To determine the true social values of an organized political group it seems essential to probe beneath rhetorical pretensions and discover how the group is prepared to allocate public funds. For example, one would hesitate to describe Britain as a social welfare state without reliance on budget figures open to analysis by competent experts. The budgets of independent African states do not as yet appear available in the open market place of scholarship. Though the author may not be blamed for failure to employ unobtainable information, the right to generalize in the absence of basic material is open to question. Descriptive material tracing institutional evolution from colonial bases still requires collection and arrangement, though it may appear a pedestrian approach. But in the main part of his work Spiro carries out this type of analysis in a penetrating manner. The methodology may fail to fulfil its promises in light of the lack of a sufficiency of the raw material of scholarship, but the capacity of the author to make valuable comments on the African scene is well sustained. THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University*.

Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804–1952. BY NADAV SAFRAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 298. $6.75.)

Nadav Safran, in this interpretative study of the political evolution of modern Egypt, has added a fifth book to the recent, yet already widely esteemed, collection of Harvard Middle Eastern Studies. He attempts here to analyze the basic cause of Egypt's instability which, as he correctly points out, lies in the conflict between traditional ideology and modern reality. He focuses attention on the evolution of ideas in Egypt from 1804 to 1952 using as the analytical structure of his work three historical-sociological propositions. The first is that "a political community cannot be viable and stable unless it is founded upon a more or less generally shared set of ideas, modes of thinking, norms and values"; the second is that "there is an intimate connection between material realities and modes of thought, ideas, norms and values"; the third suggests that there is "one experience which most, if not all, societies must undergo, and which nearly always exerts such pressure on the existing belief-system as to disrupt it and lead to the breakdown of the political community." This reviewer finds these propositions both relevant and applicable.

This objective and sympathetic study does not intend to measure results, but rather attempts to disect the nature of the conflict and expose the efforts of modern Egyptian intellecutal and political leaders to evolve an ideology adapted to modern realities in lieu of the "obsolescent traditional belief-system of Islam"; to elicit the difficulties they encountered, and the reaction which their artificial achievements provoked.

The book is divided into five parts. In Part I, "Modern Historical Evolution Versus Traditional Belief," the author analyzes the outstanding factors of the Islamic ideology which, up to the rise of Muhãmmad ʻAli, had controlled tightly the Egyptian political community, discovering that there existed certain possibilities for initiative in introducing new subjective norms. Then he reviews briefly the main economic, social and political transformations that took place there up to 1882, illustrating the challenge they constituted on the traditional Islamic ideological system. This challenge, one of the basic factors of the Ŭrabi revolution, "consisted of a contradiction between the Islamic world view and the world view implicit in the new condition of life."

Part II is an excellent and thorough analysis of the "Main Trends of Ideological Evolution." Here, the author gives a just evaluation of the impact of the West on Egyptian intellectual and political leaders since 1882, and describes the hasty and timid progress of Egyptian political thought by commenting on the works of outstanding Egyptian Islamic reformists and liberal nationalists. His explanation of the reasons for the failure of the liberal-Islamic program is thought-provoking.

Part III describes the "Triumph of the Liberal Nationalist Movement"; this victory is accurately attributed to a handful of Western-educated and Western-oriented leaders who managed to use advantageously the two elemental forces which moved the Egyptian masses, namely, xenophobia and privation. Safran rightly refuses to see in this triumph any expression of a popular consensus.

Moving on to more practical ground, he examines some of the government's actions which had a direct bearing on the relations between the modern state and traditional Islam in the period between 1919 and 1952.

Part IV focuses attention of the "Progress and Decline of Liberal Nationalism." It contains a chapter devoted to brief biographical sketches of important intellectual leaders. Safran then examines their work ably, showing how the progressive phase, Western in origins and orientation, motivated by a vigorous rationalist spirit and aided by propitious historical conditions, propelled the evolution of Egyptian political thought on a boldly liberal nationalist path. It could not sustain, however, an ominous head-on collision with the Muslim traditionalist forces because of the superficiality of its appeal and the artificiality of its foundations, and because it had become exceedingly vulnerable as a result of the ever-deteriorating historical conditions.

Part V, "The Threat of Traditional Reaction," elucidates certain aspects of the Moslem Brotherhood's program and ideology. Safran finds that because of the Liberal Nationalist's failure to develop a generally accepted ideology, explaining and justifying the existing order of things, a dangerous vacuum developed which the Brotherhood sought to fill with "faith." The final chapter contains some very relevant requisites for an eventual solution of Egypt's search for political community. It remains to be seen if the new regime of President Nasir is taking them into consideration; an answer to this question may be found in P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Army and Politics in the United Arab Republic* (1961).

The conclusion of Safran is unequivocal: "The leaders [have] failed to work out any such viable ideology." Safran, however, attempts to de-emphasize this conclusion by invoking several major extenuating circumstances: (1) Egypt "had to undergo change at a more accelerated rate than the Christian West." (2) The forces of change were of foreign origin at a time when Egypt was under the sway of foreign imperialism. (3) Islam from the outset had been far more involved in "the politico-social order" than Christianity. These extenuating circumstances are the more convincing because throughout his study Safran compares Egypt to the Christian West in its earlier attempt to respond to the challenge of modernism.

Mr. Safran's ideas on the Islamic views of history have much in common with those of Gustav von Grunebaum, although the approach Safran adopted in his study is indeed original; for he does not, like H. A. R. Gibb, in *Modern Trends in Islam*, D. Lerner, in *The Passing of Traditional Society*, and W. C. Smith, in *Islam in Modern History*, approach his subject solely as an Islamist or a social scientist, but rather, in synthesizing all their views, he analyzes a particular Islamic society from both points of view. All in all, this book is a welcome and scholarly contribution that will be of interest to the Islamist, the political philosopher, and the social scientist and the historian as well as the student of comparative government. Safran's selection of primary sources is, indeed, impressive. This reviewer, however, cannot concur as to the sincerity of Victorian England's declaration of its intention to evacuate Egypt *promptly*. At any rate, such an argument is both polemic and irrelevant.—Alfred G. Gerteiny, *St. John's University* (New York).

Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings. By Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown. (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 577. $5.25, paper.)

This is an unusual volume of readings, unrivalled at present in the field of comparative politics. It is comprehensive in scope and varied in content. It contains traditional and modern readings, and opens its doors generously to the sister disciplines, such as social psychology, and particularly sociology. Perceptive, sophisticated, and well written, though at times over-condensed, introductory notes to the individual chapters weave together often seemingly incongruous material, and give the impression of continuity and coherence to a field of study which is actually in a state of flux.

This wide horizon is manifest also on another level: the various methods of analysis are applied to every kind of contemporary political system. This leads, unfortunately, to certain contradictions which cannot but confuse the beginner. They appear first in the introductory section in which the authors reveal their basic general conception, namely that "a political system is, above all, a mechanism for the making of decisions," the efficiency of which "can be gauged in terms of its ability to make decisions which are widely accepted." This can be tested by looking into the responses governmental decisions will "elicit among the social groups, interest groups, and voluntary associations." So far so good. But how can one really say without misleading the as yet uninitated reader that "in a totalitarian system the test is ultimately the same?"

This problem of giving democracies and totalitarian systems the same analytical treatment reoccurs from time to time. The authors state, for instance, that the "mass party" characterizes both modern democracies and dictatorships. In Great Britain and in the Soviet Union "the party remains the most important instrument used by social groups in their quest for power." This is, however, rather effectively contradicted later in this very book by Gabriel Almond, when he says that "the structure we call *party* in the totalitarian system is not a party at all" because it is the manifestation of a totally different political culture.

As one proceeds through this collection, three questions, which have irked the teacher of beginning courses in contemporary politics, constantly come to mind. The answers this volume suggests may be worth further thought. (1) At what point of undergraduate studies should one introduce theory and methods, and on what level of abstraction? If theory and method are necessary to the understanding of case studies, it must be done rather early in the game, no matter how difficult this seems to the student. If, however, theorizing takes place on a highly abstract level and is not followed by application to concrete instances, it may become a pedagogical dud. Pioneering moves in theory should be inspiring to the enterprising and—one hopes—knowledgeable graduate student, but could hopelessly confuse the beginner. (2) Should a highly comparative discussion precede or follow a country-by-country presentation? Here the reply seems clear: the more sophisticated and suggestive the comparative approach, the more it requires from the reader a general idea of the *Gestalt* of at least certain governments, which are representatives of the archtypes compared. (3) Finally, can democracies and totalitarian governments be compared within the same discussion? Clearly, the answer here is negative. While the present volume sheds light on some of the most intricate problems of democracies, totalitarian government seems to appear, on the whole, as a kind of foil. Nowhere can one find a really penetrating discussion of communist government in action, nor is there much attention paid to fascism. The more the authors try to bring totalitarianism within the ken of their so highly comparative approach,the more it seems to elude them.

Clearly, however, for students who have already been exposed to a country-by-country study, this collection offers more stimulating, important and varied comparative analyses than have ever before been assembled in one volume.—GEORGE A. LANYI, *Oberlin College*.

The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada. BY JAMES EAYRS. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 232. $6.95.)

Professor Eayrs prepared this study of historical developments and contemporary practices in the conduct of Canadian external affairs in conjunction with his participation in the program financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and sponsored by the School of International Service of the American University to investigate the making of foreign policy in various countries. Beginning with a discussion of the role played by the political executive, the author proceeds to examine various agencies concerned with foreign policy including the bureaucracy, Parliament, and the military. Concluding chapters deal with functions of a foreign service: intelligence, planning, negotiation, and propaganda. In these chapters there are some particularly acute comments on the Canadian experience in the modern world, where the diplomat must perform negotiating functions as in the past while also fulfilling the propaganda function in an age when technology has made it first possible and then necessary to address and persuade mass publics at home and abroad.

The development of the Department of External Affairs is expertly traced from its humble origins in a small office (above an Ottawa barber shop) staffed by a Deputy Minister, two clerks, and a secretary to the present large and efficient organization. Personalities of major political figures were an important factor in this development, as might be expected in a country where the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs was held by the Prime Minister until 1946. Consequently, the Prime Ministers adapted the Department of External Affairs to their own goals and operational methods. A considerable knowledge of Canadian politicians and domestic politics enenables the author to analyze the making of foreign policy in the context of Canadian government. As W. L. Mackenzie King was Prime Minister longer than any one else, he left his own unique stamp upon the conduct of foreign policy. The picture which emerges is that for much of the twentieth century external affairs have been conducted by a remarkably able bureaucracy under the suspicious eye of a Prime Minister guided by intuition and domestic political problems while occasionally referring to a Parliament largely indifferent and uninformed in the area of foreign affairs. No less than in other areas, King succeeded in attracting to external affairs a bureaucratic elite largely recruited from "promising young university graduates." Emphasis has been placed on the generalist rather than the specialist in the Department of External Affairs. Not only are members of this elite rotated among the major positions in the Department of External Affairs, but there is also considerable posting of key civil servants from one department to another for the filling of top administrative positions. Formal devices for achieving interdepartmental liaison are reinforced by the intimate and friendly relations among the senior bureaucrats and with many political leaders in the relatively small circle of the elite in Ottawa.

The scholarship represented by this volume is formidable, but presented in a most congenial format. It is apparent that the author is thoroughly familiar not only with Canadian sources but also with the broad spectrum of literature bearing upon his topic, so that he has examined the Candian experience in the vista of the larger world and has reached conclusions valid to the analysis of other departments concerned with external affairs whether they be the State Department, the Foreign Office, or the recently created ministry of a newly established nation. Particularly in the areas of intelligence and planning the evaluations of the Canadian experience should be useful for anyone searching for general principles of foreign policy and its administration as well as for the specialist in Canadian affairs. There are, for example, cogent comments upon the assumptions with which planning is justified and upon reasons for planning in the liberal democracies.

Professor Eayrs has not hesitated to generalize about national characteristics in the formation of foreign policy so that there are some challenging insights such as in explaining that Canadian policy makers have described their endeavors as "cautious, patient, compromising, flexible" in accord with an ethic based on a non-revolutionary tradition different from that in the United States where "From the American revolutionary tradition derives that characteristically American belief that some swift and spectacular stroke may permanently solve problems which in their nature admit only of amelioration." This difference, the author believes, is part of the reason why Canada has not advocated the "crash program" and enunciated "doctrines" so popular south of the border. Through a pragmatic process of trial and error, the Canadian government, fully aware of the role and limitations of a small power, has developed an effective technique for responding to particular external factors and situations and has made a virtue of the "art of the possible."—JOHN R. WILLIAMS, *West Virginia University.*

Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning in Action. BY DANIEL R. MANDELKER. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Pp. 172. $5.00.)

Contrary to the implication of the title, this study is not an examination of Green Belts as such, but an account of the way planning is administered in England. Green Belts are used as the focus, and applications to develop land are traced from their initial submission to the local planning committee through an appeal to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Green Belts are rings, sometimes several miles deep, around large cities which are kept free of urban development. English practice is contrasted with contemporary planning in the United States. The value of this approach is that it goes below the more frequently publicized policy aims of British planning and investigates the way the system actually works.

As in the United States planning decisions are largely decentralized to the local level. Here some of the similarity ends. The English development plan (a sort of combined zoning ordinance, subdivision ordinance, general land use plan, urban renewal program, and official street map) is wider in scope than a zoning ordinance, but less detailed and not legally binding. It is applied in a general manner by local planning committees and its application is subjected to internal review by the Ministry. External review by the courts, as is the American practice, is virtually non-existent. Professor Mandelker feels that internal administrative checks on local planning action compare favorably with external judicial review. At the same time he documents a need for improved procedures.

English development policy is most restrictive in the Green Belt areas. Even here, however, it is sometimes fuzzy and vague, leaving a great deal to administrative or local discretion. As a consequence there are radical variations in the way it is applied from place to place. Ministerial review of plans and appeals for development is *ad hoc* and has not served to clarify policy or establish precedent on which future action can be based. Further, ministerial directives have not served as a mechanism for clarifying policy. However, the keynote of British planning administration is flexibility. This is an advantage if not carried to its ultimate extreme of haphazard administration. There are in fact many inconsistencies in administration and the workload is staggering.

Administrative delay is common—almost standard operating procedure.

American planners overplan while their English counterparts underplan. Policies restricting development in the Green Belts around large metropolitan areas when combined with an otherwise flexible system of land control have accomplished much. These devices have prevented uneconomic exploitation of land on the periphery, compelled developers to use vacant lots where services are available, and limited sporadic and ribbon development. On the other hand, underplanning in concert with restrictive Green Belt policies have led to a number of serious problems. Existing towns and cities have filled up very rapidly causing an inflated demand for vacant land. Land prices have skyrocketed. Population growth has continued, outstripping the forecasts, and as a result redevelopment is lagging and housing shortages are mounting pressures for change.

This review of British experience is particularly timely for several reasons. First, there are some indications that American planning is moving toward a more flexible system of land control. Therefore it should be of considerable interest to persons considering this course of action. It goes beyond objectives and considers the practical aspects of a flexible system. The use of Green Belts as a focal point is also of current interest as a result of proposals for a federal aid program to preserve open space in our large metropolitan areas. It illustrates the impact of such a policy and documents its side-effects in a nation where open space is a much more critical commodity.

This is a short, well organized treatment of English planning presenting a relatively new approach to the subject, at least insofar as American readers are concerned. Nonetheless this is not a book that can be easily consumed at one sitting. The author successfully bridges the "terminology-gap" by presenting a concise glossary of terms.—G. Ross Stephens, *University of Connecticut.*

Parliament and Public Ownership. By A. H. Hanson. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 248. Price $4.80.)

In the United Kingdom, as Lowell long ago said, it is the cabinet that legislates, with the advice and consent of parliament. At the same time, no one questions the right of members of the legislature to investigate the activities of ministers in the government. As Lowell also noted, the cabinet administers subject to the constant supervision and criticism of the House of Commons. To what extent this principle affects the administration of publicly-owned industries is the subject of Mr. Hanson's book, published for the Hansard Society. Mr. Hanson recognizes that it may be natural to progress from democracy to socialism to what constitutes a quasi-independent bureaucracy in fact. The thinking of the Labour Party braintrusters such as R. H. Tawney, G. D. H. Cole, and Lord Morrison progressed similarly from belief in politically controlled and/or worker-controlled socialized industries (public corporations were earlier termed examples of "capitalist nationalization") to a position very similar to that of the Conservative Party with regard to the B.B.C. and the L.P.T.B.

Mr. Hanson deals with the public corporation's development in idea and fact. At the end of the second world war there were two major factors of influence: the acceptance of the idea of planning and the election for the first time of a Labour Government with an absolute majority. But the T.U.C., largely ignoring past experience with the public corporation, definitely insisted on ministerial responsibility for the conduct of policy-making. The Coal Industry Nationalization Act of 1946 was drafted with this principle in mind, and was the subject of criticism by the Conservative Opposition. Labour's reply was that parliamentary control would diminish the need for statutory control. Discussion of nationalization bills themselves were more fruitful than subsequent debate on nationalized industries, although annual submission of the report and accounts on each industry provided regular opportunity for such debate. Question Time provides a further (and perhaps better) opportunity, and the author discusses this. Few questions have produced impressive information, although the matter of retention of miners' cottages by former miners no longer employed touched a "controversial issue." The doctrine that the minister might in many cases provide information while disclaiming responsibility received varying applications from Messrs. Shinwell and Gaitskell, and was interpreted by the Conservatives when they took office in 1951 differently from the way in which they had interpreted the doctrine when they were in opposition. The prospect held out when nationalized industries were new that "clearly defined conventions would gradually establish themselves has not materialized." Select Committees have been limited in the scope of their subject matter by the necessity of avoiding majority and minority reports if their authority is not to be jeopardized. The difference in Anglo-Saxon parliamentary tradition from that of continental Euorpe minimizes the value of taking foreign experience as a guide.

To one observer it seems odd that there is so little suggestion of the establishment in the United Kingdom of a parliamentary equivalent of the congressional investigating committee, to which directors of public corporations could be summoned. In the United Kingdom there would be no question of executive privilege. But in the absence of such an inconvenience, the tradition that only members of parliament may be questioned by parliament provides, perhaps, an equally insurmountable obstacle, and Select Committees will continue to make "non-controversial" reports.—ARTHUR BUTLER DUGAN, *The University of the South.*

Questions in Parliament. BY D. N. CHESTER AND NONA BOWRING. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Pp. vi, 335. $5.60.)

Question time is as British as fish and chips and Hyde Park, and its quaintness and ritual have long attracted the American. Now we have a compendium of information about its development and use, particularly in the latter part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Warden Chester of Nuffield College and his research assistant, Mrs. Bowring, have explored fully the history of the constitutional rules, precedents and usages surrounding this unique institution. They pay particular attention to the developments of the first decade of this century when the present rules achieved something of their form and structure. They then explore its uses from both the Members' and the Ministers' roles.

Their most interesting finding is that in spite of an enormous growth of governmental activities and a much lessened role for the back bencher, this form of back bencher activity has not greatly increased in use since the days of the Liberal Governments of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith. They explain this, in part, by noting the greatly increased use of private correspondence between Members of Parliament and Ministers, and discuss the value of this form of seeking information and redress as opposed to putting an oral Question in the House. It is clear from their findings that today's M.P. is acquiring errand boy duties for his constituency analogous to those of his American counterpart. That these have not spilled over into a greater number of Questions and demands for an extended Question time surprises the authors and the reader.

The study takes up problems of the degree to which the Question Hour is an influential access for back bench interests and suggests some tentative answers to these questions. But the authors are very reluctant to utilize systematic and statistical techniques to order their mass of detail. They state their belief that each Question put to a Minister is unique, and each Ministerial reply and the set of following supplementary Questions and answers is a particular situation, making statistical analysis difficult if not misleading. This reviewer, for one, wishes they had been more venturesome in this regard.

The study further suggests to me, without stating or developing the concept, that Parliamentary activity is often the outward sign of hidden activity. The authors do not consider the degree to which Questions are supplied by organized interests, or reflective of such, though they do go into the evidence that some are parts of party campaigns. There are numerous unconscious suggestions of that enormous part of the British political glacier below the ceremonial waters, but these are rarely followed through. The authors do reject the idea that Question Hour is an adequate reflection of the real concerns of back benchers at any one time, and for good reason. But to an American, the problem of reconciliation of particular with broader generalized interests which the British so take for granted is still open for investigation.

This work will probably remain for some time the best study of Questions in Parliament. It is so full of detail that those attempting to construct the shape of the British structure of interests and power may have to do some ferreting to find just what he desires. But the basic material and evidence are there, and we can thank Warden Chester for his long standing interest in this aspect of British politics.—JOHN H. MILLETT, *University of Wichita.*

Party Politics (Volume III): The Stuff of Politics. BY SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 493. $8.50.)

Efforts to synthesize knowledge from the diverse fields of history, philosophy and political science should almost always be applauded. *The Stuff of Politics* gives grounds for the qualification. Sir Ivor wisely notes in his introduction that this book could not have been written unless "the conventional boundaries of academic learning were ignored." Unfortunately, he has also ignored the substantive contributions which these disciplines could make to his attempt to grapple with the chief ideas of party politics in England since the Reformation.

Historians may be put off by the introduction, and underscore the author's admission that "little attention has been paid to primary sources." There is no sense of historical evolution, or even of chronology. The English Civil War, which provides a crucial test for his thesis, is nowhere treated entire. Only by ignoring events since 1918 has the author remained true to the English school of 'modern' history.

Philosophers will not regard this book as a study in philosophy, for Jennings claims he is dealing with politicians, who by definition have no ideas. Hobbes is mentioned only in passing, and

Harrington and T. H. Green are omitted. Joseph Chamberlain bulks far larger than the Utilitarians. Edmund Spenser merits a reference, but not Herbert Spencer. The author's dislike of defining concepts shows he has no time to waste on the linguistic philosophers.

Political scientists will recognize that Jennings is, if only in intention, a political behaviorist. Psychological explanations abound. Political ideas, we are repeatedly told, spring from emotion and inspire emotion; they have no rational basis. They are affectual instruments used by politicians in their perpetual struggle for power. Ideas are useful insofar as they produce favorable responses from voters. They change slowly through time, as new generations come forward. The ordinary person is slow to adapt his ways of thinking, and apathetic towards politics.

Buried within mountains of *obiter dicta* and quotes from pre-1939 secondary sources are sufficient ideas to sustain a reasonable essay on the persistence through the centuries of a common political culture in England. But in this sort of exercise almost everything depends upon how the points are made. (Cf. Professor Oakeshott's *Political Education.*) Jennings' style combines many different faults. First, there is the suggestive epigram which is left unexplored: "There is no Liberal who is not a little conservative, and no Conservative who is not a little liberal." Then there is the platitude: "Changes in the physical environment produce changes in social conventions; and conventions change even when there are no very evident changes in the physical environment." Frequently one finds statements which are accurate only if words are stretched beyond their breaking point: "Newspapers, magazines, books and broadcasts publish much the same ideas." Then there is the inaccurate statement: "One third of the electorate is over 48, one third under 38, and one third between 38 and 48." Legalistic interpretations abound: "The primary purpose of a fiscal law is to raise money for the Crown." Finally, and incessantly, the grating, patronizing chattiness: "The American colonies were juvenile delinquents who needed a good spanking."

The amount of space given to different issues and men is somewhat idiosyncratic. Ten pages are devoted to Ireland before 1690, and hardly two pages to the Commonwealth and Empire since 1918. Foreign policy in this century seems to be of no importance. Eden, rightly, is ignored, but so are Sir Eyre Crowe, Norman Angell, Lord Robert Cecil and the pacifists. Nothing much appears to have happened to the welfare state since the Education Act of 1902; the landmark Act of 1944 is ignored. Professor J. R. Seeley receives full attention as an historian and political figure; Professor R. H. Tawney is ignored. But then, he is in good company in this. Phillip Snowden appears as an important figure in economics, and the ideas and influence of a mere bursar of Kings, J. M. Keynes, are passed over completely.

Anyone interested in an introduction to the subject which Jennings purports to treat would do far better to read the volumes on the English political tradition edited by Alan Bullock and F. W. D. Deakin or Dicey's *Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century.*—RICHARD ROSE, *University of Manchester.*

The Administration of British Foreign Relations. BY DONALD G. BISHOP. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961. Pp. 410. $7.00.)

Professor Bishop has given us a most interesting and informative book which deals with the governmental structure and operations by which British foreign policy is formulated and administered.

In the opening chapter the nature of the general executive control of foreign relations is explored and detailed consideration is given to the constitutional powers over certain basic foreign affairs—the declaration of war, the making of treaties, and the recognition of new governments. Subsequent chapters are concerned with the role of the Monarch and how the King influences the control of foreign relations, the relations between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet and its influence upon foreign relations, Parliament and its efforts to control foreign affairs, the problem of maintaining continuity in foreign policy, and the role of public opinion and the press in policy determination. Key chapters deal with the organizational aspects and with administrative procedures and problems. Attention is devoted to the historical development of the Foreign Service during the nineteenth and twentieth centures and the significant 1943 reforms are closely analyzed. Major personnel problems facing the Foreign Service are examined—recruitment, including efforts made to broaden the educational and social basis of selection, examination techniques, promotional criteria, and remuneration. The present administrative organization of the Foreign Office is described, emphasis being given to the geographical area, the functional subject, and administrative departments.

The analysis of how the Foreign Service actually operates is most informative. The author drawing upon historical materials gives the reader thumb nail sketches of a number of "typical" Foreign Secretaries, analyzes their duties, and charts the major responsibilities of their principal administrative aids—The Permanent Under-Secretary of State, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and Minister of State. In the overseas sphere, the work of the embassies is dealt with, particularly the issuance and carrying out of diplomatic instructions, the principal duties of diplomats, and the work of the Consular Service. The Foreign Office possesses no monopoly of control over "foreign affairs." Actually, the entire gamut of governmental affairs is involved, particularly the work of the Treasury, the Defense Departments, Board of Trade, and the Home Office.

Professor Bishop concludes that in the future four major problems confront the British government in the conduct and administration of foreign affairs. And, interestingly enough, these are the same problems which continually concern our own leaders and those of other major democratic nations. The first of these is a pressing need to secure the continuous co-ordination of the policies of the various ministries and departments, as they relate to foreign affairs, with the work of the Foreign Office. Today there is a high degree of intermingling of "foreign" and "domestic" problems. Few governmental activities can be exclusively classified as purely "domestic." Another important problem involves the recent democratization of the control of foreign affairs. Since the decline of the Monarch's power, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have been responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. The Cabinet, as a whole, has less real control over foreign affairs than the theory of parliamentary government indicates, and individual members, although they may be well informed of developments, are often unable to influence the making of decisions and must rely primarily upon the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. "Parliament has developed a new and considerable interest in foreign relations," Dr. Bishop observes, "though it has not yet found any effective way to control them." The achievement of continuity in foreign policy has been made possible by the development of a high degree of party responsibility, so that except in isolated instances government proposals are almost certain of approval by the House of Commons. In the modern day issues of foreign policy are openly debated in the Parliament, in the press and in a variety of forums throughout the country. Public opinion affects the making of foreign policy more than in earlier periods, and the Foreign Office of necesssity must devote more attention to shaping and cultivating public attitudes. The desire of the press to publish as much news as possible and the necessity of the government to conduct its relations with foreign nations in secrecy still constitute an unsettled dilemma.

The third problem, that of devising the most effective form of organization for the conduct of foreign relations, is one concerning which most progress has been made. The reorganizations which took place after the end of World War II have done much to raise the administrative efficiency of the Foreign Service to new high levels. The fourth and final problem is the development of a staff broad-visioned enough to deal with the increased scope of foreign affairs in the contemporary world.—John S. Harris, *University of Massachusetts*.

British Broadcasting in Transition. By Burton Paulu. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961, Pp. viii, 250, $5.00.)

This tightly-organized general survey will interest not only students of public opinion and British politics, but also any concerned with framing new policies for American broadcasting. The author, Director of the Department of Radio and Television Broadcasting at Minnesota, based his work on a mixture of observation, interviewing, and printed materials (including reports of scientifically-minded audience researchers). While no interview schedules are found, a listing of respondents suggests a broad coverage of participants and informed observers. Largely a description of the history, policies, programs, and audiences of the competing government and commercial television systems, the study contains separate chapters on programs of "News and Opinion" and "Political Broadcasting." Description is blended with skilled analyses of the effects of the systems upon each other, and of the relationships between outside action and the systems' behavior. Some existing commentary on British political coverage will need revision due to the combined effects of competition in broadcasting and the abolition of the fourteen-day rule. Those desiring fuller background to recent developments in radio should consult Paulu's *British Broadcasting* (1956). Since decision-makers are unlikely to consider seriously a government operated network, those seeking experience relevant to U. S. policy-making will probably find the form of commercial television of primary interest. The Independent Television Authority, a government-established group, establishes and operates transmitters and has broad supervisory powers over the programs which are produced by private corporations. Advertisers have no connection with any program. Without detracting from the present study, it would seem highly desirable that a more systematic analysis of the precise relationship between the Authority and the program companies be performed. Those impressed with the institutions of British commercial television should remember that both regulator and regulated know their status is subject to official review (ITA's license expires in 1964, as does that of the BBC) and that politically-articulate publics are watching. Review is not likely to end either system, but it may determine standards of regulation and performance for a long period.

Paulu's final chapter contains a summary and evaluation of both networks' past performance as well as detailed suggestions for future policy. Competition has improved British television service, giving viewers a second choice and causing improved performance by the BBC. Although applauding commercial TV for the most part, Paulu opposes proposals for commercial radio. He observes the difficulty already encountered by the BBC in an already-complex frequency jungle, but his main argument is in terms of the wide choice already available to the radio audience. The three BBC programs do not have a monopoly on the radio audience since English-language, commercialized Radio Luxembourg has long attracted a wide following.

Among the most fascinating sections was that discussing how commerical TV came into being. Many Conservative M.P.'s, the Labour Party, and most educators, churchmen, and newspapers formed the opposition. Many were opposed out of fear that standards would be lowered—the specter of U. S. TV haunted them. The BBC license and monopoly would have been renewed by the last Labour government if it had made a decision. The case illustrates an interest (BBC) not having a champion in the decision-making group (Labour cabinet) so that decisions affecting it were delayed through lack of attention. At the end the parties both took stands contrary to the polled opinion of most of their supporters. And the Greek tragedy element was present too—Labour insures the adoption of the policy it dislikes (commercial television) by causing a party issue defeat of what apparently could have been a free vote and victory.—R. J. Alperin, *University of Maryland.*

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The George Washington University

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INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZATION

The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy. By Bryce Wood (New York and London: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. x, 438. $7.50.)

For thirty years now the term "good neighbor" has had wide use in the language of international politics in the Western Hemisphere. Like other commonplaces of this idiom the phrase has served varying purposes in a number of distinct and specialized vocabularies. Statesmen have praised the policy of the Good Neighbor. The policy has helped journalists to fill their columns. Certain entrepreneurs have expressed their doubts about its wisdom. Few of the interested parties, however, have undertaken to examine the policy systematically or to identify its substance. Did the United States government assume the role of the Good Neighbor as a consequence of a searching re-appraisal of interests sometime around 1930? Did policy-makers embark on a program of reform in Latin American relations after an examination of national conscience? Re-appraisal, reform and certain other motivations have been cited as sources of the Good Neighbor Policy without further clarifying of what went into the policy or how it was worked out.

A complete contrast to this general fuzziness is offered in this excellent study by Bryce Wood. The precision and thoroughness of his work give it a two-fold merit which will be immediately obvious to any student of Inter-American affairs. First, Wood succeeds in making a comprehensive identification of the substance and the reality of the Good Neighbor Policy. In the second place, an indirect but not unimportant consequence of his effort is the enrichment of a wide range of scholarship dealing with Latin America and the United States.

In connection with the first, careful research of the whole record between 1926 and 1943 establishes the Good Neighbor Policy in the "patterns of policy actions" that emerged in the period. In the Coolidge administration the possibility of domination of the hemisphere by superior force alone began to lose any attraction it might once have had for United States policy-makers. By Franklin Roosevelt's third term not only the attraction but even the possibility had disappeared. The latter did not vanish because United States interest in Latin America had diminished or because United States involvement in the area had become less intense. It was rather that a new rationale of power and responsibility had emerged from the post-World War I experience of the United States. Wood traces this development chiefly through case studies of Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia, Mexico and Venezuela. These cases, along with other materials, supply the means for delineating the policies of non-intervention and non-interference on the part of the United States and the consequences of these policies in what the author calls the "idea of reciprocity." These developments are related in vivid and convincing detail.

It is perhaps inevitable that readers will here and there take issue with the author on the use made of some of the detail. For example, the presentation of certain quotes from United States sources, notably Welles' and Caffrey's despatches from Havana, may on occasion appear needlessly ironic, especially when a similar tone is lacking in the presentation of material from Grau San Martin. The difference in tone invites the suggestion that somehow Grau was a wiser or more responsible statesman than the two Ambassadors, a suggestion to which this reader is not prepared to assent. At the most, however, this represents only minor flaws which do not mar the author's real achievement.

As noted above, the second merit of this book is that it constitutes a significant enrichment of the whole range of scholarship in recent and contemporary Latin American studies. Students of United States policy toward Latin America are in large part familiar with the ground that the study covers. They have not, however, previously been presented with so comprehensive an exploration of the political and diplomatic history of the period. The principal sources on which the work is based are the published and unpublished documents of the Department of State and the documents in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Access to the unpublished documents of the State Department has undoubtedly enhanced the value of the study. As the "Note on Sources" at the end of the book makes clear the conditions attached to the permission to consult unpublished documents in no way restricted the author's freedom of interpretation, although the use of certain quotes and references was limited.

The author's independence of judgment, his meticulous research and presentation have combined to produce a first-rate book which, in all probability, will remain the standard reference on the Good Neighbor Policy for a long time to come.—John J. Kennedy, *University of Virginia.*

Pan America in Crisis. By William Manger. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. vii, 104. Price $3.25.)

Dr. William Manger, the author of this slender but penetrating volume on the inter-American system, is peculiarly well qualified to write on the subject. For more than four decades he was associated with the Pan American Union, the system's secretariat, and for more than a fourth of that time was the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Few if any people have had a better opportunity to observe the high-level working of an organization of this sort.

The formalized inter-American system, now operating under the rubric of the Organization of American States, is, unfortunately, relatively little known in the United States even though its headquarters has always been in this country's capital city, almost literally—which was bad for the symbolism of the relationship—under the shadow of the old State Department building. The public often confused, and still does, the OAS with the Pan American Union, its secretariat. Many persons think that all Latin American Countries' ambassadors to the United States are identical with their ambassadors to the OAS.

Dr. Manger dispels these misconceptions. Further, he lays an excellent historical foundation in brief form, in Chapters III and IV for the development of the system through twelve decades from 1826 to 1948. Two other chapters deal with the post-Bogotá (i.e., post-1948) period and the contemporary situation. A final chapter treats of the United States relation to the OAS.

The high point in cooperation and effectiveness, Dr. Manger tells us, was reached in the years from 1945 to 1947. According to the author even at the Bogotá conference in 1948, when the cornerstone of the present structure of the system was laid, the evidences of recession of confidence were beginning to be shown.

In his later chapters Dr. Manger becomes increasingly critical of the operation of the regional organization. A substantial portion of the fault, he maintains, rests with the United States, but Latin American states themselves are by no means free from responsibility as well. One of the current difficult problems which the OAS has not successfully solved, Dr. Manger avers, is that of reconciling the potentially conflicting principles of unilateral nonintervention and collective responsibility for continental peace and security. Relations among the states of the hemisphere have sadly deteriorated in recent years, he says, and the ouster of Cuba from the system, following the ill-fated invasion attempt of April, 1961, and the action involving the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's alleged complicity in the assassination attempt on President Betancourt of Venezuela are but two of the more dramatic evidences of the decline in the effectiveness of the system.

Those officially connected with the inter-American system will doubtless want, and deserve, their day in court to refute some of the accusations made in this volume. Nonetheless, attention must be given to the charges Dr. Manger levies if for no other reason than the soberness and seriousness with which he makes them and the experience from which he writes.

The continuance of a viable inter-American system must necessarily surmount various built-in obstacles, not the least of which is the incongruity of one great power in the hemisphere operating vis-à-vis twenty lesser powers of varying strengths. It is undoubtedly true that abrasive incidents and trends have characterized the operation in recent years. Still, there are solid bases for hoping that the OAS may yet deserve the label of the most effective as well as the oldest regional organization in the world. Let us hope that Dr. Manger may give us a new edition of his stimulating study in a few years from now, and also that the circumstances of that time may inspire less pessimism and fewer reservations than he now feels.—Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Middle Eastern Affairs: Number Two (*St. Antony's Papers No. 11*). Albert Hourani, editor. (U. S. Publisher, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, Illinois). 167 pages, price: $3.75.

This book consists of five research papers and a "Note," prepared under the auspices of St. Antony's College, Oxford. It is edited by Professor Hourani, a distinguished Oxford scholar on the Middle East. As the papers are written by different scholars on divergent topics, it is best to treat each separately. Elizabeth Monroe of Oxford writes on "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy.'" During his service as Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin was "accused" by "all Jews, most Americans and many Englishmen" of pursuing an "Arab policy." Yet the Arabs never thought of him as "their man." Bevin was able to sway King Abdullah and Nuri al-Sa'id to his side, but these two old men were already pro-British. In the rest of the Arab world he had little success. Monroe rightly attributes his "Arab policy" to the Palestine question. His policy was in line with the British defense considerations in the area, and with the treaties he hoped to sign with the Arab states. The Zionist leanings of his party, the pressure of the U. S. at a time when Britain was her economic dependent, the crisis in Germany, the economic difficulties at home, the little help he got from the Arabs, all conspired to defeat his policy in Palestine. In despair he submitted the conflict to the U.N. The author succeeds in putting Bevin's policy in its proper perspective—as a minor item in a crowded world agenda.

"A Decade of Discovery: America in the Middle East, 1947–1958," is contributed by William Polk of Harvard. After alluding to America's missionary and commercial activities in the Middle East Professor Polk examines briefly but lucidly the increasing American involvement in the area after 1947, when its immediate cause was Britain's inability to carry its post-war imperial burdens. In order to defend Greece and Turkey against Communist threat the "Truman Doctrine" was proclaimed. The U. S. has sought stability in the Middle East through economic aid. Economic policy, however, without a propitious political policy remains ineffective. The author discusses the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower doctrine, the Suez "war," and correctly examines the American landing in Beirut in the context of the Iraqi coup. However, his figure of 5,000 for the landing force may, in the private opinion of American officials in Beirut, be safely multiplied by two.

"Dragomania: The Dragomans of the British Embassy in Turkey," by Allan Cunningham of the University of London, is an interesting account of the role played by the Dragomans (i.e. interpreters) who worked at the British Embassy in Constantinople during the nineteenth century. They were mostly Levantines-descendants of European families long resident in the East. The Dragomans were not merely interpreters but skilled negotiators who understood the Turkish mind and the labyrinths of the Turkish court. However, they were not always reliable nor liked by the polished ambassador who employed them. They had to do for lack of Turkish-trained Englishmen. In the 1830's there was only "one person in all London teaching Turkish." To tackle the problem a member of the Foreign Office recommended the recruiting of "British subjects upon whom entire trust and reliance may be placed, in lieu of foreigners upon whom no reliance whatever can be placed." In 1877 the Turkish interpreterships were made subject to civil service examination. This act meant the end of the Dragoman, but not the end of the "problem of language" in diplomatic intercourse.

"Salisbury and the Tunisian question, 1878–1880," by André Raymond of the University of Bordeaux, is based in part on Raymond's researches at Oxford on British policy toward Tunis, 1830–1881. It provides an enlightening chapter on European diplomacy toward North Africa. Tunis became a pawn of European diplomacy largely through the Bismarckian policy of "compensation," which aimed at solving European difficulties at the expense of Turkey. Bismarck, whose interest was in solidifying Germany's position in Europe, was eager to divert the European powers—namely France and Britain—into African ventures. Salisbury, unlike Palmerston, believed English interests could best be maintained through "territorial re-arrangements" in the Ottoman Empire. Britain's interest in occupying Cyprus pleased Bismarck. "Take Egypt," he added. France, said Bismarck, need not be vexed, she could have Tunis or Syria. "Do what you like in Tunis" was the British advice to the French. Italy's hope of getting British support in annexing Tunis did not materialize. Italy was encouraged to look toward Tripoli. Such was the "international brigandage" of imperial Europe.

The researches of Elie Kedourie of the London School of Economics on Sa'ad Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd deflates, as all researches tend to do, the myth of a hero. Fortunately, however, his conclusion will never reach the Egyptian masses to whom Sa'ad was a hero, a savior and a national symbol. That he was once moderate, turned an opportunist, and a demagogue, who did not flinch from resorting to religious fanaticism, do not, as the author implies, diminish his qualifications for leadership. Leadership is a relevant concept that accommodates itself to the values of the society in which it operates.—Elie Salem, *American University of Beirut, Lebanon.*

Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary. By E. Wilder Spaulding. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. 302. $4.50.)

This is an era in which criticisms of the diplomatic techniques of the United States have risen to extraordinary heights. Books attacking the professional training and qualifications of our overseas emissaries have won fame and presumably fortune for their authors. At the same time, because of the modern revolution in communications some political scientists have tended to write off diplomacy below the presidential or cabinet level as no longer significant. Adherents of either position could profitably examine the balanced views of this volume.

Dr. E. Wilder Spaulding, historian and State Department officer, has produced an interesting, well-written, and frequently witty book which summarizes the careers of over sixty American diplomats. For purposes of convenience his subjects are classified into "The Old Masters," newspaper men, scholars, college presidents, women and the professionals. A chapter entitled "Potpourri" examines the careers of politicians, millionaires, and merchants. As might be expected, the individuals selected range from the sublime to the ridiculous, from the well-known to the obsure. The evidence presented indicates that although the historical procedures by which American diplomats have been selected produced ambassadors with an amazing breadth of background "successes" and "failures" can be found in any of the author's conceptual categories. Apparently there are no reliable criteria by which predictions can be made as to whether skills acquired in one field will be transferable to diplomacy. Advocates of a completely professional foreign service will gain little comfort from Spaulding's temperate conclusion that while the spoils system may be outrageous, a "generous smattering" of amateur appointees may in fact be desirable.

If the purpose of this book is indeed to illustrate the qualities that "go to make a competent diplomat," it falls short of its objective at a number of points. The only clearcut standard for measuring competence which emerges is enthusiasm on the part of the emissary for the country to which he is assigned. This leads the author to describe Andrew Dickson White as "one of our greatest chiefs of mission . . . " while brushing to one side the fact that during the Spanish American War he permitted the German foreign office to assume that the "United States would not object to a few German naval bases on the former Spanish islands in the Pacific) including the Philippines. . . . " There is never any serious attempt to separate the negotiating efforts of the overseas representatives from those taking place simultaneously in Washington or other capitals, or to consider diplomacy in a power or national interest context. The excellent introductory and concluding chapters are drawn more from the outstanding literature in the field than from the case studies presented in the book. Moreover, analysis in depth is sacrificed for quantity of examples. With only 193 pages devoted to examining the various overseas representatives, the author has allowed himself an average of but slightly over three pages to discuss each of his subjects. This is hardly enough material for the reader to gain any real appreciation of the merits and demerits of the individuals concerned. The result is a series of thumbnail sketches which frequently emphasize the non-diplomatic backgrounds of the subjects more than their competence as negotiators.

Yet, Dr. Spaulding's ability to caricature his subjects with a few well-turned phrases is delightful. Thus: "Joseph Patrick Kennedy . . . was one of the least appropriate appointments that Franklin Roosevelt, famous for his inappropriate appointments, ever conjured up." "Max Gluck had done us no great harm. He had only made his country look ridiculous in the eyes of intelligent foreigners. . . . " "As the man primarily responsible for preventing Napoleon the Little from saving the Confederacy . . . John Bigelow deserves to rank with our greatest. . . ." "As one might expect, *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* found more to be enthusiastic about with regard to Mrs. Luce's Italian venture than did the State Department."

Although biographies of ambassadors are not uncommon, there has never been a serious effort by political scientists to analyze diplomacy through a systematic survey of the careers of our foreign emissaries. Perhaps a biographical school of diplomacy is not necessary, but this book is evidence enough that serious studies in depth which relate the personalities and career backgrounds of diplomats to their negotiating tasks might well shed new light on the perplexing problems of diplomacy.—HUBERT S. GIBBS, *Boston University*.

Perspectives on Peace, 1910–1960. Published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. FOREWORD BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSON AND BERNARD BUSH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.; London: Stevens & Sons, 1960. Pp. viii, 202. $3.00.)

The title of this important collection of essays by world figures does not do it justice. The book does not look backward to 1910, when the Carnegie Endowment was founded. Rather, the authors, distilling a formidable aggregate of experiences, re-assess the past only to draw conclusions for the future. These papers should indeed, as President Johnson says, increase public awareness of the dynamic nature of peace. These men are very much in earnest. Some are deeply worried. Most of them plead for changes and new initiatives they consider imperative to maintain the peace. The book should be pondered, and it should create controversy.

In the first piece, the indefatigable former president of the Endowment, James T. Shotwell, offers wise but not sedate "Reflections on War and Peace," focusing on the background and continued meaning of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. There follow essays by Sir Harold Nicolson (U.K.), Salvador de Madariaga (Spain), Dag Hammarskjold, Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Jean Monnet (France), Alberto Lleras Camargo (Colombia), Lester B. Pearson (Canada), Ismet Inönü (Turkey), Max Huber (Switzerland), Henri Bonnet (France), and Sir Norman Angell (U.K.) We are told that efforts at wider geographic representation "were unfortunately unsuccessful."

Since most of the pieces are tersely reasoned, and shades of opinion count decisively, no full summary is possible within limited space. But a few characteristics stand out. The author with the longest experience at the U.N.—Mr. Pearson—is the one most satisfied with the U.N. Against the clamor of nationalisms, the most frequent theme is the need for integration. The greatest obstacle to a more harmonious world is mutual fear and suspicion. The principal villain is the clinging to out-dated concepts of sovereignty.

De Madariaga's "Blueprint for a World Commonwealth" goes farthest in this respect. Only self-deception prevents nations from realizing that "their separate destinies have merged" and that they should "surrender their sovereignties to a sovereignty embodying that merged sovereignty." The matter is complicated but also made more urgent by the pluralistic character of the *loci* of sovereignty: many a small country's sovereignty is fictitious, and even within big ones "some institutions become too strong for the national sovereignty to resist." He mentions the Communist Party in the USSR; the army, often, in France; and sees the USA exercising more "sovereignty" over Guatemala and Panama than over the CIO–AFL or giant corporations at home.

Objectively, "the World *Community* is already a fact"; hence, it "must be *governed*, *i.e.*, must become a World *Commonwealth.*" (ital. added) Looking at the East–West conflict, de Madariaga arrives at the same conclusion. He concedes to the USSR two decisive advantages: "it has an aim while the free world has none; and it seeks world unity, which is consonant with the need of our day." (p. 63) The free world must also set its sight at world unity and solidarity. The U.N., "too loosely conceived" and built on the counting of votes, does not fill the bill. He proposes, as basis for discussion, an ultimate "ideal system of federations," consisting of nine large units: the USA; the Commonwealth; Europe up to the Russian frontier (!); the USSR; Yellow Asia; Islam (from Pakistan to Morocco); Africa south of the Sahara; Iberian America. Each unit would be governed by a council and an assembly. A "Council of Nine" would "rule world affairs." A World Court would administer "world law," to be defined by a "World Legislature."

Mr. Pearson emphasizes the link between diplomatic techniques and organizational set-ups. Less critical of open diplomacy than Sir Harold Nicolson, he draws highly significant conclusions from what he calls the guide of unhappy experiences from both secret and public diplomacy. He is not in disfavor of group or bloc diplomacy but credits it with preventing further polarization of the world community. In fact, "the healthier practices of bloc diplomacy may provide the best hope of maintaining orderly diplomatic processes at the U.N. and elsewhere." He is concerned over the lack of progress in such collective diplomacy in NATO, stating that unless a method to take collective political decisions is found, "NATO is not likely to survive." He has much, albeit not un-critical, praise for the U.N. In "these indispensable halls" plans to preserve the peace "are much more likely to emerge . . . than . . . from voyages to Canossa or to Berchtesgaden." He reiterates his well-known view that negotiation is indispensable as the only alternative to nuclear cataclysm. This point is stressed, also, by General Inönü, former president of Turkey: "Mankind must be taught ceaselessly, in every possible way, that at the present stage of civilization, nations are under compulsion to, and should be able to, co-exist peacefully."—John H. E. Fried, *New York University*.

Studies in World Public Order. By Myres S. McDougal and Associates. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. Pp. xx, 1058. Price $15.00.)

This volume is a collection of studies and essays previously published in learned journals over the past two decades by Professor McDougal and associates (Harold Lasswell, Asher Lans, Richard Gardner, and others). Integrated by the conceptual framework of the contextual, policy-oriented jurisprudence espoused by Professors McDougal and Lasswell, the studies suggest effective policies for the achievement of a world legal order. The conceptual framework is set forth in two introductory essays, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," and "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest." The latter essay, containing the authors' initial suggestions that legal education must be training for policy-making and that the content of the law depends upon the goals and values to be achieved, is doubtless well known among those interested in legal studies. In the former essay, one of more recent vintage, the authors consider the effective contribution of students of international law to the establishment of a world legal order based on respect for human dignity. In this regard, they challenge legal scholars ". . . to develop a jurisprudence . . . which will assist the peoples of the world to distinguish public orders based on human dignity and public orders based either on a law which denies human dignity or a denial of law itself for the simple supremacy of naked force, and . . . to invent and recommend the authority structures and functions . . . necessary to a world public order that harmonizes with the growing aspirations of the overwhelming numbers of the peoples of the globe and is in accord with the proclaimed values of human dignity enunciated by the moral leaders of mankind."

For such a policy-oriented inquiry, the traditional concept of international law as a body of conventional and customary legal rules governing the relations of states is insufficient. International law must instead be envisioned " . . . as a whole *process* of authoritative decision in the world arena, a process in which authority and control are appropriately conjoined and which includes, along with an inherited body of flexible prescriptions explicitly related to community policies, both a structure of established decision-makers and a whole arsenal of methods and techniques by which policy is projected and implemented."

In the substantive studies (some of which are quite lengthy), the authors test the conceptual framework by applying it to specific contemporary problems related to the development of a world legal order. These problems include such matters as the interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements, the United Nations Charter and the veto power, the law of the sea, and the law of outer space. Because of limited space (and the fact that these studies have been previously published), it is unnecessary to assay each one. This reviewer particularly appreciated the study entitled "Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy." Published in 1945, this study (of interest to students of both international and constitutional law) is a scholarly and persuasive statement of the legal equality of the congressional-executive agreement with the treaty instrument. Moreover, the former instrument, the authors assert, is more in accord with the basic principles of American government and more responsive to the national interest than the treaty instrument. Within this context, a discussion of the Bricker proposal of the last decade would have been quite instructive. It is unfortunate, however, that this study and several of the others were not brought up to date for subsequent publication. Their revision in the light of more recent developments would have enhanced the volume's usefulness.

One study of particular interest is that entitled "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security." After examining the traditional legal rules subsumed under the rubric of "freedom of the seas," the authors conclude that under contemporary conditions the claim of the United States to conduct hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific Ocean is a reasonable assertion that contravenes no prescription or policy with respect to the law of the sea.

Although many political scientists and legal scholars may be unsympathetic to Professor McDougal's policy-oriented jurisprudence, none can deny that he exercises a significant impact on legal studies and the study of international law in particular. He is a prolific and persuasive scholar. His deductive analyses of contemporary international legal problems suggest a wealth of further research requirements and possibilities. No student of international law can well ignore his writings. For one interested in a convenient collection of these studies, this volume is a welcome addition to the literature.—DON C. PIPER, *Duke University.*

World Polity II. A Yearbook of Studies in International Law and Organization.—(Washington, D. C.: The Institute of World Polity, Georgetown University; Utrecht and Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers, 1960. Pp. 414.)

Such questions as what is right and what is wrong, what is legal and what is not, still puzzle the mind of man. However, it seems that the most immediate question of the day, which is characterized as a status of intermediacy, *i.e.*, a twilight zone between war and peace, is the question of the survival of nation-states.

The Institute of World Polity of Georgetown University, which gives priority to research on the problems of legal and ethical control of force in international community, in its second volume of *World Polity* reminds those who are committed to the defense of material well-being that the real problem is the revitalization and preservation of the concrete societal order and value systems. The first two contributions in *World Polity II*, namely Professor William H. Roberts' "The Nature of Contemporary Conflict," and Professor William V. O'Brien's "Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War" emphasize the importance of the hierarchy of values established by the deductive natural law school and call for strengthening the conceptual foundation of man and his society. Because of the "balance of terror," the present international conflict may never take the nature of a war as that term is understood in pre-atomic age international law. During this status of intermediacy the free peoples of the world are provided, maybe for the last time, the opportunity to find the real strength in their original value system.

Professors Roberts' and O'Brien's realistic and penetrating analysis of the present day total conflict certainly deserve praise.

Using a morphological method, Professor Roberts discusses the underlying sub-strata of modern international conflict. The writer argues that "the Western world has not yet completely realized the fact that the assumptions on which its policies had been based for centuries do not any more provide an adequate foundation for action intended to cope with modern problems." "In the process of struggling to adjust its principles to changed conditions," Professor Roberts observes, "the West has become lost in existential fear and anxiety." According to the writer the problem is not to be Red or dead but "the survival of man and societies as concretely existing moral entities." Rejecting the materialist creed of the Communists and material prosperity of the West as solutions to the problems of man, Professor Roberts calls for "the establishment of a trans-national societal order ensuring the continued growth and development of Western system of values."

The editor of *World Polity II*, Professor William V. O'Brien, in his article analyzes the dilemma of survival under the threat of nuclear weapons. He goes to the heart of this neglected subject and considers the normative regulation of nuclear weapons. A brilliant student of the late Professor Ernst Feilchenfeld and an authority in his own right on "military necessity," he argues that the "conceptual basis for a law of nuclear war is to be found . . . in the proper interpretation of the central principle of legitimate military necessity." His study is based on two assumptions: "1. Unlimited nuclear warfare is inadmissible because its predictable effects threaten the physical existence of mankind. . . . 2. But nuclear weapons in some form are an accepted integral part of modern defense establishments and their use in serious international conflicts is virtually inevitable." He would accept defeat instead of resorting to disproportionate, illegal and immoral means. Because "the subordinate place of the State in the natural law hierarchy of values clearly precludes the use of nuclear means which would result in disproportionate injury to the earth, to mankind, to the international society." However, the inevitable counter argument is: but will the Communist play ball according to the Western values of natural law? Professor O'Brien's answer: "From the efforts of decision-makers to reconcile their duty of success with the limitations of natural law there will emerge, in effect, the consensus of mankind which will shape the customary law of nuclear war." To some this may sound like the solution furnished by Suarez to the border line case known as "the plank of Carneades."

Other contributions to *World Polity II* include "Submarine Warfare and International Law" by Lieutenant Commander William H. Barnes II; "Rules of Land Warfare During the War of American Revolution" by Dr. Martin J. Clancy; and "The Law of War: A Bibliography, 1945–1958" by Mr. J. R. Leguey-Feilleux who is the Director of Research of the Institute of World Polity.

Commander Barnes, an expert in the field of submarines, combines his practical experience and extensive knowledge in his article. He argues that today's submarine fleet and guided missiles introduce new dimensions of naval warfare. Coupled with the failure of great powers to comply with the limitations of conventional rules with respect to submarine warfare, the atomic age and its unpredictable destructive capacity makes imperative the regulation and limitation of submarine warfare. Commander Barnes' proposals with respect to submarine warfare tie in very closely with Professor O'Brien's concept of legitimate military necessity.

The summary of the War of the American Revolution told by Dr. Clancy is a serious legal treatise exploring the practice of the Revolutionary War. The "civilized warfare" of the Eighteenth century revolutions is brought once again to the attention of responsible officials of the nuclear age. Dr. Clancy's "Rules of Land Warfare During the War of the American Revolution" is certainly a notable contribution to the efforts of revitalizing the International Law of War.

Jean-Robert Leguey-Feilleux must have spent long and arduous hours in preparing this excellent bibliography on the laws of war for the years 1945–1958. He presents a carefully organized listing of some 1,900 studies, covering systematically the entire field of the law of war. Since two of the contributions in *World Polity II* originally were theses, one wonders why he has left out the unpublished Masters theses and Doctoral dissertations in this field. This would be also of great service to the student, the writer and the publicist.

The reviewer is of the opinion that the essays in *World Polity II* are most provocative and will stimulate the mind of any reader who is very much concerned with the sub-strata of the present day total conflict and the development of the international law of war in the nuclear age.—METIN TAMKO, *Middle East Technical University* (Ankara).

Geschichte der Internationale. BY JULIUS BRAUNTHAL. (Hannover, West Germany: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf. Gmbh, Hannover, 1961. Vol. I. Pp. 404.)

This is the first volume of what I assume will be a two-volume history of the "International." The present work covers the predecessors and beginnings of the international Socialist movement through the First and Second Internationals up to 1914. The outbreak of the First World War offers an almost self-evident divide in the history not only of the International, but of the West in general: this was really the end of the 19th century, the beginning of the great seismic shocks from which date a new epoch in human history.

The outline of the book is primarily chronological, though with one or two important exceptions. The first part, which begins with the French revolution, runs to the founding of the First International whose life takes up the second section of the book. The last part covers the period from 1889, the founding of the Second International, to July 28, 1914—the day when the Bureau of the International met for the last time before Armageddon. The author has been personally involved in the workings of the international socialist movement, partly before World War II, but primarily as Secretary of the reconstructed Socialist International after the war. The book is dedicated to Friedrich Adler who held office as General Secretary of the Labor and Socialist International in the Twenties and Thirties.

The treatment is primarily in ideological terms. Thus the history of the First International is presented as the evolution of the struggle between the Anarchists and Marx for the "right" doctrine of the international Socialist movement. The relationship among doctrine, the stage of economic development, the progress of industrialization, the political and social institutions of the area concerned is not in the center of the author's interest, although in some parts of the book such considerations are not completely neglected. Thus the rise of reformism is explained by the growth of the machine of the movement and the development of a rich variety of institutions. As an intellectual history and a reasoned report on developments in the international Socialist movement, this book is a first-rate addition to the literature.

Readers will particularly enjoy the brief but penetrating discussion of the conflict between Proudhon and Bakunin on one hand, and Marx on the other; of the remarkable ability of the First International to shift its policy when conditions changed as they did on September 4, 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, when the French Republic was proclaimed. Contemporary problems—such as the Yugoslav experiment in local self-government—can be seen in a new focus thanks to the author's splendid analysis of the Paris Commune while the alliance of communism and nationalism and peasant rebellion—one of Lenin's strategic masterpieces—can be traced back to Marx' view of the Irish question.

The story of the Second International is told mainly in terms of the great debates in the International itself—the famous "Millerand case," the revisionist conflict, the general or mass strike debate, and those on colonialism and war. As is inevitable and probably desirable in a book of this kind, the author is not merely a distant observer but emotionally and intellectually involved. This becomes particularly clear in Braunthal's report on the revisionist debate. There can be little doubt left today that on the main issues regarding the evolution of Capitalism Bernstein was far closer to the truth than his orthodox opponents, particularly Kautsky and Bebel. The author would probably not deny this, but he seems to think that from the point of view of the life of the movement and its enthusiasm the "myth" of the great historical mission of the working class was an indispensable element. For supporters of "scientific socialism" this seems a remarkable "deviation" into the philosophy that animated Sorel.

One major omission in this excellent book relates to trade unionism. The somewhat peculiar relationship between the trade unions and the Socialists on the international scene would deserve detailed treatment, particularly as this helps understand the delayed development of a separate trade union international. The Menshevik-Bolshevik split is, I assume, to be treated in the next volume even though chronologically it would belong in the present book.

Some minor requests may be in order in view of a possible English translation of the book, which I hope will soon be forthcoming. Some data on membership figures of the organizations affiliated with the Socialist International at various dates would be enlightening, as would be the more liberal use of dates in the text. A few misprints should be eliminated. American readers would enjoy learning more about the—sometimes surprisingly intimate—relations between events in this country and the evolution of the Socialist International.

Many illustrations and an excellent index add to the usefulness of the book for the student. In view of the high quality of this first volume, we shall be looking forward eagerly to its sequel.—ADOLF STURMTHAL, *University of Illinois.*

The Position of the Individual in International Law according to Grotius and Vattel. BY PETER P. REMEC. PREFACE BY QUINCY WRIGHT. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Pp. xii, 260. $4.70.)

This scholarly study contains more than a mere discussion of the question of the position of the individual in international law according to Grotius and Vattel. After a 40 page survey of the current doctrine on the question the author gives his reasons for the reexamination of just these two classical writers. However, even if the *magna opera* under discussion had not had, in recent years, their bicentennial and tercentenary, respectively (which occasions would be reason enough for considering them, especially from such an important angle as that of the position of the individual) no apology for this reexamination is necessary if the study is interesting in itself; and if it is not, good reasons for undertaking it do not enhance its significance.

The two main chapters of the book deal primarily and interestingly with the general theory of international law of Grotius and Vattel, in particular with the relationship between natural and positive law, while the specific question of the position of the individual occupies only a relatively minor part of the discussion. Dr. Remec then takes up the question: "How would Grotius or Vattel solve certain problems which, according to the present exigencies of international life, involve the individual as such?", limiting the comparison of the two authors "to the possibility of international protection of the rights of the individual against oppression by his own state." His answer is that "both authors admit the possibility of an individual appeal beyond the municipal law to the law of nature. Both admit the possibility of violent resistance in extreme cases . . . on the ground of the law of nature". In general, however, "Grotius recognizes but Vattel denies the possibility of international protection of human rights against one's own state," the former permitting "just humanitarian intervention," the latter holding for nonintervention.

One of the main purposes of the study is to establish whether, in view of "the modern trend of international law doctrine . . . to abandon the purely positivistic conceptions" and of the "manifold return to natural law principles," "the fundamental principles of the law of nature and of nations held by either of the two classic authors are suitable, at least in part, for a modern re-application." Those of Vattel would not seem to be suitable while those of Grotius would have to be qualified in terms of collective intervention, intervention by international organization, in order to avoid the dangers of unilateral intervention. It is submitted that such results can be and have been obtained without recourse to natural law principles. Natural law can be used both to justify and to attack an existing *status quo*. "Positivists,"[1] on the other hand, do not necessarily agree with the *lex lata;* only they do not claim that their proposed *lex ferenda* is the only admissible one. It would be difficult to argue, as the learned author seems to imply, that the extension of the *Rechts- und Handlungsfaehigkeit* of the individual in international law, which has taken place in particular since the First World War, is due only to natural law concepts. On the other hand, all the natural law of the world has not saved the victims of Hitler or Stalin.—SALO ENGEL, *The University of Tennessee.*

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[1] If one is to continue the use of these labels, see *e.g.* Kunz in 55, *The American Journal of International Law* 951 (1961), and Rubin in 56 *ibid.*, 514 (1962).

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DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER
Deputy Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1961 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Additions

H. Angell, The Regulation, Limitation and Subsidization of Election Campaign Funds. *McGill.*

Hoyt B. Ballard, Some Contemporary Views on the Nature and Function of Political Philosophy. *Texas.*

George D. Beam, The Use of Logical Models in Political Science. *Michigan.*

Pushpa Bhana, The Concept of "Class" in Utilitarian Thought. *Toronto.*

Franklyn G. Bonn, The Idea of Political Party in Early Jeffersonian Thought. *Minnesota.*

A. Bromke, Poland's Own Road to Socialism. *McGill.*

Ian Budge, Political Decision. *Yale.*

Harold M. Cady, James Madison's Theories of Federalism and Their Impact on the American Constitutional System. *Claremont.*

Ann Cagan, Political Thought of Contemporary Scientists. *Harvard.*

Vilma A. Cavallaro, Jose Ortega y Gasset: His Philosophy of Politics and History. *New York University.*

Philip C. Chapman, The Image of the Mass. *California* (Berkeley).

N. T. Cieplak, Sorel's Theory of Syndicalism. *McGill.*

John R. Crutcher, Sanctions of African Rule in Tanganyika: The Transformation of Religio-Political Symbolism. *Notre Dame.*

Theodore Denno, Evolution of the Marxian Utopia. *Maryland.*

Spynos Dialismas, The Origins and Development of Athenian Democracy. *American.*

Sharron E. Doerner, The Political Community: A Critique of Select Thinkers. *Indiana.*

Paul Eidelberg, The Political Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Reinterpretation of the Intention of the Founding Fathers. *Chicago.*

John Ellsworth, Individualism and Community in the 17th Century. *Claremont.*

Gerald Friedberg, Socialism in America, A Case Study: The Life and Times of John Spargo. *Harvard.*

Gerard A. Gibbons, Reason of State and the Right of Resistance. *New York University.*

Arthur S. Goldberg, Consensus-Cleavage and Political Stability. *Yale.*

H. P. Habib, A Case Study of Egyptian Conservatism: Ismail Sidqi. *McGill.*

George Heiman, A Comparative Study of the German and English Idea of Freedom in the 19th Century. *Toronto.*

Joseph A. Hennessy, The Political Philosophy of Maurice Barres: A Critical Analysis. *Notre Dame.*

Morton Horwitz, Rise of the Doctrine of Tyranny of the Majority. *Harvard.*

W. Marvin Kendrick, Xenophon's Political Philosophy. *Chicago.*

Frederick E. Kidder, The Political Philosophy of Luis Munoz Rivera (1859–1916) of Puerto Rico. *Florida.*

F. A. F. Kunz, The Senate of Canada, 1925–1961. *McGill.*

George Mace, The Comparative Influence of

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* Similar lists have been printed in the *Review* annually since 1911, except for 1915–19, 1921 and 1923–24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1961, list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes, and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science; to avoid misunderstandings, entries are not accepted from individual candidates for degrees. The subject matter classification of an entry by the department concerned, if given, is followed. Each entry is listed under one classification only.

For a fuller note about coverage and subject matter classification, and for references to dissertation lists in cognate fields, see the 1960 list, LIV, 816.

For a chart which classifies, by subject category, the numbers of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this REVIEW, LII, 916.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Hobbes and Locke on The Federalist Papers. *Claremont.*

H. H. Macquarrie, Sir Robert Borden and the Conservative Party of Canada. *McGill.*

Frank B. Mallonee, Jr., An Exposition of the Political Ideas of Jefferson Davis. *Emory.*

Louis C. Midgley, Politics, Power and Ultimate Concern: The Political Philosophy of Paul Tillich. *Brown.*

Larry D. Nachman, The Liberal Politics of John Stuart Mill. *Columbia.*

P. C. Noble, Regionalism in International Organization: Theory and Practice. *McGill.*

Alan Ritter, Political Thought of Proudhon. *Harvard.*

James W. Roberts, Lenin's Theory of Imperialism: Evolution and Present Meaning. *North Carolina.*

Esther E. Rowland, Ernest Jones, Chartist. *Columbia.*

Peter Sampo, Mazzini and the Church: A Study in Political Symbolism. *Notre Dame.*

Elizabeth B. Sass, The Contribution of American Political Science to Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

Marvin Schick, The United States Court of Appeals: A Study in Judicial Behavior. *New York University.*

Thomas Schrock, The Political Thought of Daniel Defoe. *Chicago.*

Barbara Silberdick, The Political Thought of Oliver Cromwell: The Search for a Stable Constitutional Order. *Yale.*

James A. Steintrager, Human Nature and Political Society: An Examination of the Ethical Basis of J. S. Mill's Political Thought. *Chicago.*

Rolf H. Theen, The Political Thought of Peter Nikitich Tkachev. *Indiana.*

Jean P. Tournon, The Nature and Role of the Political Group. *California* (Berkeley).

Hihun Pak, Logical Positivism and Political Theory. *Minnesota.*

Rev. Joseph Pittau, Political Theory in Early Meiji Japan: The Making of the Major Constitution. *Harvard.*

Ernest J. Walters, Social Science and Democracy: A Study of Graham Wallis. *Chicago.*

Richard S. Wells, Political Ideology and the Legal Profession: The Case of the Carr Law Firm of Manchester, Iowa. *Iowa.*

Burton Zwiebach, The Political Thought of R. H. Tawney. *Columbia.*

Changes

Jerome I. Cooperman, The Philosophical Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Leo Strauss, T. O. Weldon, J. P. Sartre. *Rutgers.*

Gordon J. Schochet, Robert Filmer and His Critics: A Study in Conflicting Theories of Obligation in Seventeenth Century English Political Thought. *Minnesota.*

Deletions

Jason M. Aronson, Shaftesbury's Political Thought and Its Philosophical Foundations. *Chicago.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Additions

Marjorie E. Aghassi, Attitudes toward Channeling of U. S. Foreign Aid through the United Nations: A Case Study of Interest Groups before Congress. *Columbia.*

Samuel B. Bloom, Federal Aid to Higher Education and the Doctrine of Separation of Church and State in Education. *California* (Berkeley).

Ruth E. Cowart, The Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960: A Study of the Legislative Process. *American.*

William J. Crotty, Jr., The Democratic Advisory Council: An Analysis. *North Carolina.*

John E. Crow, Lawyers and Politics: A Behavioral View. *Washington* (Seattle).

J. Clarence Davies, 3d, Target Groups and Urban Renewal. *Columbia.*

Donald M. Freeman, Religion and Southern Politics: A Study of the Political Behavior of Southern White Protestants. *North Carolina.*

Louis C. Gawthrop, Congressional Control of Foreign Aid Agencies, 1948–1960. *Johns Hopkins.*

Jackson A. Giddens, The United States Information Agency: Its Organization and Operation. *Fletcher School.*

John Grupenhoff, A Study of the Politics of Cincinnati, Ohio and of Hamilton County, since 1924. *Texas.*

John E. Harr, Specialization and the Senior Officer in the Conduct of U. S. Foreign Affairs. *California* (Berkeley).

Richard Hofferbert, Out-Party Power Consolidation: A Case Study of Routine Political Career Building. *Indiana.*

Joseph P. Kelly, An Analysis of a Montana Democratic Congressional Candidate's Primary and General Campaigns in the 1960 Election. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Helenan Lewis, The Teenage Joiner and His Orientations Toward Public Affairs: A Test of Two Hypotheses about Multiple Group Membership. *Michigan State.*

Diane Monson, Interests and Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. *New York University.*

Richard E. Morgan, The Religious Interest Group in American Politics: A Case Study of the Protestants and other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. *Columbia.*

Edwin E. Olson, Congressional Attitudes toward the Federal Public Service. *American.*

Milton Pabon, Study of Political Legitimacy in Puerto Rico. *Chicago.*

Robert L. Piper, The Attempt to Draft Adlai Stevenson for the 1960 Presidential Nomination. *Syracuse.*

Quentin L. Quade, Harry S. Truman and the Conduct of Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Presidential Leadership. *Notre Dame.*

Mark Reader, The Political Criticism of George Orwell, *Michigan.*

Michael P. Rogin, McCarthyism and Agrarian Radicalism. *Chicago.*

Bernard Samoff, Influence of NLRB Decisions: Statutory Protection of Job Rights from Union-Caused Discrimination. *Pennsylvania.*

Alan H. Schechter, The Businessman as Statesman: A Study of the Influence of Government Service on Attitudes and Perceptions of Business Executives. *Columbia.*

Edward Schneier, The House Committee on Un-American Activities and Its Client Groups. *Claremont.*

Captain John Seigle, Internal War: The United States Response. *Harvard.*

Wayne W. Shannon, The House Conservative Coalition: The Case of the 86th Congress. *Cornell.*

David A. Smeltzer, The Problem of Alternatives: The Role of Congressional Committee Hearings. *Michigan*

Changes

Alten B. Davis, The Excess Land Law in the Central Valley of California. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert S. Getz, Congressional Conflict of Interest: A Study in Legislative Policy. *Rutgers.*

James R. Kerr, Congressmen as Overseers: Congressional Surveillance of the Civilian Space Program. *Stanford.*

David M. Olson, The Government Relations Programs of the American Petroleum Institute and the Independent Petroleum Association of America: A Comparative Study. *California* (Berkeley).

Herbert C. Phillips, Depressed Areas Legislation and West Virginia Politics. *Pittsburgh.*

Deletions

Joseph D. Lubin, The Item Veto and the Presidency. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert L. Skinner, Principles, Policy and Pressure. A Study of the Americans for Democratic Action. *Johns Hopkins.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

Brother Norbert Brockman, Constitutional Theories of the American Bar Association. *Catholic University.*

Ida M. Chiaraviglio, The Contribution of the State of Georgia to the Development of the Concept of Federalism. *Emory.*

Marcus H. Evans, Jr., The Negro, the Courts and Equal Protection of the Laws. *Duke.*

Robert K. Faulkner, The Constitutional Understanding of John Marshall. *Chicago.*

Lawrence E. Green, The Development of Military Due Process by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals. *Stanford.*

Richard C. C. Kim, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Supreme Court. *Oklahoma.*

George R. LaNoue, Church and State Compromises in Contemporary Education. *Yale.*

Brother E. Adrian Leonard, Mr. Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1947. *Notre Dame.*

Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law. *Wisconsin.*

Clifford M. Lytle, The Warren Court and Its Critics. *Pittsburgh.*

Leonard G. Miller, Double Jeopardy in the Federal System. *Chicago.*

Robert Mollan, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program—The Eisenhower Years. *Minnesota.*

John A. Morgan, Jr., The Concept of Congressional Intent in Decisions of the Warren Court. *Duke.*

Lawrence Parkus, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Appointments to the District and Circuit Courts. *Cornell.*

Denny E. Pilant, No Preferred Status: An Examination of the Supreme Court's "No Preference" Interpretation of the First Amendment. *Duke.*

Leon I. Salomon, The Solicitor General of the United States. *Columbia.*

Michael D. Shmidman, Judicial Definition and Determination of "Religion" and "Religious Activity"—A Case Study of Selected State Court Decisions, in the Past Decade. *Columbia.*

Donald F. Vance, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty: The Development of a Judicial Definition of Religion by the Supreme Court of the United States. *Indiana.*

Changes

John Quincy Adams, The Protection of Civil Rights in Texas. *Texas.*

Harry M. Clor, Justice Frankfurter and the Nature of Constitutional Government. *Chicago.*

Maria J. Falco, Accusatorial versus Inquisitorial

Methods of Judicial Procedure. *Bryn Mawr.*

Robert E. Newton, Conceptions of Judicial Self-Restraint in the Opinions of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter. *Catholic University.*

Eugene C. Price, Administrative Practices of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. *California* (Berkeley).

Otis H. Stephens, The Fourteenth Amendment and Confessions of Guilt: Role of the Supreme Court. *Johns Hopkins.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

James M. Banovetz, Governmental Cost Burdens and Service Benefits in Metropolitan Areas. *Minnesota.*

John Buechner, The Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1961–62 and Local Government: A Case Study. *Michigan.*

Carl P. Chelf, Politics and Education: A Case Study of Western Kentucky State College and Its First President. *Nebraska.*

Mary M. Conway, Constituency Influences and Legislative Voting Behavior in the Indiana General Assembly. *Indiana.*

Beverly B. Cook, Political Organization and Ideology in a Non-Partisan City: A Case Study of Claremont, California. *Claremont.*

Robert E. Doubleday, The Politics of the 1947 Constitutional Revision in New Jersey. *New York University.*

Alvin Dozeman, The Modern Role of the North Carolina Republican Party. *Duke.*

Donald C. Flesche, The Illinois School Problems Commission: Its Role in the State Decision Making Processes. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Arthur Galub, The Politics of Court Reform in New York State. *Columbia.*

Millard L. Gieske, The Politics of Knute Nelson, 1912–1920. *Minnesota.*

Leonard E. Goodall, The Response of Municipalities to State Regulation of Local Indebtedness: A Study in the Avoidance of State Law. *Illinois.*

Joah Gotwals, Study of the Decisions of the Urban Traffic and Transportation Board, 1953–55. *Pennsylvania.*

J. David Greenstone, Working Class Politics: The Organization, Tactics and Ideology of Labor's Committee on Political Education. *Chicago.*

George C. Littke, The Role of an Interim Committee in The State Legislative System: The New York Wiretap Committee. *New York University.*

Judson L. James, The Politics of Party Leadership: The Inter-relationships of Democratic State and County Party Organizations in New York State, 1955–1958. *Columbia.*

David T. Livingston, Factors Associated with Expenditure Patterns among Suburban Governments. *Pennsylvania.*

David W. McCoy, The Conflict in Purpose of Political Patronage. *Chicago.*

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Charles G. Mayo, The 1961 Mayoralty Election in Los Angeles: The Political Party in a Non-partisan Election. *Southern California.*

Alexander V. Prisley, A Study of the 1961–62 Rhode Island General Assembly. *Brown.*

Morley Segal, The Political Career of James Rolph, Jr., 1912–1933. *Claremont.*

Clarence Stone, Community Power Elite and the Role of the City Manager. *Duke.*

Tandy Tollerson III, Absentee Voting in Missouri, *Missouri.*

Joseph B. Tucker, A Functional Analysis of Political Patronage in Nine Illinois Counties. *Illinois.*

Thomas M. Watts, Indiana Primary Elections: The Selection of County Candidates and the Distribution of Power. *Indiana.*

T. Phillip Wolf, Comparative Party Organization: California 1962. *Stanford.*

Michael J. Zavacky, A Comparative Study of Structure and Processs in the Juvenile Court System of Pennsylvania. *Pittsburgh.*

Changes

Ronald C. Cease, The Alaska Borough System: Plan and Promise. *Claremont.*

Shirley Chapman, The Dynamics of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Reflected in Metropolitan Atlanta 1945–1960. *Emory.*

James B. Hobbs, The Impact of Selected Supreme Court Decisions in Kansas City, Missouri. *Missouri.*

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

David E. Haight, "Sharing of Functions" in Canadian Federalism. *Chicago.*

Gad Horowitz, Labour in Politics: The Case of Canada. *Harvard.*

Allan Kornberg, Some Differences in Role Perceptions between Ontario and Quebec Provincial Legislators. *Michigan.*

Walter L. White, The Treasury Board in Canada. *Michigan.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Additions

Maurice Apstein, The Role of the Government Laboratory in Defense. *American.*

John F. Aronne, Managing the Airspace: A Study of Air Traffic Control. *New York University.*

Aljit M. Banerjee, Recruitment and Training of All-India Central Service Personnel. *New York University.*

Ali-Reza Besharat, Political and Administrative Decentralization. *Southern California.*

Edward C. Bishop, Efficient Administration Through Delegation of Authority in a Federal Field Office. *New York University.*

William B. Boise, The Use of Formal Negative Sanctions in Securing Employee Conformity in a Public Bureaucracy. *Pennsylvania.*

Herbert S. Duncombe, Administrative Discretion in the Administration of Public Assistance. *Washington* (Seattle).

John P. Eberle, Scheduling, Control, and Reporting for Processing a Major Census. *American.*

Margaret Feiler, The Austrian Civil Service from 1933–1945: The Influence of Political and Constitutional Changes on the Structure of Bureaucracy. *New York University.*

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Chester G. Hall, Jr., The United States Civil Service Commission: An Arm of the President or of Congress? *American.*

W. Joseph Heffernan, Jr., Public Assistance as a Government Function: A Case Study of Professional and Official Attitudes. *North Carolina.*

Mel Huden, Factors Affecting the Mobility of Public Employees. *Southern California.*

Allen A. Hyman, Significant Aspects of the Growth and Potential of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO. *Pennsylvania.*

Walter Langway, Employment Security in Sweden. *New York University.*

Edward F. Marek, The Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York. *New York University.*

Alexandre M. Mattos, Standards and Patterns of Administrative Reorganization in the U. S. 1945–55. *Southern California.*

Joseph Mehr, The Implications of Quantitative Analysis to Administration and Management. *New York University.*

A. Warren Meixner, The Public Authority as a Governmental Technique in New Jersey: A Case Study of the Development and Operation of the N. J. Turnpike Authority and the N. J. Highway Authority. *New York University.*

Mohammad A. Niaz, Strategy of Change. *Southern California.*

Modestus W. Notoatmodjo, The Concept of Gotong Rojong in Modern Indonesia. *Indiana.*

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Donovan Perkins, Determination of Physicians' Attitudes Pertaining to Home Care Programs. *Southern California.*

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John W. Ramsey, Impact of the Bureau of the Budget on Policy Formation, 1946–49. *Missouri.*

Chung-Hyun Ro, A Comparative Analysis of Manpower Administration in Developing Countries. *New York University.*

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Leland Swanson, Real Time System for Law Enforcement in Los Angeles County. *Southern California.*

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Gilbert B. Siegal, The Central Executive Staff

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Additions

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Fuad S. Abu-Zayyad, The United Arab Republic—A Case Study in Arab Unity. *Fletcher School.*

Will Adams, Capital Punishment as an Instrument of Soviet Social Control. *Columbia.*

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Edward Baum, Foundations and Formulation of United States Foreign Policy towards Africa since World War II. *California* (Los Angeles).

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Pritam T. Merani, International Law Concerning Territorial Disputes with Emphasis on Post World War II Period. *Johns Hopkins.*

Kusma Lata Mittal, India's Attitude and Policy Towards the Problem of Human Rights in the United Nations. *Toronto.*

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Stephanie Neuman, Patterns of Elite Development in Indonesia. *New York University.*

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Ronald S. Pugsley, Congressional Critics of Foreign Aid: An Analysis of the Congressional Opposition to Foreign Economic Assistance, 1947–60. *Michigan.*

Mohy I. Quandhour, A Diplomatic Political History of the Caucasus, 1830–1864. *Claremont.*

Amir Rafat, Nationalization of the Private Property of Aliens in Recent International Law (Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Cuba). *Minnesota.*

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C. N. Satyapalan, Sino-Indian Relations 1954 to Present. *Pennsylvania.*

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Brent Scowcroft, Ideology and Foreign Aid: An Analysis of Congressional Reaction to the Foreign Aid Programs to Spain and Yugoslavia. *Columbia.*

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II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

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Eldon G. Bowman; A.B., Claremont, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Patrick Henry's Political Philosophy. *Claremont.*

George Carey; A.B., Northwestern, 1955; M.A., Illinois, 1958; Ph.D., Indiana, 1961. The Principle of Political Equality in Theories of Democratic Government. *Indiana.*

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Mary S. Power; A.B., Wells College, 1957; M.S., Stanford, 1960; Ph.D., Illinois, 1961. Vernon Louis Parrington and J. Allen Smith: An American Political Tradition. *Illinois.*

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Charles E. Schutz; A.M., Chicago, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Development and Significance of the Political Thought of Walter Lippmann. *Chicago.*

George A. Shanker; B.A., Northeastern, 1941; M.A., Colorado, 1947; Ph.D., New School, 1962. The Political Thought of Daniel Webster. *New School.*

John E. Tashjean; A.B., College of St. Thomas, 1951; M.A., Georgetown, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Franz Borkenau: A Study of His Social and Political Ideas. *Georgetown.*

Michael Walzer; B.A., Brandeis, 1956; Ph.D., Harvard, 1961. The Revolution of the Saints. *Harvard.*

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James E. Anderson; B.S., Southwest Texas State College, 1955; Ph.D., Texas, 1960. The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State: A Study of American Ideas on the Regulation of Economic Enterprise, 1885–1917. *Texas.*

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James W. Davis; B.A., Valley City State Teachers College, 1941; M.A., Minnesota, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Presidential Primary, 1928–1960. *Minnesota.*

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Harry S. Hall; A.B., Harvard, 1943; A.M., Chicago, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Congressional Attitudes toward Science and Scientists: A Study of Legislative Reactions to Atomic Energy and the Political Participation of Scientists. *Chicago.*

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Howard K. Hyde; A.M., Chicago, 1935; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Business Management in Defense. *Chicago.*

Erwin A. Jaffe; B.A., Rutgers, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Passage of the McCarran-Walter Act: The Reiteration of American Immigration Policy. *Rutgers.*

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Frank J. Kendrick; A.B., Grinnell College, 1950; A.M., Chicago, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. McCarthy and the Senate. *Chicago.*

Martin Lease; A.B., Indiana, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. William Howard Taft and the Powers of the President. *Indiana.*

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Harry J. Psomiades; A.B., Boston University, 1953; M.I.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Greek-Turkish Relations, 1923–30: A Study in the Politics of Rapprochement. *Columbia.*

Robert H. Puckett; A.B., DePauw University, 1957; A.M., Chicago, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. International Control and Limitation of Space Activities: The American National Interest. *Chicago.*

Young J. Rew; B.A., State College, Washington, 1956; M.A., George Washington, 1959; Ph.D., American, 1962. A Study of the Governor-General of Korea: 1919–1937. *American.*

George W. Rice; B.A., Ohio Wesleyan, 1951; M.A. Ohio State, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Soviet Position on Dependent Territories in the United Nations. *Ohio State.*

Raymond S. Rodgers; A.B., Sir Williams College, 1957; M.I.A., Columbia, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Facilitation Problems of International Associations. *Columbia.*

Gabriella E. Rosner; A.B., Vassar 1954; M.I.A., Columbia, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The United Nations Emergency Fund. *Columbia.*

John C. Satra; Jur. D., Charles University (Prague), 1948; Ph.D., Florida, 1961. The Fate of Jean Monnet's Concept of European Integration in the Light of Cross Pressures on the European Coal and Steel Community. *Florida.*

George Stambuk; University of Zagreb; M.A., Indiana, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1961. American Military Forces Abroad: A Postwar Pattern in International Relations. *Indiana.*

Leonard S. Stein; A.M., Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1962. Consistency of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy. *Chicago.*

Edward S. Su; LL.B., National Anwhei University, 1944; B.A., Fresno State, 1950; M.A., Illinois, 1951; M.S., *ibid.,* 1955; Ph.D., Fordham, 1962. Sino-Russian Relations in Sinkiang: A Comparison of International Relationships Outside and Inside the Communist System. *Fordham.*

Usha Roy Sud; A.B., University of Allahabad, 1947; M.A., *ibid.,* 1949; Ph.D., Michigan, 1962. The General Assembly and Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 1943–59. *Michigan.*

Hung Chao Tai; B.A., National Taiwan University, 1954; M.A., Illinois, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1961. United Nations Membership Problems. *Illinois.*

Brady Tyson; B.A., Rice Institute, 1949; B.D., Perkins School of Theology, 1949–1952; Ph.D., American, 1962. Herbert Butterfield's Concept of International Relations: An Analysis and Comparison of a Christian Approach. *American.*

William R. Vizzard, Jr.; B.S., San Francisco, 1949; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1961. Prisoner of War Policy in Relation to Changing Concepts of War. *California* (Berkeley).

Miner L. Weems; A.B., Washington, 1954; M.A., Georgetown, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1962. The Propaganda Struggle in the Middle East 1955–1958: A Comparative Study of the Role of Propaganda as a Legitimate Tool of Government in the Cold War. *Georgetown.*

Gordon L. Weil; A.B., Bowdoin, 1958; Ph.D., Columbia, 1962. The European Convention on Human Rights: Background, Development and Prospects. *Columbia.*

Ann R. Willner; B.A., Hunter College, 1945; M.A., Yale, 1946; Ph.D., Chicago, 1961. From Rice-Field to Factory: The Industrialization of a Rural Labor Force in Java. *Chicago.*

Andrez J. Wojcik; A.B., Georgetown, 1953; M.A., Columbia, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1961. Attitudes of Certain Western Public Communication Media toward the Polish Frontier Issues, 1939–40. *Columbia.*

Gregory B. Wolfe; A.B., Reed, 1943; A.M., Fletcher School, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1961. The Montevideo Conference of 1933; Reactions of the North and South American Press to the Foreign Policy of the U. S. *Fletcher School.*

Manaspas Xuto; B.A., Hons., Chulalongkorn, 1956; A.M., Fletcher School, 1957; M.A.L.D., *ibid.,* 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.,* 1961. United States Policy toward Formosa, 1850–1955. *Fletcher School.*

NEWS AND NOTES

With this number, Victor T. Le Vine of Washington University (St. Louis) becomes Acting Book Review Editor, *vice* Thomas H. Eliot, who resigned upon becoming Chancellor of Washington University. Professor Le Vine will act until Professor Austin Ranney is able to assume the post, in the spring of 1963.—MAN. ED.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The New York State Political Science Association held its sixteenth annual meeting April 13–14 on the campus of Union College, Schenectady, New York. The general theme of the conference was "The Political Implications of Nuclear Energy." Lt. Gen. F. W. Farrell, Director, New York State Civil Defense Commission, discussed "Civil Defense Problems" and Samuel S. Stratton, Representative from the 32d District, New York, spoke on "Our Nuclear Defense Policy." In addition, there were panel discussions on "Civil or Uncivil Defense" and "Arms Control—The International Issues."

President William R. Willoughby chaired the business meeting of the conference, which elected the following new officers: Channing B. Richardson, Hamilton, president; Herbert Rosenbaum, Hofstra, vice-president; James A. Riedel, Union College, secretary-treasurer; and members of the executive council, Sterling Spero, New York University; Carolyn Landau, Duchess Community College; Seldon Kruger, Agricultural and Technical Institute, Delhi, State University of New York.

The 1962 annual meeting of the Iowa Conference of political scientists was held at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, on April 7, 1962. The sessions were directed mainly at the study of Iowa political parties and elections. The principal address was given by Louis Harris, president of Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., New York City, who spoke on: "Some Observations on the Contribution of Political Party Organization in American Politics." John R. Schmidhauser, associate professor of political science at the State University of Iowa, was elected president of the conference for 1962–63.

The Northern California political science association held its fourteenth annual meeting at the University of San Francisco on April 28. Panels discussed "The Role of the Electorate in Governmental Policy-Making" and "Approaches to Foreign Policy." Dean Leo A. Huard, University of Santa Clara Law School, addressed the meeting on the topic "Law and Order on the Space Frontier." The Presidential Citation Award for teaching, service to the profession, community service and research was given to Dean R. Cresap of San Jose State College. Officers elected for 1962–63 were: president, John H. Bunzel, Stanford University; vice-president, Paul R. Murray, Sacramento State College; secretary-treasurer, John M. M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. The following were elected to the council: Paul F. Ashby, San Francisco State College; Donald W. Brandon, University of San Francisco; Benjamin G. Franklin, Chico State College; Jack F. Leach, Monterey Peninsula College; Eugene C. Lee, University of California; Cheryl J. Petersen, Sonoma State College; and William W. Young, Fresno State College.

The new officers of the New England Political Science Association are: Sigmund Neumann, Wesleyan, president; Merle Fainsod, Harvard, vice-president; together with Ruth Schachter Morgenthau (BU African Studies), Elmer Cornwell (Brown) and Robert Dishman (New Hampshire) as members of the executive committee.

The Midwest conference of political scientists held its twentieth annual meeting April 26 to 28 at the University of Notre Dame. General sessions of the conference were addressed by Professor Leo Strauss on the functions of political theory and by president Charles S. Hyneman of the American Political Science Association on "Policing the Democratic Process."

Panel sessions featured papers and discussions on the following topics: "The Scope of Comparative Analysis," "The Role of the Suburbs in the Metropolis," "The Political Act as an Act of Will," "Foreign Policy and the Stationing of Military Forces Abroad," "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," "Mass Parties and National Integration in Africa," "Measuring Legislative Malapportionment," "The 'Unconscious' Political Implications of Institutional Procedures in Administration," "Judicial Attitudes in the

Labor Relations Decisions of the Warren Court," "Albert Camus as a Political Philosopher," "Social Change and Election Politics in Israel," "The Role of the Judiciary in State Political Systems," "Foreign-Aid Programs and Parties: Problems for 1962," and "Constituency Influence in Congress."

President Richard C. Spencer chaired the business meeting of the conference, which elected the following new officers: E. Allen Helms, Ohio State University, president; Richard G. Browne, Illinois State Normal University, vice-president, and as members of the executive council, Louis C. Kesselman, University of Louisville and G. Theodore Mitau, Macalester College. Phillip Monypenny of the University of Illinois will be the new editor of the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. Harry R. Davis of Beloit College was re-elected as secretary-treasurer.

The 1963 meeting will be held at the University of Chicago on April 25 to 27. The program chairman is Leon Epstein, University of Wisconsin.

The next annual meeting of the Conference on the History of Western America will be held at the Albany Hotel, Denver, Colorado, October 11–13, 1962, with the University of Denver as the host institution. Robert G. Athearn of the University of Colorado, is the program chairman and Allen D. Breck, of the University of Denver, is in charge of local arrangements. Papers will represent disciplines in social sciences, the humanities, and the sciences. A preliminary program will be available.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Social Science Research Council's annual announcement describing fellowships and grants to be awarded in 1962–63 will be ready for distribution in early September. It will list the following programs which are to be continued without major changes: Research Training Fellowships, predoctoral and postdoctoral; Faculty Research Fellowships; Grants-in-Aid of Research; Fellowships in Political Theory and Legal Philosophy; Grants for Research on American Governmental and Legal Processes.

International Conference Travel Grants will again be offered to American social scientists for travel to certain meetings outside North America.

Under joint sponsorship with the American Council of Learned Societies, grants will be offered to mature scholars for research in the social sciences and humanities on certain foreign areas. Grants for research on Africa South of the Sahara, on Latin America, and on the Near and Middle East (including North Africa) will be administered by the Social Science Research Council; while those for Asian Studies and for Slavic and East European Studies will be administered by the American Council of Learned Societies, to which correspondence relating to the latter programs should be directed.

Inquiries and requests for the detailed announcement when issued may be addressed to the Social Science Research Council, Fellowships and Grants, 230 Park Avenue, New York 17, New York.

Applications for some categories of awards will be due not later than November 1.

An Inter-university Consortium for Political Research has been created by a group of cooperating universities and the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan to promote graduate research training and to facilitate basic research on politics. The Consortium was formally established during a two-day conference at Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 1 and 2. Representatives from some twenty departments of political science met with members of the staff of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan and agreed upon a tentative mode of organization and a set of operating principles to guide the new organization during its first years of operation.

The Consortium represents an innovation in academic organization in the social sciences. Although it was not modelled on existing natural science counterparts, it shares with them the feature of being an association of institutions organized for cooperation around the more or less unique facilities of a research organization. The ultimate objective of the ICPR is to stimulate basic research on problems of politics and government. Advanced training in social science research methodology and in the methods and techniques of political analysis will be formally organized for faculty members as well as advanced graduate students from the participating schools. Research conferences devoted to the consideration of new problems in theory construction and data collection and interpretation in such areas as legislative behavior, judicial behavior and the historical analysis of aggregative data will be developed for participating faculty members.

Both the research and the training aspects of ICPR activity will be developed initially around the facilities of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. One of the important goals of the organization is to increase access to the archival and instructional facilities of the Center and to enable the profession to make more efficient use of the data repository created at SRC through its research program in political behavior. The research materials already collected by SRC, including not only the data from six national election surveys but also election statistics, census materials and congressional roll call records, will be augmented by new data collections undertaken by Consortium participants and by the addition of other collections of data already in existence elsewhere.

The ICPR staff will also undertake to provide a clearing house facility for the individual participants. Communications among American researchers sharing common research interests and with foreign research scholars and their institutions abroad will be improved through a newsletter and other forms of current research reports. As with the research conferences, the clearing house activities will attempt to speed up the dissemination of new ideas and information among interested scholars, reduce inadvertent duplication of efforts and facilitate the pooling of intellectual resources committed to research in political science.

Each of the participating schools will be represented at an annual meeting of the Committee of Representatives. A five-man Council will be responsible for overseeing Consortium activities throughout the year. At the June meeting the Committee of Representatives elected James Prothro, University of North Carolina, as its chairman; the other four Council members, elected at the same time, are: David Easton, University of Chicago; Robert Lane, Yale University; Austin Ranney, University of Illinois; and William Riker, University of Rochester. The Consortium staff is headed by Warren E. Miller, Survey Research Center, as Executive Director and includes two other SRC staff members, Donald Stokes and Philip Converse, as Associate Directors. Membership in the ICPR is limited to the institutional participation of institutions of higher education; special provision for participation by persons not affiliated with a member institution may be made by the Council upon request by the individual. The current list of member institutions is Cornell University, The University of Chicago, University of Florida, Georgetown University, University of Illinois, State University of Iowa, The University of Kansas, The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Minnesota, The University of North Carolina, Northwestern University, University of Oregon, Princeton University, The University of Rochester, University of California at Los Angeles, Vanderbilt University, Washington University, Wayne State University, The University of Wisconsin, and Yale University. Inquiries concerning membership or individual participation should be addressed to Warren E Miller, Executive Director, ICPR, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The United States Department of State and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University are publishing jointly *A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1920–9145*.

This Catalog, consisting of three volumes, will list for the period 1920 to 1945 all files from the political archives of the German Foreign Ministry that were seized by the American and British armies at the end of World War II. It will continue and complete the work of the *Catalog of German Foreign Ministry Files and Microfilms, 1867–1920* which was published by the American Historical Association in 1959.

The Catalog will include the title, number, and date of all files contained in the archives, and the corresponding serial and frame numbers of those files that were microfilmed. It was compiled and prepared for printing by Dr. George O. Kent of the Historical Office of the Department of State, and its publication and distribution will be financed by the Hoover Institution. Volume I is scheduled to be published in the summer of 1962. The remaining volumes are scheduled to appear, respectively, late in 1962 and in 1963.

A major accomplishment in the flow of foreign scholarly and cultural publications to American libraries was hailed in the Library of Congress last May 23, with an informal meeting signalizing the first receipt of some 200,000 items that have been purchased since January in India, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic, with the U. S.-owned foreign currencies under the new Library of Congress Public Law 480 program. Congressman John D. Dingell of Michigan sponsored the amendment, P. L. 85-931, that authorized this trade of food for thought, in aid of the acquisition of foreign publications for selected American research centers.

The Max Weber Centennial Commission has been established in order to mark the year 1964 as the one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the German social scientist by focusing attention on Weber's impact on the social sciences.

The Commission is designed to coordinate the efforts of cooperating institutions of higher learning and academic organizations by arranging visiting professorships, exchange lectureships, seminars, and institutes. It is intended that special attention will be given to social science problems in the areas of Weber's interests. The activities of the Commission will culminate in a symposium scheduled for April, 1964, in Kansas City.

Preliminary planning has been made possible by a grant from the Kansas City Association of Trusts and Foundations. Members of the steering committee are Jeptha Carrell, Community Studies, Inc.; Robert W. Habenstein, University of Missouri; Jerzy Hauptmann, Park College; Francis Heller, University of Kansas; Berndt Kolker, University of Kansas City; Warren A. Peterson, Community Studies, Inc.; Wayne Wheeler, University of Chicago. Hauptmann and Wheeler serve as co-chairmen. The Commission's headquarters are located at 716 Railway Exchange Building, 706 Grand Avenue, Kansas City 6, Missouri.

Charles S. Ascher of Brooklyn College, during a summer of international meetings, chaired sessions of the conference of non-governmental organizations, of which he is president, in Geneva; of the section on administrative law of the congress of comparative law in Hamburg; and of the section on legal and economic problems at the international congress on housing and planning in Paris.

Douglas E. Ashford will be visiting at the school for advanced international studies, Johns Hopkins University (Washington, D. C.), for the academic year 1962–63.

John W. Baker, chairman and professor, department of political science, College of Wooster, is on research leave for the 1962–63 school year. He will be a research associate at the University of California, Berkeley and will spend part of the spring semester in Nigeria and Ghana.

During 1962–63, **Zbigniew Brzezinski** will be on research leave from Columbia, having received a Guggenheim grant.

Violet Butler has been appointed part-time temporary instructor for the academic year 1962–63 at Kent State University.

George E. G. Catlin has been elected as Miembro de Honor, Instituto de Estudios Politicos, Spain.

Carl Q. Christol, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Southern California, has been granted a year's leave of absence for the academic year 1962–63. During the year he will hold the Chair of International Law at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

James B. Christoph, Ohio State University, is in Britain for the 1962–63 academic year to study British politics on a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

Arch T. Dotson, associate professor of government at Cornell University, has been given a leave of absence to serve as director of the Ford Foundation Project to develop a city plan for Calcutta.

Eleanor Dulles is joining the department of political science, Duke University, as a visiting professor for the fall semester, 1962.

Raymond English, professor and chairman of the political science department, Kenyon College, will be on sabbatical leave, 1962–63. He has received a Lilly Fellowship from the Hazen foundation for research during his leave of absence.

William T. R. Fox will be on research leave from Columbia during 1962–63.

William R. Gable of the institute of public administration and the department of political science of the University of Michigan is chief of party of an American contract team to assist in the establishment of an institute of public and business administration in Taiwan. The institute is being established by the Chinese government under contract with AID and the University of Michigan. Professor Gable will be in Taiwan for 18 months.

Elliot R. Goodman, associate professor, Brown University, has received a Guggenheim fellowship and a NATO research fellowship, and will be on a year's leave in Paris. Mr. Goodman's replacement for this coming academic year will be visiting associate professor **Leonard Rowe**, who comes from Harvard.

John Groom, assistant professor of political science, will serve on the staff of the University of Redlands in Europe at Salzburg, Austria, for the year 1962–63.

Bertram M. Gross has been on leave during 1961–62 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. His leave has been extended to allow him to accept an appointment for the remainder of 1962 as Leatherbee lecturer on management at the Harvard graduate school of business administration.

John H. Herz, of the College of the City of New York, will serve as Visiting Lecturer on International Politics at the Fletcher School during the fall term of 1962–63.

Robert H. Huckshorn, assistant professor at the University of Idaho, is on leave as the 1962–63 Republican national committee faculty fellow. This award is co-sponsored by the National Center for Education in Politics.

Samuel P. Huntington, of Columbia University, will be on research leave during 1962–63, occupying the Ford research professorship during the autumn term and serving as research associate in the institute of war and peace studies during the spring.

EDWARD G. JANOSIK, University of Pennsylvania, has received grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council for a study of factionalism in the relationships between constituency Labour parties and national Labor Party organs. He will be on sabbatical leave 1962–63.

PAUL KECSKEMETI has been appointed a Senior Fellow of the research institute on Communist affairs of Columbia University for the academic year 1962–63. He will also serve as a visiting professor in the department of public law and government of Columbia University.

WILLMOORE KENDALL has been appointed visiting professor of government at Los Angeles State College for the 1962–63 academic year.

HANS KOHN has joined the University of Denver faculty in September as a visiting professor of international relations.

MORTON KROLL of the University of Washington will be on leave next year to serve under a Smith-Mundt award as visiting professor of political science at the University College of the University of British West Indies.

WERNER LEVI, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, will serve as visiting professor during 1962–63 at the University of Hawaii, where he will assist in the development of an international relations center.

WARNER E. MILLS, JR., associate professor of government at Beloit College, is on sabbatical leave during 1962–63 for study and research into political behavior in small cities.

O. WILLIAM PERLMUTTER, American Academic adviser of the institute of European studies, will serve as visiting professor of political science during 1962–63 at the University of Minnesota.

FRED W. RIGGS, professor of government at Indiana University, has accepted a scholarship in the institute of advanced projects at the East–West Center in the University of Hawaii for the academic year 1962–63, where he will work with several Asian scholars from southeast Asia on comparative studies of public administration in developing countries.

JOHN P. ROCHE, Morris Hillquit professor of labor and social thought, Brandeis University, will spend the year 1962–63 as visiting professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

CHARLES P. SCHLEICHER of the University of Oregon has received a Fulbright grant for 1962–63, and will do research and teach at Delhi University, India.

DEAN CATHERYN SECKLER-HUDSON of the school of government and public administration of the American University received the honorary degree of LHD from Ohio Wesleyan University on June 3, 1962. June of 1960, she received an LLD from Gettysburg College.

MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, will serve as visiting professor during 1962–63 at Cornell University.

JOHN SPANIER was visiting professor of government at the University of Texas during the 1962 spring semester. He will be visiting professor of political science at Haverford College for the 1962–63 academic year.

JOHN G. STOESSINGER of Hunter College will serve again in 1962–63 as visiting associate professor of international relations at Columbia.

HIRAM M. STOUT of Duke University served as visiting professor in the department of political science for the spring semester, 1962.

WILLIAM L. STRAUSS, associate professor of political science, Arizona State College, has been appointed as a Fulbright lecturer at Seoul National University in Seoul, Korea for the academic year 1962–63.

HOWARD J. TAUBERFELD has received the appointment of Carnegie visiting research scholar for 1962–63 and will be on leave from the school of law, Southern Methodist University for that full year. His office will be at the Carnegie Endowment, U.N. Plaza at 46th Street, New York City.

THOMAS L. THORSON, assistant professor, has received the Kiekhofer award for outstanding teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He will be on leave 1962-63 on a Guggenheim fellowship.

HANS B. THORELLI, University of Chicago, will be a visiting professor of business administration, international center for the advancement of management education, Stanford University, fall, 1962.

DAVID B. TRUMAN will be abroad on sabbatical leave during the winter term of 1962–63. Herbert A. Deane will serve as acting chairman of the department of public law and government, Columbia University.

PIO ULIASSI has been appointed a senior fellow of the research institute on Communist affairs of

Columbia University for the academic year 1962–63.

H. Odell Waldby, professor of government at Florida State University, is technical advisor to an American contract team to assist in the establishment of an Institute of Public and Business Administration in Taiwan.

Clinton Ivan Winslow of the department of political science at Goucher College has been named professor emeritus as of September, 1962. Dr. Winslow has served in the department since 1923, and as its chairman for 32 years.

Pamela Wrinch, who has been working on a research project at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, has accepted the position of visiting assistant professor in the political science department, West Viriginia University, 1962–63.

I. William Zartman of the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina has been granted a leave of absence for the year 1962–63 to accept a Rockefeller Foundation research grant for travel and research in West Africa.

Aristide R. Zolberg, assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin, is directing the training program for Peace Corps members going to the Ivory Coast.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Henry J. Abraham has been promoted to the rank of full professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Alan Altshuler, formerly of the University of Chicago, has been appointed an assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

Jvan Avakumovic has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science and international relations at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada.

Hans H. Baerwald, formerly of Miami University, Ohio, has been appointed lecturer in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Richard C. Baker of Southern Illinois University, Alton Center, has been appointed as chairman of the department of political science of Rockford College, effective September, 1962.

Sidney Baldwin, assistant director of the Inter-University Case Program, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Baruch School of Business and Public Administration of the City College of the City University of New York.

Carl Beck has been promoted to the rank of associate professor, department of political science, University of Pittsburgh.

Daniel M. Berman, formerly of Washington College, has been appointed associate professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

Joseph L. Bernd has been promoted to associate professor at Southern Methodist University.

Jerome J. Bolner, who obtained his Ph.D. in June, 1962 at University of Virginia, has been appointed assistant professor of political science, University of Alabama.

Franklyn G. Bonn, Jr., receiving his Ph.D. at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed an assistant professor at University of Wisconsin for 1962–63.

Bernard C. Borning, chairman of political science at the University of Idaho, has been promoted to professor.

Eldon Bowman has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the College of Wooster.

Donald Brandon has been promoted to associate professor in the department of political science at the University of San Francisco.

Edward H. Buehrig, chairman of the Ford Foundation Grant Committee, has been promoted to university professor at Indiana University, department of government.

Ronald F. Bunn, Texas, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

Frederic S. Burin, II, formerly of the Department of State, has been appointed associate professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

Lawrence H. Chamberlain assumed the duties of vice president of Columbia University on April 1, 1962.

Warner O. Chapman, director of departmental undergraduate program, has been promoted to associate professor at Indiana University, department of government.

Patrick J. Conklin, of the University of Tulsa, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri.

Jerome I. Cooperman, formerly of Rutgers University, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at Goucher College.

Richard W. Cottam, department of political science, University of Pittsburgh, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Ralph Crow, American University of Beirut, has been appointed visiting associate professor at Indiana University, department of government.

Alexander Dallin has been named director of the Russian institute at Columbia.

John A. Davis has been promoted to professor of political science at the City College of the City University of New York.

Vera Micheles Dean has been named professor of international development at New York University's Graduate School of Public Administration.

Guy H. Dodge is retiring from the chairmanship of the department of political science, Brown University, after having served for twelve years. He will continue in the department as a professor of political science. His successor, as of July 1, will be **Elmer E. Cornwell**.

H. Sydney Duncombe has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Idaho.

Chester B. Earle has been promoted to the rank of professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

William Ebenstein, from Princeton has resigned to accept a position as professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Jack D. Edwards, formerly of the University of Nevada, has been appointed assistant professor at the College of William and Mary.

Rowland A. Egger, chairman of the departments of political science and foreign affairs, has been named Edward R. Stettinius professor of foreign affairs, University of Virginia.

E. U. Essien-Udom, who will teach the African course—Contemporary Africa and Its Background—at Brown University, comes from Harvard.

Blair Ewing of the University of Chicago has become instructor in political science at Harpur College.

James Farganis, presently a graduate student at Cornell University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Harpur College.

Leonard J. Fein, who completed his doctoral work this year at Michigan State University, has been appointed assistant professor in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Werner J. Feld has resigned from North Georgia College to become assistant professor of political science at Moorhead State College, Moorhead, Minn.

Alfred P. Fernbach has been promoted to professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia. During 1961–62, Mr. Fernbach has held a Fulbright appointment in India.

Walter O. Filley has been promoted to the rank of professor at Harpur College.

Donald C. Flesche of Washington University has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Kalamazoo College, Michigan.

Harry J. Friedman has been appointed associate professor in the department of government and the East-West Center, University of Hawaii.

Murray Frost, formerly of Michigan State University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

George B. Galloway, senior specialist in American Government at the Library of Congress, has been appointed executive secretary of the United States Group of the Interparliamentary Union. In this capacity he attended the spring meeting of the IPU in Rome, Italy, April 23–29.

Charles E. Gilbert has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Swarthmore College.

Ralph M. Goldman has accepted appointment as professor of government at San Francisco State College.

Charles H. Goodman, professor of the school of government and public administration at the American University, has been appointed assistant dean of the school.

CULLEN B. GOSNELL retired as a professor of political science at Emory University at the end of the spring quarter after thirty-seven years of teaching at the University. He was the first chairman of the department and one of the original organizers of the Southern Political Science Association.

CHARLES J. GRAHAM, professor of political science, Wisconsin State College (River Falls), has been named chairman of the department of social sciences. He was on leave a year and a half while serving as legislative assistant to Senator William Proxmire in Washington.

SVEN GROENNINGS, Stanford, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

J. V. GROVES has been appointed associate professor at West Virginia Wesleyan College.

WILLIAM ROBERT GUMP has been appointed instructor in government at Miami University, Ohio.

LOUIS K. HARRIS has been promoted to full professor, Kent State University.

HORACE V. HARRISON, associate professor, has been appointed director of graduate studies of the department of government and politics, University of Maryland. He is on sabbatical leave in the fall, 1962, to prepare a study on "United States-Latin American Relations."

LAWRENCE J. R. HERSON has been appointed professor and chairman of the department of political science at The Ohio State University.

LOUIS HENKIN of the Pennsylvania Law School will join Columbia in 1962–63 with a joint assignment as professor of law and professor of international law and diplomacy.

DUANE W. HILL, Montana State College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at University of Wyoming.

DONALD HINDLEY, previously at the school of international affairs, Australian National University, Canberra, has been appointed assistant professor of politics at Brandeis University.

WILLIAM H. HUNT has been appointed instructor of political science at Wabash College for 1962–63.

J. WOODFORD HOWARD is joining the department of political science, Duke University, as assistant professor. He was formerly at Lafayette College and last year was a fellow at the Harvard Law School.

CARROLL P. Hurd, University of Wyoming, has resigned in order to become president of Sheridan Community College, September, 1962.

WILLIAM P. IRWIN has been appointed professor and chairman of the department of political science at Western Reserve University. He was with NCEP and earlier, associate professor of political science at Colorado State University.

HERBERT JACOB of Tulane University has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin for 1962–63.

DAN N. JACOBS has been promoted to associate professor of government at Miami University, Ohio.

WALTER D. JACOBS has been appointed assistant professor in government and politics at the University of Maryland; he formerly held an appointment in the University of Maryland overseas program.

ROBERT BENESON JANES, who has been a graduate student in department of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, has been appointed instructor in political science at Birmingham-Southern College.

CECIL E. JOHNSON of Southern Methodist University has been promoted to associate professor.

RAYMOND H. KAARET, chairman of the department of political science at Rockford College, has resigned to accept an appointment as chairman of the department of political science at Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York.

HAROLD KAPLAN, who served as lecturer in government at Columbia during the past year has accepted a post at York University, Toronto, Canada.

BERNARD W. KLEIN was appointed supervisor of the Lansing Office of the Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan.

EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ of the legislative reference staff at the Library of Congress has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Virginia.

RICHARD J. KOZICKI has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

FRED KRINSKY, formerly of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, has accepted a position as an associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Southern California.

Louis E. Lambert, assistant chairman of government, has been promoted to associate professor, Indiana University.

Oliver M. Lee resigned his instructorship in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland to accept an appointment with the Library of Congress.

J. Gus Liebenow, associate professor, has been named chairman of the African studies program at Indiana University, department of government.

John W. Lewis has been appointed assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

Orma Linford of the University of Wisconsin has been appointed instructor in government at Beloit College.

Robert D. Loevy, formerly of the Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science and associate director of the Field Politics Center at Goucher College.

John Lovell, Wisconsin, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

C. Peter Magrath, instructor, has been promoted to an assistant professor at Brown University.

Charles E. Martin of the University of Washington retired in June, 1962 after having served the department since 1924. He has accepted appointment as professor of American studies at the University of the Philippines.

Charles McCall, Yale, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

Carl A. McCandless, professor of political science, Washington University, St. Louis, has been appointed chairman of the department.

Theodore McNelly has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Martin Meadows, formerly of the University of Maryland, has been appointed assistant professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

Edward N. Megay, formerly of the College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

William E. Melvin has been appointed public administration advisor (personnel) by the Agency for International Development, Quito, Ecuador. His former position was in the Office of Personnel, AID, Washington, D. C.

Charles A. Micaud, who has been professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, has been appointed professor of international relations at the University of Denver.

Frank Miller, formerly an instructor at Ohio State University, has been appointed as assistant professor of political science at the College of Wooster.

Arthur J. Misner has been promoted to professor of government, Los Angeles State College.

Emmet V. Mittlebeeler has been promoted to the rank of professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University. He has received a Fulbright award to lecture in political science at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the academic year 1962–63.

John A. Morgan is joining the department of political science, Duke University, as instructor for the 1962–63 academic year. He is formerly of Southwestern Louisiana University.

Steven Muller has been promoted to associate professor of government and appointed director of Cornell's center for international studies.

Donald C. Mundinger has been appointed assistant dean of the college of arts and sciences of Valparaiso University, Indiana.

Joseph S. Murphy has been promoted to assistant professor of politics at Brandeis University.

William T. Nichols, who obtained his Ph.D. in foreign affairs in June, 1962 at the University of Virginia has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Georgia.

Lawrence E. Noble, Jr., of Centre College has been appointed to an associate professorship in political science at the University of Mississippi.

Dale W. Olsen has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, as of March 15, 1962.

Edwin E. Olson, a Ph.D. candidate at American University, has accepted a position as instructor in the department of political science at the University of Southern California.

Robert Osborn, Columbia, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

Arthur M. Osteen, previously in Pakistan at the Academy for Village Development on a Fellowship from Syracuse University's Afro-Asian Program, has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina.

Charles Edwin Patterson, Jr., who completed his Ph.D. work at the University of Illinois in August, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Lehigh University.

George A. Peek, Jr. of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of professor.

J. Roland Pennock has been appointed to the newly created Richter professorship of political science at Swarthmore College. He will be on leave during the first semester of 1962–63.

Dwynal B. Pettengill has been appointed assistant professor at the College of William and Mary.

John N. Plank, assistant professor of government at Harvard, has been appointed to a new post of Latin American Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Nathaniel S. Preston, formerly of Trinity College, has been appointed assistant professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University. He will serve as coordinator of the school's Washington Semester Program.

Hugh Douglas Price will leave Columbia to become associate professor at Syracuse University.

Jeffry L. Radell, recently appointed associate professor in the department of political science at Niagara University, has been named director of its Soviet and East European Institute.

Austin Ranney has accepted an appointment as a professor at the University of Wisconsin, effective February, 1963.

David O. Rankin, completing his doctoral studies at the University of Idaho, has been appointed instructor of political science at Cornell College, Iowa.

A. M. Rich, completing his doctoral studies at the University of Idaho, has accepted the position of assistant director, bureau of municipal research and service, Portland, Oregon.

Benjamin Rivlin has been promoted to full professor at Brooklyn College.

William H. Roberts, the Catholic University of America, has been appointed director of editorial planning and a member of the executive staff of the New Catholic Encyclopedia.

Cyril B. Roseman has been appointed instructor in political science at Swarthmore College, 1962–63.

Joseph A. Rothschild has been promoted to associate professor at Columbia University.

Thomas A. Rusch has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

John S. Saloma III, Harvard University and Congressional Fellow (1961–62), has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Leon I. Salomon, a doctoral candidate at Columbia and lately a lecturer at Brooklyn College, has been appointed instructor in government in Trinity College, Hartford.

Allan F. Saunders, dean of the college of arts and sciences, has been designated senior professor of government at the University of Hawaii.

Howard A. Scarrow has been appointed associate professor of political science at the State University of New York, Long Island Center.

Lawrence Scheinman was appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

Warner R. Schilling has been promoted to associate professor at Columbia University.

Thomas M. Scott of Northwestern University has been appointed instructor in the department of political science of the University of Minnesota, in the field of metropolitan government.

Otis H. Shao of Moravian College has been appointed associate professor of political science at Florida Presbyterian College.

Marshall D. Shulman, associate director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and formerly Special Assistant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, has been appointed professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, offering courses in the fields of international politics and Soviet diplomacy.

Robert H. Simmons, formerly of New Mexico Highlands University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

Robert Sittig has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

David A. Smeltzer was appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

David G. Smith has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

Richard G. Smolka has been appointed assistant professor in the school of government and public administration of the American University.

Peter G. Snow, Thomas Jefferson Foundation Fellow in political science at the University of Virginia, has been appointed to the staff of the department of political science at the University of Iowa.

Margaret Soderberg of Washington University has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois.

Richard F. Staar was promoted from an associate professor to a full professor to begin with the fall quarter, 1962.

Albert L. Sturm, formerly of West Virginia University, was a visiting member of the Institute of public administration at the University of Michigan during the second semester. He has become director of the institute of governmental research and professor of government at Florida State University.

Joseph L. Sutton, chairman of the Asian studies committee, has been promoted to professor at Indiana University, department of government.

E. Harold Swayze of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

Norman C. Thomas of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to assistant professor.

Samuel F. Thomas has been promoted to professor of political science at the Baruch School of business and public administration of the City College of the City University of New York.

R. J. Tresolini professor of political science at Lehigh University has been named head of a newly created department of government.

Gordon Tullock, formerly of the department of international studies of the University of South Carolina, has accepted an associate professorship in the department of economics at the University of Virginia. He remains a research associate of the institute of international studies at the University of South Carolina.

Wayne Untereiner has been appointed associate professor at Indiana University, department of government.

Donald Urquidi, formerly of Michigan State University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

Herbert Waltzer has been promoted to associate professor of government at Miami University, Ohio.

Morris Watnick has been appointed associate professor of politics at Brandeis University.

Thomas Watts, Indiana University, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

Richard S. Wheeler, assistant professor of political science at Duke University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Gary Wilhelm, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Illinois, has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at the Ohio State University.

Larman C. Wilson has been appointed instructor in government and politics at the University of Maryland in the fall, 1962.

John P. White of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

James H. Wolfe of the University of Maryland has accepted a position as assistant professor in the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina.

David O. Wurfel, of International Christian University in Tokyo, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri effective September, 1962.

W. Ross Yates, associate professor of political science at Lehigh University, has been named associate dean of the college of arts and sciences.

IN MEMORIAM

Morris Bryan Lambie, who was professor of government and director of the bureau of municipal administration at Harvard University, 1935–54, and professor of political science, director of the Municipal Reference Bureau, and executive secretary of the League of Minnesota Municipalities, at the University of Minnesota, 1921–35, died on March 23, 1962, in Jordan, where he was teaching public administration at Bir Zeit University under a combined Department of State and Ford Foundation grant. After his retirement from the faculty of Harvard University, Professor Lambie had taught at Tufts University, Boston University, and Boston College. Among many public activities, he served as chairman of the advisory council of the Massachusetts Division of Employment Security and consultant to the Greater Boston Economic Study Commission.

Harold Zink, professor of political science at Ohio State University, died June 19, 1962, of a heart failure after several weeks of trying illness.

Prior to joining the faculty at Ohio State, Professor Zink was chairman of the department at DePauw University. He lectured at European and Asian universities and frequently contributed to the academic journals. He was the author of more than a dozen books, including *American Military Government* (1947), and *The United States and Germany* (1957).

During World War II, he was assigned to SHAEF, first in London and then in France, as a staff officer. He was American editor of the Handbook for Military Government in Germany and a consultant to the Allied Control Council on the reorganization of the German Government.

Professor Zink made many contributions to the literature of political science; and his book on city bosses is widely regarded as a classic in its field. During his later years he devoted himself to the study of comparative government, especially of British institutions in their domestic and overseas settings. He brought to that subject a keen concern for governmental changes and evolution: a concern that made him a "field researcher" and constant world traveller, bringing to his classroom and his books the most up-to-date knowledge of the world's governments. He also directed a research project on local government in Sweden, Italy and India, sponsored by UNESCO, from 1954 through 1957.

He was active in the formation of the Midwest Conference, and a regular participant in the programs of the American and the International Political Science Associations.—Lawrence J. R. Herson

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

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

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

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